



EXECUTIVE SERIES
COMMAND AND CONTROL

ADDP 00.1



AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE DOCTRINE PUBLICATION

Edition 2



EXECUTIVE SERIES

ADDP 00.1

COMMAND AND CONTROL

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M. D. Binskin, AC
Air Chief Marshal
Chief of the Defence Force

Department of Defence
CANBERRA ACT 2600
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PREFACE

1. Military doctrine describes fundamental principles that guide actions by armed forces to achieve their objectives. While authoritative, doctrine requires judgement in application.
2. Following from the broad definition of doctrine, joint doctrine describes principles that guide the employment and operational effectiveness of a joint force. Joint doctrine publications are designed to concisely describe these principles, and so promote coordinated actions in support of missions and the commander's intent.
3. Australian Defence Doctrine Publications (ADDPs) and Australian Defence Force Publications (ADFPs) are authorised joint doctrine for the guidance of ADF operations. ADDPs are pitched at the philosophical and application level, and ADFPs are pitched at the procedural level.
4. The content of this publication has been derived from general principles and doctrine contained in other relevant joint and single-service publications, Defence manuals and allied publications and agreements. Every opportunity should be taken by users of this publication to examine its contents for applicability and currency. If deficiencies or errors are found, amendments must be made. The Joint Doctrine Directorate invites assistance from you, the reader, to improve this publication.
5. **Aim.** The aim of ADDP 00.1—*Command and Control* is to provide guidance about command and control of joint and multinational operations. This publication assists strategic and operational planning, and contributes to ADF education and training.
6. **Level.** This publication is for use by commanders, their staff and other personnel at the strategic and operational levels.
7. **Scope.** This publication provides philosophical and application level doctrine on command and control in the Australian Defence Force (ADF). It describes the nature and extent of types and states of command used from the strategic to the tactical levels.
8. ADDP 00.1, edition 2 contains a number of changes from edition 1 the significant changes are as follows:
 - a. An updated history of the evolution of ADF command and control arrangements has been included (Chapter 1).
 - b. Discussion of mission command and personal command philosophy has been expanded and included in its own chapter (Chapters 2 and 3).
 - c. Chapters addressing command of the ADF and states of command have been updated and, where necessary, the details of each of the states of command have been clarified (Chapters 4 and 5).
 - d. Inclusion of command arrangements used in multinational operations (Chapter 7).
9. ADDP 00.1—*Command and Control* needs to be viewed within the total context of military activities. To this end, additional recommended reading is:

- a. ADDP-D—[Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine](#)
- b. ADDP 00.6—[Leadership](#)
- c. ADDP 3.0—[Campaigns and Operations](#)
- d. ADDP 5.0—[Joint Planning](#)
- e. Royal Australian Navy Doctrine 1—[Australian Maritime Doctrine](#)
- f. Land Warfare Doctrine 0-0—[Command, Leadership and Management](#)
- g. Australian Air Publication 1001.1—[Command and Control in the Royal Australian Air Force](#).

AMENDMENTS

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The art of command requires refinement of a number of professional and personal attributes, including mental discipline, operational experience, a clear sense of professional judgment and a rigorous approach to the use of time.

**General Sir Peter Cosgrove, AK, MC, KStJ
Racing Towards the Future 2003**

1.1 Commanders are appointed to conduct campaigns and operations. They are assigned military forces and have the authority to commit military personnel to battle in potentially life threatening circumstances. Commanders therefore have a vitally important responsibility and are accountable for their actions, or for their inaction.

1.2 Command and control (C2) is the process and means for the exercise of authority over, and lawful direction of, assigned forces. C2 provides a system for empowering designated personnel to exercise lawful authority and direction over assigned forces for the accomplishment of missions and tasks.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Definitions

Command. The authority that a commander in the military Service lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Note: Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of, organising, directing, coordinating and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale and discipline of assigned personnel.

Control. The authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate organisations, or other organisations not normally under their command, which encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or directives. Note: All or part of this authority may be transferred or delegated.

Command and control (C2). C2 is the process and means for the exercise of authority over, and lawful direction of, assigned forces.

1.3 Command is the authority that a commander in the military Service lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command provides legal authority given to an individual to direct, coordinate or control military forces. It is the process of a commander imposing their will and intentions on subordinates to achieve assigned objectives. A commander's key duty is decision-making and the ability to make correct decisions in a timely manner is therefore a key measure of a successful commander.

1.4 Decision-making however, is not all that is required of a successful commander. Command encompasses the authority, responsibility and accountability for deploying and assigning forces to achieve missions. Authority involves the right to enforce obedience and discipline when necessary. Although a commander can delegate certain authorities they nonetheless retain overall responsibility for command (see Chapter 5). Responsibility includes ensuring that the health, welfare,

morale and discipline of assigned personnel is effectively maintained. Finally, accountability encompasses the need to comply with constitutional and legislative accountabilities (such as workplace health and safety legislation), corporate governance requirements, and the laws of armed conflict.

1.5 Command is one of the six ADF joint functions.¹ Each function is a set of related joint capabilities and activities, grouped together to help joint commanders integrate, synchronise and direct campaigns and operations. Successful campaigning requires coordination across the functions and commanders should therefore be familiar with each of them. For further details, see Australian Defence Doctrine Publication (ADDP) 3.0—Campaigns and Operations.

1.6 In contrast to command, control is the authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate organisations, or other organisations not normally under their command, which encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or directives.

1.7 Control can be permissive or restrictive. The former allows specific actions to occur, while the latter limits or proscribes the conduct of certain actions. Primary control measures include planning guidance, operation orders, rules of engagement, airspace control measures, fire support coordination measures, and manoeuvre control measures such as axes of advance, boundaries, phase lines and objectives.

1.8 The terms command and control are closely related and are often abbreviated together as C2. However, they are not synonymous and there is a subtle but important difference between them. While commanders assign responsibilities, control enables coordination between elements of a force and other organisations, the imposition of restrictions and limits, and the establishment of guidelines to regulate freedom of action.

Command, leadership and management

1.9 Although this publication does not focus on leadership or management, both concepts are related to command and the relationship between the three terms is important.

Definitions

Leadership. The process of influencing others in order to gain their willing consent in the ethical pursuit of missions.

Management. The process of planning, organising, directing and controlling organisational resources in the pursuit of organisational goals.

1.10 A member of the military may be assigned a leadership position with the legitimate and related powers of command, and yet display little or no positive leadership behaviour. With command comes the power and authority over subordinates that the leader needs to achieve tasks. Although not its intended

¹ The other ADF joint functions are: situational understanding; force generation and sustainment; force projection; force protection; and force application.

purpose, command takes away the requirement to actively exercise persuasion and personal influence to get things done.

1.11 In theory, a commander is able to ignore leadership and rely solely on command to achieve military objectives. In reality, this would be foolish as the leadership provided by a commander is necessary to ensure subordinate commitment to purpose and willingness to continually pursue military objectives, even when unobserved. Without leadership, the subordinate's will to fight is neither seeded nor nourished and therefore quickly wilts, jeopardising the mission. The 'line of credit' provided by the power and authority of command is important, but leadership is essential.

1.12 A more comprehensive treatment of leadership is contained in ADPP 00.6—*Leadership*.

1.13 Like leadership, management is related to command but the two terms mean different things. Management is an impersonal, rational act involving activities such as planning, budgeting, performance measurement and resource allocation. In management theory, people are viewed as one of a number of resources, although astute managers realise that people perform more effectively if they are led, rather than simply being tasked as manager may allocate other resources.

1.14 Personnel in management roles may or may not have command of subordinates, but there is always a personnel management aspect to command. Furthermore, although civilians are not eligible to command military personnel they may, in some circumstances, be appointed as their manager.

**HISTORICAL EXAMPLE
GENERAL MONASH'S USE OF COMMAND AND CONTROL
AT HAMEL, FRANCE, 4 JULY 1918**



Portrait of General Sir John Monash

By mid-1918, the strategic and operational setting for the Western Front made conditions favourable for a more mobile style of operation that, when combined with technological advances, encouraged combined arms methods.

One early proponent of these methods was the newly-appointed commander of the 1st Australian Corps, Lieutenant General John Monash. In his first major battle leading this formation, Monash developed and executed a plan that led to a stunning success. Within 93 minutes, 1st Australian Corps overcame a prepared German position in the hills and woods around the village of Hamel in northern France. Furthermore, the casualties suffered in the attack were moderate by World War I standards and the Corps was poised to hold against counterattack. Monash's employment of command and control was an outstanding feature of this battle.

In terms of command, Monash prepared his formations to operate with other combat arms, including through rehearsals. He employed tanks in direct support of the infantry, and used carrier tanks to carry supplies forward. Aircraft were tasked to identify enemy dispositions, contribute to security by reporting on breaches of camouflage, attack possible German reserves, cover the noise of preparations, and conduct ammunition resupply. Deception was employed to make the Germans believe there was no build-up on that part of the front. Further, no registration artillery fire was permitted and gas was interspersed with smoke in regular pre-determined pre-dawn fire missions. In the attack, smoke (without gas) was used to blind the German defenders, and a creeping artillery barrage covered the assaulting infantry-tank force and

inhibited counterattacks during consolidation.

Monash's command style might be described as either meticulous or micro-managing, but he was undoubtedly thorough in preparation. He used conferences of the key staff involved to work through details and options—and changed his mind at times when subordinate commanders developed rational counter-proposals. He made personal visits to battalion-level commanders, ensuring they understood their roles while improving his understanding of their situation. Monash also clearly assigned his formations and supporting forces through well-prepared written orders, using command terminology that might seem quaint or ambiguous today. Nevertheless, phrases such as 'at the disposal of', and 'the main function of'—which he used to assign artillery, tanks and supporting arms to his formations—were understood and authoritative.

The control measures employed by Monash were similarly clear. Maps were marked with assembly areas and routes, defined start lines, and a 'blue line' to denote the limit of exploitation. He encouraged his infantry-tank teams to exploit to the blue line, rather than capture objectives, and was willing to bypass strongpoints to maintain momentum. Orders also provided clear guidance on timings, liaison and reserves. His plan maintained discipline and did not permit exploitation beyond the blue line, ensuring his forward troops were under a protective artillery umbrella at all times.

Monash and 1st Corps' success at Hamel was an early exemplar of the efficacy of combined arms warfare. Similar approaches would be employed on larger scales into the final Allied offensives of the Great War.

ANNEX 1A

THE EVOLUTION OF AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS SINCE 1973

1. Prior to 1973, each of the Services had their own Service Board and Department, and the Service Chiefs answered to a minister for that Service. The implementation of the 1973 Tange Report (officially titled Australian Defence: Report on the Reorganisation of the Defence Group of Departments) led to the abolition of the Boards and the amalgamation of the Departments into a single Department of Defence. In 1976, associated reforms created the Australian Defence Force (ADF) as a joint organisation. The implementation of the Tange Report also established a diarchy between the Secretary of the Department of Defence (SECDEF) and the Chief of Defence Force Staff (later re-titled Chief of the Defence Force (CDF)) and subordinated the Service Chiefs to the CDF (see further details on the diarchy in Chapter 4).
2. Although the creation of the diarchy resulted in SECDEF and CDF having equal responsibility for administering Defence, the CDF exclusively has full command of the ADF (see details of 'full command' in Chapter 5). Following further reforms, from November 1985 to January 1997, CDF exercised the operational element of full command directly from Headquarters Australian Defence Force (HQADF), through the Assistant Chief, Operations, with Operations Division providing staff support. Operational level functions were split between Operations Division and the three environmental (sea, land and air) commanders (see details of the 'levels' of command in Chapter 4).
3. In 1995, then-CDF General John Baker initiated a fundamental review of ADF command arrangements, with the intent to strengthen joint command effectiveness at the operational level. At that time it was accepted that the principal function of the ADF was to defend Australia and that responses to other threats, although possible, were not likely. The paradigm of 'structure for war, adapt for peace' predominated.
4. In 1997, ADF command arrangements were formally restructured to separate those command structures primarily focused on the military strategic level from those primarily focused on the operational level. CDF delegated command at the operational level to a permanent Commander Australian Theatre, who would be in command of a single headquarters—Headquarters Australian Theatre. Environmental commanders were designated component commanders for operations. The component commanders also retained responsibility to their respective Service Chief for raising, training and sustaining forces.
5. These C2 arrangements were developed and implemented in a relatively stable strategic environment where the major threats were perceived as likely to originate from conventional military forces. In accordance with strategic guidance contained in the 1987 and 1994 Defence White Papers, it was also presumed that operations in defence of Australia would be conducted in vulnerable northern areas of the country. As a result of this presumption, some C2 infrastructure was relocated to northern Australia.

6. The 1999 deployment of the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) resulted in the ADF's highest operational tempo since 1972. The need for a review of C2 doctrine in the ADF was also recognised in 1999, but for some time this did not occur due to the operational tempo. In 2000, the Chiefs of Service Committee (COSC) formalised two new standing command authorities—'theatre command' and 'national command'—as integral elements of ADF C2 (see details of COSC in Chapter 4). These concepts were detailed in the doctrine pamphlet, ADF Operational Command and Control, provisional edition.

7. In 2003, then-CDF General Peter Cosgrove initiated two further reviews that, in light of the experience of recent operations, identified several key strategic issues affecting the ADF's C2 requirements. Both the 2000 Defence White Paper and the 2003 Defence Update found that the strategic environment was now characterised by a mixture of traditional military threats and asymmetric threats arising from terrorism and globalisation. The need to succeed within this strategic environment drove the development of revised operating concepts. These concepts encompassed a continuum of operations that ranged from armed conflict to operations designed to shape and influence regional and world views.

8. Other key issues identified by the 2003 reviews included closer government interest in operations with potentially high strategic consequences, and the effects of technology on C2 and information management. The reviews recommended a simpler and flatter command structure for operations and a separate appointment with command responsibility for all ADF joint operational activity.

9. In 2004, the Minister for Defence announced the establishment of Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQJOC), with CDF's operational command of the ADF to be executed through Vice Chief of the Defence Force (VCDF), who would have a dual capacity as Chief of Joint Operations (CJOPS).

10. In 2005, then CDF, Air Chief Marshal Angus Houston, initiated another review into the ADF's higher C2 arrangements. The officially titled Report on the Review of Australian Defence Force High Command and Control Arrangements was known as the 'Wilson Review' after the officer appointed to conduct it, Major General Richard Wilson. This review examined the concepts of command and control, and the broader national and Defence context of the ADF higher C2 arrangements. It confirmed Government intent through a re-appraisal of strategic guidance and made an assessment of likely future trends in warfare as they affected C2.

11. COSC accepted the majority of the Wilson Review's recommendations, the most significant of which was the reorganisation of HQJOC. Prior to this, HQJOC had been structured as a fragmented, component-based headquarters. As a result of this review, component commanders were removed from the joint operational command structure and a single integrated headquarters was established, organised in accordance with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) common joint staff system (see ADFP 5.0.1—*Joint Military Appreciation Process Annex 1B*).

12. In 2007 following approval from the Minister for Defence, the VCDF and CJOPS roles were separated. It was a response to a Defence Management Report initiative, which sought to strengthen the command and leadership of ADF operations while ensuring that Government is provided with high quality and timely operational and strategic advice. Since then VCDF has been responsible for Defence business at

the strategic level, specifically supporting the Government and CDF, while CJOPS has been responsible to CDF for the conduct of operations (see details in Chapter 4).

13. The Prime Minister officially opened the purpose-built HQJOC facility at Bungendore in 2009 and enabled for the first time all of the elements of HQJOC to be located within a single facility. This has since ensured that CJOPS is able to exercise effective C2 of operations from a single location. Also in 2009, the ADF published a new C2 doctrine manual, ADPP 00.1—*Command and Control*, edition 1.

14. In 2014 the First Principles Review of Defence (the Review) was conducted. Published in 2015, the Review found a proliferation of structures, processes and systems with unclear accountabilities, which in turn caused institutionalised waste, delayed decisions, flawed execution, duplication, over-escalation of issues for discussion and low engagement levels among employees in parts of the organisation.

15. The focus of the Review was on ensuring that Defence is fit for purpose, is able to respond to future challenges, and deliver against its outputs with the minimum resources necessary. The Review recommended substantial change across Defence to ensure it can deliver on the plans in the Defence White Paper. The Government agreed, or agreed in principle, to 75 of the 76 recommendations.

16. The Review recommended Defence move from a federated approach into a single, integrated end-to-end organisation that would deliver enhanced joint capability—the ‘One Defence’ approach. Headquarters’ arrangements were re-assessed, and the result supports a more integrated approach to the management, development of advice and planning for the ADF—the integrated Australian Defence Force Headquarters (ADFHQ).

17. As 2017 progressed so did the functionality of the ADFHQ organisation, realising the ‘One Defence’ concept with the appointment of a chief of staff, the VCDF as the deputy in command of the ADF, the Joint Force Authority and the establishment of the Chief of Joint Capabilities.

CHAPTER 2

THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE APPROACH TO COMMAND

Executive summary

- The Australian Defence Force takes a deliberate approach to command.
- There are eight principles of command: unity of command, span of command, clarity, redundancy, delegation of command, control of significant resources, obligation to subordinates, and accountability.
- Commanders need to consider a wide range of factors that exist within the operational environment, including political, legal, cultural and social issues, in addition to traditional military considerations.
- The Australian Defence Force approach to command is known as mission command.
- Under mission command, in its simplest form, the superior commander directs what is to be achieved but leaves subordinate commanders free to decide how to achieve assigned tasks.
- Flexibility and the use of initiative are encouraged at all levels of command.

INTRODUCTION

2.1 There are two components of command. The first is the underlying approach within an organisation that determines the style in which its members go about developing a personal command philosophy. This component is covered below. The second component is organisational, functional and legal, covering the structures and mechanisms empowering designated commanders to exercise specified lawful authority and direction over assigned forces for missions and tasks. This component is addressed in subsequent chapters.

PRINCIPLES OF COMMAND

2.2 As with the principles of war, certain principles of command have been identified as consistent over time. There are eight principles of command:

- a. unity of command
- b. span of command
- c. clarity
- d. redundancy
- e. delegation of command
- f. control of significant resources
- g. obligation to subordinates
- h. accountability.

Unity of command

2.3 The first and foremost principle of command is that there can only be one recognised command authority at any time. A subordinate can only have one superior. The command authority may change as tasks change, but the principle of unity of command, with one designated commander clearly responsible for each task, must be maintained. This is particularly important in multi-phased joint operations, such as airborne or amphibious operations, where lack of unity of command could create doubt as to who is in command of the operation at various phases.

HISTORICAL EXAMPLE UNITY OF COMMAND: OPERATION OBOE

The allied invasion of Borneo in 1945, codenamed Operation OBOE, encompassed the battles of Tarakan (Operation OBOE I, 1 May–21 June), North Borneo (Operation OBOE VI, 10 June–5 August) and Balikpapan (Operation OBOE II, 1–21 July 1945). All three battles involved the conduct of amphibious landings.



Troops of the 7th Division, Australian Imperial Force, landing at Balikpapan, Borneo, 1 July 1945

Due to the overall command structure established by the Commander-in-Chief of the South–West Pacific Area United States of America’s Army General Douglas MacArthur, there was no overall task force commander for Operation OBOE. Instead, MacArthur had established separate commands for allied naval, land and air forces. For Operation OBOE, 1st Australian Corps, under the command of Lieutenant General Sir Leslie Morshead, provided the land forces. The allied air force units involved were commanded by RAAF Air Vice Marshal William Bostock, and naval units involved were under overall command of US Navy Vice Admiral Thomas Kinkaid. Each of these officers reported to the commander for their respective environment, rather

than to a single task force commander.

Operational success therefore depended entirely on informal cooperation between these commanders, and between their subordinate commanders. This arrangement resulted in operational outcomes that were less than ideal:

At Balikpapan, for example, the Navy disagreed with the Army's choice of landing beach because it was in the area where Japanese defences were strongest. This choice would mean the minesweepers having to operate close under the enemy's guns while supporting warships would have to stand further offshore...Navy, however, was overruled and Army opinion prevailed.¹

Another problem was personality conflict between RAAF commanders. Specifically, Air Vice Marshal Bostock had a dysfunctional relationship with Air Vice Marshal George Jones, Australia's Chief of the Air Staff (CAS). Originally close friends, their relationship soured when Jones was promoted to CAS despite Bostock being considered 'next in line' due to rank and experience. Ongoing conflict between the two men resulted in Jones manipulating maintenance policy to prevent RAAF bomber squadrons providing support to Bostock during Operation OBOE I. This resulted in deficiencies in the level of air support provided to the landing force.

Even though Operation OBOE was ultimately successful, it remains a poignant example of the importance of establishing unity of command, and of the costs of failing to do so.

Span of command

2.4 There is a limit to the number of subordinate force elements (FE) that can be commanded effectively. Analysis of past operations indicates that an ideal span is between three and six subordinate FE. The optimum number depends on a number of factors so no precise number can be prescribed.

2.5 While all command and control (C2) arrangements must be sufficiently flexible to cope with additional subordinate FE, the commander must not be overloaded to the point where it is not possible to command effectively. The establishment of subordinate commanders and headquarters (HQ) should be used to ensure span of a command does not become too wide.

2.6 There is a range of degrees of authority from which to match mission and responsibility (see Chapter 5 for information about degrees of authority). An operational commander needs to be assigned the mix of combat, combat support and combat services support necessary to achieve the mission. Assigning lesser degrees of authority may be appropriate in the case of FE that provide temporary, spasmodic or external support. The allocation of additional FE vital to a plan should be achieved with consideration to ensure that the commander is not burdened with C2 responsibilities for other FE where cooperative support would suffice.

¹ David Stevens, 'Maritime Aspects of Australian Amphibious Operations', in: Lt Col Glenn Wahlert, (Ed.), *Australian Army Amphibious Operations in the South-West Pacific: 1942-45* Sydney: Australian Army Doctrine Centre, 1995, p. 108.

2.7 For FE, the limits of a viable span of command depend on subordinate and technical command requirements, effective combat groupings and communications feasibility. There is usually no need for transient maritime and air FE to be under the command of a deployed operational commander. For example, in East Timor in 1999 the span of command for Major General Peter Cosgrove's Joint Task Force 631 (JTF 631) was immediately overextended because contingents were deployed from 22 nations. A substantial air and sea line of communication between East Timor and Australia was also established. If the forces conducting this task had also been placed under JTF 631, General Cosgrove's span of command would probably have become unmanageable.

Clarity

2.8 The principle of clarity, though closely related to unity of command, focuses on the military chain of command. It requires commanders at each level to respond to directions from higher HQ, and in turn issue directions to subordinates. Consequently, each HQ normally reports to only one superior HQ, thereby following an unambiguous chain of command. All elements in the chain must be aware of their superior and subordinate HQ and the C2 relationships with other FE operating in the same theatre or joint force area of operations.

Redundancy

2.9 To provide command redundancy, alternative commanders and HQ must be nominated at all levels. Procedures established and practised to allow command to be passed to the alternative commanders in such a way that operations are not adversely affected. The purpose of this process is to ensure that ongoing operations are not disrupted during a transfer of authority.

2.10 The provision of staff, communications and information systems for alternative HQ is factored into planning. Navy FE, having a network of ships equipped with command centres and communications, have an inherent redundancy. Air bases are similarly equipped, and generally are in continuous contact with aircraft. In the land environment, command redundancy is inherent in the chain of command, which specifies a second-in-command and so on. This applies from the lowest level—the section commander and section second-in-command—to the highest level—The Chief and Deputy Chief of Army.

Delegation of command

2.11 Delegation of command must be legal and within the scope of authority of the commander making the delegation (see Chapter 5). When delegating command authority, the commander must ensure that the delegation:

- a. is unambiguous
- b. clearly defines the degree of authority and responsibilities transferred, including any related conditions and limitations
- c. clearly specifies the point at which the authority becomes effective
- d. gives guidance to the action to be taken in the event of a contingency or opportunity—this guidance should specifically address those contingencies where the commander cannot be contacted or is unable to perform their duties for a period of time.

2.12 For the smooth and robust delegation of command it is necessary for the commander's vision to be clearly articulated and understood. Subordinate personnel who are likely to be appointed to an acting command position must familiarise themselves with all aspects of their commander's responsibilities. They must position themselves to anticipate having to discharge these duties or respond to contingencies where communication with the commander is lost, or the commander is incapacitated.

Control of significant and limited resources

2.13 Some resources are designated as significant resources due to of their wide utility but limited availability, or the limited availability of expert control cells. Examples include submarines, special forces and some aircraft types. C2 of significant resources is normally retained at the highest practicable level. Delegation of authority over such resources is rare and invariably involves procedures for the rapid return of the authority if, and when, circumstances change.

2.14 Constant liaison between the strategic, operational and tactical level planning staffs, together with selection of the most appropriate type and duration of C2 arrangements, is essential to ensure best use is made of scarce resources.

Obligation to subordinates

2.15 Commanders are obliged to consider the interests and wellbeing of their subordinates and represent them in the chain of command. This includes responsibility for safety, health, welfare, morale and discipline of assigned personnel. Commanders are also obliged to exercise appropriate C2 over their subordinates.

2.16 Command obligation is a feature of military culture and is facilitated by the philosophy of mission command. The ADF national command system has an obligation to establish, without lavish or wasteful use of resources, support systems additional to the host and multinational lead nations in-theatre standards, which meet the usual aspirations and legitimate needs of ADF personnel.

Accountability

2.17 Commanders are accountable for their actions. There are several aspects to this accountability, including the need to comply with constitutional and legislative accountabilities (such as workplace health and safety legislation), corporate governance requirements, and compliance with the law of armed conflict (LOAC).

HISTORICAL EXAMPLE OBLIGATION TO SUBORDINATES: PERSONNEL SUPPORT IN GREAT BRITAIN, WORLD WARS I AND II

The evolution of personnel support arrangements in the United Kingdom (UK) during World Wars I and II (WW I and WW II) provides an example of Australian support for personnel serving overseas as part of multinational forces.

During WW I, HQ Australian Imperial Force (AIF) established a series of administrative, training, medical, convalescent and recreational facilities in the Middle East and UK. While the British Army was willing to provide such services, the Australian Government and HQ AIF determined that Australian services should provide for the needs of its force. Accordingly, of an AIF numbering of over 300 000,

55 000 were engaged in administrative support in the UK, with another administrative cadre in the Middle East.

Support in the UK in WW II was not as well organised. The agreement covering the Empire Air Training Scheme provided that Dominion output would serve in national squadrons. This never eventuated, with nominal Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) squadrons containing a mix of nationalities, and half of RAAF aircrew directly allotted to Royal Air Force (RAF) squadrons. Responsibility for administrative support was affected by the British Government and attempts to form a RAAF base were circumvented to avoid diminution of the Air Ministry's ability to employ RAAF elements and individuals piecemeal within RAF wings and squadrons.

Concern about this lack of support resulted in the dispatch of Air Marshal Sir Richard Williams to London in 1941 to establish a RAAF counterpart of HQ AIF. This was to fulfil the Australian Government desire 'that RAAF personnel shall be under the command of RAAF officers ... to the fullest possible extent', and that they be provided with adequate, specifically-Australian amenities. It was not until the establishment of Air Officer Commanding Overseas HQ RAAF in 1941 that 15 000 RAAF aircrew overseas began to receive the support and amenities appropriate and usual for Australian forces.

COMMAND AND THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

2.18 The operating environment faced by today's commander is one characterised by a mixture of change, complexity and uncertainty. Commanders in this environment need to consciously consider a wide range of factors including political, legal, cultural and social issues, in addition to traditional military considerations.

Factors affecting the exercise of command

2.19 The effective exercise of command is intimately linked to the nature of the operational environment, including the strategic context and the technology available. For details about the personal aspect of command see Chapter 3. Factors that should be taken into account by the commander include:

- a. complexity
- b. diversity of actors
- c. geographical non-linearity
- d. limitations
- e. the effects of technology.

2.20 **Complexity.** There are two types of complexity: structural and interactive. Structural complexity exists in a system made up of many parts, but these parts interact in a predictable (usually linear) way. Interactive complexity exists in a system that is made up of many parts, but where those parts are able to interact with each other and the system itself in many possible ways, and which may change significantly over time. The effects of this variety of interaction are very difficult to predict accurately, and are pervasive to the extent that they may even change the structure of the system itself.

2.21 Although operations have always been structurally complex, today it is widely understood that they are also interactively complex. As a result, the effects of any

action cannot necessarily be taken for granted. All operational plans need to be developed and enacted with enough flexibility to address unexpected situations.

2.22 **Diversity of actors.** The operational environment is characterised by a diverse and sometimes ambiguous array of actors, including:

- a. conventional military forces including multinational forces
- b. host national government officials including police and service providers
- c. non-conventional forces
- d. non-state actors—for example, terrorist organisations, mercenaries, pirates, organised criminal groups
- e. international organisations—for example, United Nations, International Committee of the Red Cross
- f. non-governmental organisations—for example, Oxfam, *Médecins sans frontières*
- g. multinational corporations
- h. civilians.

2.23 Each of these actors may be a threat, friendly or neutral, and may change between these categories over time. Each actor has its own attributes, internal dynamics and intentions that need to be analysed and comprehended. The commander must develop a situational understanding of key actors and their relationships that may affect achieving the mission.

2.24 **Geographical non-linearity.** The contemporary operational environment does not necessarily include well-defined fronts, flanks and rear areas. As a result, force protection is an important command consideration, regardless of where forces are located.

2.25 **Limitations.** The conduct of operations is invariably subject to limitations. These limitations can circumscribe the political and/or strategic aims of an operation, the intensity of combat operations, the geographic extent of military action, the duration of hostilities, support of national objectives by the host and home populations, and the kinds of operations and activities conducted. Limitations consist of constraints and restrictions as follows:

- a. **Constraints.** Constraints are actions imposed by a superior commander or another authority, which must be undertaken. Constraints may be derived from specified or implied tasks. An example is the tasking of a subordinate commander to maintain a reserve for employment that may be employed by the superior commander on order.
- b. **Restrictions.** Restrictions are prohibitions on activities that a superior commander or another authority might impose. Restrictions may be legal (imposed by international and domestic laws); moral and ethical (these limitations are now very largely absorbed into international norms and values); or political (which include, in the case of multinational operations, what is considered acceptable by all contributing countries).

2.26 **The effects of technology on information.** Technology—and accompanying social changes—has increased the speed, reach, volume and scope of information available. There are several aspects to this change. The first is a raised expectation by commanders at all levels to be continually informed. This expectation needs to be satisfied by a sound system and process for passing information and advice, and an understanding of the broader implications of events by commanders and staffs.

2.27 A second aspect is a faster and more streamlined passage of information: a situation with benefits and risks. This factor can boost shared situational understanding and lead to better informed decision-making. However, this change also risks increased political and command intervention in tactical matters. While increased higher level involvement can and should be positive, its exercise requires discipline to avoid micro-management. A streamlined information flow can also cause ‘information overload’ which, unless managed, may lead to indecisiveness as commanders and their staff wait until they have ‘all the information’. At the same time, senior leaders can access information from a broad range of connected sources that transmit straight from the area of operations to a global audience. This ‘CNN effect’ is now well established and complemented by social media, which bypasses ‘traditional’ methods of information verification.

2.28 A third aspect, which has a close relationship to the second, is the compression of the decision-making cycle that results from an increased information flow. Militaries are now using communication and information systems to display a common operational picture and are using software-aided decision-making tools to develop possible courses of action. This technology is developing rapidly. In the near future, simultaneous transmission of situation pictures to commanders at all levels will offer unparalleled visibility of the operational environment.

2.29 Overall, reliance on sophisticated technologies creates opportunities and vulnerabilities—for both the ADF and potential adversaries. Despite technological advances, command remains a human activity and the ADF employs mission command to capitalise upon that.

MISSION COMMAND

2.30 Mission command promotes flexibility by encouraging initiative, ingenuity, innovation, resourcefulness and devolution of authority in achieving the commander’s intent.

2.31 Mission command has been adopted because it aligns well with the ADF’s overall approach to warfare. The ADF’s approach to warfare is a combination of manoeuvre, interoperability, networking and decision superiority. For further details about the ADF approach to warfare see Australian Defence Doctrine Publication-Doctrine (ADDP–D)—*Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine*.

Definition

Mission Command. A philosophy for command and a system for conducting operations in which subordinates are given a clear indication by a superior of their intentions. The result required, the task, the resources and any constraints are clearly enunciated, however subordinates are allowed the freedom to decide how to achieve the required result.

2.32 Mission command promotes decentralised execution, freedom and speed of action and initiative, but is responsive to superior direction. Under mission command, in its simplest form, the superior commander directs *what* is to be achieved but leaves the subordinate commander free to decide *how* to achieve assigned tasks.

2.33 Mission command can only succeed through the combined efforts of superior and subordinate commanders. Superior commanders maintain the ultimate responsibility for achieving the mission and must ensure that they do not misapply mission command to avoid their own command responsibilities. Subordinate commanders must be fully aware of the superior commander's intent, and continually monitor and assess developing situations, while maintaining excellent communication through their chain of command and with supporting FE.

2.34 Successful application of the philosophy of mission command depends on the following prerequisites:

- a. **Doctrine.** Mission command is most successful when supported by doctrine. Military doctrine describes fundamental principles that guide actions by armed forces to achieve their objectives. While authoritative, doctrine requires judgement in application. Good doctrine is based on the thorough analysis of experience, information such as lessons, and new concepts and trends. It is used in professional military education, and can be used by operators facing unfamiliar situations so they can draw upon the organisation's collective experience.
- b. **Reliability.** Commanders rely on subordinates to provide accurate and timely information to achieve operational success. High demands are made on the leadership qualities of subordinates, on their initiative and on their sense of responsibility to carry out their assigned tasks.
- c. **Trust.** Mission command requires a high level of mutual trust at all levels of command which is established through intensive, realistic training and reinforced by success on operations. Subordinates are trusted by being allocated sufficient resources to carry out their missions, and commanders should keep control to a minimum so as not to constrain their subordinates' freedom of action.
- d. **Understanding.** Commanders ensure that subordinates understand the commander's intentions, their own missions, and the strategic, operational and tactical context. Subordinates are told what objectives they need to achieve and the reasons why achieving them is necessary. The alternative for commanders is to resort to ponderous, detailed orders, which can stifle initiative and slow the tempo of operations.

e. **Risk.** Gaining and holding the initiative is critical in a rapidly moving situation. Hesitation, indecision and time-wasting by seeking confirmation from higher command may be riskier than a flawed but timely decision based on the best available information.

2.35 Increasingly, legislative and regulatory requirements, together with resource constraints, compound to work against mission command. These constraints can lead to conservatism, indecisiveness, or micro-management, potentially creating a tendency towards risk aversion. Even though mission command must be accompanied by the implementation of appropriate risk management measures, operations will always require a degree of risk-taking. Therefore, mission command should be applied during peacetime to develop decisiveness, moral courage, initiative and daring, which can be easily translated into the operational environment.

Application of mission command

Commanders at all levels had to act more on their own; they were given greater latitude to work out their own plans to achieve what they knew was the Army Commander's intention. In time they developed to a marked degree the flexibility of mind and a firmness of decision that enabled them to act swiftly to take advantage of sudden information of changing circumstances without reference to their superiors. This acting without orders, in anticipation of orders, or without waiting for approval, yet always within the overall intention, must become second nature and must go down to the smallest units.

Field Marshal Sir William Slim

Governor General of Australia 1953-60

2.36 Although philosophical in nature, mission command is not all theory. Its practical application in the ADF stresses five key concepts which are discussed in the following paragraphs.

Learning through practice

2.37 Mission command requires practice during training, not just for a particular operation, but for operations in general. Questioning should be encouraged to provide insight by engaging experience and creativity. Sufficient instruction and training should occur in a benign environment, in which honest mistakes are accepted and discussed, and unorthodox solutions are encouraged.

2.38 A deeper understanding of what constitutes commander's intent should be the subject of continual development. Progressive thinking should be used to translate a higher commander's intent into lower-level objectives and foster an outcome-driven approach. Mission command cannot function without the unifying purpose of commander's intent.

Wise application

2.39 Commanders have a right to be satisfied that subordinates not only understand their intentions but are also acting on them. The use of orders groups, back-briefs before mission execution and face-to-face communication during the conduct of operations not only develops trust and mutual understanding of the plan, but also strengthens collective and individual confidence, purpose and resolve.

2.40 Although commanders should practise mission command whenever possible, judgement in application is required. Mission command does not necessarily apply to all situations and to all personnel. For example, mission command may not be compatible with, or acceptable to, some potential partners. Mission command should be applied with particular care in a multinational environment (see Chapter 7). While over-direction will often cause offence, too little direction may fail to achieve results in a timely fashion, or at all.

Flexibility and adaptability

2.41 Mission command must remain dynamic and agile. It should be applied flexibly, reflecting the understanding that doctrine itself is not immutable, and it should be adapted for a particular campaign, operation or situation. A commander's style of command must also reflect the situation, including the capability and understanding of subordinates. The characteristics of persuasion, compulsion, loyalty and leadership by example combine to create an individual command style, but the relative proportion of each must be tempered to suit the situation.

2.42 In exceptional circumstances, there may be brief occasions when commanders have to skip an echelon and 'reach down' at least one level of command. Historical evidence provides many examples of this: Napoleon, Rommel and Patton all intervened at a decisive point and brought about startling tactical successes. Endorsement of such action by a commander should not be seen as an encouragement of micro-management. It is a technique that should be applied sparingly, based on higher strategic knowledge, to turn the tide in a wavering operation or to seize the initiative where none was previously seen to exist.

Risk taking

2.43 Increasingly, tight legislative and regulatory requirements together with resource constraints, compound to work against mission command. These constraints can breed conservatism and indecisiveness, potentially creating a tendency towards risk aversion in a wider operational environment. Nevertheless, the Law of Armed Conflict applies in combat and commanders must take calculated risks and make judgements about what risks are necessary and acceptable to achieve mission objectives. Therefore mission command should be used during peacetime, with appropriate risk management measures, to develop decisiveness, moral courage, initiative and daring which can be easily translated into a warfighting environment.

Delegation

2.44 The ADF's mission command philosophy is realised in the commander's confidence in delegating responsibility to subordinates, and the professional discharge of those responsibilities of command by subordinates. This is of particular importance in response to fleeting windows of opportunity during the conduct of operations, and contingencies where no specific direction has been given to the subordinate.

HISTORICAL EXAMPLE

APPLICATION OF MISSION COMMAND: AL MUTHANNA TASK GROUP, 2005

The first Al Muthanna Task Group deployed to southern Iraq from April to November 2005. During its 191 days in Iraq, the 450-strong Task Group conducted 2,359 discrete tactical tasks in an operational environment characterised by a complex mixture of human, physical and informational factors.



Australian Light Armoured Vehicles and support vehicles of Combat Team Courage, Al Muthanna Task Group, in southern Iraq

Throughout the deployment the commander, Lieutenant Colonel Noble, relied heavily on the use of mission command to ensure success in the complex operational environment. This involved emphasising the importance of subordinates complying with the commander's intent in all of their actions, while also ensuring that subordinates were allowed the flexibility to plan and execute their own courses of action. Reflecting on the deployment, Noble later wrote that:

The key to effective, focused action is mission command. Mission command must be believed in and nurtured. For it to be effective it must be built on the intellectual components of clear intent, trust and accountability. The central moral component is trust. A physical control framework must also be established to support decision makers at every level, especially those in the midst of chaos and in close contact with the adversary.

CHAPTER 3

PERSONAL COMMAND PHILOSOPHY

Executive summary

- The purpose of a command philosophy is for the commander to declare what they expect of their command and what their command can expect of them.
- Commanders should develop a personal command philosophy based on vision, values, leadership expectations and personal convictions.
- Commanders must create and sustain an effective command climate that fosters a common understanding with subordinates, a sense of involvement in decision-making and a shared commitment.

The underlying philosophy of leaders has a significant impact on the way they relate to others, attempt to influence others, judge the actions of others, and make decisions affecting others.

Steven J. Mayer

INTRODUCTION

3.1 Taking command is an extremely personal business. From the moment a commander takes command they begin to develop a command philosophy, either consciously or subconsciously, that considerably influences their personal life, their work and that of their subordinates.

3.2 In the Australian Defence Force (ADF) commanders are encouraged to consciously consider their approach to command. The joint professional military education continuum requires participants to prepare a command philosophy. As a result, by the time most members of the ADF are appointed to a command position, they have already considered their approach to command and are developing their personal command philosophy.

PERSONAL COMMAND PHILOSOPHY

3.3 The purpose of a command philosophy to declare what the commander expects of their people and what their people can expect of them. How this is communicated by a commander to their subordinates ultimately depends on a commander's personality and approach to command, however a new commander can use their command philosophy as a tool to assist in establishing a rapport with their subordinates by clearly defining their philosophy up front through a verbal address and/or written guidance. This should be continually reinforced by the commander in subsequent interactions with subordinates to ensure a consistent message.

3.4 A command philosophy is relevant at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, and to non-operational and operational command appointments. Regardless of the level and type of command appointment, a good command philosophy will:

- a. indicate those aspects of organisational activity most important to the commander

- b. give insight into the commander's leadership style so others in the command can coordinate their actions with those of the commander
- c. be broad enough to provide reference points for ethical, personal leadership style, and managerial style preference issues
- d. provide a foundation of understanding by which the commander and their subordinates can build a relationship of respect, trust and mutual expectation.

3.5 A good command philosophy will not simply be a one-way list of expectations that a commander has of subordinates. Rather, it is a statement of what subordinates can expect of the commander—a two-way performance contract. In addition, commanders must guard against command philosophies that simply spout obvious statements, such as 'embracing the ADF's values', without providing clear direction as to what the commander personally believes that to mean.

3.6 A command philosophy that a commander does not personally believe in, or does not intend to live and work by, should not even exist. The damage that such a philosophy will do to the trust and respect in which a commander is held cannot be over-emphasised, as the promulgation of it is likely to lead or contribute to accusations of hypocrisy and double-standards.

Components of a personal command philosophy

- 3.7 In general, a command philosophy has the following four components:
- a. **Vision.** Every success is based on an initial concept. A commander's vision provides the initial common focus for an organisation's energy and allows priorities to be determined, setting the conditions for success.
 - b. **Values.** Members in an organisation who share the same values view tasks from a common perspective and act accordingly. A commander has the responsibility to draw together the common values within subordinates, making them robust enough to withstand external pressures and influences.
 - c. **Leadership expectations.** Subordinate leaders have specific responsibilities and obligations, and these must be clearly articulated and understood by them and their subordinates. By clearly articulating and reinforcing expectations, galvanising all components with an overall purpose, a commander has the opportunity to create synergistic effects.
 - d. **Personal convictions.** A commander is expected to possess attributes such as moral and physical courage, integrity, humility, fairness and diligence. A commander should also display social ease or 'people skills'. Not only must a commander's character be visible to subordinates, but they must understand the personal convictions of their commander to best be able to interpret and carry out their commander's intent.

**HISTORICAL EXAMPLE
PHILOSOPHY OF HIGHER OPERATIONAL COMMAND
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS, HEADQUARTERS
MULTINATIONAL FORCE—IRAQ, 2004-05**

Between August 2004–April 2005, Australian Army Major General Jim Molan served as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations within Headquarters Multinational Force—Iraq (HQ MNF-I). In this role, Molan reported directly to the Commanding General, USA Army General George Casey, Jr., and was responsible for implementing operational plans across Iraq. During this period, MNF-I comprised 160 000 MN soldiers, most of whom were American. Major operations included the November 2004 Battle of Fallujah and the January 2005 Iraqi national election.

Although in a senior staff rather than a command position, Molan nevertheless promulgated a personal command philosophy, which he used to guide his own conduct and to provide guidance to his staff. This command philosophy read:

Be technically proficient.

Understand the politics.

Understand war in general.

Understand the principles of command and control and the technicalities of headquarters.

Confidently know your strengths and weaknesses.

Be prepared to apply both extreme violence and extreme humanity.

Understand the specific war, your enemies, allies and own forces, especially joint.

Develop a simple vision simply expressed.

Be courageous (physically and morally).

Be confident that you learn wars by doing.

Command so that people know that you are commanding.

Your soldiers understand their unlimited liability—they know that they may be killed.

Do not be surprised that you are being surprised (expect uncertainty and risk).

Watch your back.

Act legally and morally based on your ethics.

Care for your people and your mission.

Test your decision but trust your judgement (intuition).

Be very, very lucky.¹

¹ Major General Jim Molan, 'Operations in the Land of Two Rivers', Command Papers 6/2005, Canberra: Centre for Defence Leadership and Ethics.

COMMAND CLIMATE

To the fundamental skills of battle management and combat must be added cultural awareness and historical knowledge, as well as a firm foundation of ethical understanding. Leaders must be able to lead, but they must also be ready to liaise, persuade and cooperate, however alien the protagonist or strange the environment.

**General David Hurley, AC, DSC
Chief of the Defence Force, 2011–14**

3.8 Whether during peace or on operations, a commander, by force of personality, leadership style, command presence and general behaviour, has a considerable influence on the morale, sense of direction and performance of their staff and subordinate commanders. Thus, it is a commander's responsibility to create and sustain an effective command climate.

3.9 This command climate must encourage subordinate commanders at all levels to think independently and take the initiative. Subordinates expect commanders to keep them informed and, when possible, to explain reasons for instructions. Commanders need to work hard at building relationships based on mutual respect and open communication. This fosters a common understanding, a sense of involvement in decision-making and a shared commitment.

Measuring the command climate

3.10 The ADF uses a range of tools to measure the command climate of units. One of these is the Profile of Unit Leadership, Satisfaction and Effectiveness (PULSE) is a unit climate survey specifically designed for military units in Australia. It is grounded in research literature on organisational climate and military unit effectiveness and has evolved from collaborative work between Canadian and Australian Defence psychology researchers.

3.11 The purpose of the PULSE is to provide commanders with a measure of the climate within their organisation. The PULSE is administered via a questionnaire that addresses a range of issues related to the human component of military capability, including the core dimensions of leadership, teamwork, job satisfaction, work motivation, satisfaction with communication, and job stressors.

3.12 The theoretical model of PULSE is proposed that there are two basic sets of forces acting on the individual in an organisational setting (in a military context).

- a. The first force, Job Demands such as work overload, high tempo, poor conditions, role conflict, and harassment, can put the individual under pressure and may have a negative impact on the physical and mental health of individuals.
- b. The second set of forces, Job Resources, are factors within the workplace that help an employee deal successfully with job demands and develop into a more capable employee. Examples include confidence in leadership, organisational support, a sense of autonomy, a sense of being treated fairly, and satisfaction with communication across the unit. Job resources help the individual cope with the pressure of job demands and bolster resilience.

3.13 The PULSE is designed to inform commanders of perceived personnel strengths and weaknesses and to provide a framework for future decision making regarding the management of the unit. In this way, the PULSE can enable commanders to assess a unit's current command climate and, where necessary, to chart a course towards improvement.

CHAPTER 4

COMMAND OF THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE

Executive summary

- Three levels are used to describe the differing roles and functions of command: there are known as the strategic, operational and tactical levels. In practice, matching command authorities to each level is not straightforward due to their overlapping nature.
- The strategic level is subdivided into the national strategic and military strategic levels. The former is concerned with the coordination and direction of national power to achieve national objectives. The Australian Government, through the Minister for Defence, provides direction to the Chief of Defence Force and the Secretary of the Department of Defence.
- Command at the military strategic level is concerned with organising and applying military power to achieve national strategic objectives. The Chief of the Defence Force has full command of the Australian Defence Force.
- Command at the operational level is concerned with planning and executing campaigns and operations to support military strategic objectives.
- Command at the tactical level is concerned with planning and conducting military tasks and actions to achieve operational objectives.

INTRODUCTION

4.1 Command and control (C2) doctrine in the Australian Defence Force (ADF) is applied at three levels: strategic (sub-divided into national strategic and military strategic), operational and tactical. These levels provide a framework for the C2 of campaigns and operations, and for the analysis of politico-military activity conducted before, during and after a campaign or operation.

4.2 The ADF's command system is derived from law, directives and convention and leads to a culture of civilian control of the military. Under the *Defence Act 1903* the Minister for Defence (MINDEF), who is also a member of Cabinet, has general control and administration of the Defence Force. In performing and exercising functions and powers under the *Defence Act 1903 Part II*, the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) and Secretary of the Department of Defence (SECDEF) must comply with any directions of MINDEF.

4.3 CDF commands the ADF while Service Chiefs exercise full command of their respective Services for all aspects except operations (see Chapter 5). When directed by MINDEF and Cabinet, CDF's command includes direct authority for operations. In practice, Chief of Joint Operations (CJOPS) typically exercises command at the operational level on behalf of CDF. Tactical level commanders are appointed to lead Joint Task Forces (JTF) or Force Elements (FE), such as task groups and task units, to achieve assigned missions. These key appointments form the ADF's command chain, and ensures a coherent link between strategic aims and tactical action.

THE STRATEGIC, OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL LEVELS

Levels of command

4.4 An understanding of the strategic, operational and tactical levels—and their limitations—is vital to a commander's grasp of the application of military force.

4.5 **Strategic level.** The strategic level is concerned with the coordination and direction of national power to secure national objectives. The strategic level includes:

- a. **National strategic.** The national strategic level is concerned with the broad political dimension of national activities, both domestically and internationally, and is the exclusive province of Government. Cabinet, which is advised by a variety of departments and agencies, provides national strategic objectives and overall direction to government agencies. National government, military and industrial resources are mobilised at this level.
- b. **Military strategic.** The military strategic level plans and directs military campaigns and operations to meet national strategic objectives.

4.6 **Operational level.** The operational level is the primary responsibility of CJOPS. At this level, campaigns and operations are planned and conducted to achieve strategic objectives. The focus of command at the operational level is on forming joint forces, deploying them into areas of operations, monitoring and controlling operations and sustaining them logistically.

HISTORICAL EXAMPLE OPERATION AUGURY—PHILIPPINES 2017

As the military strategic planning guidance for Operation AUGURY—PHILIPPINES was developed within the Australian Government in 2017, staff officers from Military Strategic Commitments and Headquarters Joint Operations Command drafted the national strategic and military strategic objectives for CDF's approval prior to inclusion in the Cabinet Submission for Government consideration. This example demonstrates the close link required between the strategic and operational levels, and helps to ensure strategic direction can be implemented with the means available.

4.7 **Tactical level.** Most JTF and their commanders act at the tactical level. At this level, tasks are planned and conducted to achieve operational objectives through manoeuvre and the generation of lethal and non-lethal effects.

4.8 Although these levels of command were originally developed with warfighting in mind, they can be applied to all military activities (see ADDP 3.0—*Campaigns and Operations*). As shown in Figure 4.1, the levels of command are linked and interdependent, and distinctions between levels can be imprecise.

Figure 4.1: The strategic, operational and tactical levels and corresponding command arrangements



THE NATIONAL STRATEGIC LEVEL

4.9 The national strategic level in Australia is established through constitutional arrangements, conventions, law and a culture that gives effect to civilian control of defence and the military. The key appointments at the national strategic level include Cabinet and related committees, and the Minister of Defence.

Civil control of defence activities

4.10 Defence activities are governed by the principle of civil control, which is established in the legal and constitutional framework governing Australia, and given effect through the roles of Parliament and the Government.

4.11 **Legal and Constitutional basis.** Under Section 68 of the Constitution, the Governor-General is the Commander-in-Chief of the naval and military forces of the Commonwealth of Australia. In practice, however, the Governor-General acts upon the advice of Ministers (who form the Cabinet) and command of the ADF is exercised by CDF. Therefore, committing forces to operations is fundamentally influenced by

the Prime Minister of Australia following deliberation with the Cabinet, which includes MINDEF.¹

4.12 Parliament and the Government. The constitutional authority for setting strategic and defence policy is established in Section 51 of the Constitution. This means the Australian Parliament can enact laws concerning national security agencies, while direction to those agencies is provided by the Government. In practical terms, the authority to direct the Australian Defence Force and associated entities, such as the relevant intelligence agencies, is exercised by the Cabinet, the National Security Committee of Cabinet (NSC) and MINDEF. Cabinet and NSC mechanisms ensure that decisions to deploy the ADF reflect a whole-of-government approach.

Figure 4.2: The Australian Federal Government identifies the national strategic objectives that guide Australia's military strategy



The Cabinet and the Minister for Defence

4.13 The Cabinet, which exists by convention, is composed of the Government's most senior Ministers. Cabinet is appointed by the Governor-General, on the advice of the Prime Minister, and makes the decision to commit the ADF to operations. Cabinet may also make policy decisions that influence military operations in other ways, such as by regulating aspects of the national economy or making resources available for military forces. The Cabinet delegates many aspects relating to the strategic direction of operations to its sub-committee, known as the National Security

1. *Defence Act 1903*, Part IIIAAA provides a specific process for calling out the ADF to protect Commonwealth interests and States and self-governing Territories against domestic violence.

Committee of Cabinet (NSC), and to MINDEF, who is a member of Cabinet and responsible for the general control and administration of the ADF (under the *Defence Act 1903*).

4.14 Within the remit given by the Cabinet, the NSC directs national strategy and provides coherence to policy, including military and non-military aspects. The NSC usually comprises the Prime Minister (Chair), the Deputy Prime Minister, MINDEF, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Treasurer, the Attorney-General and the Minister of Home Affairs. Additional members may be co-opted permanently or as required, or appointed to serve on the NSC at the discretion of the Prime Minister. Key officials are usually co-opted to attend the NSC, including CDF and SECDEF.

4.15 The NSC's broad responsibilities in regards to the national strategic direction of the ADF include:

- a. recommending to Cabinet (or determining) the political objectives to be achieved, and monitor progress towards their achievement; and
- b. stipulating and monitoring limitations and conditions to be imposed on military activity, including circumstances in which military activity should cease (the end state).

The Secretaries Committee on National Security

4.16 The Secretaries Committee on National Security (SCNS) supports the NSC. The role of SCNS is to ensure that whole-of-government implications of policy submissions are considered, facts are agreed, and differences at the officials' level are resolved as far as possible before being considered by the NSC. Membership of the SCNS consists of the Secretaries of several Government departments and agencies with responsibilities for Australia's security, including SECDEF and CDF.

THE MILITARY STRATEGIC LEVEL

4.17 The ADF command structure begins at the military strategic level and continues through to the tactical level. Command arrangements at each level reflect the distribution of responsibilities for planning and directing resources for campaigns, operations, combined and joint exercises and other directed activities. The ADF command structure therefore:

- a. facilitates the efficient and effective employment of capabilities and resources to execute government direction
- b. enables commanders at all levels to achieve their mission and be accountable for their actions
- c. adapts to any campaign or operation.

Military strategic command, policy and administration

4.18 Command at the military strategic level is legitimate only when it is exercised in response to lawful direction from the Government. Defence and the ADF will lose the confidence of the Government and the people if it fails to act legitimately and in accordance with direction.

4.19 The *Defence Act 1903* was amended by the *Defence Legislation Amendment (First Principles) Act 2015*. The 2015 legislation has determined the command structure of the ADF to be as follows:

- a. CDF exercises full command of the ADF (a further appointment, CJOPS, supports CDF's command of the ADF at the operational level);
- b. Vice Chief of the Defence Force (VCDF) has command authority under direction of CDF;
- c. Service Chiefs are explicitly subject to direction by CDF; and
- d. the dual leadership system of Defence and the ADF, known as the diarchy, was retained.

4.20 The high-level architecture of Defence's command and management system reflects policy direction from Government that includes the *Defence White Paper*, the Integrated Investment Program, the *Defence Industry Policy Statement*, the First Principles Review and the Defence budget.

4.21 At the military strategic level, Defence develops and implements plans to give military substance and effect to Government guidance. These plans include the *Defence Planning Guidance* incorporating *Australia's Military Strategy*.

4.22 Under the *Defence Act 1903*, CDF and SECDEF jointly administer Defence, except with respect to matters relating to command of the ADF and any other matters prescribed by MINDEF. This joint administration is commonly known as the diarchy.

4.23 The diarchy is a governance structure unique in the Commonwealth public service. It reflects the amalgamation into one Defence organisation what were previously discrete entities. Since the mid-1990s, respective MINDEF have usually issued a joint ministerial directive to CDF and SECDEF. Recent directives have unambiguously established MINDEF as the *customer for*, and *owner of*, outputs delivered by CDF and SECDEF. Such directives detail the respective roles, responsibilities and accountabilities of CDF and SECDEF, ministerial expectations, and implementation directions.

4.24 CDF is supported by officers including the Vice Chief of the Defence Force (VCDF), the Service Chiefs, CJOPS, and the Chief of Joint Capabilities (CJC). CDF, together with SECDEF, manage their responsibilities through senior Defence committees that provide the primary decision-making committees in the Department of Defence and ADF.

Chief of the Defence Force

4.25 In addition to exercising full command of the ADF and being responsible for delivering capability outcomes, CDF is the principal military adviser to MINDEF. In this role, CDF is responsible for:

- a. advising Government on the deployment of the ADF to achieve Government objectives, including identifying strategic objectives, assessing their feasibility; and identifying the desired strategic end state
- b. planning and executing military operations, including establishing the command organisation specific to an operation and approving the operational-level commander's objectives and concept of operations
- c. directing forces and resources to be assigned (including with regard to multinational partner capabilities and needs)
- d. employing the ADF to enhance national strategic interests, alliance relationships and regional security

- e. preparing forces for operations consistent with government requirements
- f. preparing military policy and plans
- g. stewardship of the military workforce
- h. operational logistics
- i. managing military information and communications technology.

Incoming Chief of the Defence Force, Air Chief Marshal Mark Binskin (left), with outgoing Chief of the Defence Force, General David Hurley, July 2014



Secretary of the Department of Defence

4.26 SECDEF is the principal civilian adviser to MINDEF and carries out the functions of a departmental head. In that context, SECDEF exercises statutory responsibilities under the *Public Service Act 1999* and responsibilities under the *Public Governance Performance and Accountability Act 2013* in relation to the efficient, effective and ethical use of resources. MINDEF consults SECDEF for advice on departmental issues and the proper use of resources in Defence.

4.27 Under the *Public Governance Performance and Accountability Act 2013*, SECDEF is responsible for the Department and the ADF, and associated regulations and Chief Executive Instructions. ADF members are allocated to the Department of Defence under regulation 4 of this Act and are required to comply with its requirements.

Vice Chief of the Defence Force

4.28 VCDF is appointed by the Governor-General in accordance with Section 12(2) of the *Defence Act 1903*. VCDF is the military deputy to CDF and acts as CDF in the CDF's absence. VCDF's day-to-day role is to assist CDF with the command

and administration of the ADF. VCDF is the Joint Force Authority for the ADF and leads as the primary integrator of military forces. VCDF provides CDF with advice on Defence preparedness, and contemporary and future military strategies. VCDF is also the chair of the Investment Committee (see paragraph 4.37 below).

Service Chiefs

4.29 The three Service Chiefs are Chief of Navy, Chief of Army and Chief of Air Force. Each is accountable to CDF, receive separate charters from CDF, and have full command of their respective services and assigned elements.

4.30 As capability managers the Service Chiefs raise, train and sustain their Service to deliver Service capabilities, including combat ready forces. The Service Chiefs provide CDF advice on the present and future force. They may advise ministers in matters relating to their responsibilities.

Chief of Joint Operations

4.31 CJOPS commands the Joint Operations Command (JOC), direct command units and assigned forces in the planning and conduct of campaigns, operations, joint exercises and other activities directed by CDF. CDF directs the assignment of forces to CJOPS as required, and CJOPS may appoint commanders and delegate command within assigned forces.

4.32 CJOPS is a principal adviser to CDF at the military strategic level for operations. CDF retains the right to command operations, although in practice CJOPS exercises theatre command (tcomd) of assigned forces for operations, joint exercises and activities on behalf of CDF (see Chapter 5).

Chief of Joint Capabilities

4.33 Chief of Joint Capabilities (CJC) commands the Joint Capabilities Command, and is responsible to CDF for the provision of joint health, logistics, Information Warfare and education and training. CJC also manages agreed joint projects, and their sustainment, to support joint capability requirements.

Senior Defence Committees

4.34 CDF's command of the ADF is supported by senior Defence committees. The Defence Committee, of which CDF is a member, is pre-eminent, and is supported by an Enterprise Business Committee (EBC) and an Investment Committee (IC). CDF obtains military advice through the Chiefs of Service Committee and Strategic Command Group. In addition, the Strategic Policy Committee may make decisions that influence operations or related activities such as international engagement.

4.35 **Defence Committee.** The Defence Committee (DC) is the primary decision-making committee in Defence. It comprises SECDEF as Chair; CDF, VCDF, the Associate Secretary, Deputy Secretary Strategic Policy and Intelligence (DEPSEC SP&I) and the Chief Finance Officer. In the absence of SECDEF, CDF assumes the chair. The Committee's focus is on major capability and resource trade-offs, and the shared accountabilities which include:

- a. integration of strategic and policy advice to Government including bi-annual assurance to the Defence Ministers that strategy, capability and resources are aligned;

- b. setting and monitoring top level resource allocations, including the appropriate balance of resources between capital, operating and personnel costs;
- c. approval of plans and scrutiny of performance against those plans including the Corporate Plan, the associated Annual Plan and the Investment Plan as recommended by the respective committees;
- d. endorsement of the investment portfolio and capability proposals recommended by the Investment Committee; and
- e. consideration of the significant risks escalated by the EBC and IC.

4.36 **Enterprise Business Committee.** The EBC is a subsidiary of the DC and is responsible for the effective running of the organisation of Defence. Its remit includes corporate planning, performance monitoring and reporting, enterprise risk management, information management and service delivery reform. It is chaired by the Associate Secretary and the alternate chair is VCDF. The decisions of the committee are binding across Defence.

4.37 **Investment Committee.** Chaired by VCDF, the IC is responsible for bringing into being the future force and supporting enablers. It ensures proposals are: consistent with strategic guidance, integrated and interoperable, affordable, tailored and technically and commercially feasible. IC outcomes are a standing item at the DC, and all decisions of the IC are binding across the Defence organisation.

4.38 **Chiefs of Service Committee.** The role of the Chiefs of Service Committee (COSC) is to provide strategic advice to CDF. It provides CDF with advice on the following:

- a. preparedness including joint collective training
- b. current requirements for enabling functions
- c. ADF specific policy
- d. the ADF workforce framework, including employment frameworks, diversity and joint force establishments and stewardship of the military workforce
- e. ADF conditions of service.

4.39 The COSC permanent members comprise CDF (Chairman), SECDEF, VCDF, the Service Chiefs and CJOPS. Permanently invited members are DEPSEC SP&I, Deputy Secretary Defence People, Chief Joint Capability and Gender Adviser to CDF. The chiefs of staff to CDF, SECDEF and VCDF are nominated as advisers to COSC. Only CDF may vary the composition of the committee.

4.40 **Strategic Command Group.** The Strategic Command Group (SCG) is the primary advisory forum which supports CDF as commander of the ADF. It provides situational awareness of ADF operations, critical incidents and strategic matters. It is employed by CDF to issue direction and guidance on ADF matters, and to coordinate responses to major incidents while ensuring Groups and Services have a common understanding of issues and priorities.

4.41 **Strategic Policy Committee.** The Strategic Policy Committee is chaired by SECDEF and makes decisions on key strategic issues including; strategic guidance for major capability decisions, development of Cabinet submissions on major policy issues, policy for major initiatives or international engagement and Defence positions on significant international dialogues.

Support from other sources

4.42 Other government agencies may support Defence and deployed commanders in a whole-of-government approach. This support should be coordinated at the highest practicable level. Government legislation, conventions, departmental instructions, contracts and memoranda of understanding control these supporting agencies. In the case of agencies with legislative obligations, direction and/or command is conducted through the Minister responsible for that agency. In the case of contractors, supervision is the responsibility of the contracting Defence Group.

THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL

4.43 The operational level commander exercises command of assigned forces.² This includes providing direction and resources to the forces taking military action. The focus of command at this level is on forming the JTF, deploying the force into the area of operations, sustaining the force, allocating resources and providing guidance to best achieve strategic objectives and effects. The operational level commander links military strategic objectives with all tactical activity in the theatre and directs military resources to achieve the end state.

4.44 In the ADF, the operational level is the primary responsibility of CJOPS, who uses operational art and campaign design (see below and Australian Defence Doctrine Publication (ADDP) 3.0—*Campaigns and Operations* and ADDP 5.0—*Joint Planning*).

Definitions

Operational art. The skilful employment of military forces to attain strategic goals through the design, organisation, sequencing and direction of campaigns and major operations. Operational art translates strategic into operational and ultimately tactical actions. It requires a commander to:

- (a) identify the military conditions or end-state that constitute the strategic objective
- (b) decide the operational objectives that must be achieved to reach the desired end state
- (c) order a sequence of actions that lead to fulfilment of the operational objectives
- (d) apply the military resources allocated to sustain the desired sequence of actions.

Campaign design. The manner in which the Chief of Joint Operations expresses a vision of how the campaign may unfold and how desired objectives will be sequenced and synchronised.

4.45 ADF commanders at the operational level include:

- a. CJOPS
- b. Deputy Chief of Joint Operations (DCJOPS)
- c. single-Service environmental commanders

² The states of command relevant to the operational level are described in Chapter 5.

- d. Special Operations Commander Australia (SOCAUST)
- e. Commander Joint Logistics (CJLOG)
- f. Commander 1st Division (COMD 1 DIV)/Commander Deployable Joint Force Headquarters (COMD DJFHQ)
- g. Commander Joint Task Force (CJTF).

Operational command by Chief of Joint Operations

4.46 Depending on the nature and scale of an operation, and within the constraints of CDF's charter letter and any amplifying directive, CJOPS commands operations directly and exercises theatre command (tcomd) over assigned forces. CJOPS designs a campaign or operational plan, commands assigned forces and directs the major operations of a campaign. CJOPS is accountable to CDF, and CJOPS' priorities are reviewed annually by CDF.

4.47 In addition to the command function described in paragraphs 4.31-32, and with the support of Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQJOC), CJOPS:

- a. identifies Defence response options through the development of Contingency and Operational Plans
- b. manages operational and HQJOC organisational risks
- c. develops and manages joint collective training of the ADF in accordance with CDF's annual training guidance
- d. certifies assigned forces as ready for operations
- e. conducts and evaluates activities assigned to JOC within the Program of ADF Activities.

4.48 CJOPS also has other responsibilities including as the ADF search and rescue authority, the coordinator for Defence Assistance to the Civil Community (DACC) and Defence Force Aid to the Civil Authority (DFACA), and governance coordination for Defence simulation.

Deputy Chief of Joint Operations

4.49 DCJOPS is responsible for coordinating the HQ staff effort, through the HQJOC Branch Heads, to plan, control and coordinate campaigns, joint and combined operations and exercises (see ADDP 5.0—*Joint Planning*).

Single-Service environmental commanders

4.50 Environmental commanders are responsible to their respective Service Chiefs for raising, training and sustaining forces under their command. They are responsible to CJOPS for contributing operationally ready force elements (FE) from within their commands.

4.51 **Commander Australian Fleet (COMAUSFLT).** COMAUSFLT is responsible to Chief of Navy (CN) for the force generation of naval elements for subsequent employment on operations by CJOPS. This responsibility includes group training (ie task group level) and the naval aspects of joint collective training together with the mounting process to assure that the required level of capability has been met.

4.52 **Commander Forces Command (COMD FORCOMD).** COMD FORCOMD is responsible to Chief of Army (CA) for generating Army FE through a single training

continuum that unifies individual and collective training. COMD FORCOMD then assigns FE to Headquarters 1st Division (HQ 1 Div) to undertake mission-specific training, assessment and certification prior to force assignment to CJOPS for operations.

4.53 Air Commander Australia (ACAUST). ACAUST is responsible to Chief of Air Force (CAF) for the capability management of operational forces and for the raising, training and sustainment of Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) forces. ACAUST reports directly to CAF on all aspects relating to the delivery of RAAF capability to meet CAF and CJOPS tasking.

Other joint commanders

4.54 Special Operations Commander Australia. SOCAUST commands Special Operations Command (SOCOMD), and has higher command relationships with CDF, CA and CJOPS. SOCOMD is allocated to COMD to CJOPS for Special Operations planning and conducting campaigns, operations, joint and combined exercises, and other directed activities. For domestic counter-terrorist and other sensitive strategic operations, SOCAUST has a direct relationship with CDF. SOCAUST is responsible to CA for generating and preparing assigned units, and for providing a scaleable headquarters (see ADPP 3.12—*Special Operations*).

4.55 Commander Joint Logistics. CJLOG leads the Defence logistic system that provides global support to operations. In this capacity, CJLOG has operational responsibilities to CJOPS and other operational commanders for the provision of:

- a. logistic support to campaigns, operations, exercises and other activities
- b. logistic advice
- c. the coordination of support to operations by the enabling groups.

4.56 Joint Logistics Command (JLC) provides logistics and movement support to operations, force preparation and raise, train and sustain activities. JLC develops tactical level guidance, taken from HQJOC guidance, to sustain operational forces (see ADPP 4.0—*Defence Logistics*).

4.57 Commander 1st Division and Deployable Joint Force Headquarters. The primary role of COMD 1 Div is to prepare and command assigned forces in order to meet directed operational requirements. COMD 1 Div is also COMD DJFHQ. This arrangement gives the ADF a two-star level HQ that can be deployed at short notice. COMD DJFHQ's key tasks include providing a scalable HQJTF to meet preparedness priorities, the generation and certification of forces, and the joint lead for developing amphibious capabilities. DJFHQ is under operational control (opcon) to CJOPS for operational planning (see Chapter 5).

4.58 Commander Joint Task Force. CJTF are appointed as required to undertake planning, which might be conducted at the operational or tactical levels (see ADPP 5.0—*Joint Planning*).

Authority for orders in the joint environment

CDF directs that any officer, warrant officer or non-commissioned officer may give lawful orders when in joint units or where joint responsibilities are held. The exercise of command power will occur primarily within existing chains of command. However, this will not prevent ADF members, regardless of their service, exercising command to maintain safety, military discipline, or uphold ADF values.

THE TACTICAL LEVEL

4.59 ADF force elements generally operate at the tactical level. At the tactical level, JTF commanders execute the campaign or operation plan employing subordinate FE commensurate with the task, operation or activity. The elements of the ADF tactical command structure are described below.

Joint task forces

4.60 A JTF is established when required to co-ordinate force elements of two or more Services, other joint force activities, or with another Government agency or a non-governmental organisation. For further details of the command and control aspects of multiagency operations see Chapter 7. The JTF is dissolved once the mission and end state have been achieved.

4.61 The composition of JTF may vary from small and specialised to very large, perhaps comprising a significant portion of the ADF. The composition of a JTF is largely determined by the mission and situation and is outlined in the CDF order establishing the force. This order also details the broad command arrangements for the operation and assigned FE.

4.62 FE are subordinate elements of a JTF and are known, in order from highest to lowest, as task groups (TG), task units (TU) and task elements (TE). These FE may be single Service tactical organisations (for example, Naval task groups or Army battle groups), or joint forces assembled into environmental or functional components. A mixture of structures may be used (see Chapter 6).

Joint Task Force Commanders

4.63 A CJTF is designated by CDF or CJOPS and is responsible for operations as directed. Commanders of JTFs plan and execute operations, often supported by component commanders.

4.64 The authority establishing a JTF appoints the CJTF and assigns the mission and subordinate FE. CJTF is responsible for making recommendations to the establishing commander on the proper employment of forces to achieve the mission.

4.65 The responsibilities of a CJTF include:

- a. exercising C2 over assigned and attached FE
- b. developing a detailed plan for approval by the establishing authority
- c. requesting rules of engagement (ROE) to accomplish the assigned mission
- d. notifying the establishing authority when prepared to assume responsibility for the assigned joint force area of operations
- e. ensuring that the JTF operates as an effective, mutually supporting team
- f. using assigned or attached FE effectively to achieve the mission
- g. providing guidance to FE for the planning and conduct of operations
- h. monitoring the operation and keeping the superior commander informed
- i. coordinating with other forces and agencies not assigned or attached, including friendly forces and governments
- j. establishing, if necessary, a coordinating procedure for specific functions or activities among assigned, attached and supporting FE

- k. establishing the succession of command within the JTF
- l. allocating tasks to subordinate commanders.

Joint task force component commanders

4.66 Where the component method of command is used, component commanders are appointed. JTF component commanders are responsible for commanding their components (such as land, maritime, air, special operations or logistics components) in accordance with joint and single-Service doctrine to achieve their allocated tasks in support of CJTF's objectives.

4.67 The responsibilities of a JTF component commander include:

- a. exercising C2 of assigned, attached and supporting FE
- b. coordinating with other component commanders to ensure the effective and efficient conduct of operations
- c. planning and executing operations in accordance with CJTF guidance and plans
- d. monitoring the operation and, as required, passing information to CJTF
- e. ensuring administrative and logistic support for the force
- f. providing liaison personnel to CJTF and other component commanders directed.

CHAPTER 5

STATES OF COMMAND

Executive summary

- The states of command are used to describe the framework of degrees of authority that may exist between headquarters, joint task forces and force elements.
- There are two groups of command authority: standing and operational.
- The standing command authorities are full command, theatre command, and national command.
- The operational command authorities are operational command, tactical command, operational control and tactical control.
- Command authorities are supplemented by other administrative, support and coordination arrangements designed to ease the span of command of the commander.
- The administrative authorities are administrative control, local administration and technical control.
- The forms of operational or administrative support are direct support and in support of.
- There are two coordination authorities and they are coordinating authority and direct liaison authorised.

Defining the battlespace and establishing a clear command and control system should be regarded as the very essence of effective planning at the operational level of war. All other operational functions—including manoeuvre, fires, logistics, intelligence and force protection—rely on a clear demarcation by an operational headquarters of battlespace parameters and command and control organisation.

Lieutenant Colonel Chris Field
Planning in Operation Iraqi Freedom
2003

INTRODUCTION

5.1 To ensure that commanders at various levels have sufficient command and control of assigned forces to carry out their responsibilities, they are assigned specified degrees of authority. For simplicity and consistency, framework of degrees of authority, known as states of command, has been established. These states of command may exist between headquarters (HQ), joint task forces (JTF) and force elements (FE).

5.2 There is no direct relationship between command arrangements at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, and the states of command. Commanders at

each of the levels are concerned with the strategic, operational and tactical levels within the command structure (see Chapter 4), whereas the states of command are concerned with assigning forces, missions and tasks, and the ability to delegate operational authority. Furthermore, various administrative authorities have been established to support the command of assigned forces.

5.3 The descriptions of each of the states of command are generic. Supplementary details pertaining to the command arrangements for specific operations are promulgated in the directive or operation order (opord) applicable to each operation. Operational planners must be cognisant of the requirement to clearly outline command states and relationships within specific operational documents.

STANDING COMMAND AUTHORITIES

5.4 The command authorities are standing and operational. Standing command authorities comprises full command (fullcomd), theatre command (tcomd) and national command (natcomd).

Definitions

Full command. The military authority and responsibility of a commander to issue orders to subordinates. It covers every aspect of military operations and administration and exists only within national services.

Theatre command. The authority given by the Chief of the Defence Force to the Chief of Joint Operations to command assigned forces to prepare for and conduct operations (campaigns, operations, combined and joint exercises, and other activities as directed).

National command. A command that is organised by, and functions under the authority of a specific nation.

Full command

5.5 Full command equates to ownership of the force and conveys with it complete operational and administrative authority and responsibility. The term full command effectively represents command at the strategic level. The exercise of full command includes responsibility for resource utilisation, administration, planning and controlling forces. The right to exercise full command is enshrined in legislation, with section 9 of the *Defence Act 1903* granting the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) and the Service Chiefs full command of the ADF and its three Services respectively. These four personnel are the only members of the ADF who can exercise full command.

5.6 CDF's full command includes the authority to conduct operations, when directed by the Minister for Defence (MINDEF) and Cabinet on an occasion-by-occasion basis. This is the authority required by a commander before legally using force in pursuit of national objectives.

5.7 Service Chiefs exercise full command of their Service subject to CDF's direction following the *Defence Legislation Amendment (First Principles) Act 2015*. As such, Service Chiefs exercise complete administrative authority over, and have complete administrative responsibility for, their Service. They are responsible for

raising, training and sustaining the FE of their Service for operations and for advising CDF on the employment of these FE.

5.8 The full command held by each Service Chief includes all authority required to command, lead and manage the respective Service in preparation for operations. A Service Chief whose FE have been assigned to another commander for operations, exercises or other selected activities, remains responsible for those residual command responsibilities not covered by the operational commander's delegated authority and responsibilities.

5.9 In discharging their raise, train and sustain responsibilities, Service Chiefs keep CJOPS informed of any activity or development that may have an adverse impact on current forces assigned, or on forces expected to be assigned to subsequent rotations into a joint force area of operations (JFAO). For example, Service Chiefs inform CJOPS of changes in training or administrative procedures, or of any significant capability management issues that arise.

5.10 Full command exists only within a national force. No commander from another country can exercise full command over ADF forces. CDF retains full command of the ADF at all times, regardless of any delegated authorities. The term command, as used internationally, implies a lesser degree of authority than when it is used in a purely national sense. No multinational force commander has full command over forces assigned since, in assigning forces to a multinational force, contributing nations delegate only operational command or operational control (see Chapter 7).

5.11 CDF delegates certain aspects of his full command authority and responsibility to CJOPS, as specified in CDF directives. The delegated aspects of full command are termed theatre command.

Theatre command

5.12 Theatre command (tcomd) is the authority given by CDF to CJOPS to command assigned forces during preparation for and conduct of campaigns and operations. Tcomd is limited by function and assignment and cannot be delegated or transferred. CDF is the only authority who can direct Service Chiefs to assign forces to CJOPS under tcomd.

5.13 CJOPS, on behalf of CDF, normally exercises tcomd over all ADF forces in a designated operational theatre—for example, during the last decade all ADF forces deployed to the Middle East Area of Operations (MEAO), regardless of their Service, were deployed under the authority extended to CJOPS by tcomd.

5.14 Tcomd effectively provides CJOPS with the authority to exercise the operational component of full command. When forces are assigned to CJOPS under tcomd, CJOPS determines the level of administrative responsibility necessary for the effective and efficient conduct of operations. The residual administrative responsibilities remain the responsibility of the Service Chiefs. The administrative responsibility described here does not refer to 'administrative authorities'—for example, CJOPS cannot decide that HQJOC has techcon. The division of these responsibilities between CJOPS and Service Chiefs is not definitive and varies according to the nature and duration of the operation or exercise, forces assigned, location of the deployment and the rotation plan for personnel and equipment. These arrangements are agreed during the planning phase and detailed in campaign and operations orders and/or instructions.

5.15 Depending on the size of the operation, tcomd can be quite a significant and complex responsibility. To alleviate this, tcomd includes the authority for CJOPS to assign and task forces as necessary. CJOPS therefore exercises tcomd through:

- a. national commanders, during multinational (MN) operations
- b. JTF commanders
- c. any other commander conducting operations or activities for CJOPS.

5.16 Although CJOPS can assign and task forces, CJOPS cannot delegate tcomd to a subordinate commander. CJOPS may, however, delegate operational command (opcomd), operational control (opcon), tactical command (tacomd), tactical control (tacon), and/or natcomd of assigned forces to subordinate commanders. Opcomd cannot be further delegated unless specified. Lower levels of command authority may be further delegated.

5.17 Unless otherwise directed by CDF, tcomd implies the authority for CJOPS to act as the Australian operational level military point of contact in relationships with other nations' commands, Australian diplomatic missions, other Australian agencies, and agencies of countries in-theatre. For example, as a result of the strategic responsibilities assigned to the Commander United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) by the US National Command Authority, a defined relationship exists between CDF, CJOPS and Commander USPACOM. CDF deals with Commander USPACOM at the strategic level, while CJOPS deals with Commander USPACOM at the operational level.

5.18 Tcomd includes the authority to ensure that FE are prepared for operations, as required by CDF and preparedness directives. CJOP's primary management tool for achieving preparedness requirements is the Program of ADF Activities (PADFA). Tcomd is limited to that responsibility for preparedness devolved to CJOPS by CDF and the Chiefs of Service Committee in preparedness directives and PADFA, and by CDF in directives to CJOPS. The raising of single-Service FE to designated levels of capability is the responsibility of the appropriate Service Chief (see Chapter 4).

5.19 During operations, tcomd includes the authority to assign priorities and issue directives to Commander Joint Logistics (CJLOG), for logistic support to meet the theatre commander's operational requirements and scheme of manoeuvre. When the support of other enabling organisations outside Joint Logistics Command is required, CDF may assign them to CJOPS under support arrangements.

National command

5.20 Natcomd is a standing command authority, conferred upon an appointed Australian commander, to safeguard Australian national interests during MN operations. In most circumstances natcomd would be conferred upon the senior Australian commander in the JFAO.

5.21 Unless specified otherwise, CJOPS is the conduit of natcomd functions between CDF and the Australian national commander of forces assigned to CJOPS. For example, forces deployed to the MEAO in the 2000s and 2010s were under tcomd of CJOPS, who delegated natcomd to the senior deployed ADF commander (Commander Australian Contingent).

5.22 Natcomd provides for the oversight of assigned national forces and includes:

- a. liaison with the MN force commander and the Australian chain of command over changes to operational command authority

- b. maintenance of access by Australian FE to their military representatives on national matters involving the employment, administration and conditions of service particular to Australian forces.

5.23 Natcomd does not in itself include operational command authorities, nor does it include administrative functions. Operational command authorities and administrative functions must be specified if a commander is to concurrently exercise both them and natcomd. For further details about command arrangements for MN operations see Chapter 7.

HISTORICAL EXAMPLE NATIONAL COMMAND OF AUSTRALIAN FORCES DEPLOYED OVERSEAS

During the Anglo-Boer War in South Africa (1899–1902), Colonial and later Australian forces were placed entirely at the disposal of the British command. That experience, together with Federation, led to an Australian determination to maintain the national identity of forces deployed overseas.

In World War I (WW I), the Australian Imperial Force (AIF) was assigned under operational command of the Imperial General Staff but was administered by the AIF commander. The latter reported to the Australian Government and was directed to keep the force intact, uniquely Australian, and committed strategically in accordance with national direction. This set a precedent for World War II (WW II) and subsequent deployments in Korea and South East Asia.

The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) was controlled differently, as it had been agreed at the 1911 Imperial Conference that upon a declaration of war, the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board and naval services would come under direct control of the British Admiralty. The Australian fleet would become a squadron of the Royal Navy (RN), taking orders directly from London, or from the RN officer under whose command they were placed.

During WW II, the RAN was again placed under command of the RN, as well as USA Navy commanders. The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) dispatched large numbers of aircrew to Britain, the Middle East and Burma and, although there were RAAF squadrons, many individuals were absorbed into Royal Air Force units. An attempt at forming a RAAF HQ in Britain, as the AIF had, was ineffective. In the South West Pacific Area, however, HQ RAAF Command maintained RAAF forces as an Australian entity.

With the increasing commitment of the ADF to United Nations and MN operations from the 1990s and the increasing emphasis on joint C2, it has now become standard to establish a national HQ responsible for forces of the three Services. For the 2003 commitment to Iraq, Minister of Defence Senator Robert Hill stated, 'the commander of Australian troops is Australian. Australian commanders command Australian troops and a coalition of the willing led by the United States of America (USA) would in effect be managed by the USA. So in terms of the management of the total coalition, that would be USA leadership with Australia in the loop. But decisions relating to commitment of our forces, targeting by our forces, their rules of engagement are all Australian decisions.

OPERATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITIES

5.24 Operational command authorities may be qualified by time, task and function. In descending order, these include opcomd, tacomd, opcon and tacon, and are defined below.

Definitions

Operational command. The authority granted to a commander to specify missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to re-assign forces and to retain or delegate operational control, tactical command and/or tactical control as may be deemed necessary. It does not of itself include responsibility for administration or logistics

Tactical command. The authority delegated to a commander to specify missions and tasks to forces under his command for the accomplishment of the mission specified by higher authority.

Operational control. The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time or location; deploy units concerned and retain or delegate tactical control of those units. It does not include authority to allocate separate employment of components of the units concerned. It does not, of itself, include responsibility for administration or logistics.

Tactical control. The detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or manoeuvres necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.

The delegation of operational command authorities

5.25 Operational command authorities are delegated by CJOPS or subordinate commanders and empower a commander to employ assigned forces to achieve missions. The delegated authority may be command itself, or degrees of command and control (C2) with certain qualifications. The operational command authority granted to a commander must be stated with clarity and precision. The commander and subordinate commanders must understand precisely the C2 arrangements for the operation.

5.26 The degree of authority delegated should be sufficient to allow a commander to direct and deploy assigned forces to complete tasks without reference to a higher authority. The delegation should be balanced with the commander's level of responsibility. A commander should not be assigned more forces than required or given excessive authority over forces, as capabilities may be wasted that could be better used elsewhere.

5.27 Levels of authority and responsibility may be:

- a. directed by common usage
- b. specified in detailed subordinate doctrine, alliance agreements, memorandums of agreement and memorandums of understanding
- c. promulgated on a case by case basis in documents such as directives and opords.

5.28 Only one commander exercises opcomd of any FE. A commander assigned opcomd cannot further delegate opcomd, unless specified. Lower levels of operational authority (tacomd, opcon or tacon) may be delegated to subordinate commanders.

5.29 A summary of what a commander is authorised to do with assigned forces is given in Table 5.1 and Table 5.2. For details of MN operations see Chapter 7.

Table 5.1: Australian Defence Force command authorities

	Australian Defence Force states of command						
	standing command authorities			operational authorities			
	fullcomd	tcomd	natcomd	opcomd	tacomd	opcon	tacon
Specify missions	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes ¹	No	No
Specify tasks	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes ¹	No	No
Direct FE for specific mission/task	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes (local direction)
Deploy FE	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No
Allocate separate employment of FE	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Administrative responsibility	Yes	As specified	No	If specified	If specified	If specified	If specified

¹ To accord with the mission given by the higher authority

Table 5.2: Ability of each command authority to delegate authority

Ability to delegate authority ²	Australian Defence Force states of command						
	standing command authorities			operational authorities			
	fullcomd	tcomd	natcomd	opcomd	tacomd	opcon	tacon
fullcomd	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
tcomd	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No
natcomd	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
opcomd	Yes	Yes	No	No (unless specified)	No	No	No
tacomd	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
opcon	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
tacon	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

² These standing authorities cannot be delegated when operating within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Alliance. For MN operations commanders must confirm the appropriate delegations with each national chain of command.

Transfer of authority

5.30 Operational authority can be delegated or transferred by commanders within the definition of each authority. The transfer of authority must:

- a. be unambiguous
- b. clearly define the degree of authority

c. clearly specify the point at which the authority becomes effective.

5.31 This is achieved through the promulgation of a written mechanism, such as an opord, which provides details of the authorities that are being transferred, who they are being transferred to, and how long they are being transferred. Forces are transferred using the terms 'assign' when passing from one commander to another, and 'attach' when joining an FE. The level of authority to be exercised on transfer, including responsibility for administration and logistics, must be specified as part of the operational authority and is not determined by the use of these terms.

5.32 The process of transferring FE equally applies to exercises as well as operations. Using the same process for exercises and operations provides a consistent approach and ensures clarity of the states of command of all FE involved.

5.33 The assignment and reassignment of FE must align with a recognised phase of an operation and must be designed to balance the needs and timing imperatives of the single-Services and CJOPS. Requirements for the handover and/or hand back of FE will vary by operation and by FE. Precise details for each handover and/or hand back of FE are included in opord, directives and procedures.

Operational command

5.34 Opcomd is the highest degree of operational authority that can be assigned to a subordinate commander by CJOPS. It is usually assigned for the duration of an operation. It provides the subordinate commander with the authority to task assets over the range of their capabilities without further approval being sought.

5.35 Only one commander exercises opcomd of assigned forces. Opcomd of ADF FE is not normally assigned to a non-ADF commander.

5.36 A commander assigned opcomd may:

- a. specify missions and tasks
- b. reassign them
- c. allocate separate employment of components of FE
- d. delegate tacomd, opcon, or tacon to a subordinate commander
- e. specify the requirements for reception, staging, on forwarding and integration (RSO&I) of forces moving into their operational area
- f. specify reputation management requirements with their operational area, including the conduct of military public affairs activities.

5.37 While opcomd does not of itself include responsibility for administration or logistic support, commanders holding opcomd clearly require and invariably hold a level of authority and a level of responsibility for both administration and logistic support, and other aspects of operational importance. Levels of authority and responsibility vary according to environment, Service, country and circumstances.

5.38 A commander assigned forces by CJOPS under opcomd cannot delegate opcomd to a subordinate commander unless specified. Lower levels of command (tacomd, opcon, or tacon) may be delegated to subordinate commanders.

Tactical command

5.39 Tacomd is commonly used below opcomd in single-Service environments. Tacomd allows a commander freedom to task forces and to group and regroup forces as required.

5.40 A commander assigned tacomd of forces may:

- a. specify missions and tasks provided they accord with the mission given by higher authority
- b. allocate separate employment of components of FE involved
- c. delegate tacomd or tacon to a subordinate commander.

5.41 Tacomd is normally the highest operational authority that can be assigned to a non-ADF commander over ADF FE in MN operations.

Operational control

5.42 Opcon is similar to tacomd, except that it does not authorise a commander to specify missions and tasks, or to group and regroup forces.

5.43 A commander assigned opcon of forces may:

- a. direct assigned or attached forces, limited by function, time or location
- b. delegate opcon or tacon to a subordinate commander.

Tactical control

5.44 Tacon gives a commander the authority to locally direct a FE. Normally, tacon is not a pre-designated operational authority assigned at the operational level. Rather, it is intended as short-term authority delegated by a local tactical commander for the immediate conduct of tactical activity.

5.45 A commander delegated tacon may:

- a. direct FE in manoeuvres to accomplish missions or tasks
- b. delegate tacon to another commander.

5.46 A commander assigned tacon of FE must use them to accomplish the task/s assigned by a higher commander. A commander cannot assign new missions or tasks to FE under their tacon.

ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES

5.47 Administrative authorities determine which commander is responsible for addressing the administrative aspects of command and comprise: administrative control and local administration.

Definitions

Administrative Control. Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organisations in respect to administrative matters such as personnel management, supply services and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organisations. Note: Local administration is a subset of administrative control.

Local administration. Direction or exercise of administration controlled by a local commander and related specifically to the troops or to the operation in the commander's area. Note: Local administration is a subset of administrative control.

The delegation of administrative authorities

5.48 Service Chiefs retain overall administrative authority for their respective Services, which they exercise through the chain of command. In the case of FE assigned to CJOPS under tcomd arrangements, the Service Chiefs exercise their administrative responsibilities through CJOPS and the operational chain of command. Therefore, the assignment of FE under tcomd includes the administrative control of assigned forces, unless otherwise specified.

5.49 Tcomd also authorises CJOPS to coordinate with subordinate commanders and to approve any joint aspects of administration and support necessary to the conduct of missions and tasks. Tcomd provides CJOPS with the authority to maintain discipline as a function of command including, for example, appointment of commanding officers for discipline and convening of courts-martial on matters of a joint nature.

5.50 Tcomd includes the authority for CJOPS to assign priorities and issue directives to Chief of Joint Logistics (CJLOG) for logistic support within a theatre of operations, to meet the operational requirements and scheme of manoeuvre. Tcomd also includes the authority for CJOPS, through Service Chiefs and Group Heads, to assign priorities to other Defence supporting organisations for the support of operations. Tcomd provides CJOPS with the administrative authority to use the resources of all forces assigned as necessary to accomplish missions and tasks.

5.51 When assigning FE under opcomd and tacomd, the level of administrative support required and provided must be clearly specified. In some cases, the nature and/or location of the tasking of assigned FE may preclude the use of established procedures for the provision of support. In these cases, the FE may be concurrently assigned under an operational command authority to one HQ or FE, and under an administrative authority to another.

Administrative control

5.52 Administrative control is the authority given to a HQ or FE to address the administrative needs of subordinate FE. These needs include personnel management, supply of equipment and other stores, and other administrative matters that are not included in the operational missions of the subordinate FE.

5.53 For example, a RAAF lodger FE at an air base may be assigned under administrative control of the local combat support unit. In this case, the local combat support unit is responsible for all administrative matters relating to the lodger unit,

including such things as housing and feeding its members and maintaining its vehicle fleet.

Local administration

5.54 Local administration is conducted by a local commander, who may be assigned administrative authority over all FE within their local area. Responsibilities may be specified in the opord pertaining to each operation and local administration may involve:

- a. discipline and administrative sanctions
- b. provision of services and administration, such as accommodation, water, light, power, care and wellbeing of personnel including rationing, hygiene and sanitation, fire protection, maintenance of barracks and camps, and supervision of stores accounting and internal checking
- c. allocation of ranges, training areas and recreation facilities
- d. local movement of personnel and materiel
- e. local road traffic control and movement
- f. security, including preventative measures against vandalism and theft
- g. honours and awards
- h. supervision and maintenance of safety
- i. allocation of any local pool of labour and unit transport
- j. allocation of local duties.

5.55 For example, an infantry battalion located at a RAAF base may be assigned under the air base commander for local administration. In this case, the infantry battalion would be administered by the air base commander for local administrative issues and for the duration of its time in location only. Other administrative issues, such as those requiring action over a longer-term than the duration of the battalion's stay at the RAAF base, would remain the responsibility of the HQ or FE assigned administrative control of the infantry battalion.

Technical control

5.56 Technical control (techcon) advice is from a designated authority appointed to oversee the efficient use of a capability, often across command boundaries. For an operational commander, techcon advice will be in regard to the employment of capabilities used within their operating parameters.

5.57 Techcon received from a delegated authority may not be modified by a commander. However, the advice may be rejected in part or in whole by a commander in consideration of operational factors. The commander is to document the reasons for rejecting the advice and is accountable for the consequences of rejecting the advice. Such consequences may include loss of services.

Technical control. The provision of specialist and technical advice by designated authorities for the management and operation of forces.

Notes:

1. Technical control is exercised by capability managers and is not normally delegated. It is not included in a delegation of theatre command.
2. Technical control is exercised through the Chief of Joint Operations for assigned forces.
3. Technical control advice may not be modified but may be rejected in part or in total by a commander in consideration of operational factors and within their span of command.
4. A commander is accountable for the consequences of rejecting the advice.

5.58 Techcon, like other authorities, must be assigned. A designated authority with technical control can still offer general advice; it does not exclusively offer only techcon advice. Given the important distinction between the two, a designated authority should clearly state whether the advice it is offering is techcon advice or general advice.

5.59 A commander can authorise a delegate to exercise techcon within that commander's authority. If authorised, techcon may be further delegated. Care should be taken with any further delegation of techcon, because it is authorising personnel further down the command chain to have the ability to offer techcon advice to the commander, for which the commander must document reasons for the rejection of technical advice.

5.60 The exercising of techcon implies the designated authority has an understanding of the employment of that capability within the commander's environment. The designated authority is likely to rely on reports and returns from within the commander's FE to have the comprehensive understanding on which advice can be offered. The designated authority can request reports and returns from FE not under the designated authorities command authority but requires the commander to order subordinates to provide reports and returns if it is to be mandatory.

5.61 A designated authority may provide technical advice direct to a commander or pass it to the staff for forwarding to the commander. The latter allows the commander's staff to relate the advice to the operational situation in briefing the commander. The staff is to make it clear when the advice is techcon advice and not just general advice.

5.62 In some circumstances, staff may be able to accommodate the techcon without having to first brief the commander. This would occur when the advice relates to equipment settings for which there is no impact upon a commander's plan.

SUPPORT ARRANGEMENTS

5.63 A commander may be provided operational or administrative support by FE that are not under their operational or administrative authority. In this case, support arrangements are established. The two support arrangements used within the ADF are direct support and 'in support of'.

Definitions

Direct support. The support provided by a force element (FE) not attached to or under command of the supported FE commander but required to give priority to the support required by that FE.

In support of. Assisting another force element while remaining under the initial command.

Direct support

5.64 A FE that is tasked to provide priority support to another FE that is not under the same commander is in direct support of the supported FE.

5.65 A FE in direct support cannot be tasked to provide the same resource under direct support to more than one FE. While tasked in direct support, the FE is not attached to or under command of the supported FE but remains under command of its parent FE. The support may be withdrawn only with the agreement of the supported FE or direction from a superior authority. Planning and tasking remains with the supporting FE's parent command. The support provided would usually include the provision of advice, liaison and communications.

5.66 Examples of direct support are:

- a. gunships from an Army aviation regiment may be in direct support of a brigade for a specific task, such as a river crossing
- b. a maritime patrol aircraft may be tasked in direct support of a maritime task group for anti-surface warfare or anti-submarine warfare activities.

In support of

5.67 'In support of' is the lowest level of control and does not confer on the supported FE any responsibility or authority for administration or movement of the supporting FE. The commander of the supporting FE assigns priority to the support given in accordance with their own judgment or advice given by the supported FE. For example, a naval surface combatant may be assigned in support of an Army FE for naval gunfire support during an assault conducted by that Army FE.

Supported and supporting commanders

5.68 Prioritisation and coordination of FE across a variety of tasks is essential. A useful way for a superior commander to do this is by assigning supported or supporting commanders and designating the main effort in each phase of an operation (see Chapter 6).

5.69 Supported commanders have primary responsibility for all aspects of a task and are allocated resource priority. Supported commanders must indicate to supporting commanders their specific mission requirements and associated coordinating instructions.

5.70 Supporting commanders provide forces, equipment, logistics or other support to a supported commander. They must advise the supported commander on the availability and most appropriate employment of their assets. Supporting commanders under an in direct support arrangement are responsible for completing the tasks allocated to them by the supported commander. Supporting commanders

under an in support of arrangement may prioritise their own missions/tasks, however they must use any remaining capacity to assist the supported commander's tasks.

COORDINATION AUTHORITIES

5.71 When coordination is required between two or more countries or forces, coordination authorities are used to ensure the required level of coordination is achieved. The two coordination authorities are coordinating authority (CA) and direct liaison authorised (DIRLAUTH).

Definition

Coordinating authority. The authority granted to a commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more countries or commands, or two or more Services or two or more forces of the same Service.

Notes:

1. The commander has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved or their representatives but does not have the authority to compel agreement.
2. In case of disagreement between the agencies involved, the commander should attempt to obtain essential agreement by discussion.
3. In the event essential agreement cannot be obtained the matter will be referred to the appropriate authority.

Direct liaison authorised. That authority granted by a commander (any level) to a subordinate to directly consult or coordinate an action with a command or agency within or outside of the granting command.

Notes:

1. Direct liaison authorised is more applicable to planning than operations and always carries with it the requirement of keeping the commander granting direct liaison authorised informed.
2. Direct liaison authorised is a coordination relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised.

Coordinating authority

5.72 Coordinating authority (CA) is granted to a commander to enable them to coordinate specific functions or activities involving two or more countries or FE. The commander that has been granted coordinating authority has the power to enforce consultation between the FE but cannot compel them to agree. If the actors cannot agree, the commander with coordinating authority must refer the issues to higher authority.

Direct liaison authorised

5.73 Dirlauth is that authority granted by a commander to a subordinate to consult directly or to coordinate an action with an element within or outside the granting command.

HISTORICAL EXAMPLE AUSTRALIAN COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS IN URUZGAN PROVINCE, AFGHANISTAN, 2006-10

Contemporary military operations can require complicated command arrangements that concurrently utilise multiple states of command. Command arrangements for JTF633 during the period August 2006 to August 2010 are a good example. Elements of JTF633 were deployed to Uruzgan Province, Afghanistan and had an initial strength of 400 personnel, which grew to 1 080 by the end of the period. Its core roles included reconstruction tasks and, increasingly, training and mentoring to the Afghan National Army.



Commander Australian 1st Reconstruction Task Force (part of JTF633) and Dutch Task Force Uruzgan Commander stand before a map showing Afghanistan with Uruzgan Province painted green, Afghanistan, 2007

The C2 arrangements applied to JTF633 were derived from a national strategic decision that Australia would not command any of the Regional Commands that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) International Stabilization Force (ISAF) had established in Afghanistan. As a result of this decision, OPCON of JTF633 was given to the commander of the Dutch Task Force that was also deployed in Uruzgan Province. Natcomd was retained by Commander JTF633. This gave Commander JTF633 the power to veto the tactical employment of Australian forces by the Dutch commander in instances where this employment may have been contrary to

Australian operational or strategic interests. This power seldom, if ever, needed to be used, due to the good working relationship and mutual understanding between Australian and Dutch commanders.

An added complication was the concurrent deployment of an Australian Special Operations Task Group that was assigned to ISAF special operations forces. Its area of operations was limited to Uruzgan Province and its primary mission was to support JTF633 by seeking to deny the adversary sanctuaries and freedom of movement within the province. This combination of command arrangements was complicated, and its successful implementation depended on good will and understanding at all levels of command within ISAF. This demonstrates that military commanders at all levels need to be pragmatic and adaptable, especially when command arrangements are shaped by national strategic imperatives.

CHAPTER 6

METHODS OF COMMAND

Executive summary

- The Australian Defence Force recognises two methods for command and control of joint operations; the direct method and the component method.
- The direct method is useful for campaigns and operations of limited scale and intensity.
- The component method of command may be better suited for campaigns and operations of greater scale and intensity.
- With the component method, the force is divided into components, each with its own component commander who issues orders consistent with the broad direction of the joint commander.
- Components may be grouped along single-Service lines, or comprise functional groupings of force elements from more than one Service under appropriate states of command.


INTRODUCTION

6.1 The Australian Defence Force (ADF) recognises two methods of command and control (C2) of a Joint Task Force (JTF): the direct method and the component method. Selection of the most appropriate C2 method, including joint staff structure, should be guided by the principles of command and should consider the scale and intensity of the campaign or operation.

THE DIRECT METHOD

6.2 A commander joint task force (CJTF) may exercise command authority directly over assigned forces. The direct method (Figure 6.1) is normally used when the knowledge and capacity of the commander and staff are such that they can employ the capabilities of assigned forces effectively, and when the scale and intensity of the operation is limited. When using the direct method of command, the headquarters (HQ) must be appropriately staffed and equipped for the greater span of command.

Figure 6.1: The direct method of command



HISTORICAL EXAMPLE

THE DIRECT METHOD OF COMMAND: OPERATION VIC FIRES ASSIST

Beginning on 7 February 2009, under conditions of extreme heat and wind, up to 400 bush fires swept through the north-east of the state of Victoria. The speed and ferocity with which the fires spread caused a major disaster, responsible for 173 deaths, and for the destruction over 2000 houses and 3500 other structures.

On the same day, the Victorian Emergency Management Authority requested Defence Assistance to the Civil Community (DACC). At 2153 h, Chief of Joint Operations (CJOPS) issued the task order establishing Joint Task Force 662 and Operation VIC FIRES ASSIST. Between 8 February and 14 March, over 850 Defence personnel were deployed on this operation at any one time. Their tasks included providing logistics support, rapid impact assessments, hazardous risk search, fire mapping and conducting initial environmental damage assessments.



Personnel deployed on Operation VIC FIRES ASSIST conducting a rapid impact assessment

Throughout Operation VIC FIRES ASSIST, JTF 662 used the direct method of command. Under this arrangement, the commanders of contributing unit force element (FE) reported directly to Commander JTF 662, Brigadier Michael Arnold. This command arrangement was flexible and allowed for different FE to be easily added to or removed from the JTF as the operation transitioned from the initial response to the recovery phase.

THE COMPONENT METHOD

6.3 When the scale and intensity of the operation is great, the span of command may become too broad for effective use of the direct method of command. An alternative is to divide the force into components, each with its own commander who


issues orders consistent with the broad direction of the CJTF. This is known as the component method of command.

6.4 Component commanders are usually, though not always, collocated with the CJTF. They require staff support and command facilities (large or small, collocated or separate) depending on the operation.

6.5 Components may be grouped along single-Service lines, or they may comprise functional groupings of formations, units, sub-units or elements from more than one Service under appropriate states of command (see Chapter 5). An example of the latter is the assignment of tactical fighter aircraft under tactical control (tacon) of a maritime component commander for maritime air defence.

6.6 The component method of command is shown in Figure 6.2. The five types of component commanders shown in this figure indicate one possible division between components. In this division, three components (maritime, land and air) are environmentally determined. These may potentially be either single Service or functional in composition. The other two components (special operations and logistics) are functional. Although this division between components is typical (as it aligns with existing ADF command arrangements), it is not universal (see Chapter 4). The division between components, and the assignment of forces to each, is the responsibility of the CJTF.

Figure 6.2: The component method of command



Roles of component commanders

6.7 A CJTF will usually delegate force elements (FE) to a component commander under either tactical command (tacomd), operational control (opcon) or tacon arrangements. Component commanders are responsible for C2 of the FE within their component. This includes issuing orders and providing guidance consistent with the broad objectives of the CJTF. Component commanders may also be called upon to advise the CJTF regarding the employment of FE within their component.

HISTORICAL EXAMPLE THE COMPONENT METHOD OF COMMAND: OPERATION UNIFIED PROTECTOR

Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR was the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operation conducted from March to June 2011 to enforce United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, which established a no-fly zone over Libya and an arms embargo against it and demanded an immediate cease fire between President Gaddafi's forces and rebel groups.



NATO area of operations during Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR

Due to the complex nature of the operation, the size of the operational area and the number of countries contributing forces, it was decided to use the component method of command for the operation. An Allied Joint Force Command was established in Naples, Italy, commanded by Royal Canadian Air Force Lieutenant General Charles Bouchard. Under the overall command of AJFC, two component commands were established: Allied Maritime Component Command, based in Naples and commanded by Italian Navy Vice Admiral Rinaldo Veri; and Allied Air Component Command, based in Izmir, Turkey, and commanded by US Air Force Lieutenant General Ralph Jodice II.

Because of its limited mandate, ground forces were not deployed during the operation. Instead, NATO forces coordinated efforts with Libyan rebels, bringing an extra level of complexity to the operation. Despite this, the lack of NATO ground forces negated the need for a land component command, so one was not established.

SELECTION OF METHOD OF COMMAND

6.8 Selection of the most appropriate method of command, including joint staff structure, should be guided by the principles of command and by the scale and intensity of the campaign or operation. Additionally, the following factors may need to be considered:

- a. the nature of the mission
- b. the size and composition of the force
- c. the need to maintain flexibility
- d. political and geographic considerations
- e. communications.

6.9 Smaller, less complex JTF can often be commanded without the need to create components. HQ JTF staff directly controlling a force element group on behalf of a CJTF permits efficiencies in time and personnel. Examples of these types of JTF include JTF 639 for Operation RESOLUTE and JTF 635 for Operation ANODE.

6.10 For larger operations the size of the JTF and the complexity of the mission may dictate the establishment of components. An example of this type of JTF is the Australian commitment to operations in the Middle East in 2003-4. In this case, ADF elements were committed to coalition operations in the Persian Gulf, Iraq and Afghanistan and were placed under operational control of the lead coalition nation, which organised forces using the component method. An Australian national command element was also established to carry out national command functions determined by the Australian government (see Chapter 7).

Joint staff structures

6.11 Both methods of command employ the common joint staff system adapted from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization joint staff system (see Australian Defence Force Publication (ADFP) 5.0.1—*Joint Military Appreciation Process*). When the direct method of command is selected, all staff will be located within HQ JTF. This is referred to as an integrated staff structure. When the component method of command is selected, a smaller staff is required within HQ JTF, however each component commander also maintains their own staff to conduct planning and to provide direction to the force elements being commanded by the component commander. In this instance the overall structure is referred to as a component staff structure, even though each component's staff as well as the HQ JTF staff are individually organised along the same lines as an integrated staff.

SUPPORTED AND SUPPORTING COMMANDERS

6.12 One way for a CJTF to achieve coordination across a variety of operational tasks is by assigning subordinate commanders as either supported or supporting commanders and designating the main effort in each phase of an operation.

6.13 **Supported commander.** Supported commanders have primary responsibility for all aspects of an assigned task and are allocated resource priority.

Supported commanders must indicate to supporting commanders their support missions/requirements and associated coordinating instructions.

6.14 **Supporting commander.** Supporting commanders provide forces, equipment, logistics or other support to a supported commander as required. They must advise the supported commander on the availability and most appropriate employment of their assets. Supporting commanders under an 'in direct support' arrangement are responsible for completing the mission/tasks allocated to them by the supported commander. Supporting commanders under an 'in support of' arrangement may prioritise their own missions/tasks, however they must use any remaining capacity to assist the supported commander's mission/tasks.

6.15 **The assignment of supported and supporting commanders.** The assignment of supported and supporting commanders is dynamic and will change according to the needs of the situation. In a complex operation with multiple lines of operation, a supported commander on one line of operation may simultaneously be a supporting commander to another commander on a concurrent line of operation.

6.16 For example, in the lodgement phase of an amphibious operation the joint force maritime component commander may be designated the supported commander for the amphibious line of operation, which in this case is also usually designated the main effort. Concurrently the joint force air component commander may be designated the supported commander for the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance line of operation. Due to the multiple capabilities inherent to many ADF force elements, both commanders may also be designated as supporting commanders for the others' line of operation. However, the main effort remains paramount regardless of supported and supporting arrangements.

6.17 Another example is the force assignment of air assets and personnel on the recommendation of Director-General Air Command Operations (DGACOPS). Royal Australian Air Force elements are assigned to CJOPS under theatre command arrangements. In most cases operational command is delegated to Director-General Air (DGAIR), who is also assigned as a supporting commander to applicable CJTF. Operations where this command arrangement has been in place include Operation RESOLUTE, Operation GATEWAY and Operation SOLANIA.

CHAPTER 7

COMMAND IN MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

Executive summary

- Multinational operations include combined operations (those undertaken alongside formal allies), coalition operations (those undertaken with countries unified by a common mission) and operations that may not have a common mission.
- There may be subtle differences in states of command used by multinational partners.
- Before operations are undertaken, governments must agree on the command arrangements at the national, military strategic and operational levels.
- When necessary and appropriate Government authorises the assignment and employment of Australian forces under international commanders.
- No international commander can exercise full command over Australian forces that are assigned to a multinational force. The Chief of the Defence Force retains full command.
- Contributing nations appoint a national contingent commander to represent national interests at the operational level. The designated Australian Defence Force officer is commander Australian contingent

INTRODUCTION

7.1 Multinational joint operations are part of an Australian whole-of-government approach that includes other government departments (OGD) as well as Defence. They are conducted in a multinational (MN) environment, alongside other agencies, to meet both military and non-military national strategic objectives. MN operations require a clear understanding of both national command and control (C2) arrangements and the MN C2 arrangements.

7.2 A comprehensive MN approach responds effectively to complex crises by coordinating military and non-military activities (further details in Australian Defence Doctrine Publication (ADDP) 3.0—*Campaigns and Operations*).

7.3 MN operations are conducted by agencies. An agency is any sized organisation, group or element, of any type, whether national, international, military, non-military, government or non-government. Agencies usually broadly agree about desired outcomes yet each agency in the OE has its own aims, objectives and methods. From a military perspective, strategic and operational planners should, as far as practicable, accommodate disparate agencies that are working toward a common goal.

The Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands represented a new model of regional intervention using the full assets of diplomatic, economic, police and military assets in a coordinated, whole-of-government approach. The command arrangement was unconventional and accepted risk—but it proved appropriate. It was important that the response was not unilateral on Australia's part but rather a multilateral Pacific effort to help a neighbour in need—and five nations committed military forces.

**Lieutenant Colonel John Frewen, Commander,
Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands
2003**

7.4 The command arrangements for MN operations requires consideration of agencies and foreign nation states of command, Australian national command arrangements, operational command arrangements and operational authorities. In multiagency operations the command and control (C2) arrangements requires clear guidance.

MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

7.5 Multinational forces, are composed of forces of two or more nations undertaking operations within the structure of a coalition, alliance or under the supervision of an international organisation. This categorisation includes allied, bilateral, coalition, combined, or multilateral arrangements. Most MN operations will be conducted within a framework of formal agreements such as:

- a. Combined operations: when conducted with a country that is formally an ally, or with countries that are formally allies.
- b. Coalition operations: when conducted with nations that are not all formally allies but are unified by a common mission.

7.6 An example of a combined operation is Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR, which was undertaken by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member countries. An example of a coalition operation is the 2003 invasion of Iraq, which was undertaken by 'a coalition of the willing'. Coalition operations are currently the most common form of ADF operation.

Definitions

Combined. Forces of two or more allied nations, acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission.

Coalition. Forces of two or more nations, which may not be allies, acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission.

7.7 Some MN operations are conducted in an informal and largely uncoordinated manner, with independent national and international agencies unified only by their rapid response to a sudden and urgent need, such as a large scale environmental and/or humanitarian crisis. These informal international responses to crises are referred to simply as multinational operations.

7.8 An example of a MN operation was the response to the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004. The broader international response was characterised by several countries, multinational and other agencies rapidly reacting to a major disaster in an independent, fragmented and largely uncoordinated manner with the common goal of

providing disaster relief. These multinational operations were conducted under national command arrangements, however significant command interaction and liaison with OGD, host nations and international and non-governmental organisations was required. The ADF component was Operation SUMATRA ASSIST.

7.9 Operations involving force contributions from foreign nations are influenced by differences in politics, strategic outlook, language, religion, culture, national customs, equipment and systems, doctrine and practices. For United Nations (UN) missions, the military component is provided by several troop-contributing countries (TCC). In other MN operations, the term more commonly used is troop-contributing nations (TCN).

Overview of required command arrangements

7.10 Before operations are undertaken, governments must agree on the command arrangements at the national, military strategic and operational levels. The types of command arrangements which might be required are:

- a. **National Command Authority.** The National Command Authority is comprised of the national leaders of the defence forces involved in the operations, such as the Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand and the President of the United States, or their representatives.
- b. **Combined (or Coalition) Force Commander.** A Combined (or Coalition) Force Commander (CFC) and Deputy Combined (or Coalition) Force Commander must be mutually agreed and appointed to ensure unity of command. Staff representation on the combined force headquarters should also be agreed. The combined or coalition force commander will exercise operational authority over assigned forces agreed by the appropriate national chain of command. Changes to operational authority must be approved by the national chain of command. The combined or coalition force may be designated as combined or coalition joint task force.
- c. **Chief of Joint Operations.** Unless otherwise directed by CDF, theatre command (tcomd) implies the authority for the Chief of Joint Operations (CJOPS) to act as the Australian operational level military point of contact in relationships with other nations' commands, Australian diplomatic missions, other government agencies, and agencies of countries in theatre.
- d. **National commander.** The senior officer from each partner designated as the national commander and exercising national command (natcomd) over national personnel. The national commander maintains access to their military representatives on purely national matters involving the employment and conditions of service of their national forces. The national commander has no operational authority over deployed ADF forces unless separately assigned by CJOPS.

7.11 Full command (the military authority and responsibility of a superior officer to issue orders to subordinates) exists only within a national force. In the ADF, full command is retained by CDF at all times. No international commander can exercise full command over ADF forces. Full command equates to 'ownership' and conveys with it complete operational and administrative authority and responsibility.

7.12 Tcomd, which is an authority unique to Australia, is retained by CJOPS and is not delegated. Operational command (opcomd) and operational control (opcon) can be delegated to the CFC by CJOPS (although opcomd would not usually be

delegated). Tactical command (tacomd) and tactical control (tacon) can be delegated to commanders at the tactical level.

7.13 Interpretation of the degree of authority implied by each state of command in a MN system differs markedly between nations and Services and, like any aspect of doctrine, is subject to flexible interpretation by the key personalities in the chain of command at the time. It is important for both superior and subordinate commanders to be absolutely clear about any restrictions on the use of FE, and to be pragmatic about what needs to be achieved to realise the commander's intent.

7.14 When Australian FE are working under United States of America (USA) authority, further constitutional complications arise because of the direct strategic links that USA combatant commanders have with their National Command Authority comprising the President of the United States and the Secretary of Defense. It is important that Australia identifies early in the operation where influence and additional coordination should be applied in order to match responsiveness in decision-making.

Foreign nation states of command

7.15 Many of Australia's potential military partners adhere to or refer to the NATO model and its definitions for command, which have subtle differences to Australian terminology. Significantly, the NATO acronym for operational command (opcomd) is OPCOM, and the NATO acronym for tactical command (tacomd) is TACOM.

7.16 Further complicating MN operations, the operational command authorities that define command relationships vary in term and/or definition between nations.

7.17 To aid interoperability, the operational command authorities used by the UN are listed in Annex 7A. The equivalent USA and NATO command authorities are detailed in Annex 7B, and a geographic depiction of the USA combatant commands is in Annex 7C.

7.18 The British Armed Forces and Canadian Forces use NATO states of command and operational command authorities. The New Zealand Defence Force uses the same states of command and operational command authorities as the ADF, with the exception of theatre command (tcomd).

Australian national command arrangements

7.19 **Commander Australian Contingent.** Each TCN contributing to a MN operation, or TCC contributing to a UN operation, appoints a national contingent commander to represent national interests.

7.20 In general, an ADF officer so appointed is designated Commander Australian Contingent (COMAUSC). The roles of a COMAUSC include:

- a. representing national concerns to the CFC
- b. keeping Australian authorities informed
- c. coordinating and fostering international component relations in support of the commander's mission.

7.21 Tasks for a COMAUSC may include:

- a. exercise command as directed by CDF and/or CJOPS, keeping them informed of the situation in-theatre, with particular emphasis on developments which may affect national political objectives or require

- changes in rules of engagement (ROE), the concept for operations or the commitment of additional national resources
- b. advise the CFC on specific capabilities of Australian forces and any constraints limiting their employment
 - c. facilitate liaison support to the staff of the CFC
 - d. ensure, through the Australian chain of command, that administrative and logistic support is available for Australian forces to achieve and sustain their operational readiness
 - e. integrate the Australian communication and information systems (CIS) with other components of the force
 - f. facilitate the integration of Australian intelligence architecture into the force while ensuring the integrity of national security
 - g. coordinate and cooperate with other national commanders to ensure unity of effort as directed by the CFC
 - h. recommend to CDF and/or CJOPS changes to the national C2 arrangements under which Australian forces are assigned or attached to the force
 - i. implement Australian information operations with due regard to any instructions issued by the CFC.

7.22 The distinction between representing Australian national concerns and exercising command over Australian FE should be clearly articulated and may change during the course of an operation. The COMAUSC may not be assigned a command authority for deployed FE, as deployed FE may be under the command of another Australian commander or under the direct command of CDF or CJOPS. Alternatively, the commander of an Australian JTF may be COMAUSC.

7.23 Directives to the national commander and to FE should contain provisions for changing circumstances to avoid confusion that can arise in the absence of clear written directives or from the need to reinterpret extant directives.

7.24 **National limitations.** The governments of TCC and/or TCN maintain an administrative channel of communications to their contingents, commanders and personnel on operational matters. In the case of UN operations, they must not, however, issue any instructions to their military personnel contrary to UN policies and the implementation of its mandated tasks.

7.25 On occasion, the separate chains of command in MN operations will present conflicting information and/or tasks to a commander. The force may request a particular task be conducted that falls outside national guidance or tasking. Accordingly, permission to conduct the task may be refused by the Australian commander exercising national command. Methods to assist in dealing with such situations include:

- a. ensuring that the CFC, UN head of mission (HOM), or other operational commanders understand any limitations that apply to Australian FE under their control before such situations arise
- b. appreciating that neighbouring FE supplied by other TCC/TCN may have different powers or limitations from Australian FE, and making the effort to understand theirs as much as they would understand any Australian national limitations

- c. actively implementing measures such as briefings and coordination conferences, within operations security considerations, to minimise cross-cultural or multiagency misunderstandings.

7.26 While these measures may not necessarily prevent ill-feeling when a task is refused, reinforcing the ground rules at the outset enhances mutual respect and helps to minimise long-term damage. Once deployed, it is normal practice that, if any planning will impact on national contingents, the CFC will consult with the commander of that national contingent.

HISTORICAL EXAMPLE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS DURING OPERATIONS IN IRAQ, 2003

In early 2003, Australian Defence Force (ADF) personnel were pre-deployed to the Middle East to support international efforts in Iraq. Operation BASTILLE was the name given to the initial pre-deployment of forces, acclimatisation activities and in-theatre training. Operation FALCONER was the name given to combat operations in support of disarmament, and Operation CATALYST was the name given to stabilisation and recovery efforts.

During these operations, Australia retained command and control (C2) of ADF force elements (FE) at all times, while still working effectively within the coalition. The Chief of Defence Force (CDF) retained full command of all Australian FE. Commander Australian Theatre (COMAST), based in Sydney maintained theatre or operational command (tcomd/opcomd) of forces assigned to operations in the Middle East Area of Operations (MEAO). The Commander Australian National Headquarters (HQ)-MEAO exercised national command (natcomd) of ADF FE deployed under Operations BASTILLE, FALCONER and CATALYST. To ensure effective overall strategic direction of Australia's efforts in Iraq, the Strategic Command Group met frequently, supported by video links with COMAST and the natcomd HQ in the MEAO. CDF and the Secretary of the Department of Defence then briefed the National Security Committee of Cabinet and received additional guidance from the Prime Minister and Minister for Defence.

Australian FE were assigned to the coalition component commander under opcon. This arrangement allowed the component commander to provide direction to ADF FE, while they remained under their Australian commanding officers at unit level. Although ADF FE worked toward the overall coalition plan, there were processes in place to ensure that Australian forces were always employed in accordance with Australian Government policies. Royal Australian Air Force and special operations forces were placed in the Coalition Air Operations Centre (CAOC) to ensure that targets assigned to ADF units were appropriate and lawful under Australian ROE. Australian commanders had ADF legal officers to advise them on the laws of armed conflict during the process of allocating targets. RAAF commanders were also appointed as Director of the CAOC at certain points during these operations. In this role, they directed coalition as well as Australian missions.



F/A-18 flight line crews from 75 Squadron conduct pre-flight checks before missions over Iraq as part of Operation BASTILLE

Occasionally, Australia was allocated targets on the USA-developed strike lists, but they were always assessed according to Australia's own legal obligations. Several target categories were subject to Australian Ministerial approval before they could be engaged. Australian pilots could, and on occasion did, abort missions to avoid the risk of unintended casualties if their target could not be clearly identified from the air. These arrangements permitted smooth, effective integration of ADF elements within the coalition, and were testimony to the routine high levels of interoperability with our allies. Improvements in communications and web technology greatly assisted high-level decision making.

Operational command arrangements

7.27 Major considerations for C2 architecture within a MN joint task force are as follows:

- a. **Scale and duration.** The scale, nature, range and likely duration of the operation, including the number and status of other concurrent operations.
- b. **Influence.** Where and how best to influence partner nations and key decision-makers.
- c. **Command.** Where and how best to exercise command of the JTF or Australia's contribution, reflecting the ADF approach to command.
- d. **Communications.** The capacity and suitability of available CIS infrastructure, which should enable, not hamper, C2.

7.28 **Campaign arrangements.** CJOPS may have to conduct a campaign, coordinating several operations, and use a combination of types of command arrangements. This is especially the case where Australia is the lead nation.

7.29 **Lead nation.** The Australian term lead nation is equivalent to the NATO term framework nation. Australian doctrine uses the term lead nation because it suggests

greater emphasis on will, capability, competence and influence. Where Australia is the lead nation, the majority of forces are usually drawn from the ADF.

7.30 **Command attributes.** The CFC must understand the strengths and weaknesses not only of ADF forces under their command, but also forces from other nations. This task requires political awareness, patience, tact and mutual understanding based on knowledge of other nations' languages, history and culture. The posting of high calibre commanders and staff officers to MN headquarters in peacetime prepares commanders for this level of understanding. This extends to attachés, exchange officers and liaison officers.

7.31 Elements from other nations embedded in each component are responsive to their national chain of command, which can cause friction. The commander should strive to overcome this friction by combining national contingents together into a strong and coordinated team. At the same time, the commander must balance the burden and risk-sharing in order to ensure that no one nation either sustains disproportionate casualties, or receives disproportionate credit, both of which may weaken the cohesion of the alliance or coalition.

7.32 Conflicting national pressures and/or exploitation by the adversary will inevitably strain force unity. The commander has to call on leadership skills, including personal example and strength of character, to build and maintain the morale of the force and the confidence of the alliance or coalition. If the commander can emphasise that although political problems may exist, the real task of the commander and allied subordinates is to produce a military solution to a military problem, then cooperation is more likely to be put on a sound basis without offending national sensitivities. The operational level commander should take every opportunity to discuss military problems with Ministers, Chiefs of Staff and senior officers from contributing nations who visit the operational area.

Operational command authorities

7.33 When necessary and appropriate, the Australian Government will authorise the assignment and employment of Australian forces under foreign commanders. The respective commanders are:

- a. the CFC, the strategic level commander in a multinational force, or in a combined or coalition operation
- b. the component commander in a combined or coalition operation
- c. the force commander (FC), the operational level commander in a UN mission.

7.34 The commander will exercise the operational command authority over assigned forces agreed by the appropriate national chain of command. Changes to the operational command authority can only occur with the approval of the national chain of command.

HISTORICAL EXAMPLE

AUSTRALIA AS A LEAD NATION: INTERNATIONAL FORCE FOR EAST TIMOR, 1999-2000

The situation in East Timor rapidly deteriorated in early 1999 as armed groups opposing East Timorese independence from Indonesia resorted to destruction, violence and intimidation. It soon became clear to the international community that armed intervention would be required to end the violence.

On 15 September 1999, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1264, which called for a multinational force to be created to restore peace and security in East Timor, to protect and support the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) in carrying out its tasks, and to facilitate humanitarian assistance operations. The International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) was subsequently formed, with Australia as the lead nation.

As operational planning for INTERFET progressed, it became clear that a variety of multinational partners was required, not just for political expediency, but also to assist with logistical sustainment and to provide additional capability. When it became clear that the ADF would have to build a coalition, senior ADF commanders drew upon long-term relationships with their counterparts throughout the region to facilitate a workable coalition. Australians quickly learnt that trust could not be 'surged'. Many years of international engagement by Australia's three services provided the foundation upon which the INTERFET coalition was constructed.

Just after dawn on 20 September 1999, INTERFET troops deplaned at Dili airport. Meanwhile, in Dili harbour, the visible presence of four coalition warships helped persuade the East Timorese population, as well as any potentially hostile armed groups, that INTERFET was numerically strong and militarily powerful.

INTERFET eventually included over 11 000 personnel from 22 nations, including the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, New Zealand, France, Italy, Britain, the United States of America and Canada. The coalition also included 22 ships from nine navies (the Royal Australian Navy provided 14 of these). More than 130 fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, from nine air forces and 10 military air services, were also allocated to INTERFET. Almost every operational unit in the ADF was either deployed or on standby in support of operations. Under the command of (then) Major General Peter Cosgrove, INTERFET quickly achieved its mission of restoring order within East Timor, allowing command of the operation to be transitioned to the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) on 28 February 2000.

PEACE OPERATIONS

7.35 The ability of the ADF to conduct operations across the spectrum of armed conflict enables the effective conduct of peace operations. Australia has acted as the lead nation for several peace operations, and has provided several senior officers to command appointments on UN or UN-sanctioned missions.

7.36 The composition and C2 of the military component of a peace operation depends on the type and intensity of the operation. Force members must understand

the mission and the mandate, accepting that although the military is a key player, a military solution will not necessarily be the measure of success for a mission.

7.37 Within the multinational forces that conduct UN operations, command is made complex because most contributing countries have their own separate chains of command. For the ADF, this usually takes the form of the opcon of the force itself, and national command, which is normally vested in the COMAUSC. It is important to gain an understanding of the capabilities and limitations each contributing country's respective commands, prior to deploying if possible.

7.38 In the field, it is essential that effective command relationships be implemented among the TCC and the UN. In the transition to peace operations, whether it be under MN or UN auspices, it is important to recognise the following C2 aspects:

- a. The role of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) as the head of a UN mission, as opposed to military or national leadership. Appointments below the SRSG are generally considered equal in status, except when the mission is structured along functional lines (such as peacekeeping, governance and administration). The SRSG has a direct relationship to the UNSG and staff, and component commanders/heads work for the SRSG with links to respective offices or departments in UN New York or UN Geneva.
- b. The head of mission (HOM) represents the UNSG, leads political engagement and speaks on behalf of the UN within the mission area.
- c. The roles of the FC and Chief Military Observer (CMO) in exercising leadership and command over ADF personnel serving as a UN military observer. Depending on the nature of the mission, the CMO may be an independent appointment or may serve under the opcon of the FC.
- d. The role of the FC in exercising leadership and command over ADF personnel serving as a UN military liaison officer.
- e. In UN operations, the Director or Chief of Mission Support (D/CMS) is appointed by the Under-Secretary-General for field support at UN Headquarters and leads the mission's division of administration. The D/CMS reports to the Head of Mission (HOM) and is accountable to the HOM for the efficient and effective provision of administrative and logistic support to all mission components. The D/CMS exercises financial authority in consultation with the HOM."
- f. The role of the civil authority and cooperation with local civilian police (civpol) forces and UN civpol. Given the internal security responsibilities of both local and UN civpol and the responsibilities of the military component, good working relationships with members of these organisations at the operational and tactical levels are essential.

7.39 Further information about the UN chain of command is given in Annex 7D. For further information about the conduct of peace operations see ADDP 3.8—*Peace Operations*.

HISTORICAL EXAMPLE AUSTRALIA'S COMMITMENT TO PEACE OPERATIONS: CAMBODIA, 1992-1993

The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) comprised components for human rights, electoral, military, civil administration, civil police, repatriation and rehabilitation. The military component of UNTAC consisted of 15 000 personnel, drawn from 15 countries. The ADF provided a contingent of 1 215 personnel, comprising a Force Communications Unit, a helicopter squadron and a Movement Control Unit.



The UNTAC Force Commander, Lieutenant General John Sanderson (Australia), with his deputy, Major General Tamlicha Ali (Indonesia), and headquarters staff



Aviation tasks included collection of ballot boxes for elections organised by UNTAC

Annexes:

- 7A United Nations operational command authorities
- 7B United States and NATO states of command
- 7C United Nations chain of command

ANNEX 7A

UNITED NATIONS OPERATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITIES

1. Through the 1990s, the United Nations (UN) was confronted with many systems and procedural difficulties directly related to how it exercised command and control (C2) of military forces placed at its disposal for the prosecution of a UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR). These were largely resolved as a result of various reviews, and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) issued formal guidance in 2001 regarding C2 of military components in UN peacekeeping operations.¹
2. Command relationships within the UN are determined by operational command authorities, which empower a force commander (FC) or chief military observer (CMO) to properly employ the operational capability of assigned forces to achieve the designated mission. In common with most defence forces, the UN uses a framework of operational authority for simplicity and consistency.
3. The UN operational command authorities are defined below.
 - a. **United Nations Operational Authority.** The authority transferred by the member states to the UN to use the operational capabilities of their national military contingents, units, formed police units and/or military and police personnel to undertake mandated missions and tasks. Operational authority over such forces and personnel is vested in the Secretary-General, under the authority of the UN Security Council (UNSC). United Nations Operational Authority involves the full authority to issue operational directives within the limits of:
 - (1) a specific mandate of the UNSC
 - (2) an agreed period of time, with the stipulation that an earlier withdrawal of a contingent would require the contributing country to provide adequate prior notification
 - (3) a specific geographic area (the mission area as a whole).
 - b. The UN Operational Authority does not include responsibility for certain personnel matters of individual members of military contingents and formed police units, such as pay, allowances, and promotions. These functions remain a national responsibility. In regard to disciplinary matters, while the discipline of military personnel remains the responsibility of the troop-contributing countries the UN may take administrative steps for misconduct, including repatriation of military contingent members and staff officers. With

¹ The 2001 guidance document has since been superseded by: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *Authority, Command and Control in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, UN Policy Document, Reference No. 2008.4, approved 15 February 2008.

respect to the Experts on Mission, including UN police officers and military observers, the UN will take administrative actions and disciplinary measures in accordance with the UN Directives for Disciplinary Matters Involving UN Police Officers and Military Observers.

- c. **Command.** The authority granted to a military commander in a UN peacekeeping operation to direct assigned forces in order to achieve specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location (or a combination), to deploy units concerned and/or military personnel, and to retain or assign tactical command (tacomd) or tactical control (tacon) of those units/personnel. Operational control (opcon) includes the authority to assign separate tasks to sub units of a contingent, as required by operational necessities, within the mission area of responsibility, in consultation with the contingent commander and as approved by the United Nations Headquarters (HQ).
- d. **United Nations operational control.** Opcon is the authority granted to a military commander in a UN peacekeeping operation to direct assigned forces in order to achieve specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location (or a combination), to deploy units concerned and/or military personnel, and to retain or assign tacomd or tacon of those units/personnel. Opcon includes the authority to assign separate tasks to sub units of a contingent, as required by operational necessities, within the mission area of responsibility, in consultation with the contingent commander and as approved by the UN HQ.
- e. **United Nations tactical command.** The authority delegated to a military or police commander in a UN Peacekeeping operation to assign tasks to forces under their command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority.
- f. **United Nations tactical control.** Tactical control (tacon) is the detailed and local direction and control of movement or manoeuvres necessary to accomplish mission or tasks assigned. As required by operational necessities, the Head of Military Component (HOMC) and Head of Police Component (HOPC) may delegate tacon of the forces assigned to the UN peacekeeping operation to subordinate sector and/or unit commanders.
- g. **Administrative control.** The authority over subordinate or other organisations within national contingents for administrative matters such as personnel management, supply, services and other non-operational missions of the subordinate or other organisations. Administrative control is a national responsibility given to the National Contingent Commander (NCC) in peacekeeping operations.
- h. **Tasking authority.** The authority vested in specified senior appointments (Head of Military Component (HOMC), Head of Police Component (HOPC) or Director of Mission Support/Chief of Mission Support (DMS/CMS)) of UN peacekeeping operations to assign tasks to enabling units. Tasking authority includes the authority to deploy, redeploy and employ all or part of an enabling unit to achieve the mission's mandate. Enabling units comprise aviation, engineering, logistics, medical, signals, transport and explosive

ordinance disposal units. Tasking authority over military or police personnel/units, when exercised by civilians, is applicable for their routine and day to day employment and does not include tacon of military/police resources exercised purely in pursuance of military or police operations.

- i. **Technical reporting.** Technical reporting is an information and technical advisory communication link not relating to the C2 of operations or to national administrative control. This link does not circumvent the primary reporting line and command/supervisory relationships, through which formal direction and tasking is issued.
- j. **Transfer of authority.** The transfer of authority between national contingents and military personnel to the UN-designated commander must be completed immediately before these forces come under control of the UN. This process may take place when personnel arrive in the mission area, or it may be transferred immediately prior to deployment from home locations. The exact timing for this transfer is decided during the negotiations between the UN and national authorities. Contributing member states negotiate with UN HQ the specific date and location that the UN will assume 'UN Operational Authority' over their uniformed personnel and units. The Operational Authority over military and police 'Experts on Mission', which includes military observers and Individual police officers/advisers, is considered to be automatically transferred to the UN when a contributed Expert on Mission reports to the designated UN authority for his/her duties in the operational area of responsibility. The operational authority is reverted back to the respective national authorities on completion of assignment with the UN, or at the time of repatriation.
- k. **Memorandum of understanding.** Troop contributing countries (TCC) establish a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the UN. The MOU formalises numbers of troops to be deployed, equipment and capabilities available for tasking. The MOU also includes agreed levels of administration support to be provided to the contingent by the UN DMS/CMS. This includes quantities and types of rations, and quantity and quality of water as examples.

ANNEX 7B

US AND NATO STATES OF COMMAND

Table 7B.1: United States of America and NATO states of command

ACTIVITY	US Combatant Command ¹	US OPCON ²	NATO OPCOM ³	NATO OPCON	NATO TACOM ⁴	US and NATO TACON ⁵
Assign tasks	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No
Direct/employ forces	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Reassign forces	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No
Deploy forces within theatre	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Assign separate employment of unit components	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Administrative/logistic responsibility	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Deploy units	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Delegate equal command status	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Delegate lower command status	Yes	Yes	Yes ⁶	Yes	No	No
REMARKS	¹ US Combatant Command is broadly equivalent to the command authority held by Chief of Joint Operations under Theatre Command. ² Operational Control (opcon) ³ NATO Operational Command (OPCOM). (Australia opcomd) ⁴ Tactical Command (Australia tacomd). ⁵ Tactical Control. ⁶ NATO OPCOM authority only allows commanders to delegate opcon with prior approval.					

ANNEX 7C

UNITED NATIONS CHAIN OF COMMAND

1. This annex defines and describes the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping chain of command and authorities. Command and control (C2) exists at three separate but overlapping levels:

- a. the strategic level
- b. the operational level
- c. the tactical level.

Figure 7C.1: Levels of authority, command and control in United Nations peacekeeping operations



Strategic level

2. The management of a peacekeeping operation at UN Headquarters (HQ) level is at the strategic level of authority and C2. The chain of command is:
- a. **United Nations Security Council.** The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is responsible for the overall political direction of the peacekeeping operation. It provides the legal authority, high-level strategic direction and political guidance for all UN peacekeeping operations, and it vests the operational authority for directing these operations in the Secretary General of the UN. The UNSC authorises the mandate of the mission through a UNSC Resolution.
 - b. **Secretary General.** The Secretary General is responsible for the executive direction and control of the mission. Member States transfer 'Operational Authority' over their military forces and personnel to the UN. This authority is vested in the Secretary General, who exercises it on behalf of the UNSC.
 - c. **Under Secretary General of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.** The Under-Secretary General (USG) of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has been delegated responsibility from the Secretary General for the administration of, and provision of executive direction for, all UN peacekeeping operations.¹ Specifically, the USG DPKO:
 - (1) directs and controls UN peacekeeping operations
 - (2) formulates policies and develops operational guidelines based on UNSC resolutions (mission mandates)
 - (3) prepares reports of the Secretary General to the UNSC on each peacekeeping operation with appropriate observations and recommendations
 - (4) advises the Secretary General on all matters relating to the planning, establishment and conduct of UN peacekeeping operations
 - (5) acts as a focal point between the Secretariat and Member States seeking information on all matters related to UN peacekeeping missions
 - (6) is responsible and accountable to the Secretary General for ensuring that the requirements of the UN security management system are met within DPKO-led field missions.

¹ There are two USG accountable to the Secretary General for the conduct of peacekeeping operations that include military elements: the USG DPKO and the USG for the Department of Political Affairs (DPA). USG DPA has responsibility for Special Political Missions, some of which include military elements. Some UN Missions for which USG DPA is responsible are managed by USG DPKO.

3. In addition to the responsibilities mentioned above, it is important to be aware of additional UN-system responsibilities for financial authority and for the safety and security of UN staff, which lie outside of the authority of the USG DPKO but which affect UN peacekeeping operations. These are:

- a. **The Under Secretary General of the Department of Management.** The USG of the Department of Management is delegated financial authority and responsibility from the Secretary General for all financial matters relating to UN peacekeeping operations.
- b. **The Under Secretary General of the Department of Safety and Security.** The USG of the Department of Safety and Security is directly accountable and responsible to the Secretary General for the executive direction and control of the UN security management system and for the overall safety and security of UN civilian personnel and their recognised dependents at both HQ locations and in the field.
- c. **The Under Secretary General of the Department of Field Support.** On behalf of the Secretary General, the USG of the Department of Field Support (DFS) directs all support for peacekeeping operations by providing necessary strategic direction to guide the work programme of DFS. Under direction of the USG DFS, the DFS is responsible for delivering dedicated support to field operations, including on personnel, procurement, information technology, logistics, finance, communications, and other administrative and general management issues.

4. **The Military Adviser.** The Military Advisor (MILAD) is the senior uniformed person at UN HQ in New York. The MILAD is established as a line position heading the Office of Military Affairs within the DPKO, however the MILAD is accountable directly to both the USG DPKO and the USG of the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) for management of military elements deployed on peacekeeping operations under their respective authorities.

5. **Contributing Member States.** Member States that provide military and police personnel to UN peacekeeping operations retain full and exclusive strategic level command and control of their personnel and equipment. Contributing Member States may assign these personnel and assets to serve under the authority of the Secretary General of the UN and under the operational control of the Head of Military Component (HOMC) of a UN peacekeeping operation for specified periods and purposes as agreed in a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with UN HQ. Member States may withdraw their military and police personnel and the operational control of those personnel from the UN through formal communication with UN HQ.

Operational level

6. The field-based management of a peacekeeping operation at the Mission HQ is considered to be the operational level. The following senior officials hold operational level authority and C2 responsibilities at the Mission HQ level:

- a. Head of Mission (HOM)
- b. Head of Military Component

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- c. Head of Police Component (HOPC)
- d. Deputy Special Representative(s) of the Secretary General (DSRSG)
- e. Director of Mission Support/Chief of Mission Support (DMS/CMS).

7. In addition, there are several joint, integration and coordination structures that support mission-wide coherence at the operational level. These are not C2 structures, but they support integration of effort across the peacekeeping operation under the authority of the HOM.

Head of Mission

8. The HOM of a peacekeeping operation is generally a Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG). The HOM reports to the Secretary General through the USG DPKO. The HOM is the senior UN Representative and has overall authority over the activities of the UN in the mission area. The HOM represents the Secretary General, leads UN political engagement and speaks on behalf of the UN within the mission area. The HOM leads and directs the heads of all mission components and ensures unity of effort and coherence among all UN entities in the mission area, in accordance with the UN Integrated Strategic Framework for the mission.

9. The HOM provides political guidance for mandate implementation and sets mission-wide operational direction, including by making decisions about resource allocation in case of competing priorities. The HOM delegates the operational and technical aspects of mandate implementation to the heads of all components of the mission. The HOM provides direction to those components through the component heads.

Head of Military Component

10. In peacekeeping operations the HOMC is generally designated as the Force Commander (FC). If the military component comprises Military Observers only, a Chief Military Observer (CMO) or Chief of Staff (COS) will be appointed as the HOMC. The CMO reports directly to the HOM and exercises operational control over all Military Observers.

11. The HOMC establishes the military operational chain of command in the field and may establish subordinate Sector Commands, as appropriate. In doing so, the HOMC places military units under the tactical control of military commanders in the operational chain of command.

12. The HOMC maintains a technical reporting and communication link with the DPKO Military Adviser at UN HQ. This technical reporting link must not circumvent or substitute the chain of command between the USG DPKO and the HOM, nor should it interfere with decisions taken by the HOM in accordance with this policy directive.

Head of Police Component

13. The HOPC reports to the HOM, exercises operational control and provides direction to all members of the police component of the mission. This includes all UN Police Officers (including all members of Formed Police Units) and relevant civilian

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staff serving in the police component. The HOPC, in consultation with DPKO, establishes the police chain of command. The HOPC also establishes appropriate succession arrangements within the police component to ensure effective C2 in his/her absence.

14. The HOPC maintains a technical reporting and communication link with the DPKO Police Adviser at UN HQ. This technical reporting link must not circumvent or substitute the command chain between the USG DPKO and the HOM, nor should it interfere with decisions taken by the HOM in accordance with this policy directive.

Deputy Special Representative(s) of the Secretary General

15. Peacekeeping operations generally have at least one DSRSG to support the HOM in executing the substantive civilian functions of the mission. DSRSG report to the HOM and they exercise managerial authority over those mission components that have been assigned to them. When a DSRSG is designated as the Deputy HOM, he/she shall support the SRSG through the performance of any specifically delegated HOM responsibilities and shall officiate as HOM in the absence of the SRSG.

16. In integrated missions, the Resident Coordinator (and Humanitarian Coordinator, as appropriate) of the UN Country Team may be appointed as DSRSG to co-ordinate the mission's activities with UN agencies, funds, programs and other development and humanitarian entities operating in the mission area.

Director of Mission Support/Chief of Mission Support

17. The DMS/CMS reports to the HOM and is accountable to the HOM for the efficient and effective provision of administrative and logistic support to all mission components. The DMS/CMS advises the HOM on the rules and regulations relating to the commitment of UN financial resources to ensure the provision of efficient and effective administrative and logistics support to all mission components. The DMS/CMS has sole UN authority in the field to commit UN financial resources for any purpose, including any contractual arrangements for the use of local resources. The DMS/CMS is responsible for the strict observance of, and compliance with, UN technical and administrative regulations related to the administration of the mission and logistics management.

GLOSSARY

The source for approved Defence terms, definitions and abbreviations is the Australian Defence Glossary (ADG), available on the Defence Restricted Network at <http://adg.eas.defence.mil.au/adgms/>. Note: The ADG is updated periodically and should be consulted to review any amendments to the data in this glossary.

TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

administrative control

Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organisations in respect to administrative matters such as personnel management, supply services and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organisations.

Note: Local administration is a subset of administrative control.

campaign design

The manner in which the Chief of Joint Operations expresses a vision of how the campaign may unfold and how desired objectives will be sequenced and synchronised.

coalition

Forces of two or more nations, which may not be allies, acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission.

combined

Forces of two or more allied nations, acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission.

command

The authority which a commander in the military Service lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment.

Notes:

1. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of, organising, directing, coordinating and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions.
2. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale and discipline of assigned personnel.

command and control

The process and means for the exercise of authority over, and lawful direction of, assigned forces.

control

The authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate organisations, or other organisations not normally under their command, which encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or directives.

Note: All or part of this authority may be transferred or delegated.

coordinating authority

The authority granted to a commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more countries or commands, or two or more services or two or more forces of the same service.

Notes:

1. The commander has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved or their representatives but does not have the authority to compel agreement.
2. In case of disagreement between the agencies involved, the commander should attempt to obtain essential agreement by discussion.
3. In the event essential agreement cannot be obtained the matter will be referred to the appropriate authority.

direct support

The support provided by a unit or formation not attached to or under command of the supported unit or formation commander but required to give priority to the support required by that unit or formation.

direct liaison authorised

That authority granted by a commander (any level) to a subordinate to directly consult or coordinate an action with a command or agency within or outside of the granting command. Direct liaison authorised is more applicable to planning than operations and always carries with it the requirement of keeping the commander granting direct liaison authorised informed. Direct liaison authorised is a coordination relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised.

force element

A component of a unit, a unit, or an association of units having common prime objectives and activities.

full command

The military authority and responsibility of a commander to issue orders to subordinates. Note: It covers every aspect of military operations and administration and exists only within national services.

in support of

Assisting another formation, unit or organisation while remaining under the initial command.

leadership

The process of influencing others in order to gain their willing consent in the ethical pursuit of missions.

levels of conflict

The recognised levels of conflict from which the levels for the planning and command of operations are derived. Note: They are strategic, operational and tactical.

line of communication

A land, water or air route that connects an operating military force with one or more bases of operations, and along which supplies and reinforcements move.

local administration

Direction or exercise of administration controlled by a local commander and related specifically to the troops or to the operation in the commander's area. Note: Local administration is a subset of administrative control.

management

The process of planning, organising, directing and controlling organisational resources in the pursuit of organisational goals.

mission command

A philosophy of command and a system for conducting operations in which subordinates are given a clear indication by a superior of their intentions.

Note: The result required, the task, the resources and any constraints are clearly enunciated, however subordinates are allowed the freedom to decide how to achieve the required result.

multinational operation

A military action conducted by forces of two or more nations, undertaken within the structure of a coalition, an alliance or under the supervision of an international organisation such as the United Nations. Note: It is used to encompass all related terms such as allied, bilateral, coalition, combined, or multilateral.

national command

A command that is organised by, and functions under the authority of a specific nation.

operation

A series of tactical actions with a common unifying purpose, planned and conducted to achieve a strategic or campaign end state or objective within a given time and geographical area.

operational art

The skilful employment of military forces to attain strategic goals through the design, organisation, sequencing and direction of campaigns and major operations.

Notes:

1. Operational art translates strategic into operational and ultimately tactical actions.

2. It requires a commander to:

(a) identify the military conditions or end-state that constitute the strategic objective;

(b) decide the operational objectives that must be achieved to reach the desired end state;

(c) order a sequence of actions that lead to fulfilment of the operational objectives; and

(d) apply the military resources allocated to sustain the desired sequence of actions.

operational command

The authority granted to a commander to specify missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to re-assign forces and to retain or delegate operational control, tactical command and/or tactical control as may be deemed necessary. Note: It does not of itself include responsibility for administration or logistics.

operational control (opcon)

The authority delegated to a commander to:

a. direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time or location;

b. deploy units concerned and retain or delegate tactical control of those units.

Notes:

1. It does not include authority to allocate separate employment of components of the units concerned.

2. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control.

tactical command

The authority delegated to a commander to specify missions and tasks to forces under his command for the accomplishment of the mission specified by higher authority.

tactical control (tacon)

The detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or manoeuvres necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.

technical control (techcon)

Technical control. The provision of specialist and technical advice by designated authorities for the management and operation of forces.

Notes:

1. Technical control is exercised by capability managers and is not normally delegated. It is not included in a delegation of theatre command.

2. Technical control is exercised through the Chief of Joint Operations for assigned forces.

3. Technical control advice may not be modified but may be rejected in part or in total by a commander in consideration of operational factors and within their span of command.

4. A commander is accountable for the consequences of rejecting the advice.

theatre command

The authority given by the Chief of the Defence Force to the Chief of Joint Operations to command assigned forces to prepare for and conduct operations (campaigns, operations, combined and joint exercises, and other activities as directed).

SHORTENED FORMS OF WORDS

1JMU	1 Joint Movement Unit
AAP	Australian Air Publication
ACAUST	Air Commander Australia
ACBPS	Australian Customs and Border Protection Service
ACS	Australian Customs Service
ADDP	Australian Defence Doctrine Publication
ADDP-D	Australian Defence Doctrine Publication-DocTrine
ADF	Australian Defence Force
ADFHQ	Australian Defence Force Headquarter
ADFP	Australian Defence Force Publication
ADFWC	Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre
AIF	Australian Imperial Force
C2	command and control
CAS	Chief of Staff
CASG	Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group
CAOC	coalition air operations centre
COMBPC	Commander Border Protection Command
CC	component commander
CDF	Chief of the Defence Force
CDJFHQ	Commander Deployable Joint Force Headquarters
CDRUSPACOM	Commander United States Pacific Command
CFC	Combined (or Coalition) Force Commander
CJC	Commander Joint Capabilities
CIS	communication and information system
CINCPAC	Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (USA)
civpol	civilian police
CJLOG	Commander Joint Logistics
CJOPS	Chief of Joint Operations
CJTF	commander joint task force
CMO	Chief Military Observer
CMS	Chief of Mission Support
COMAST	Commander Australian Theatre
COMAUSC	Commander Australian Contingent
COMAUSFLT	Commander Australian Fleet
comd	commander
conops	concept of operations
COP	common operating picture
COS	chief of staff
COSC	Chiefs of Service Committee
Cth	Commonwealth
DACC	Defence Assistance to the Civil Community
DC	Defence Committee
DCJOPS	Deputy Chief of Joint Operations
DEPSEC	Deputy Secretary
DFACA	Defence Force Aid to the Civil Authority
DFS	Department of Field Support
DGACOPS	Director-General Air Command Operations

DGAIR	Director-General Air
DIRLAUTH	direct liaison authorised
DJFHQ	Deployable Joint Force Headquarters
DMS	Director of Mission Support
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DSRSG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General
FC	force commander
FE	force element
forcomd	Commander Forces Command
fullcomd	full command
HOM	head of mission
HOMC	Head of Military Component
HOPC	Head of Police Component
HQ	headquarters
HQ 1 Div	Headquarters 1st Division
HQJOC	Headquarters Joint Operations Command
HQMNF-1	Headquarters Multinational Force Command
INTERFET	International Force for East Timor
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
JFAO	joint force area of operations
JLC	Joint Logistics Command
JOC	Joint Operations Command
JTF	joint task force
LOAC	law of armed conflict
MEAO	Middle East Area of Operations
MILAD	Military Advisor
MINDEF	Minister for Defence
MN	multinational
MNF	multinational force
MNO	multinational operation
MOU	memorandum of understanding
natcomd	national command
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCC	National Contingent Commander
NSC	National Security Committee of Cabinet
OE	operational environment
OGD	other government departments
OPD	operational preparedness directive
opcomd	operational command
opcon	operational control
opord	operation order
PADFA	Program of Australian Defence Force Activities

PULSE	Profile of Unit Leadership, Satisfaction and Effectiveness
RAAF	Royal Australian Air Force
RAN	Royal Australian Navy
RN	Royal Navy
ROE	rules of engagement
RSO&I	reception, staging, onward movement and integration
SCAC	Secretary and Chief of the Defence Force's Advisory Committee
SCG	Strategic Command Group
SCNS	Secretaries Committee on National Security
SECDEF	Secretary of the Department of Defence
SOCAUST	Special Operations Commander Australia
SOCOMD	Special Operations Command
SP&IG	Strategic Policy and Intelligence Group
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
tacomd	tactical command
tacon	tactical control
TCC	troop-contributing country
TCN	troop-contributing nation
tcomd	theatre command
techcon	technical control
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
UNSG	United Nations Secretary-General
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
USA	United States of America
USG	Under-Secretary-General
VCDF	Vice Chief of the Defence Force
WHS	Workplace Health and Safety




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EXECUTIVE SERIES
Command and Control

ADDP 00.1



AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE DOCTRINE PUBLICATION

Edition 2 - AL1



EXECUTIVE SERIES

ADDP 00.1

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Australian Defence Doctrine Publication (ADDP) 00.1—*Command and Control*, edition 2, amendment list 1 is issued for use by the Australian Defence Force and is effective forthwith. This publication supersedes ADDP 00.1, edition 2.

Angus J Campbell, AO, DSC
General
Chief of the Defence Force

Department of Defence
CANBERRA ACT 2600

16 May 2018

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PREFACE

1. Military doctrine is the description of the fundamental principles that guide actions by military forces to achieve their objectives. While authoritative, it requires judgement in application.
2. Following from the broad definition of doctrine, joint doctrine describes principles that guide the employment and operational effectiveness of a joint force. Joint doctrine publications are designed to concisely describe these principles, and so promote coordinated actions in support of missions and the commander's intent.
3. Australian Defence Doctrine Publications (ADDPs) and Australian Defence Force Publications (ADFPs) are authorised joint doctrine for the guidance of operations. ADDPs are pitched at the philosophical and application levels, and ADFPs are pitched at the procedural level.
4. The content of this publication has been derived from general principles and doctrine contained in other relevant joint and single-service publications, Defence manuals and allied publications and agreements. Every opportunity should be taken by users of this publication to examine its contents for applicability and currency. If deficiencies or errors are found, amendments must be made. The Joint Doctrine Directorate invites assistance from you, the reader, to improve this publication.
5. **Aim.** The aim of ADDP 00.1—*Command and Control* is to provide guidance about command and control of joint and multinational operations. This publication assists strategic and operational planning, and contributes to Australian Defence Force (ADF) education and training.
6. **Audience.** This publication is for use by commanders, their staff and other personnel at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. It is also applicable to those involved in capability management, and for other government agencies who work with the ADF.
7. **Scope.** This publication provides philosophical and application level doctrine on command and control in the ADF. It describes the nature and extent of types and states of command used from the strategic to the tactical levels.
8. ADDP 00.1, edition 2, amendment list 1 contains a number of changes from edition 2. The significant changes are as follows:
 - a. The title of Chapter 5 has been changed from 'States of command' to 'Command and administrative authorities'.
 - b. The definition and use of 'full command' has been amended to clarify that it is an authority retained exclusively by Chief of Defence Force (as per changes made to the *Defence Act 1903* in 2016).
 - c. The terms 'service command' and 'joint command' have been introduced for the command statuses held respectively by Service Chiefs and Joint Chiefs (Vice Chief of Defence Force, Chief Joint Operations and Chief of Joint Capabilities).

- d. The definition of 'theatre command' has been revised to reflect that the Chief of Defence Force can assign this authority to any officer (not just Chief Joint Operations).
- e. The definition of 'national command' has been revised.
- f. The Uruzgan historical example (Chapter 5) has been revised to improve clarity.
- g. The passage on 'supported and supporting commanders' has been removed from Chapter 5 (it is already addressed in more detail in Chapter 6).
- 9. ADDP 00.1 needs to be viewed within the total context of military activities. To this end, additional recommended reading is:
 - a. ADDP-D—[Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine](#)
 - b. ADDP 00.6—[Leadership](#)
 - c. ADDP 3.0—[Campaigns and Operations](#)
 - d. ADDP 5.0—[Joint Planning](#)
 - e. Royal Australian Navy Doctrine 1—[Australian Maritime Doctrine](#)
 - f. Land Warfare Doctrine 0-0—[Command, Leadership and Management](#)
 - g. Australian Air Publication 1001.1—[Command and Control in the Royal Australian Air Force](#).

AMENDMENTS

Proposals for amendment of ADDP 00.1 may be sent to:

Deputy Director Joint Doctrine
Joint Doctrine Directorate
Force Analysis Branch
Russell Offices
PO Box 7909 | Canberra BC | ACT 2610
[Canberra Joint Doctrine Directorate](#)

Amendment number	Chapter(s)	Amendment	Effective date
AL1	Ch 5, glossary	Revised definition of 'full command', introduced 'service command' and 'joint command'. Re-categorised 'theatre command' and 'national command'.	01 Mar 19
	Other chapters	Minor editorial amendments	

DOCTRINE PUBLICATION HIERARCHY

The hierarchy of ADDPs and ADFPs, and the latest electronic version of all ADDPs and ADFPs, are available on:

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(<http://drnet.defence.gov.au/VCDF/JointDoctrineLibrary/Pages/Welcome.aspx>)

and

Defence Secret Network [Joint Doctrine Library](http://web.wlm.nnw.dsn.defence.mil.au/adfwc/)
(<http://web.wlm.nnw.dsn.defence.mil.au/adfwc/>)

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The art of command requires refinement of a number of professional and personal attributes, including mental discipline, operational experience, a clear sense of professional judgment and a rigorous approach to the use of time.

General Sir Peter Cosgrove, AK, MC, KStJ
Racing Towards the Future
2003

1.1 Commanders are appointed to conduct campaigns and operations. They are assigned military forces and have the authority to commit military personnel to battle in potentially life threatening circumstances. Commanders therefore have a vitally important responsibility and are accountable for their actions, or for their inaction.

1.2 Command and control (C2) is the process and means for the exercise of authority over, and lawful direction of, assigned forces. C2 provides a system for empowering designated personnel to exercise lawful authority and direction over assigned forces for the accomplishment of missions and tasks.

Definitions

Command: The authority which a commander in the military Service lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment.

Notes:

1. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of organising, directing, coordinating and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions.
2. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale and discipline of assigned personnel.

Control: The authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate organisations, or other organisations not normally under their command, which encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or directives.

Note: All or part of this authority may be transferred or delegated.

Command and control: The process and means for the exercise of authority over, and lawful direction of, assigned forces by a designated commander.

1.3 Command is the authority that a commander in the military service lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command provides legal authority given to an individual to direct, coordinate or control military forces. A commander's key duty is decision-making, and the ability to make correct decisions in a timely manner is therefore a key measure of a successful commander.

1.4 Decision-making, however, is not all that is required of a successful commander. Command encompasses the authority, responsibility and accountability for deploying and assigning forces to achieve missions. Authority involves the right to enforce obedience and discipline when necessary. Although a commander can delegate certain authorities they nonetheless retain overall responsibility for command (see Chapter 5). Responsibility includes ensuring that the health, welfare, morale and discipline of assigned personnel is effectively maintained. Finally,

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accountability encompasses the need to comply with constitutional and legislative accountabilities (such as workplace health and safety legislation), corporate governance requirements, and the laws of armed conflict.

1.5 Command is one of the six ADF joint functions.¹ Each function is a set of related joint capabilities and activities, grouped together to help joint commanders integrate, synchronise and direct campaigns and operations. Successful campaigning requires coordination across the functions and commanders should therefore be familiar with each of them. For further details, [see Australian Defence Doctrine Publication \(ADDP\) 3.0—Campaigns and Operations](#).

1.6 In contrast to command, control is the authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate organisations, or other organisations not normally under their command, which encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or directives.

1.7 Control can be permissive or restrictive. The former allows specific actions to occur, while the latter limits or proscribes certain actions. Primary control measures include planning guidance, operation orders, rules of engagement, airspace control measures, fire support coordination measures, and manoeuvre control measures such as axes of advance, boundaries, phase lines and objectives.

1.8 The terms command and control are closely related and are often abbreviated together as C2. However, they are not synonymous and there is a subtle but important difference between them. While commanders assign responsibilities, control enables coordination between elements of a force and other organisations, imposes restrictions and limits, and establishes guidelines to regulate freedom of action.

Command, leadership and management

1.9 Although this publication does not focus on leadership or management, both concepts are related to command and the relationship between the three terms is important.

Definitions

Leadership: The process of influencing others in order to gain their willing consent in the ethical pursuit of missions.

Management: The process of planning, organising, directing and controlling organisational resources in the pursuit of organisational goals.

1.10 A member of the military may be assigned a leadership position with the legitimate and related powers of command, and yet display little or no positive leadership behaviour. With command comes the power and authority over subordinates that the leader needs to achieve tasks. Although not its intended

¹ The other ADF joint functions are: situational understanding; force generation and sustainment; force projection; force protection; and force application.

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purpose, command takes away the requirement to actively exercise persuasion and personal influence to get things done.

1.11 In theory, a commander is able to ignore leadership and rely solely on command to achieve military objectives. In reality, this would be foolish as the leadership provided by a commander is necessary to ensure subordinate commitment to purpose and willingness to continually pursue military objectives, even when unobserved. Without leadership, subordinates are unlikely to receive the guidance and encouragement necessary to fight as a cohesive unit towards the assigned objective. While the 'line of credit' provided by command authority is essential, leadership is critical to mission success.

1.12 A more comprehensive treatment of leadership is contained in [ADDP 00.6—Leadership](#).

1.13 Like leadership, management is related to command but the two terms mean different things. Management is an impersonal, rational act involving activities such as planning, budgeting, performance measurement and resource allocation. In management theory, people are viewed as one of a number of resources, although astute managers realise that people perform more effectively if they are led, rather than simply being tasked in the manner that a manager may allocate other resources.

1.14 Personnel in management roles may or may not have command of subordinates, but there is always a personnel management aspect to command. Furthermore, although civilians are not eligible to command military personnel they may, in some circumstances, be appointed as their manager.

**HISTORICAL EXAMPLE
GENERAL MONASH'S USE OF COMMAND AND CONTROL
AT HAMEL, FRANCE, 4 JULY 1918**



Portrait of General Sir John Monash

By mid-1918, the strategic and operational setting for the Western Front made conditions favourable for a more mobile style of operation that, when combined with technological advances, encouraged combined arms methods.

One early proponent of these methods was the newly-appointed commander of the 1st Australian Corps, Lieutenant General John Monash. In his first major battle leading this formation, Monash developed and executed a plan that led to a stunning success. Within 93 minutes, 1st Australian Corps overcame a prepared German position in the hills and woods around the village of Hamel in northern France. Furthermore, the casualties suffered in the attack were moderate by World War I standards and the Corps was poised to hold against counterattack. Monash's employment of command and control was an outstanding feature of this battle.

In terms of command, Monash prepared his formations to operate with other combat arms, including through rehearsals. He employed tanks in direct support of the infantry, and used carrier tanks to carry supplies forward. Aircraft were tasked to identify enemy dispositions, contribute to security by reporting on breaches of camouflage, attack possible German reserves, cover the noise of preparations, and conduct ammunition resupply. Deception was employed to make the Germans believe there was no build-up on that part of the front.

Further, no registration artillery fire was permitted and gas was interspersed with smoke in regular pre-determined pre-dawn fire missions. In the attack,

smoke (without gas) was used to blind the German defenders, and a creeping artillery barrage covered the assaulting infantry–tank force and inhibited counterattacks during consolidation.

Monash’s command style might be described as either meticulous or micro-managing, but he was undoubtedly thorough in preparation. He used conferences of the key staff involved to work through details and options—and changed his mind at times when subordinate commanders developed rational counter-proposals. He made personal visits to battalion-level commanders, ensuring they understood their roles while improving his understanding of their situation. Monash also clearly assigned his formations and supporting forces through well-prepared written orders, using command terminology that might seem quaint or ambiguous today. Nevertheless, phrases such as ‘at the disposal of’ and ‘the main function of’—which he used to assign artillery, tanks and supporting arms to his formations—were understood and authoritative.

The control measures employed by Monash were similarly clear. Maps were marked with assembly areas and routes, defined start lines, and a ‘blue line’ to denote the limit of exploitation. He encouraged his infantry-tank teams to exploit to the blue line, rather than capture objectives, and was willing to bypass strongpoints to maintain momentum. Orders also provided clear guidance on timings, liaison and reserves. His plan maintained discipline and did not permit exploitation beyond the blue line, ensuring his forward troops were under a protective artillery umbrella at all times.

Monash and 1st Corps’ success at Hamel was an early exemplar of the efficacy of combined arms warfare. Similar approaches would be employed on larger scales into the final Allied offensives of the Great War.

ANNEX 1A

THE EVOLUTION OF AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS SINCE 1973

1. Prior to 1973, each of the Services had their own Service Board and Department, and the Service Chiefs answered to a minister for that Service. The implementation of the 1973 Tange Report (officially titled *Australian Defence: Report on the Reorganisation of the Defence Group of Departments*) led to the abolition of the Boards and the amalgamation of the Departments into a single Department of Defence. In 1976, associated reforms created the Australian Defence Force (ADF) as a joint organisation. The implementation of the Tange Report also established a diarchy between the Secretary of the Department of Defence (SECDEF) and the Chief of Defence Force Staff (later re-titled Chief of the Defence Force (CDF)) and subordinated the Service Chiefs to the CDF (see further details on the diarchy in Chapter 4).
2. Although the creation of the diarchy resulted in SECDEF and CDF having equal responsibility for administering Defence, the CDF exclusively has full command of the ADF (see details of 'full command' in Chapter 5). Following further reforms from November 1985 to January 1997, CDF exercised the operational element of full command directly from Headquarters Australian Defence Force (HQADF) through the Assistant Chief, Operations, with Operations Division providing staff support. Operational-level functions were split between Operations Division and the three environmental (sea, land and air) commanders (see details of the 'levels' of command in Chapter 4).
3. In 1995, then-CDF General John Baker initiated a fundamental review of ADF command arrangements with the intent to strengthen joint command effectiveness at the operational level. At that time, it was accepted that the principal function of the ADF was to defend Australia and that responses to other threats, although possible, were not likely. The paradigm of 'structure for war, adapt for peace' predominated.
4. In 1997, ADF command arrangements were formally restructured to separate those command structures primarily focused on the military strategic level from those primarily focused on the operational level. CDF delegated command at the operational level to a permanent Commander Australian Theatre, who would be in command of a single headquarters—Headquarters Australian Theatre. Environmental commanders were designated component commanders for operations. The component commanders also retained responsibility to their respective Service Chiefs for raising, training and sustaining forces.
5. These command and control (C2) arrangements were developed and implemented in a relatively stable strategic environment where the major threats were perceived as likely to originate from conventional military forces. In accordance with strategic guidance contained in the 1987 and 1994 Defence White Papers, it was also presumed that operations in defence of Australia would be conducted in vulnerable northern areas of the country. As a result of this presumption, some C2 infrastructure was relocated to northern Australia.

6. The 1999 deployment of the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) resulted in the ADF's highest operational tempo since 1972. The need for a review of C2 doctrine in the ADF was also recognised in 1999, but for some time this did not occur due to the operational tempo. In 2000, the Chiefs of Service Committee (COSC) formalised two new command authorities—'theatre command' and 'national command'—as integral elements of ADF C2 (see details of COSC in Chapter 4). These concepts were detailed in the doctrine pamphlet 'ADF Operational Command and Control', provisional edition.

7. In 2003, then-CDF General Peter Cosgrove initiated two further reviews that, in light of the experience of recent operations, identified several key strategic issues affecting the ADF's C2 requirements. Both the 2000 Defence White Paper and the 2003 Defence Update found that the strategic environment was now characterised by a mixture of traditional military threats and asymmetric threats arising from terrorism and globalisation. The need to succeed within this strategic environment drove the development of revised operating concepts. These concepts encompassed a continuum of operations that ranged from armed conflict to operations designed to shape and influence regional and world views.

8. Other key issues identified by the 2003 reviews included closer Government interest in operations with potentially high strategic consequences, and the effects of technology on C2 and information management. The reviews recommended a simpler and flatter command structure for operations and a separate appointment with command responsibility for all ADF joint operational activity.

9. In 2004, the Minister for Defence announced the establishment of Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQJOC), with CDF's operational command of the ADF to be executed through Vice Chief of the Defence Force (VCDF), who would have a dual capacity as Chief Joint Operations (CJOPS).

10. In 2005, then-CDF Air Chief Marshal Angus Houston initiated another review into the ADF's higher C2 arrangements. The officially titled *Report on the Review of Australian Defence Force High Command and Control Arrangements* was known as the 'Wilson Review' after the officer appointed to conduct it, Major General Richard Wilson. This review examined the concepts of command and control, and the broader national and Defence context of the ADF's higher C2 arrangements. It confirmed Government intent through a re-appraisal of strategic guidance and made an assessment of likely future trends in warfare as they affected C2.

11. COSC accepted the majority of the Wilson Review's recommendations, the most significant of which was the reorganisation of HQJOC. Prior to this, HQJOC had been structured as a fragmented, component-based headquarters. As a result of this review, component commanders were removed from the joint operational command structure and a single integrated headquarters was established, organised in accordance with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) common joint staff system (see [Australian Defence Force Procedures 5.0.1—Joint Military Appreciation Process](#) Annex 1B).

12. In 2007 following approval from the Minister for Defence, the VCDF and CJOPS roles were separated. It was a response to a Defence Management Report initiative that sought to strengthen the command and leadership of ADF operations while ensuring that Government is provided with high quality and timely operational

and strategic advice. Since then VCDF has been responsible for Defence business at the strategic level, specifically supporting the Government and CDF, while CJOPS has been responsible to CDF for the conduct of operations (see details in Chapter 4).

13. The Prime Minister officially opened the purpose-built HQJOC facility at Bungendore in 2009 and enabled for the first time all of the elements of HQJOC to be located within a single facility. This has since ensured that CJOPS is able to exercise effective C2 of operations from a single location. Also in 2009, the ADF published a new C2 doctrine manual, ADDP 00.1—*Command and Control*, edition 1.

14. In 2014, the First Principles Review of Defence (the Review) was conducted. Published in 2015, the Review found a proliferation of structures, processes and systems with unclear accountabilities, which in turn caused institutionalised waste, delayed decisions, flawed execution, duplication, over-escalation of issues for discussion and low engagement levels among employees in parts of the organisation.

15. The focus of the Review was on ensuring that Defence was fit for purpose, could respond to future challenges, and could deliver against its outputs with the minimum resources necessary. The Review recommended substantial change across Defence to ensure it can deliver on the plans in the Defence White Paper. The Government agreed, or agreed in principle, to 75 of the 76 recommendations.

16. The Review recommended Defence move from a federated approach into a single, integrated end-to-end organisation that would deliver enhanced joint capability—the ‘One Defence’ approach. Headquarters’ arrangements were re-assessed, and the result supported a more integrated approach to the management, development of advice and planning for the ADF—the integrated Australian Defence Force Headquarters (ADFHQ).

17. The functionality of the ADFHQ organisation has progressed since the release of the Review. In 2016, the Government amended the *Defence Act 1903* and repealed the *Naval Defence Act 1910* and *Air Force Act 1923*. In sum, these changes reinforced the command authority of the VCDF relative to the Service Chiefs. Other key changes occurred in 2017 with the designation of VCDF as the Joint Force Authority, the establishment of the Chief of Joint Capabilities and the appointment of an ADFHQ chief of staff.

CHAPTER 2**THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE APPROACH TO COMMAND****Executive summary**

- There are eight principles of command: unity of command, span of command, clarity, redundancy, delegation of command, control of significant resources, obligation to subordinates, and accountability.
- Commanders need to consider a wide range of factors that exist within the operational environment, including political, legal, cultural and social issues, in addition to traditional military considerations.
- The Australian Defence Force approach to command is known as mission command.
- Under mission command, in its simplest form, the superior commander directs what is to be achieved but leaves subordinate commanders free to decide how to achieve assigned tasks.
- Flexibility and the use of initiative are encouraged at all levels of command.

INTRODUCTION

2.1 There are two components of command. The first is the underlying approach within an organisation that determines the style in which its members go about developing a personal command philosophy. This component is covered below. The second component is organisational, functional and legal, covering the structures and mechanisms empowering designated commanders to exercise specified lawful authority and direction over assigned forces for missions and tasks. This component is addressed in subsequent chapters.

PRINCIPLES OF COMMAND

2.2 As with the principles of war, certain principles of command have been identified as consistent over time. There are eight principles of command:

- a. unity of command
- b. span of command
- c. clarity
- d. redundancy
- e. delegation of command
- f. control of significant resources
- g. obligation to subordinates
- h. accountability.

Unity of command

2.3 The first and foremost principle of command is that there can only be one recognised command authority at any time. A subordinate can only have one

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superior. The command authority may change as tasks change, but the principle of unity of command, with one designated commander clearly responsible for each task, must be maintained. This is particularly important in multi-phased joint operations such as airborne or amphibious operations, where lack of unity of command could create doubt as to who is in command of the operation at various phases.

HISTORICAL EXAMPLE

UNITY OF COMMAND: OPERATION OBOE

The allied invasion of Borneo in 1945, codenamed Operation OBOE, encompassed the battles of Tarakan (Operation OBOE I, 1 May–21 June), North Borneo (Operation OBOE VI, 10 June–5 August) and Balikpapan (Operation OBOE II, 1–21 July 1945). All three battles involved the conduct of amphibious landings.



Troops of the 7th Division, Australian Imperial Force, landing at Balikpapan, Borneo, 1 July 1945

Due to the overall command structure established by the Commander-in-Chief of the South–West Pacific Area, United States of America’s Army General Douglas MacArthur, there was no overall task force commander for Operation OBOE. Instead, MacArthur had established separate commands for allied naval, land and air forces. For Operation OBOE, 1st Australian Corps, under the command of Lieutenant General Sir Leslie Morshead, provided the land forces. The allied air force units involved were commanded by RAAF Air Vice Marshal William Bostock, and naval units involved were under overall command of US Navy Vice Admiral Thomas Kinkaid. Each of these officers reported to the commander for their respective environment, rather than to a single task force commander.

Operational success therefore depended entirely on informal cooperation between these commanders, and between their subordinate commanders. This arrangement

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resulted in operational outcomes that were less than ideal:

At Balikpapan, for example, the Navy disagreed with the Army's choice of landing beach because it was in the area where Japanese defences were strongest. This choice would mean the minesweepers having to operate close under the enemy's guns while supporting warships would have to stand further offshore...Navy, however, was overruled and Army opinion prevailed.¹

Another problem was personality conflict between RAAF commanders. Specifically, Air Vice Marshal Bostock had a dysfunctional relationship with Air Vice Marshal George Jones, Australia's Chief of the Air Staff (CAS). Originally close friends, their relationship soured when Jones was promoted to CAS despite Bostock being considered 'next in line' due to rank and experience. Ongoing conflict between the two men resulted in Jones manipulating maintenance policy to prevent RAAF bomber squadrons providing support to Bostock during Operation OBOE I. This resulted in deficiencies in the level of air support provided to the landing force.

Even though Operation OBOE was ultimately successful, it remains a poignant example of the importance of establishing unity of command, and of the costs of failing to do so.

Span of command

2.4 There is a limit to the number of subordinate force elements that can be commanded effectively. Analysis of past operations indicates that an ideal span is between three and six subordinate force elements. The optimum number depends on a number of factors so no precise number can be prescribed.

2.5 While all command and control (C2) arrangements must be sufficiently flexible to cope with additional subordinate force elements, the commander must not be overloaded to the point where it is not possible to command effectively. The establishment of subordinate commanders and headquarters (HQ) should be used to ensure span of a command does not become too wide.

2.6 There is a range of degrees of authority from which to match mission and responsibility (see Chapter 5 for information about degrees of authority). An operational commander needs to be assigned the mix of combat, combat support and combat services support necessary to achieve the mission. Assigning lesser degrees of authority may be appropriate in the case of force elements that provide temporary, spasmodic or external support. The allocation of additional force elements vital to a plan should be achieved with consideration to ensure that the commander is not burdened with C2 responsibilities for other force elements where cooperative support would suffice.

¹ David Stevens, 'Maritime Aspects of Australian Amphibious Operations', in: Lt Col Glenn Wahlert, (Ed.), *Australian Army Amphibious Operations in the South-West Pacific: 1942-45* Sydney: Australian Army Doctrine Centre, 1995, p. 108.

2.7 For force elements, the limits of a viable span of command depend on subordinate and technical command requirements, effective combat groupings and communications feasibility. There is usually no need for transient maritime and air force elements to be under the command of a deployed operational commander. For example, in East Timor in 1999 the span of command for Major General Peter Cosgrove's Joint Task Force 631 (JTF 631) was immediately over-extended because contingents were deployed from 22 nations. A substantial air and sea line of communication between East Timor and Australia was also established. If the forces conducting this task had also been placed under JTF 631, General Cosgrove's span of command would probably have become unmanageable.

Clarity

2.8 The principle of clarity, though closely related to unity of command, focuses on the military chain of command. It requires commanders at each level to respond to directions from higher HQ, and in turn issue directions to subordinates. Consequently, each HQ normally reports to only one superior HQ, thereby following an unambiguous chain of command. All elements in the chain must be aware of their superior and subordinate HQ and the C2 relationships with other force elements operating in the same theatre or joint force area of operations.

Redundancy

2.9 To provide command redundancy, alternative commanders and HQ must be nominated at all levels. Procedures established and practised to allow command to be passed to the alternative commanders in such a way that operations are not adversely affected. The purpose of this process is to ensure that ongoing operations are not disrupted during a transfer of authority.

2.10 The provision of staff, communications and information systems for alternative HQ is factored into planning. Navy force elements, having a network of ships equipped with command centres and communications, have an inherent redundancy. Air bases are similarly equipped, and generally are in continuous contact with aircraft. In the land environment, command redundancy is inherent in the chain of command, which specifies a second-in-command and so on. This applies from the lowest level—the section commander and section second-in-command—to the highest level—the Chief and Deputy Chief of Army.

Delegation of command

2.11 Delegation of command must be legal and within the scope of authority of the commander making the delegation (see Chapter 5). When delegating command authority, the commander must ensure that the delegation:

- a. is unambiguous
- b. clearly defines the degree of authority and responsibilities transferred, including any related conditions and limitations
- c. clearly specifies the point at which the authority becomes effective
- d. gives guidance to the action to be taken in the event of a contingency or opportunity—this guidance should specifically address those contingencies where the commander cannot be contacted or is unable to perform their duties for a period of time.

2.12 For the smooth and robust delegation of command it is necessary for the commander's vision to be clearly articulated and understood. Subordinate personnel who are likely to be appointed to an acting command position must familiarise themselves with all aspects of their commander's responsibilities. They must position themselves to anticipate having to discharge these duties or respond to contingencies where communication with the commander is lost, or the commander is incapacitated.

Control of significant and limited resources

2.13 Some resources are designated as significant resources due to of their wide utility but limited availability, or the limited availability of expert control cells. Examples include submarines, special forces and some aircraft types. C2 of significant resources is normally retained at the highest practicable level. Delegation of authority over such resources is rare and invariably involves procedures for the rapid return of the authority if, and when, circumstances change.

2.14 Constant liaison between the strategic, operational and tactical-level planning staffs, together with selection of the most appropriate type and duration of C2 arrangements, is essential to ensure best use is made of scarce resources.

Obligation to subordinates

2.15 Commanders are obliged to consider the interests and wellbeing of their subordinates and represent them in the chain of command. This includes responsibility for safety, health, welfare, morale and discipline of assigned personnel. Commanders are also obliged to exercise appropriate C2 over their subordinates.

2.16 Command obligation is a feature of military culture and is facilitated by the philosophy of mission command. The ADF national command system has an obligation to establish, without lavish or wasteful use of resources, support systems additional to the host and multinational lead nations' in-theatre standards that meet the usual aspirations and legitimate needs of ADF personnel.

Accountability

2.17 Commanders are accountable for their actions. There are several aspects to this accountability, including the need to comply with constitutional and legislative accountabilities (such as workplace health and safety legislation), corporate governance requirements, and compliance with the law of armed conflict (LOAC).

HISTORICAL EXAMPLE

OBLIGATION TO SUBORDINATES: PERSONNEL SUPPORT IN GREAT BRITAIN, WORLD WARS I AND II

The evolution of personnel support arrangements in the United Kingdom (UK) during World Wars I and II (WW I and WW II) provides an example of Australian support for personnel serving overseas as part of multinational forces.

During WW I, HQ Australian Imperial Force (AIF) established a series of administrative, training, medical, convalescent and recreational facilities in the Middle East and UK. While the British Army was willing to provide such services, the Australian Government and HQAIF determined that Australian services should provide for the needs of its force. Accordingly, of an AIF numbering of over 300,000,

55,000 were engaged in administrative support in the UK, with another administrative cadre in the Middle East.

Support in the UK in WW II was not as well organised. The agreement covering the Empire Air Training Scheme provided that Dominion output would serve in national squadrons. This never eventuated, with nominal Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) squadrons containing a mix of nationalities, and half of RAAF aircrew directly allotted to Royal Air Force (RAF) squadrons. Responsibility for administrative support was affected by the British Government and attempts to form a RAAF base were circumvented to avoid diminution of the Air Ministry's ability to employ RAAF elements and individuals piecemeal within RAF wings and squadrons.

Concern about this lack of support resulted in the dispatch of Air Marshal Sir Richard Williams to London in 1941 to establish a RAAF counterpart of HQAIF. This was to fulfil the Australian Government desire 'that RAAF personnel shall be under the command of RAAF officers ... to the fullest possible extent', and that they be provided with adequate, specifically-Australian amenities. It was not until the establishment of Air Officer Commanding Overseas HQ RAAF in 1941 that 15,000 RAAF aircrew overseas began to receive the support and amenities appropriate and usual for Australian forces.

COMMAND AND THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

2.18 The operating environment faced by today's commander is one characterised by a mixture of change, complexity and uncertainty. Commanders in this environment need to consciously consider a wide range of factors including political, legal, cultural and social issues, in addition to traditional military considerations.

Factors affecting the exercise of command

2.19 The effective exercise of command is intimately linked to the nature of the operational environment, including the strategic context and the technology available. For details about the personal aspect of command, see Chapter 3. Factors that should be taken into account by the commander include:

- a. complexity
- b. diversity of actors
- c. geographical non-linearity
- d. limitations
- e. the effects of technology.

2.20 **Complexity.** There are two types of complexity: structural and interactive. Structural complexity exists in a system made up of many parts, but these parts interact in a predictable (usually linear) way. Interactive complexity exists in a system that is made up of many parts, but where those parts are able to interact with each other and the system itself in many possible ways, and which may change significantly over time. The effects of this variety of interaction are very difficult to predict accurately, and are pervasive to the extent that they may even change the structure of the system itself.

2.21 Although operations have always been structurally complex, today it is widely understood that they are also interactively complex. As a result, the effects of any

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action cannot necessarily be taken for granted. All operational plans need to be developed and enacted with enough flexibility to enable unexpected situations to be addressed.

2.22 **Diversity of actors.** The operational environment is characterised by a diverse and sometimes ambiguous array of actors, including:

- a. conventional military forces, including multinational forces
- b. host nation government officials, including police and service providers
- c. non-conventional forces
- d. non-state actors—for example, terrorist organisations, mercenaries, pirates, organised criminal groups
- e. international organisations—for example, United Nations, International Committee of the Red Cross
- f. non-governmental organisations—for example, Oxfam, *Médecins sans frontières*
- g. multinational corporations
- h. civilians.

2.23 Each of these actors may be a threat, friendly or neutral, and may change between these categories over time. Each actor has its own attributes, internal dynamics and intentions that need to be analysed and understood. The commander must develop a situational understanding of key actors and their relationships that may affect mission achievement.

2.24 **Geographical non-linearity.** The contemporary operational environment does not necessarily include well-defined fronts, flanks and rear areas. As a result, force protection is an important command consideration, regardless of where forces are located.

2.25 **Limitations.** The conduct of operations is invariably subject to limitations. These limitations can circumscribe the political and/or strategic aims of an operation, the intensity of combat operations, the geographic extent of military action, the duration of hostilities, support of national objectives by the host and home populations, and the kinds of operations and activities conducted. Limitations consist of constraints and restrictions as follows:

- a. **Constraints.** Constraints are actions imposed by a superior commander or other authority, which must be undertaken. Constraints may be derived from specified or implied tasks. An example is the tasking of a subordinate commander to maintain a reserve for employment that may be employed by the superior commander on order.
- b. **Restrictions.** Restrictions are prohibitions on activities that a superior commander or another authority might impose. Restrictions may be legal (imposed by international and domestic laws); moral and ethical (these limitations are now very largely absorbed into international norms and values); or political (which include, in the case of multinational operations, what is considered acceptable by all contributing countries).

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2.26 **Effects of technology on information.** Technology—and accompanying social changes—has increased the speed, reach, volume and scope of information available. There are several aspects to this change. The first is a raised expectation by commanders at all levels to be continually informed. This expectation needs to be satisfied by a sound system and process for passing information and advice, and an understanding of the broader implications of events by commanders and staffs.

2.27 A second aspect is a faster and more streamlined passage of information, a situation with benefits and risks. This factor can boost shared situational understanding and lead to better informed decision-making. However, this change also risks increased political and command intervention in tactical matters. While increased higher-level involvement can and should be positive, its exercise requires discipline to avoid micro-management. A streamlined information flow can also cause ‘information overload’ which, unless managed, may lead to indecisiveness as commanders and their staff wait until they have ‘all the information’. At the same time, senior leaders can access information from a broad range of connected sources that transmit straight from the area of operations to a global audience. This ‘CNN effect’ is now well established and complemented by social media, which bypasses ‘traditional’ methods of information verification.

2.28 A third aspect, which has a close relationship to the second, is the compression of the decision-making cycle that results from an increased information flow. Militaries are now using communication and information systems to display a common operational picture and are using software-aided decision-making tools to develop possible courses of action. This technology is developing rapidly. In the near future, simultaneous transmission of situation pictures to commanders at all levels will offer unparalleled visibility of the operational environment.

2.29 Overall, reliance on sophisticated technologies creates opportunities and vulnerabilities—for both the ADF and potential adversaries. Despite technological advances, command remains a human activity and the ADF employs mission command to capitalise upon that.

MISSION COMMAND

2.30 Mission command promotes flexibility by encouraging initiative, ingenuity, innovation, resourcefulness and devolution of authority to achieve the commander’s intent.

Definition

Mission command: A philosophy for command and a system for conducting operations in which subordinates are given clear direction by a superior of their intentions.

Note: The result required, the task, the resources and any constraints are clearly enunciated, however subordinates are allowed the freedom to decide how to achieve the required result.

2.31 Mission command has been adopted because it aligns well with the ADF’s overall approach to warfare. The ADF’s approach to warfare is a combination of manoeuvre, interoperability, networking and decision superiority. For further details

about the ADF approach to warfare see [Australian Defence Doctrine Publication-Doctrine—Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine](#).

2.32 Mission command promotes decentralised execution, freedom, and speed of action and initiative, but is responsive to superior direction. Under mission command, in its simplest form, the superior commander directs *what* is to be achieved but leaves the subordinate commander free to decide *how* to achieve assigned tasks.

2.33 Mission command can only succeed through the combined efforts of superior and subordinate commanders. Superior commanders maintain the ultimate responsibility for achieving the mission and must ensure that they do not misapply mission command to avoid their own command responsibilities. Subordinate commanders must be fully aware of the superior commander's intent, and continually monitor and assess developing situations, while maintaining excellent communication through their chain of command and with supporting force elements.

2.34 Successful application of the philosophy of mission command depends on the following prerequisites:

- a. **Doctrine.** Mission command is most successful when supported by doctrine. Military doctrine describes fundamental principles that guide actions by armed forces to achieve their objectives. While authoritative, doctrine requires judgement in application. Good doctrine is based on the thorough analysis of experience, information such as lessons, and new concepts and trends. It is used in professional military education, and can be used by operators facing unfamiliar situations so they can draw upon the organisation's collective experience.
- b. **Reliability.** Commanders rely on subordinates to provide accurate and timely information to achieve operational success. High demands are made on the leadership qualities of subordinates, on their initiative and on their sense of responsibility to carry out their assigned tasks.
- c. **Trust.** Mission command requires a high level of mutual trust at all levels of command that is established through intensive, realistic training and reinforced by success on operations. Subordinates are trusted by being allocated sufficient resources to carry out their missions, and commanders should keep control to a minimum so as not to constrain their subordinates' freedom of action.
- d. **Understanding.** Commanders ensure that subordinates understand the commander's intentions, their own missions, and the strategic, operational and tactical context. Subordinates are told what objectives they need to achieve and the reasons why achieving them is necessary. The alternative for commanders is to resort to ponderous, detailed orders, which can stifle initiative and slow the tempo of operations.
- e. **Risk.** Gaining and holding the initiative is critical in a rapidly moving situation. Hesitation, indecision and time-wasting by seeking confirmation from higher command may be riskier than a flawed but timely decision based on the best available information.

2.35 Increasingly, legislative and regulatory requirements, together with resource constraints, compound to work against mission command. These constraints can lead to conservatism, indecisiveness, or micro-management, potentially creating a

tendency towards risk aversion. Even though mission command must be accompanied by the implementation of appropriate risk management measures, operations will always require a degree of risk taking. Therefore, mission command should be applied during peacetime to develop decisiveness, moral courage, initiative and daring, which can be easily translated into the operational environment.

Application of mission command

Commanders at all levels had to act more on their own; they were given greater latitude to work out their own plans to achieve what they knew was the Army Commander's intention. In time they developed to a marked degree the flexibility of mind and a firmness of decision that enabled them to act swiftly to take advantage of sudden information of changing circumstances without reference to their superiors. This acting without orders, in anticipation of orders, or without waiting for approval, yet always within the overall intention, must become second nature and must go down to the smallest units.

**Field Marshal Sir William Slim
Governor General of Australia 1953-60**

2.36 Although philosophical in nature, mission command is not all theory. Its practical application in the ADF stresses five key concepts which are discussed in the following paragraphs.

Learning through practice

2.37 Mission command requires practice during training, not just for a particular operation, but for operations in general. Questioning should be encouraged to provide insight by engaging experience and creativity. Sufficient instruction and training should occur in a benign environment, in which honest mistakes are accepted and discussed, and unorthodox solutions are encouraged.

2.38 A deeper understanding of what constitutes commander's intent should be the subject of continual development. Progressive thinking should be used to translate a higher commander's intent into lower-level objectives and foster an outcome-driven approach. Mission command cannot function without the unifying purpose of commander's intent.

Wise application

2.39 Commanders have a right to be satisfied that subordinates not only understand their intentions but are also acting on them. The use of orders groups, back briefs before mission execution and face-to-face communication during the conduct of operations not only develops trust and mutual understanding of the plan, but also strengthens collective and individual confidence, purpose and resolve.

2.40 Although commanders should practise mission command whenever possible, judgement in application is required. Mission command does not necessarily apply to all situations and to all personnel. For example, mission command may not be compatible with, or acceptable to, some potential partners. Mission command should be applied with particular care in a multinational environment (see Chapter 7). While over-direction will often cause offence, too little direction may fail to achieve results in a timely fashion, or at all.

Flexibility and adaptability

2.41 Mission command must remain dynamic and agile. It should be applied flexibly, reflecting the understanding that doctrine itself is not immutable, and it should be adapted for a particular campaign, operation or situation. A commander's style of command must also reflect the situation, including the capability and understanding of subordinates. The characteristics of persuasion, compulsion, loyalty and leadership by example combine to create an individual command style, but the relative proportion of each must be tempered to suit the situation.

2.42 In exceptional circumstances, there may be brief occasions when commanders have to skip an echelon and 'reach down' at least one level of command. Historical evidence provides many examples of this: Napoleon, Rommel and Patton all intervened at a decisive point and brought about startling tactical successes. Endorsement of such action by a commander should not be seen as an encouragement of micro-management. It is a technique that should be applied sparingly, based on higher strategic knowledge, to turn the tide in a wavering operation or to seize the initiative where none was previously seen to exist.

Risk taking

2.43 Increasingly, tight legislative and regulatory requirements, together with resource constraints, compound to work against mission command. These constraints can breed conservatism and indecisiveness, potentially creating a tendency towards risk aversion in a wider operational environment. Nevertheless, the law of armed conflict applies in combat and commanders must take calculated risks and make judgements about what risks are necessary and acceptable to achieve mission objectives. Therefore, mission command should be used during peacetime, with appropriate risk management measures, to develop decisiveness, moral courage, initiative and daring that can be easily translated into a war fighting environment.

Delegation

2.44 The ADF's mission command philosophy is realised in the commander's confidence in delegating responsibility to subordinates, and the professional discharge of those responsibilities of command by subordinates. This is of particular importance in response to fleeting windows of opportunity during the conduct of operations, and contingencies where no specific direction has been given to the subordinate.

HISTORICAL EXAMPLE**APPLICATION OF MISSION COMMAND: AL MUTHANNA TASK GROUP, 2005**

The first Al Muthanna Task Group deployed to southern Iraq from April to November 2005. During its 191 days in Iraq, the 450-strong Task Group conducted 2,359 discrete tactical tasks in an operational environment characterised by a complex mixture of human, physical and informational factors.

**Australian Light Armoured Vehicles and support vehicles of Combat Team Courage, Al Muthanna Task Group, in southern Iraq**

Throughout the deployment, the commander, Lieutenant Colonel Noble, relied heavily on the use of mission command to ensure success in the complex operational environment. This involved emphasising the importance of subordinates complying with the commander's intent in all of their actions, while also ensuring that subordinates were allowed the flexibility to plan and execute their own courses of action. Reflecting on the deployment, Noble later wrote that:

The key to effective, focused action is mission command. Mission command must be believed in and nurtured. For it to be effective, it must be built on the intellectual components of clear intent, trust and accountability. The central moral component is trust. A physical control framework must also be established to support decision makers at every level, especially those in the midst of chaos and in close contact with the adversary.

CHAPTER 3

PERSONAL COMMAND PHILOSOPHY

Executive summary

- The purpose of a command philosophy is for the commander to declare what they expect of their command and what their command can expect of them.
- Commanders should develop a personal command philosophy based on vision, values, leadership expectations and personal convictions.
- Commanders must create and sustain an effective command climate that fosters a common understanding with subordinates, a sense of involvement in decision-making and a shared commitment.

The underlying philosophy of leaders has a significant impact on the way they relate to others, attempt to influence others, judge the actions of others, and make decisions affecting others.

Steven J. Mayer

INTRODUCTION

3.1 Taking command is an extremely personal business. From the moment a commander takes command they begin to develop a command philosophy, either consciously or subconsciously, that considerably influences their personal life, their work and that of their subordinates.

3.2 In the Australian Defence Force (ADF) commanders are encouraged to consciously consider their approach to command. The joint professional military education continuum requires participants to prepare a command philosophy. As a result, by the time most members of the ADF are appointed to a command position, they have already considered their approach to command and are developing their personal command philosophy.

PERSONAL COMMAND PHILOSOPHY

3.3 The purpose of a command philosophy is to declare what the commander expects of their people and what their people can expect of them. How this is communicated by a commander to their subordinates ultimately depends on a commander's personality and approach to command; however, a new commander can use their command philosophy as a tool to assist in establishing a rapport with their subordinates by clearly defining their philosophy up front through a verbal address and/or written guidance. This should be continually reinforced by the commander in subsequent interactions with subordinates to ensure a consistent message.

3.4 A command philosophy is relevant at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, and to non-operational and operational command appointments. Regardless of the level and type of command appointment, a good command philosophy will:

- a. indicate those aspects of organisational activity most important to the commander

- b. give insight into the commander's leadership style so others in the command can coordinate their actions with those of the commander
- c. be broad enough to provide reference points for ethical, personal leadership style, as well as managerial style preference issues
- d. provide a foundation of understanding by which the commander and their subordinates can build a relationship of respect, trust and mutual expectation.

3.5 A good command philosophy will not simply be a one-way list of expectations that a commander has of subordinates. Rather, it is a statement of what subordinates can expect of the commander—a two-way performance contract. In addition, commanders must guard against command philosophies that simply make obvious statements such as 'embracing the ADF's values' without providing clear direction as to what the commander personally believes that to mean.

3.6 A command philosophy that a commander does not personally believe in or represent should not be promoted. The damage that such a philosophy will do to the trust and respect in which a commander is held cannot be over-emphasised, as its promulgation of it is likely to lead to accusations of hypocrisy and double standards.

Components of a personal command philosophy

- 3.7 In general, a command philosophy has the following four components:
- a. **Vision.** Every success is based on an initial concept. A commander's vision provides the initial common focus for an organisation's energy and allows priorities to be determined, which set the conditions for success.
 - b. **Values.** Members in an organisation who share the same values view tasks from a common perspective and act accordingly. A commander has the responsibility to draw together the common values within subordinates, making them robust enough to withstand external pressures and influences.
 - c. **Leadership expectations.** Subordinate leaders have specific responsibilities and obligations, and these must be clearly articulated and understood by them and their subordinates. By clearly articulating and reinforcing expectations, galvanising all components with an overall purpose, a commander has the opportunity to create synergistic effects.
 - d. **Personal convictions.** A commander is expected to possess attributes such as moral and physical courage, integrity, humility, fairness and diligence. A commander should also display a sophisticated level of personal engagement or 'people skills'. Not only must a commander's character be visible to subordinates, but subordinates must understand the personal convictions of their commander to best be able to interpret and carry out their commander's intent.

HISTORICAL EXAMPLE

PHILOSOPHY OF HIGHER OPERATIONAL COMMAND DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS, HEADQUARTERS MULTINATIONAL FORCE—IRAQ, 2004–05

Between August 2004 and April 2005, Australian Army Major General Jim Molan served as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations within Headquarters Multinational Force—Iraq (HQ MNF-I). In this role, Molan reported directly to the Commanding General, USA Army General George Casey, Jr., and was responsible for implementing operational plans across Iraq. During this period, MNF-I comprised 160,000 soldiers, most of them American. Major operations included the November 2004 Battle of Fallujah and the January 2005 Iraqi national election.

Although in a senior staff rather than a command position, Molan nevertheless promulgated a personal command philosophy that he used to guide his own conduct and to provide guidance to his staff. This command philosophy read:

Be technically proficient.

Understand the politics.

Understand war in general.

Understand the principles of command and control and the technicalities of headquarters.

Confidently know your strengths and weaknesses.

Be prepared to apply both extreme violence and extreme humanity.

Understand the specific war, your enemies, allies and own forces, especially joint.

Develop a simple vision simply expressed.

Be courageous (physically and morally).

Be confident that you learn wars by doing.

Command so that people know that you are commanding.

Your soldiers understand their unlimited liability—they know that they may be killed.

Do not be surprised that you are being surprised (expect uncertainty and risk).

Watch your back.

Act legally and morally based on your ethics.

Care for your people and your mission.

Test your decision but trust your judgement (intuition).

Be very, very lucky.¹

¹ Major General Jim Molan, *Operations in the Land of Two Rivers*, Command Papers 6/2005, Canberra: Centre for Defence Leadership and Ethics.

COMMAND CLIMATE

To the fundamental skills of battle management and combat must be added cultural awareness and historical knowledge, as well as a firm foundation of ethical understanding. Leaders must be able to lead, but they must also be ready to liaise, persuade and cooperate, however alien the protagonist or strange the environment.

**General David Hurley, AC, DSC
Chief of the Defence Force, 2011–14**

3.8 Whether during peace or on operations, a commander, by force of personality, leadership style, command presence and general behaviour, has a considerable influence on the morale, sense of direction and performance of their staff and subordinate commanders. Thus, it is a commander's responsibility to create and sustain an effective command climate.

3.9 This command climate must encourage subordinate commanders at all levels to think independently and take the initiative. Subordinates expect commanders to keep them informed and, when possible, to explain reasons for instructions. Commanders need to work hard at building relationships based on mutual respect and open communication. This fosters a common understanding, a sense of involvement in decision-making and a shared commitment.

Measuring the command climate

3.10 The ADF uses a range of tools to measure the command climate of units. One of these is the Profile of Unit Leadership, Satisfaction and Effectiveness (PULSE) is a unit climate survey specifically designed for military units in Australia. It is grounded in research literature on organisational climate and military unit effectiveness and has evolved from collaborative work between Canadian and Australian Defence researchers in psychology.

3.11 PULSE provides commanders with a measure of the climate within their organisation. PULSE is administered through a questionnaire that addresses a range of issues related to the human component of military capability, including the core dimensions of leadership, teamwork, job satisfaction, work motivation, satisfaction with communication, and job stressors.

3.12 The theoretical model of PULSE is proposed that there are two basic sets of forces acting on an individual in an organisational setting (in a military context).

- a. The first force, Job Demands—such as work overload, high tempo, poor conditions, role conflict and harassment—can put the individual under pressure and may have a negative effect on the physical and mental health of individuals.
- b. The second set of forces, Job Resources, are factors within the workplace that help an employee deal successfully with job demands and develop into a more capable employee. Examples include confidence in leadership, organisational support, a sense of autonomy, a sense of being treated fairly, and satisfaction with communication across the unit. Job resources help the individual cope with the pressure of job demands and bolster resilience.

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3.13 PULSE is designed to inform commanders of perceived personnel strengths and weaknesses, and to provide a framework for future decision-making regarding the management of the unit. In this way, PULSE can enable commanders to assess a unit's current command climate and, where necessary, to chart a course towards improvement.

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CHAPTER 4

COMMAND OF THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE

Executive summary

- Three levels are used to describe the differing roles and functions of command: these are known as the strategic, operational and tactical levels. In practice, matching command authorities to each level is not straightforward due to their overlapping nature.
- The strategic level is concerned with the coordination and direction of national power to achieve national objectives. It is subdivided into the national strategic and military strategic levels. At the national strategic level, the Australian Government, through the Minister for Defence, provides direction to the Chief of the Defence Force and the Secretary of the Department of Defence.
- Command at the military strategic level is concerned with organising and applying military power to achieve national strategic objectives. The Chief of the Defence Force has full command of the Australian Defence Force.
- Command at the operational level is concerned with planning and executing campaigns and operations to support military strategic objectives.
- Command at the tactical level is concerned with planning and conducting military tasks and actions to achieve operational objectives.

INTRODUCTION

4.1 Command and control (C2) doctrine in the Australian Defence Force (ADF) is applied at three levels: strategic (sub-divided into national strategic and military strategic), operational and tactical. These levels provide a framework for the C2 of campaigns and operations, and for the analysis of politico-military activity conducted before, during and after a campaign or operation.

4.2 The ADF's command system is derived from law, directives and convention and leads to a culture of civilian control of the military. Under the *Defence Act 1903* the Minister for Defence (MINDEF), who is also a member of Cabinet, has general control and administration of the Defence Force. In performing and exercising functions and powers under the *Defence Act 1903* Part II, the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) and Secretary of the Department of Defence (SECDEF) must comply with directions of MINDEF.

4.3 CDF commands the ADF while Service Chiefs exercise service command of their respective Services (see Chapter 5). When directed by MINDEF and Cabinet, CDF's command includes direct authority for operations. In practice, Chief Joint Operations (CJOPS) typically exercises theatre command at the operational level on behalf of CDF. Tactical-level commanders are appointed to lead joint task forces (JTF) or force elements such as task groups and task units to achieve assigned missions. These key appointments form the ADF's command chain, and ensure a coherent link between strategic aims and tactical action.

THE STRATEGIC, OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL LEVELS

Levels of command


- 4.4 An understanding of the strategic, operational and tactical levels—and their limitations—is vital to a commander's grasp of the application of military force.
- 4.5 **Strategic level.** The strategic level is concerned with the coordination and direction of national power to secure national objectives. The strategic level includes:
- a. **National strategic.** The national strategic level is concerned with the broad political dimension of national activities, both domestically and internationally, and is the exclusive province of Government. Cabinet, which is advised by a variety of departments and agencies, provides national strategic objectives and overall direction to government agencies. National government, military and industrial resources are mobilised at this level.
 - b. **Military strategic.** The military strategic level plans and directs military campaigns and operations to meet national strategic objectives.
- 4.6 **Operational level.** At the operational level, campaigns and operations are planned and conducted to achieve strategic objectives. This level is primarily the responsibility of a theatre commander (usually CJOPS, see Chapter 5). The focus of command at the operational level is on forming joint forces, deploying them into areas of operations, monitoring and controlling operations, and sustaining them logistically.

HISTORICAL EXAMPLE OPERATION AUGURY–PHILIPPINES 2017

As the military strategic planning guidance for Operation AUGURY–PHILIPPINES was developed within the Australian Government in 2017, staff officers from Military Strategic Commitments and Headquarters Joint Operations Command drafted the military strategic objectives for CDF's approval prior to inclusion in the Cabinet Submission for Government consideration. This example demonstrates the close link required between the strategic and operational levels, and helps to ensure strategic direction can be implemented with the means available.

- 4.7 **Tactical level.** Most JTF and their commanders act at the tactical level. At this level, tasks are planned and conducted to achieve operational objectives through manoeuvre and the generation of lethal and non-lethal effects.
- 4.8 Although these levels of command were originally developed with war fighting in mind, they can be applied to all military activities (see [Australian Defence Doctrine Publication \(ADDP\) 3.0—Campaigns and Operations](#)). As shown in Figure 4.1, the levels of command are linked and interdependent, and distinctions between levels can be imprecise.

Figure 4.1: The strategic, operational and tactical levels and corresponding command arrangements



THE NATIONAL STRATEGIC LEVEL

4.9 The national strategic level in Australia is established through constitutional arrangements, conventions, law and a culture that gives effect to civilian control of defence and the military. The key bodies and appointments at the national strategic level include Cabinet and related committees, and the Minister of Defence.

Civil control of defence activities

4.10 Defence activities are governed by the principle of civil control, which is established in the legal and constitutional framework governing Australia, and given effect through the roles of Parliament and the Government.

4.11 **Legal and Constitutional basis.** Under Section 68 of the Constitution, the Governor-General is the Commander-in-Chief of the naval and military forces of the Commonwealth of Australia. In practice, however, the Governor-General acts upon the advice of Ministers (who form the Cabinet) and command of the ADF is exercised by CDF. Therefore, committing forces to operations is fundamentally influenced by

the Prime Minister of Australia following deliberation with Cabinet, which includes MINDEF.¹

4.12 Parliament and the Government. The constitutional authority for setting strategic and defence policy is established in Section 51 of the Constitution. This means the Australian Parliament can enact laws concerning national security agencies, while direction to those agencies is provided by the Government. In practical terms, the authority to direct the ADF and associated entities such as the relevant intelligence agencies, is exercised by the Cabinet, the National Security Committee of Cabinet (NSC) and MINDEF. Cabinet and NSC mechanisms ensure that decisions to deploy the ADF reflect a whole-of-government approach.

Figure 4.2: The Australian Federal Government identifies the national strategic objectives that guide Australia's military strategy



Cabinet and the Minister for Defence

4.13 The Cabinet, which exists by convention, is composed of the Government's most senior Ministers. Cabinet is appointed by the Governor-General on the advice of the Prime Minister. Cabinet makes the decision to commit the ADF to operations, as well as making policy decisions that influence military operations in other ways. For example, Cabinet decisions to regulate aspects of the national economy may have military implications. Cabinet also makes decisions about the resources available for military forces through the budget. The Cabinet delegates many aspects relating to the strategic direction of operations to its sub-committee, known as the National Security Committee of Cabinet (NSC), and to MINDEF, who is a member of

1. *Defence Act 1903*, Part IIIAAA provides a specific process for calling out the ADF to protect Commonwealth interests and states and self-governing territories against domestic violence.

Cabinet and responsible for the general control and administration of the ADF (under the *Defence Act 1903*).

4.14 Within the remit given by the Cabinet, the NSC directs national strategy and provides coherence to policy, including its military and non-military aspects. The NSC usually comprises the Prime Minister (Chair), Deputy Prime Minister, MINDEF, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Treasurer, Attorney-General and Minister for Home Affairs. Additional members may be coopted permanently or as required, or appointed to serve on the NSC at the discretion of the Prime Minister. SECDEF and CDF are permanent invitees to the NSC and provide subject matter expertise as required. Other Defence officials may be invited for specific submissions.

4.15 The NSC's broad responsibilities in regards to the national strategic direction of the ADF include:

- a. recommending to Cabinet (or determining) the political objectives to be achieved, and monitoring progress towards their achievement
- b. stipulating and monitoring limitations and conditions to be imposed on military activity, including circumstances in which military activity should cease.

The Secretaries Committee on National Security

4.16 The Secretaries Committee on National Security (SCNS) supports the NSC. The role of SCNS is to ensure that whole-of-government implications of policy submissions are considered, facts are agreed, and differences at the officials' level are resolved as far as possible before being considered by the NSC. Membership of the SCNS consists of the Secretaries of several Government departments and agencies with responsibilities for Australia's security, including SECDEF and CDF.

THE MILITARY STRATEGIC LEVEL

4.17 The ADF command structure begins at the military strategic level and continues through to the tactical level. Command arrangements at each level reflect the distribution of responsibilities for planning and directing resources for campaigns, operations, combined and joint exercises, and other directed activities. The ADF command structure therefore:

- a. facilitates the efficient and effective employment of capabilities and resources to execute Government direction
- b. enables commanders at all levels to achieve their mission and be accountable for their actions
- c. adapts to any campaign or operation.

Military strategic command, policy and administration

4.18 Command at the military strategic level is legitimate only when it is exercised in response to lawful direction from the Government. Defence and the ADF will lose the confidence of the Government and the people if it fails to act legitimately and in accordance with direction.

4.19 The *Defence Act 1903* was amended by the *Defence Legislation Amendment (First Principles) Act 2015*. The 2015 legislation has determined the command structure of the ADF to be as follows:

- a. CDF exercises full command of the ADF

- b. Vice Chief of the Defence Force (VCDF) assists the CDF in the command of the ADF, and must act as CDF during any absence or where the CDF role is vacant
- c. Service Chiefs are explicitly subject to direction by CDF
- d. the dual leadership system of Defence and the ADF, known as the diarchy, is retained.

4.20 The high-level architecture of Defence's command and management system reflects policy direction from Government that includes the Defence White Paper, the Integrated Investment Program, the Defence Industry Policy Statement, the First Principles Review and the Defence budget.

4.21 At the military strategic level, Defence develops and implements plans to give military substance and effect to Government guidance. These plans include the Defence Planning Guidance incorporating Australia's Military Strategy.

4.22 Under the *Defence Act 1903*, CDF and SECDEF jointly administer Defence, except with respect to matters relating to command of the ADF and any other matters prescribed by MINDEF. This joint administration is commonly known as the diarchy.

4.23 The diarchy is a governance structure unique in the Commonwealth public service. It reflects the amalgamation into one Defence organisation what were previously discrete entities. Since the mid-1990s, respective MINDEF have usually issued a joint ministerial directive to CDF and SECDEF. Recent directives have unambiguously established MINDEF as the *customer for*, and *owner of*, outputs delivered by CDF and SECDEF. Such directives detail the respective roles, responsibilities and accountabilities of CDF and SECDEF, ministerial expectations, and implementation directions.

4.24 CDF is supported by officers including the VCDF, Service Chiefs, CJOPS and Chief of Joint Capabilities (CJC). CDF and SECDEF jointly manage their responsibilities through senior Defence committees that provide the primary decision-making committees in the Department of Defence and ADF.

Chief of the Defence Force

4.25 In addition to exercising full command of the ADF and being responsible for delivering capability outcomes, CDF is the principal military adviser to MINDEF. In this role, CDF is responsible for:

- a. advising Government on the deployment of the ADF to achieve Government objectives, including identifying strategic objectives, assessing their feasibility and identifying the desired strategic end state
- b. planning and executing military operations, including establishing the command organisation specific to an operation and approving the operational-level commander's objectives and concept of operations
- c. assigning command authorities to subordinates, including the service chiefs and joint group commanders (usually through a charter letter outlining responsibilities and delegations)
- d. directing forces and resources to be assigned (including with regard to multinational partner capabilities and needs)

- e. employing the ADF to enhance national strategic interests, alliance relationships and regional security
- f. preparing forces for operations consistent with Government requirements
- g. preparing military policy and plans
- h. maintaining stewardship of the military workforce
- i. providing operational logistics
- j. managing military information and communications technology.

Figure 4.3: Then-incoming Chief of the Defence Force, Air Chief Marshal Mark Binskin (left), with outgoing Chief of the Defence Force, General David Hurley, July 2014



Secretary of the Department of Defence

4.26 SECDEF is the principal civilian adviser to MINDEF and carries out the functions of a departmental head. In that context, SECDEF exercises statutory responsibilities under the *Public Service Act 1999* and responsibilities under the *Public Governance Performance and Accountability Act 2013* (PGPA Act) in relation to the efficient, effective and ethical use of resources. MINDEF consults SECDEF for advice on departmental issues and the proper use of resources in Defence.

4.27 Under the PGPA Act, SECDEF is the accountable authority for the Department (including the ADF), and associated regulations and Chief Executive Instructions. ADF members are officials of the Department of Defence for the purposes of the PGPA Act and are required to comply with its requirements.

Vice Chief of the Defence Force

4.28 VCDF is appointed by the Governor-General in accordance with Section 12(2) of the *Defence Act 1903*. VCDF is the military deputy to CDF and acts as CDF in the CDF's absence. VCDF's day-to-day role is to assist CDF with the command and administration of the ADF. VCDF is the Joint Force Authority for the ADF and leads as the primary integrator of military forces. VCDF advises CDF on Defence preparedness, and on contemporary and future military strategies. VCDF is also the chair of the Investment Committee (see paragraph 4.37 below). VCDF exercises joint command (see Chapter 5) of the VCDF Executive.

Service Chiefs

4.29 The three Service Chiefs are Chief of Navy, Chief of Army and Chief of Air Force. Each is accountable to CDF, receive separate charters from CDF, and have service command of their respective Services and assigned elements.

4.30 As capability managers, the Service Chiefs raise, train and sustain their Service to deliver Service capabilities, including combat-ready forces. The Service Chiefs provide CDF advice on the present and future force. They may advise ministers in matters relating to their responsibilities.

Chief Joint Operations

4.31 CJOPS exercises joint command of Joint Operations Command (JOC) and direct command units. When delegated by CDF, CJOPS has theatre command of assigned forces for planning and conducting campaigns, operations, joint exercises and other activities. CJOPS may appoint commanders and delegate command within assigned forces.

4.32 CJOPS is a principal adviser to CDF at the military strategic level for operations. CDF retains the right to command operations or assign theatre command to any ADF officer, although in practice CJOPS usually exercises theatre command (tcomd) of assigned forces for operations, joint exercises and activities on behalf of CDF (see Chapter 5).

Chief of Joint Capabilities

4.33 Chief of Joint Capabilities (CJC) exercises joint command of Joint Capabilities Group, and is responsible to CDF for the provision of joint health, logistics, information warfare, reserve and cadet policy, joint military police, education and training, and other functions as directed. CJC also manages agreed joint projects, and their sustainment, to support joint capability requirements.

Senior Defence Committees

4.34 CDF's command of the ADF is supported by senior Defence committees. The Defence Committee, of which CDF is a member, is pre-eminent. It is supported by an Enterprise Business Committee (EBC) and an Investment Committee (IC). CDF obtains military advice through the Chiefs of Service Committee and Strategic Command Group. In addition, the Strategic Policy Committee may make decisions that influence operations or related activities such as international engagement.

4.35 **Defence Committee.** The Defence Committee is the primary decision-making committee in Defence. It comprises SECDEF as Chair, CDF, VCDF, the Associate Secretary, Deputy Secretary Strategic Policy and Intelligence (DEPSEC

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SP&I) and Chief Finance Officer. In the absence of SECDEF, CDF assumes the chair. The committee is responsible for setting top-level organisational goals and driving delivery of the Department's commitments to Government and the community. It has a focus is on major capability and resource trade-offs, and the shared accountabilities which include:

- a. integration of strategic and policy advice to Government, including bi-annual assurance to the Defence Ministers that strategy, capability and resources are aligned
- b. setting and monitoring top-level resource allocations, including the appropriate balance of resources between capital, operating and personnel costs
- c. approval of plans and scrutiny of performance against those plans, including the Corporate Plan, the associated Annual Plan and the Investment Plan as recommended by the respective committees
- d. endorsement of the investment portfolio and capability proposals recommended by the Investment Committee
- e. consideration of significant risks in relation to the Defence enterprise escalated by the EBC and Investment Committee.

4.36 **Enterprise Business Committee.** The EBC is a subsidiary committee of the Defence Committee It is responsible for the effective running of Defence. The EBC's remit includes corporate planning, performance monitoring and reporting, enterprise risk management, information management, and service delivery reform. It is chaired by the Associate Secretary; the alternative chair is VCDF. The decisions of the committee are binding across Defence.

4.37 **Investment Committee.** Chaired by VCDF, the Investment Committee is responsible for bringing the future force and supporting enablers into being. It ensures proposals are consistent with strategic guidance, integrated and interoperable, affordable, tailored and technically and commercially feasible. Investment Committee outcomes are a standing item at the Defence Committee, and all decisions of the Investment Committee are binding across Defence.

4.38 **Chiefs of Service Committee.** The Chiefs of Service Committee (COSC) is responsible for exercising military control over issues affecting the design, generation, operational concepts, preparedness and management of ADF capabilities to achieve Government objectives. It provides CDF with advice on the following:

- a. preparedness, including joint collective training
- b. current requirements for enabling functions
- c. ADF-specific policy
- d. the ADF workforce framework, including employment frameworks, diversity and joint force establishments
- e. ADF conditions of service
- f. stewardship of the military workforce.

4.39 The COSC permanent members comprise CDF (Chairman), SECDEF, VCDF, Service Chiefs, CJOPS and CJC. Permanently invited members are the Associate Secretary, DEPSEC SP&I, Deputy Secretary Defence People, Head Force

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Design, Head Force Integration and Gender Adviser to CDF. The chiefs of staff to CDF, SECDEF and VCDF are nominated as advisers to COSC. Only CDF may vary the composition of the committee.

4.40 Strategic Policy Committee. The Strategic Policy Committee is chaired by SECDEF. It is responsible for exercising strategic guidance for major capability decisions, development of Cabinet submissions on major policy issues, Defence policy for major initiatives or international engagements, and consideration of Defence's position for significant international dialogues.

4.41 Strategic Command Group. The Strategic Command Group (SCG) is the primary advisory forum that supports CDF as commander of the ADF. It provides situational awareness of ADF operations, critical incidents and strategic matters. The CDF uses the SCG to issue direction and guidance on ADF matters, and to coordinate responses to major incidents while ensuring Groups and Services have a common understanding of issues and priorities.

Support from other sources

4.42 Other government agencies may support Defence and deployed commanders in a whole-of-government approach. This support should be coordinated at the highest practicable level. Government legislation, conventions, departmental instructions, contracts and memoranda of understanding govern the relationship between Defence and these agencies. In the case of agencies with legislative obligations, direction is conducted through the Minister responsible for that agency. In the case of contractors, supervision is the responsibility of the contracting Defence Group.

THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL

4.43 The operational-level commander exercises command of assigned forces.² This includes providing direction and resources to the forces taking military action. The focus of command at this level is on forming the JTF, deploying the force into the area of operations, sustaining the force, allocating resources and providing guidance to best achieve strategic objectives and effects. The operational-level commander links military strategic objectives with all tactical activity in the theatre and directs military resources to achieve the end state.

4.44 In the ADF, the operational level is the primary responsibility of CJOPS, who uses operational art and campaign design (see below and [ADDP 3.0—Campaigns and Operations](#) and [ADDP 5.0—Joint Planning](#)).

Definitions

Operational art: The skilful employment of military forces to attain strategic goals through the design, organisation, sequencing and direction of campaigns and major operations.

Notes:

1. Operational art translates strategic into operational and ultimately tactical actions.

² The command and administrative authorities relevant to the operational level are described in Chapter 5.

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2. It requires a commander to:

- (a) identify the military conditions or end state that constitute the strategic objective
- (b) decide the operational objectives that must be achieved to reach the desired end state
- (c) order a sequence of actions that leads to fulfilment of the operational objectives
- (d) apply the military resources allocated to sustain the desired sequence of actions.

Campaign design: The manner in which an operational commander expresses a vision of how the campaign may unfold and how desired objectives will be sequenced and synchronised.

4.45 ADF commanders at the operational level include:

- a. CJOPS
- b. Deputy Chief Joint Operations (DCJOPS)
- c. single-Service environmental commanders, including Commander Deployable Joint Force Headquarters
- d. Special Operations Commander Australia (SOCAUST)
- e. Commander Joint Logistics (CJLOG).

Operational command by a theatre commander

4.46 Depending on the nature and scale of an operation, and by means of a charter letter or directive, the CDF will usually direct a subordinate to command operations. Within the constraints specified by CDF, this subordinate exercises theatre command (tcomd) over assigned forces. The theatre commander designs a campaign or operational plan, commands assigned forces and directs the major operations of a campaign.

4.47 For most operations, CDF will usually assign CJOPS as theatre commander. In addition to the command function described in paragraphs 4.31–32, and with the support of Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQJOC), CJOPS:

- a. identifies Defence response options through the development of contingency and operational plans
- b. manages operational and HQJOC organisational risks
- c. develops and manages joint collective training of the ADF in accordance with CDF's annual training guidance
- d. certifies assigned forces as ready for operations
- e. conducts and evaluates activities assigned to JOC within the Program of ADF Activities.

4.48 CJOPS also has other responsibilities, including as the ADF search and rescue authority, the coordinator for Defence Assistance to the Civil Community and Defence Force Aid to the Civil Authority, and governance coordination for Defence simulation.

Deputy Chief Joint Operations

4.49 DCJOPS is responsible for coordinating the HQ staff effort through the HQJOC Branch Heads to plan, control and coordinate campaigns, as well as joint and combined operations and exercises (see [ADDP 5.0—Joint Planning](#)).

Single-Service environmental commanders

4.50 Environmental commanders are responsible to their respective Service Chiefs for raising, training and sustaining forces under their command.

4.51 **Commander Australian Fleet.** Commander Australian Fleet is responsible to Chief of Navy for the force generation of naval elements for subsequent employment on operations by CJOPS. This responsibility includes group training (ie task group level) and the naval aspects of joint collective training, together with the mounting process to provide assurance that the required level of capability has been met.

4.52 **Commander Forces Command.** Commander Forces Command (COMD FORCOMD) is responsible to Chief of Army for generating Army force elements through a single training continuum that unifies individual and collective training. COMD FORCOMD then assigns force elements to Headquarters 1st Division (HQ 1 Div) to undertake mission-specific training, assessment and certification prior to force assignment to a theatre commander for operations.

4.53 **Air Commander Australia.** Air Commander Australia (ACAUST) is responsible to Chief of Air Force (CAF) for the capability management of operational forces and for the raising, training and sustainment of Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) forces. ACAUST reports directly to CAF on all aspects relating to the delivery of RAAF capability to meet CAF and CJOPS tasking.

Other joint commanders

4.54 **Special Operations Commander Australia.** SOCAUST commands Special Operations Command (SOCOMD), and has higher command relationships with CDF, CA and CJOPS. SOCOMD is allocated tcomd to CJOPS for Special Operations planning and conducting campaigns, operations, joint and combined exercises, and other directed activities. For domestic counter-terrorist and other sensitive strategic operations, SOCAUST has a direct relationship with CDF. SOCAUST is responsible to Chief of Army for generating and preparing assigned units, and for providing a scalable headquarters (see [ADDP 3.12—Special Operations](#)).

4.55 **Commander Joint Logistics.** CJLOG leads the Defence logistics system that provides global support to operations. In this capacity, CJLOG has operational responsibilities to CJOPS and other operational commanders for the provision of:

- a. logistics support to campaigns, operations, exercises and other activities
- b. logistics advice
- c. the coordination of support to operations by the enabling groups.

4.56 Joint Logistics Command (JLC) provides logistics and movement support to operations; force preparation; and raise, train and sustain activities. JLC develops tactical-level guidance, taken from HQJOC guidance, to sustain operational forces (see [ADDP 4.0—Defence Logistics](#)).

4.57 **Commander 1st Division and Deployable Joint Force Headquarters.** The primary role of Commander 1st Division is to prepare and command assigned forces in order to meet directed operational requirements. Commander 1st Division is also Commander Deployable Joint Force Headquarters. This arrangement gives the ADF a two-star level headquarters that can be deployed at short notice. Commander Deployable Joint Force Headquarters' key tasks include providing a scalable HQJTF to meet preparedness priorities, generating and certifying forces, and leading development of amphibious capabilities. Deployable Joint Force Headquarters is under operational control of CJOPS for operational planning (see Chapter 5).

4.58 **Commander joint task force.** Commander joint task force (CJTF), who may operate at the operational or tactical levels, is appointed as required to undertake planning (see [ADDP 5.0—Joint Planning](#)).

Authority for orders in the joint environment

CDF directs that any officer, warrant officer or non-commissioned officer may give lawful orders when in joint units or where joint responsibilities are held. The exercise of command power will occur primarily within existing chains of command. However, this will not prevent ADF members, regardless of their service, exercising command to maintain safety or military discipline, or to uphold ADF values.

THE TACTICAL LEVEL

4.59 ADF force elements generally operate at the tactical level. At the tactical level, JTF commanders execute the campaign or operation plan employing subordinate force elements commensurate with the task, operation or activity. The elements of the ADF tactical command structure are described below.

Joint task forces

4.60 A JTF is established when required to coordinate force elements of two or more Services, other joint force activities, or with another Government agency or a non-governmental organisation. For further details of the command and control aspects of multiagency operations see Chapter 7. The JTF is dissolved on order of the theatre commander, usually once the mission and end state have been achieved.

4.61 The composition of JTF may vary from small and specialised to very large, perhaps comprising a significant portion of the ADF. The composition of a JTF is largely determined by the mission and situation, and is outlined in the CDF order establishing the force. This order also details the broad command arrangements for the operation and assigned force elements.

4.62 Force elements are subordinate elements of a JTF and are known, in order from highest to lowest, as task groups, task units and task elements. These force elements may be single-Service tactical organisations (for example, Navy task groups or Army battle groups), or joint forces assembled into environmental or functional components. A mixture of structures may be used (see Chapter 6).

Joint task force commanders

4.63 A CJTF is designated by CDF or CJOPS and is responsible for operations as directed. Commanders of JTFs plan and execute operations, often supported by component commanders.

4.64 The authority establishing a JTF appoints the CJTF and assigns the mission and subordinate force elements. CJTF is responsible for making recommendations to the establishing commander on the proper employment of forces to achieve the mission.

4.65 The responsibilities of a CJTF include:

- a. exercising C2 over assigned and attached force elements
- b. developing a detailed plan for approval by the establishing authority
- c. requesting rules of engagement to accomplish the assigned mission
- d. notifying the establishing authority when prepared to assume responsibility for the assigned joint force area of operations
- e. ensuring that the JTF operates as an effective, mutually supporting team
- f. using assigned or attached force elements effectively to achieve the mission
- g. providing guidance to force elements for the planning and conduct of operations
- h. monitoring the operation and keeping the superior commander informed
- i. coordinating with other forces and agencies not assigned or attached, including friendly forces and governments
- j. establishing, if necessary, a coordinating procedure for specific functions or activities among assigned, attached and supporting force elements
- k. establishing the succession of command within the JTF
- l. allocating tasks to subordinate commanders.

Task group commanders

4.66 The CJTF will usually exercise command through subordinate task group commanders, which may be a component if designated (see Chapter 6). Task group commanders are responsible for commanding their task groups (which may include land, maritime, air, special operations or logistics elements) to achieve their allocated tasks in support of CJTF's objectives.

4.67 The responsibilities of a task group commander include:

- a. exercising C2 of assigned, attached and supporting force elements
- b. coordinating with other task group commanders to ensure the effective and efficient conduct of operations
- c. planning and executing operations in accordance with CJTF guidance and plans
- d. monitoring the operation and, as required, passing information to CJTF
- e. ensuring administrative and logistics support for the force
- f. providing liaison personnel to CJTF and other task group commanders as directed.

CHAPTER 5

COMMAND AND ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES

Executive summary

- The Chief of the Defence Force has full command of the Australian Defence Force. Subordinate commanders exercise authority in accordance with their rank, appointment and direction under a standing or operational command authority.
- The standing command authorities are full command, service command and joint command.
- The operational command authorities are theatre command, national command, operational command, tactical command, operational control and tactical control. Commanders can also apply these command authorities (except theatre command and national command) to raise, train and sustain activities.
- Other administrative, support and coordination arrangements can supplement command authorities. These arrangements can ease the commander's span of command.
- The administrative authorities are administrative control, local administration and technical control.
- The forms of operational or administrative support are direct support and in support of.
- There are two coordination authorities: coordinating authority and direct liaison authorised.

Defining the battlespace and establishing a clear command and control system should be regarded as the very essence of effective planning at the operational level of war. All other operational functions—including manoeuvre, fires, logistics, intelligence and force protection—rely on a clear demarcation by an operational headquarters of battlespace parameters and command and control organisation.

**Lieutenant Colonel Chris Field
Planning in Operation Iraqi Freedom
2003**

INTRODUCTION

5.1 Commanders delegate authority so subordinate commanders can carry out their operational and administrative responsibilities. Command authorities provide a simple and consistent framework to communicate the extent of authority that a commander is delegating. Assigning a particular command authority specifies the subordinate commander's ability to assign forces, missions and tasks. It also conveys limitations on further delegation of authority. Command authorities are independent of the levels of command detailed in Chapter 4.

5.2 Various administrative authorities support the command of assigned forces. Administrative authorities define an officer's ability to give direction regarding the provision of support or the administration within a defined locality or task. This may

include authority over force elements or personnel that are not within the officer's chain of command.

5.3 In the Australian Defence Force (ADF), there are two types of authorities—standing and operational. Standing authorities are enduring and continue to exist, in part, even when a commander's subordinates have been assigned to another operational commander. An instrument of appointment (or similar document) will specify a commander's standing command authority.

5.4 Operational command authorities apply only for the duration of a specified operation or activity. A commander will promulgate these command authorities in the directive or operation order (opord) applicable to the operation or exercise. Operational planners must be cognisant of the requirement to be clear about command authorities and relationships in operational documents.

STANDING COMMAND AUTHORITIES

Command

5.5 Command is the authority that a commander in the military Service lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command provides an officer with authority to execute their responsibilities. It allows the commander to plan and direct the effective use of available resources for assigned missions. Command authority also allows the exercise of responsibilities for the health, welfare, morale and discipline of assigned personnel.

5.6 In general, commanders may delegate aspects of their authority within the limits of legislation, defence policy and their instruments of appointment. When delegating authority, the statement of delegation must:

- a. be unambiguous
- b. clearly define the degree of authority
- c. clearly specify the time at which the authority becomes effective.

5.7 Standing command authorities allow the ADF to function on an enduring basis. They provide authority for the necessary activities to create and prepare the ADF for operations, while ensuring accountability for outcomes. These authorities are full command, service command and joint command.

Definitions

Full command: The statutory authority of the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF), under Section 9 of the *Defence Act 1903*, to issue orders to all members of the ADF. Notes:

1. Full command covers every aspect of military operations and administration.
2. It includes responsibility to advise the Minister for Defence on matters relating to command of the ADF.

Service command: The enduring authority given by the Chief of the Defence Force to service chiefs to command their services.

Note: Service command does not include authority to conduct operations.

Joint command: The enduring authority given by CDF to ADF joint chiefs to command joint organisations in the ADF.

Note: Joint command does not include authority to conduct operations, determine single-Service personnel policy or conduct career management.

Full command

5.8 Section 9 of the *Defence Act 1903* specifies that CDF has command of the ADF. The Vice Chief of the Defence Force (VCDF) assists the CDF to exercise command and acts as the CDF in circumstances as defined under Section 13 of the Defence Act. The Governor-General appoints CDF and VCDF under Section 12 of the Defence Act.

5.9 Full command gives the CDF complete operational and administrative authority over the ADF. Responsibilities for resource utilisation, administration, planning and control of the entire ADF are inherent in full command. No other commander has full command over ADF forces.

5.10 CDF exercises command of the ADF through Service and Joint Chiefs by assigning service command, joint command and theatre command as elements of full command. The CDF specifies the division of responsibilities and authorities in a Charter Letter to each Chief. Further assignment of command below Service and Joint Chiefs is detailed in directives, orders or instructions. CDF retains full command of the ADF at all times, regardless of any authorities the CDF assigns to subordinate commanders.

5.11 The CDF has the authority to conduct operations when directed by the Minister for Defence (MINDEF) and Cabinet. MINDEF and/or Cabinet will also provide CDF with authority for the use of force where necessary to pursue national objectives.

5.12 **Cadets.** Officers, instructors and cadets from the Australian Defence Force Cadets are not members of the ADF and are not 'under command' of CDF. However, CDF directs and administers cadets. The CDF can delegate responsibilities to assist with the direction and administration of cadets to any member of the ADF.

Service command

5.13 Service command gives Service Chiefs authority to raise, train and sustain the force elements of their Service for operations, and for advising CDF on matters relating to command of force elements within their Service. It also includes authority to direct and administer cadets.

5.14 A Service Chief remains responsible for Service-specific command aspects of military personnel working within other Groups or Services at all times. Service-specific command aspects include career management and single-Service personnel policy, but does not include authority to conduct operations.

Joint command

5.15 CDF assigns joint command to VCDF, Chief Joint Operations (CJOPS) and Chief of Joint Capabilities (CJC) to exercise command over their respective organisations. These commanders raise, train and sustain the capabilities within their organisations and advise CDF on the matters relating to their command. Joint command does not include the authority to conduct operations.

5.16 Service Chiefs retain authority for career management or single-Service personnel policy.

Exercise of command

5.17 Service or joint command includes authority over both permanent/regular and reserve personnel. A military officer derives the authority from Defence Instruction Administrative Policy to direct Australian Public Service members within their organisation.

5.18 A Service or Joint Chief can delegate any component of their authority or responsibilities to subordinate officers where consistent with higher direction. However, the Service or Joint Chief retains accountability to the CDF. Any subordinate commander may likewise further delegate their standing authorities and responsibilities within the chain of command and again remains accountable to the delegating officer and, ultimately, CDF.

OPERATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITIES

5.19 Operational command authorities detail command arrangements for a specific operation, operational activity or exercise. They are effective for a specific time, task and/or function. The operational command authorities are theatre command (tcomd), national command (natcomd), operational command (opcomd), operational control (opcon), tactical command (tacomd) and tactical control (tacon). Use of these authorities is not exclusive to the conduct of operations. Except for tcomd or natcomd, commanders may also apply these command authorities to create force groupings and appoint commanders for raise, train and sustain activities.

Definitions

Theatre command: The authority given by CDF to a subordinate to command assigned forces to prepare for and conduct operations (campaigns, operations, combined and joint exercises, and other activities as directed).

Note: Theatre command does not include authority to determine single-Service personnel policy or conduct career management.

National command: The authority, conferred upon an appointed Australian commander, to safeguard Australian national interests during multinational operations.

Operational command: The authority granted to a commander to specify missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to re-assign forces and to

retain or delegate operational control, tactical command and/or tactical control as may be deemed necessary.

Note: It does not of itself include responsibility for administration.

Tactical command: The authority delegated to a commander to specify missions and tasks to forces under command for the accomplishment of the mission specified by higher authority.

Operational control: The authority delegated to a commander to:

- a. direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time or location
- b. deploy units concerned and retain or delegate tactical control of those units.

Note:

1. It does not include authority to allocate separate employment of components of the units concerned.
2. It does not, of itself, include responsibility for administration or logistics control.

Tactical control: The detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or manoeuvres necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.

Theatre command

5.20 Theatre command is the mechanism by which CDF can delegate authority to a subordinate officer to prepare for or conduct campaigns and operations. Theatre command force assigns elements to the nominated theatre commander. CDF is the only authority who can direct Service or Joint Chiefs to assign forces under tcomd. The appointed theatre commander cannot delegate or transfer tcomd. Orders issued by CDF will specify limits on the function and assignment of tcomd.

5.21 The CDF assigns tcomd in the following circumstances:

- a. **In anticipation of Government direction to conduct an operation.** Theatre command gives authority to move, equip, reorganise, train or otherwise prepare force elements for an impending operation. CDF assigns tcomd by an alert order (alerto).
- b. **To conduct an operation.** In this circumstance, tcomd additionally includes the authority to exercise or delegate opcomd. CDF assigns this authority in an execute order (executo).
- c. **To prepare force elements for joint operations.** This involves the temporary and non-operational force assignment to conduct joint exercises. CDF assigns tcomd through directives to relevant Service and Joint Chiefs in support of the CDF's Preparedness Directive.

5.22 CJOPS is the officer to whom the CDF will usually delegate tcomd over all ADF forces in a designated operational theatre. For example, CJOPS exercised tcomd over all ADF forces deployed to the Middle East Region during the last decade, regardless of their Service.

5.23 When CDF assigns forces under tcomd, the theatre commander determines the level of administrative responsibility necessary for the effective and efficient conduct of operations. The residual administrative responsibilities remain the responsibility of the Service or Joint Chiefs. Service and Joint Chiefs also retain technical control (techcon)—see later section—and authorities for single-Service

personnel policy and career management. The specific division of responsibilities between the theatre commander and Service/Joint Chiefs is not definitive. This will vary according to the nature and duration of the operation or exercise; forces assigned; location of the deployment; and the rotation plan for personnel and equipment. CDF will detail these arrangements in the relevant order and/or directive.

5.24 Depending on the size of the operation, tcomd can be a significant and complex responsibility. To alleviate this, the theatre commander usually exercises tcomd through:

- a. national commanders, during multinational operations
- b. JTF commanders
- c. any other commander conducting operations or activities.

5.25 Although the theatre commander can assign and task forces, they cannot delegate tcomd to a subordinate commander. They may delegate opcomd, opcon, tacomd, tacon and/or natcomd of assigned forces to subordinate commanders.

5.26 Unless otherwise directed by CDF, tcomd implies the authority to act as the Australian operational-level military point of contact in relationships with other nations' commands, Australian diplomatic missions, other Australian agencies and agencies of countries in-theatre. For example, a defined relationship exists between CDF, CJOPS and the Commander United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM). CDF deals with Commander USINDOPACOM at the strategic level as a result of the strategic responsibilities assigned to Commander USINDOPACOM by the US National Command Authority. Meanwhile, CJOPS deals with Commander USINDOPACOM at the operational level.

5.27 CDF will usually assign force elements under tcomd of CJOPS for the conduct of specified joint training activities.

National command

5.28 National command is an operational command authority, conferred upon an appointed Australian commander, to safeguard Australian national interests during multinational operations. The theatre commander may assign natcomd to any force assigned ADF officer, through provision of a command directive and any associated executive documents.

5.29 In most circumstances, the senior Australian commander in the joint force area of operations has natcomd over deployed forces. However, all deployed ADF personnel have an innate responsibility to advise their chain of command when they become aware of a condition or action that has potential to undermine national interests. Actions such as the abuse of prisoners, contraventions of rules of engagement, or planned operations outside any national caveat are examples of matters to be reported to the national commander.

5.30 Unless specified otherwise, the theatre commander is the conduit of natcomd functions between CDF and the Australian national commander of forces assigned tcomd. For example, forces deployed to the Middle East Region in the 2000s and 2010s were under tcomd of CJOPS, who delegated natcomd to the senior deployed ADF commander (Commander Australian Contingent).

5.31 National command provides for the oversight of assigned national forces. This may include some or all of the following responsibilities:

- a. **Liaison.** Conduct liaison with the multinational force commander and the Australian chain of command regarding changes to operational command authority.
- b. **Engagement.** Engage with multinational, host-nation and other military and civil stakeholders to maintain visibility of partner planning and future intentions.
- c. **Oversight.** Maintain situational awareness to ensure that Australian operations remain within the envelope of Australian Government–approved policy.
- d. **Detention management.** Ensure that the treatment and handling of detainees apprehended by Australian forces—from point of capture though to release or sentencing—is conducted in accordance with policy and law.
- e. **Force communication.** Ensure access to national communication and information systems (CIS) capabilities and coordination with partner CIS services.
- f. **Personnel management.** Provide timely national-specific personnel and administrative advice, guidance and support to Defence personnel in the area of operations.
- g. **Rules of engagement.** Supervise adherence to Australian Government–authorised rules of engagement and manage requests to modify rules of engagement as appropriate to changing operational circumstances.
- h. **Media access.** Facilitate access to Australian forces by national or international media in a manner consistent with Australian policy.

5.32 National command does not include operational command authorities, nor does it include administrative functions. However, the theatre commander may authorise an ADF commander to exercise natcomd together with other operational command authorities and/or administrative functions concurrently. Chapter 7 provides further details on the exercise of natcomd on multinational operations.

HISTORICAL EXAMPLE NATIONAL COMMAND OF AUSTRALIAN FORCES DEPLOYED OVERSEAS

During the Anglo-Boer War in South Africa (1899–1902), Colonial and later Australian forces were placed entirely at the disposal of the British command. That experience, together with Federation, led to an Australian determination to maintain the national identity of forces deployed overseas.

In World War I, the Australian Imperial Force (AIF) was assigned under operational command of the Imperial General Staff but was administered by the AIF commander. The latter reported to the Australian Government and was directed to keep the force intact, uniquely Australian, and committed strategically in accordance with national direction. This set a precedent for World War II and subsequent deployments in Korea and South East Asia.

The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) was controlled differently, as it had been agreed at

the 1911 Imperial Conference that upon a declaration of war, the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board and naval services would come under direct control of the British Admiralty. The Australian fleet would become a squadron of the Royal Navy, taking orders directly from London, or from the Royal Navy officer under whose command they were placed.

During World War II, the RAN was again placed under command of the Royal Navy, as well as United States Navy commanders. The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) dispatched large numbers of aircrew to Britain, the Middle East and Burma. Although there were RAAF squadrons, many individuals were absorbed into Royal Air Force units. An attempt at forming a RAAF headquarters (HQ) in Britain, as the AIF had, was ineffective. In the South-West Pacific Area, however, HQ RAAF Command maintained RAAF forces as an Australian entity.

With the increasing commitment of the ADF to United Nations and multinational operations from the 1990s and the increasing emphasis on joint command and control, it has now become standard to establish a national HQ responsible for forces of the three Services. For the 2003 commitment to Iraq, Minister of Defence Senator Robert Hill stated:

The commander of Australian troops is Australian. Australian commanders command Australian troops in a coalition of the willing led by the United States of America (USA) would in effect be managed by the USA. So in terms of the management of the total coalition, that would be USA leadership with Australia in the loop. But decisions relating to commitment of our forces, targeting by our forces, their rules of engagement are all Australian decisions.

The delegation of operational command authorities

5.33 Commanders delegate lower-level operational command to empower subordinate commanders to employ assigned forces. The delegating commander should state the operational command authority granted to a commander with clarity and precision. The commander and subordinate commanders need a shared understanding of the command and control arrangements for the operation.

5.34 The degree of authority delegated should be sufficient to allow a commander to direct and deploy assigned forces to complete tasks without reference to a higher authority. A commander should not be assigned more forces than required or be given excessive authority over forces, as this may prevent the most efficient use of resources.

5.35 Levels of authority and responsibility may be:

- a. directed by common usage
- b. specified in detailed subordinate doctrine, alliance agreements, memorandums of agreement and memorandums of understanding
- c. promulgated on a case-by-case basis in documents such as directives and opords.

5.36 Table 5.1 summarises what a commander is authorised to do with assigned forces. For details of multinational operations see Chapter 7.

Transfer of authority

5.37 Commanders can delegate or transfer elements of their authority within the definition of the relevant command authority. A commander will promulgate a written mechanism, such as an opord, to specify the authorities that they are transferring to whom and the duration of the transfer. Forces are transferred using the terms 'assign' when passing from one commander to another, and 'attach' when joining a force element. The delegating commander should specify the receiving commander's responsibility for administration and logistics, as these are not inherent within the operational command authorities.

5.38 The process of transferring force elements equally applies to exercises as well as operations. Using the same process for exercises and operations provides a consistent approach and ensures clarity of command authorities for all force elements involved.

5.39 The assignment and reassignment of force elements must align with a recognised phase of an operation and balance the needs and timing imperatives of the single-Services and the theatre commander. Requirements for the handover and/or handback of force elements will vary by operation and by force elements. Precise details for each handover and/or handback of force elements are included in opords, directives and procedures.

Table 5.1: Australian Defence Force operational command authorities

	natcomd	tcomd	opcomd	tacomd	opcon	tacon
Safeguard Australian national interests	Yes	Yes ¹	Yes ¹	Yes ¹	Yes ¹	Yes ¹
Specify missions	No	Yes ²	Yes	Yes ³	No	No
Specify tasks	No	Yes	Yes	Yes ³	No	No
Direct forces for specific mission/task	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes (local direction)
Deploy force elements	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Allocate separate employment of force elements	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Administrative responsibility	No	As specified	If specified	If specified	If specified	If specified
Further delegate operational authorities	No ⁴	natcomd ⁴ opcomd tacomd opcon tacon	opcomd ⁵ tacomd opcon tacon	tacomd tacon	opcon tacon	tacon

Notes:

1. In support of the national commander
2. Aligned to the responsibilities given by the CDF
3. To accord with the mission given by the higher authority
4. Natcomd may not be delegated
5. May only delegate opcomd where specified by higher commander

Operational command

5.40 Operational command is the highest degree of operational authority. It provides a commander with the authority to task assets over the range of their capabilities without further approval from a higher commander.

5.41 In the context of joint operations, CDF may exercise or assign opcomd after direction from Government. If assigning opcomd, CDF will usually assign force elements under opcomd of a theatre commander by an executo. The theatre commander may exercise opcomd directly or delegate it to a force-assigned subordinate—usually by an operational instruction or directive. If electing to delegate, the theatre commander will usually delegate opcomd for the duration of an operation.

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5.42 Service or Joint Chiefs may also delegate opcomd to subordinates to conduct raise, train and sustain activities.

5.43 Only one commander exercises opcomd of assigned forces. Defence will not normally assign opcomd of ADF force elements to a non-ADF commander.

5.44 A commander assigned opcomd may:

- a. specify missions and tasks
- b. reassign them
- c. allocate separate employment of force element components
- d. delegate tacomd, opcon or tacon to a subordinate commander
- e. specify the requirements for reception, staging, onward movement and integration of forces moving into their operational area
- f. specify reputation management requirements with their operational area, including the conduct of military public affairs activities.

5.45 Operational command does not of itself include responsibility for administration or logistics support. However, commanders holding opcomd clearly require and invariably hold a level of authority and a level of responsibility for both administration and logistics support, and for other aspects of operational importance. Levels of authority and responsibility vary according to environment, Service, country and circumstances.

5.46 A commander assigned forces under opcomd cannot delegate opcomd to a subordinate commander unless specified. Under opcomd, a commander may delegate lower levels of command (tacomd, opcon or tacon) to subordinate commanders.

Tactical command

5.47 Tactical command is commonly used below opcomd in single-Service environments. Tactical command allows a commander freedom to task forces and to group and regroup forces as required.

5.48 A commander assigned tacomd of forces may:

- a. specify missions and tasks provided they accord with the mission given by higher authority
- b. allocate separate employment of components of force elements involved
- c. delegate tacomd or tacon to a subordinate commander.

5.49 Tactical command is normally the highest operational authority that can be assigned to a non-ADF commander over ADF force elements in multinational operations.

Operational control

5.50 Operational control is similar to tacomd, except that it does not authorise a commander to specify missions and tasks, or to group and regroup forces. Multinational commanders may be given opcon of ADF force elements.

5.51 A commander assigned opcon of forces may:

- a. direct assigned or attached forces, limited by function, time or location

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- b. delegate opcon or tacon to a subordinate commander.

Tactical control

5.52 Tactical control gives a commander the authority to locally direct a force element. Normally, tacon is not a pre-designated operational authority assigned at the operational level. Rather, it is intended as short-term authority delegated by a local tactical commander for the immediate conduct of tactical activity.

5.53 A commander delegated tacon may:

- a. direct force elements in manoeuvres to accomplish missions or tasks
- b. delegate tacon to another commander.

5.54 A commander assigned tacon of force elements must use those force elements to accomplish the task(s) assigned by a higher commander. A commander cannot assign new missions or tasks to force elements under their tacon.

ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES

5.55 Administrative authorities determine which commander is responsible for addressing the administrative aspects of command. Administrative authorities comprise administrative control and local administration.

Definitions

Administrative control: Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organisations in respect to administrative matters such as personnel management, supply services and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organisations.

Local administration: Direction or exercise of administration controlled by a local commander and related specifically to the troops or to the operation in the commander's area.

Note: Local administration is a sub set of administrative control.

Delegation of administrative authorities

5.56 Within service command, Service Chiefs retain overall administrative authority for their respective Services, which they exercise through the chain of command. In the case of force elements assigned under tcomd arrangements, Service Chiefs exercise their administrative responsibilities through the theatre commander and the operational chain of command. Therefore, the assignment of force elements under tcomd includes the administrative control of assigned forces, unless otherwise specified.

5.57 Theatre command also authorises the theatre commander to coordinate with subordinate commanders and to approve any joint aspects of administration and support necessary to the conduct of missions and tasks. Theatre command provides the authority to maintain discipline as a function of command. This includes, for example, appointment of commanding officers for discipline purposes in accordance with any powers or delegations that the theatre commander holds under *Defence Force Discipline Act 1982*.

5.58 In accordance with any command or support relationships established by CDF (usually in a warning order, alert or executo), tcomd includes the authority to

direct or request Commander Joint Logistics or other enabling force elements from other Groups or Services to provide support into or within a theatre of operations. Theatre command also includes the authority for the theatre commander, through Service and Joint Chiefs, to assign priorities to other Defence supporting organisations for the support of operations. Theatre command provides the administrative authority to use the resources of all forces assigned as necessary to accomplish missions and tasks.

5.59 When assigning force elements under opcomd and tacomd, a delegating commander must clearly specify the level of administrative support required and provided. In some cases, the nature and/or location of the tasking of assigned force elements may preclude the use of established procedures for providing support. In these cases, a commander may concurrently assign force elements to one commander under an operational command authority, and to another officer under an administrative authority.

Administrative control

5.60 Administrative control is the authority given to a headquarters to address the administrative needs of subordinate force elements. These needs include personnel management, supply of equipment and other stores, and other administrative matters that are not included in the operational missions of the subordinate force elements.

5.61 For example, the local combat support unit at an air base may have administrative control of RAAF lodger force elements. In this case, the local combat support unit is responsible for all administrative matters relating to the lodger unit, including such things as housing and feeding its members, and maintaining its vehicle fleet. Specific authorities for administrative control will be as detailed by the delegating commander in an opord or other executive document.

Local administration

5.62 Local administration is the authority for a commander to issue direction to force elements within their local area for specified matters not related to their primary operational tasking. The commander delegating local administration may specify these responsibilities in the opord pertaining to each operation. Local administration may involve:

- a. discipline and administrative sanctions
- b. provision of services and administration such as accommodation, water, light, power, care and wellbeing of personnel (including rationing, hygiene and sanitation), fire protection, maintenance of barracks and camps, and supervision of stores accounting and internal checking
- c. allocation of ranges, training areas and recreation facilities
- d. local movement of personnel and materiel
- e. local road traffic control and movement
- f. security, including preventative measures against vandalism and theft
- g. honours and awards
- h. supervision and maintenance of safety
- i. allocation of any local pool of labour and unit transport

j. allocation of local duties.

5.63 For example, a commander may temporarily assign an infantry battalion under local administration of a RAAF air base commander. In this case, the air base commander issues direction to the infantry battalion for local administrative issues for the duration of its time in location only. Other administrative issues, such as those requiring action over a longer term than the duration of the battalion's stay at the RAAF base, would remain the responsibility of the HQ assigned administrative control of the infantry battalion.

Technical control

5.64 Technical control advice is from a designated authority appointed to oversee the efficient use of a capability, often across command boundaries. For an operational commander, techcon advice will relate to the employment of capabilities so that they are used within their operating parameters.

5.65 A commander may not modify techcon advice received from a delegated authority. However, the commander may reject this advice in part or in whole in consideration of operational factors. The commander is to document the reasons for rejecting the advice and is accountable for the consequences of rejecting the advice. Such consequences may include loss of services.

Definition

Technical control: The provision of specialist and technical advice by designated authorities for the management and operation of forces.

Notes:

1. Capability managers exercise techcon and will not normally delegate it. Technical control advice is not included in a delegation of theatre command.
2. Capability managers exercise techcon through advice to the theatre commander for assigned forces.
3. Techcon advice may not be altered but may be reject it in part or in total by a commander in consideration of operational factors and within their span of command.
4. A commander is accountable for the consequences of rejecting the advice.

5.66 Technical control, like other authorities, must be assigned. A designated authority with techcon can still offer general advice; it does not exclusively offer only techcon advice. Given the important distinction between the two, a designated authority should clearly state whether the advice it is offering is techcon advice or general advice.

5.67 A commander can authorise a delegate to exercise techcon within that commander's authority. If authorised, techcon may be further delegated. Care should be taken with any further delegation of techcon because it is authorising personnel further down the command chain to offer techcon advice to the commander upon which he or she may rely for mission success, which the commander must take into consideration and document reasons for the rejection of technical advice.

5.68 The exercising of techcon implies the designated authority has an understanding of the employment of that capability within the commander's environment. The designated authority is likely to rely on reports and returns from within the commander's force elements to have the comprehensive understanding on which advice can be offered. The designated authority can request reports and returns from force elements not under the designated authorities command authority,

but requires the commander to order subordinates to provide reports and returns if it is to be mandatory.

5.69 A designated authority may provide technical advice direct to a commander or pass it to the staff for forwarding to the commander. The latter allows the commander's staff to relate the advice to the operational situation in briefing the commander. The staff are to make it clear when the advice is techcon advice and not general advice.

5.70 In some circumstances, staff may be able to accommodate the techcon without having to first brief the commander. This would occur when the advice relates to equipment settings for which there is no effect on a commander's plan.

SUPPORT ARRANGEMENTS

5.71 Support arrangements allow a commander to receive operational or administrative support from force elements that are not under their operational or administrative authority. The two support arrangements used within the ADF are direct support and in support of.

Definitions

Direct support: The support provided by a unit not attached to or under the command of the supported unit of formation, but required to give priority to the support required by that unit or formation.

In support of: Assisting another formation, unit or organisation while remaining under the initial command.

Direct support

5.72 Under direct support arrangements, a supporting force element receives support requests directly from the supported force. The supporting element also normally establishes liaison and communications with, and provides advice to, the supported element.

5.73 A force element in direct support has no command relationship with the supported force element. Thus, while tasked in direct support, the force remains under command of its parent formation and may only withdraw support with the agreement of the supported force or direction from a superior authority. Planning and tasking authority remains with the supporting force's parent command but usually in collaboration with the supported force.

5.74 A force element cannot provide the same resource in direct support of more than one supported commander. However, they may be concurrently 'in support of' other force elements.

5.75 Examples of direct support are:

- a. gunships from an Army aviation regiment may be in direct support of a brigade for a specific task, such as a river crossing
- b. a maritime patrol aircraft may be tasked in direct support of a maritime task group for anti-surface warfare or anti-submarine warfare activities.

In support of

5.76 In support of is the lowest level of control and does not confer on the supported force element any responsibility or authority for administration or movement of the supporting force element. When in support of multiple force elements, the commander of the supporting force element prioritises support requests to best achieve their higher commander's intent. For example, a joint commander may assign a naval surface combatant in support of an Army force element for naval gunfire support during an assault.

Supported and supporting commanders

5.77 Prioritisation and coordination of force elements across a variety of tasks is essential. A useful way for a superior commander to do this is by assigning supported or supporting commanders and designating the main effort in each phase of an operation. This is not a command status. More detail and explanation is included in Chapter 6.

COORDINATION AUTHORITIES

5.78 Coordination authorities are mechanisms to achieve coordination between countries, organisations or force elements that do not share a common chain of command. The two coordination authorities are coordinating authority and direct liaison authorised.

Definitions

Coordinating authority: The authority granted to a commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more countries or commands, or two or more Services or two or more forces of the same Service.

Notes:

1. The commander has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved or their representatives, but does not have the authority to compel agreement.
2. In case of disagreement between the agencies involved, the commander should attempt to obtain essential agreement by discussion.
3. In the event essential agreement cannot be obtained the matter will be referred to the appropriate authority.

Direct liaison authorised: That authority granted by a commander (any level) to a subordinate to directly consult or coordinate an action with a command or agency within or outside of the granting command.

Notes: 1. Direct liaison authorised is more applicable to planning than operations and always carries with it the requirement of keeping the commander granting direct liaison authorised informed.

2. Direct liaison authorised is a coordination relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised.

Coordinating authority

5.79 A commander with coordinating authority is authorised to coordinate planning by two or more countries, organisations or force elements. This enables the parties involved to achieve complementary objectives by collaborating on specific functions

or activities. A commander with coordinating authority has the authority to require consultation between the parties but cannot compel them to agree. In case of disagreement between the agencies involved, the commander should attempt to obtain essential agreement by discussion. If the actors cannot agree, the commander with coordinating authority will refer the issues to their higher authority.

Direct liaison authorised

5.80 Direct liaison authorised is that authority granted by a commander to a subordinate to consult directly or to coordinate an action with an element within or outside the granting command.

5.81 Direct liaison authorised is more applicable to planning than operations and always carries with it the requirement of keeping informed the commander granting direct liaison authorised. Direct liaison authorised is a coordination relationship; it does not provide command authority.

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HISTORICAL EXAMPLE

AUSTRALIAN COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS IN URUZGAN PROVINCE, AFGHANISTAN, 2006–2010

Contemporary military operations can require complicated arrangements that use multiple command authorities. Command arrangements for various elements of Joint Task Force 633 (JTF633) in Uruzgan province provide an example.

Australia took a decision not to command any of the International Security Assistance Force's (ISAF) regional commands. Therefore, when the Reconstruction Task Force (RTF) first deployed to Uruzgan in August 2006, it operated under opcon of the Dutch-led Task Force Uruzgan. This arrangement was maintained for the RTF's successor deployments—the Mentoring and Reconstruction Task Force and the Mentoring Task Force—until the Dutch forces relinquished command in August 2010. Commander JTF633 retained natcomd and did on occasion veto the tactical employment of Australian forces where such employment may have been contrary to Australian interests. Good working relations and mutual understanding between Australian and Dutch commanders—particularly regarding respective national caveats—meant this natcomd power was rarely required.



Commander Australian 1st Reconstruction Task Force (part of JTF633) and Dutch Task Force Uruzgan commander in front of a map showing Uruzgan Province, 2007

The Australian Special Operations Task Group (SOTG) deployed to Uruzgan from 2007, which further complicated ADF command and control. SOTG's intended primary mission was to operate in direct support of ISAF elements in Uruzgan, but it worked under opcon of ISAF special operations forces. SOTG was also able—where approved via natcomd—to operate beyond Uruzgan's boundaries.

This combination of command arrangements was complicated. Its implementation depended on goodwill and understanding at all levels. Commanders, especially in multinational settings, need to be pragmatic and adaptable given that the national strategic imperatives of participating nations will often shape command arrangements.

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CHAPTER 6

METHODS OF COMMAND

Executive summary

- The Australian Defence Force recognises two methods for command and control of joint operations: the direct method and the component method.
- The direct method is useful for campaigns and operations of limited scale and intensity. In this method, task groups, units or elements report directly to the commander joint task force.
- With the component method, subordinate forces are grouped along domain, functional or single-Service lines and have a substantial headquarters to manage their actions. The component method of command may be better suited for campaigns and operations of greater scale and intensity.


INTRODUCTION

6.1 The Australian Defence Force (ADF) recognises two methods of command and control (C2) of a joint task force (JTF): the direct method and the component method. Selection of the most appropriate C2 method, including joint staff structure, should be guided by the principles of command and should consider the scale and intensity of the campaign or operation.

THE DIRECT METHOD

6.2 A commander joint task force (CJTF) may exercise command authority directly over assigned forces. The direct method (Figure 6.1) is normally used when the knowledge and capacity of the commander and staff are such that they can employ the capabilities of assigned forces effectively, and when the scale and intensity of the operation is limited. When using the direct method of command, the headquarters must be appropriately staffed and equipped for the greater span of command.

Figure 6.1: The direct method of command



HISTORICAL EXAMPLE

THE DIRECT METHOD OF COMMAND: OPERATION VIC FIRES ASSIST

Beginning on 7 February 2009, under conditions of extreme heat and wind, up to 400 bushfires swept through the north-east of the state of Victoria. The speed and ferocity with which the fires spread caused a major disaster, responsible for 173 deaths and for the destruction of over 2,000 houses and 3,500 other structures.

On the same day, the Victorian Emergency Management Authority requested Defence Assistance to the Civil Community (DACC). At 2153 h, Chief Joint Operations issued the task order establishing Joint Task Force 662 and Operation VIC FIRES ASSIST. Between 8 February and 14 March, over 850 Defence personnel were deployed on this operation at any one time. Their tasks included providing logistics support, rapid impact assessments, hazardous risk search and fire mapping, and conducting initial environmental damage assessments.



Personnel deployed on Operation VIC FIRES ASSIST conducting a rapid impact assessment

Throughout Operation VIC FIRES ASSIST, JTF 662 used the direct method of command. Under this arrangement, the commanders of contributing unit force elements reported directly to Commander JTF 662, Brigadier Michael Arnold. This command arrangement was flexible and allowed for different force elements to be easily added to or removed from the JTF as the operation transitioned from the initial response to the recovery phase.

THE COMPONENT METHOD

6.3 When the scale and intensity of the operation is great, the span of command may become too broad to effectively use the direct method of command. An alternative is to divide the force into components, each with its own commander who issues orders consistent with the broad direction of the CJTF. This is known as the component method of command.


6.4 Component commanders are usually, though not always, collocated with the CJTF. They require separate staff support and command facilities (large or small, collocated or separate) depending on the operation.

6.5 Components may be grouped along domain or single-Service lines, or they may comprise functional groupings of formations, units, sub-units or elements from more than one Service under appropriate states of command (see Chapter 5). An example of the latter is the assignment of tactical fighter aircraft under tactical control (tacon) of a maritime component commander for maritime air defence.

6.6 The component method of command is shown in Figure 6.2. The five types of component commanders shown in this figure indicate one possible division between components. In this division, three components (maritime, land and air) are

environmentally determined. These may potentially be either single Service or functional in composition. The other two components (special operations and logistics) are functional and joint. Although this division between components is typical (as it aligns with existing ADF command arrangements), it is not universal (see Chapter 4). The division between components, and the assignment of forces to each, is the responsibility of CJTF.

Figure 6.2: The component method of command



Roles of component commanders

6.7 A CJTF will usually delegate force elements to a component commander under either tactical command (tacomd), operational control (opcon) or tacon arrangements. Component commanders are responsible for C2 of the forces within their component. This includes issuing orders and providing guidance consistent with the broad objectives of CJTF. Component commanders may also be called upon to advise CJTF regarding the employment of force elements within their component.

HISTORICAL EXAMPLE THE COMPONENT METHOD OF COMMAND: OPERATION UNIFIED PROTECTOR

Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR was the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operation conducted from March to June 2011 to enforce United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, which established a no-fly zone over Libya and an arms embargo against it and demanded an immediate cease fire between President Muammar Gaddafi's forces and rebel groups.



NATO area of operations during Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR

Due to the complex nature of the operation, the size of the operational area and the number of countries contributing forces, it was decided to use the component method of command for the operation. An Allied Joint Force Command (AJFC) was established in Naples, Italy, commanded by Royal Canadian Air Force Lieutenant General Charles Bouchard. Under the overall command of AJFC, two component commands were established: Allied Maritime Component Command, based in Naples and commanded by Italian Navy Vice Admiral Rinaldo Veri; and Allied Air Component Command, based in Izmir, Turkey, and commanded by United States Air Force Lieutenant General Ralph Jodice II.

Because of its limited mandate, ground forces were not deployed during the operation. Instead, NATO forces coordinated efforts with Libyan rebels, bringing an extra level of complexity to the operation. Despite this, the lack of NATO ground forces negated the need for a land component command, so one was not established.

SELECTION OF METHOD OF COMMAND

6.8 Selection of the most appropriate method of command, including joint staff structure, should be guided by the principles of command, and by the scale and intensity of the campaign or operation. Additionally, the following factors may need to be considered:

- a. the nature of the mission
- b. the size and composition of the force
- c. the need to maintain flexibility
- d. political and geographic considerations
- e. communications.

6.9 Smaller, less complex JTF can often be commanded without the need to create components. Joint task force headquarters staff directly controlling a force element group on behalf of a CJTF permits efficiencies in time and personnel. Examples of these types of JTF include JTF 639 for Operation RESOLUTE and JTF 635 for Operation ANODE.

6.10 For larger operations the size of the JTF and the complexity of the mission may dictate the establishment of components. An example of this type of JTF is the Australian commitment to operations in the Middle East in 2003–4. In this case, ADF elements were committed to coalition operations in the Persian Gulf, Iraq and Afghanistan and were placed under operational control of the lead coalition nation, which organised forces using the component method. An Australian national command element was also established to carry out national command functions determined by the Australian Government (see Chapter 7).

Joint staff structures

6.11 Both methods of command employ the common joint staff system adapted from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization joint staff system (see [Australian Defence Force Procedures 5.0.1—Joint Military Appreciation Process](#)). When the direct method of command is selected, all staff will be located within headquarters (HQ) JTF. This is referred to as an integrated staff structure. When the component method of command is selected, a smaller staff is required within HQJTF, however each component commander also maintains their own staff to conduct planning and to provide direction to the force elements being commanded by the component commander. In this instance, the overall structure is referred to as a component staff structure, even though each component's staff, as well as the HQJTF staff, are individually organised along the same lines as an integrated staff.

SUPPORTED AND SUPPORTING COMMANDERS

6.12 One way for a CJTF to achieve coordination across a variety of operational tasks is by assigning subordinate commanders as either supported or supporting commanders and designating the main effort in each phase of an operation.

6.13 **Supported commander.** Supported commanders have primary responsibility for all aspects of an assigned task and are allocated resource priority. Supported commanders must indicate to supporting commanders their support missions/requirements and associated coordinating instructions.

6.14 **Supporting commander.** Supporting commanders provide forces, equipment, logistics or other support to a supported commander as required. They must advise the supported commander on the availability and most appropriate employment of their assets. Supporting commanders under an 'in direct support' arrangement are responsible for completing the mission/tasks allocated to them by the supported commander. Supporting commanders under an 'in support of' arrangement may prioritise their own missions/tasks; however, they must use any remaining capacity to assist the supported commander's mission/tasks.

6.15 **The assignment of supported and supporting commanders.** The assignment of supported and supporting commanders is dynamic and will change according to the needs of the situation. In a complex operation with multiple lines of operation, a supported commander on one line of operation may simultaneously be a supporting commander to another commander on a concurrent line of operation.

6.16 For example, the supported/supporting relationship is critical to command of an amphibious operation. In the lodgement phase of an amphibious operation the joint force maritime component commander may be designated the supported commander for the amphibious line of operation, which in this case is also usually designated the main effort. Concurrently the joint force air component commander may be designated the supported commander for the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance line of operation. Due to the multiple capabilities inherent to many ADF force elements, both commanders may also be designated as supporting commanders for the other's line of operation. However, the main effort remains paramount regardless of supported and supporting arrangements. Further discussion of the supported-supporting relationship in this setting is contained in [Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 3.2—Amphibious Operations](#).

6.17 Another example is the force assignment of air assets and personnel on the recommendation of Director-General Air Command Operations. Royal Australian Air Force elements are assigned to Chief Joint Operations under theatre command arrangements. In most cases, operational command is delegated to Director-General Air, who is also assigned as a supporting commander to applicable CJTF. Operations where this command arrangement has been in place include Operation RESOLUTE, Operation GATEWAY and Operation SOLANIA.

CHAPTER 7

COMMAND IN MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

Executive summary

- Multinational operations include combined operations (those undertaken alongside formal allies), coalition operations (those undertaken with countries unified by a common mission) and operations that may not have a common mission.
- There may be subtle differences in states of command used by multinational partners.
- Before operations are undertaken, governments must agree on the command arrangements at the national, military strategic and operational levels.
- When necessary and appropriate, Government authorises the assignment and employment of Australian forces under international commanders.
- No international commander can exercise full command over Australian forces that are assigned to a multinational force. The Chief of the Defence Force retains full command.
- Contributing nations appoint a national contingent commander to represent national interests at the operational level. The designated Australian Defence Force officer is commander Australian contingent.

INTRODUCTION

7.1 Multinational joint operations are part of an Australian whole-of-government approach that includes other government departments (OGD) as well as Defence. They are conducted in a multinational environment, alongside other agencies, to meet both military and non-military national strategic objectives. Multinational operations require a clear understanding of both national command and control (C2) arrangements and the multinational C2 arrangements.

7.2 A comprehensive multinational approach responds effectively to complex crises by coordinating military and non-military activities (further details in [Australian Defence Doctrine Publication \(ADDP\) 3.0—Campaigns and Operations](#)).

7.3 Multinational operations are conducted by agencies. An agency is any sized organisation, group or element, of any type—whether national, international, military, non-military, governmental or non-governmental. Agencies usually broadly agree about desired outcomes yet each agency in the operational environment has its own aims, objectives and methods. From a military perspective, strategic and operational planners should, as far as practicable, accommodate disparate agencies that are working toward a common goal.

The Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands represented a new model of regional intervention using the full assets of diplomatic, economic, police and military assets in a coordinated, whole-of-government approach. The command arrangement was unconventional and accepted risk—but it proved appropriate. It was important that the response was not unilateral on Australia's part but rather a multilateral Pacific effort to help a neighbour in need—and five nations committed military forces.

**Lieutenant Colonel John Frewen, Commander,
Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands
2003**

7.4 The command arrangements for multinational operations require consideration of agencies and foreign nation states of command, Australian national command arrangements, operational command arrangements and operational authorities. In multiagency operations the command and control (C2) arrangements requires clear guidance.

MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

7.5 Multinational forces are composed of forces of two or more nations undertaking operations within the structure of a coalition, alliance or under the supervision of an international organisation. This categorisation includes allied, bilateral, coalition, combined or multilateral arrangements. Most multinational operations will be conducted within a framework of formal agreements such as:

- a. **Combined operations:** when conducted with a country that is formally an ally, or with countries that are formally allies.
- b. **Coalition operations:** when conducted with nations that are not all formally allies but are unified by a common mission.

Definitions

Combined: Forces of two or more allied nations, acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission.

Coalition: Forces of two or more nations, which may not be allies, acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission.

7.7 Some multinational operations are conducted in an informal and largely uncoordinated manner, with independent national and international agencies unified only by their rapid response to a sudden and urgent need such as a large-scale environmental and/or humanitarian crisis. These informal international responses to crises are referred to simply as multinational operations.

7.8 An example of a multinational operation was the response to the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004. The broader international response was characterised by several countries, as well as multinational and other agencies, rapidly reacting to a major disaster in an independent, fragmented and largely uncoordinated manner with the common goal of providing disaster relief. These multinational operations were conducted under national command arrangements; however, significant command interaction and liaison with OGD, host-nation and international and non-governmental organisations was required. The ADF component was Operation SUMATRA ASSIST.

7.9 Operations involving force contributions from foreign nations are influenced by differences in politics, strategic outlook, language, religion, culture, national customs, equipment and systems, doctrine, and practices. For United Nations (UN) missions, the military component is provided by several troop-contributing countries (TCC). In other multinational operations, the term more commonly used is troop-contributing nations (TCN).

Overview of required command arrangements

7.10 Before operations are undertaken, governments must agree on the command arrangements at the national, military strategic and operational levels. The types of command arrangements that might be required are:

- a. **National command authority.** The national command authority is composed of the national leaders of the defence forces involved in the operations, such as the Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand and the President of the United States, or their representatives.
- b. **Combined (or coalition) force commander.** A combined (or coalition) force commander (CFC) and deputy combined (or coalition) force commander must be mutually agreed and appointed to ensure unity of command. Staff representation on the combined force headquarters should also be agreed. The combined or coalition force commander will exercise operational authority over assigned forces agreed by the appropriate national chain of command. Changes to operational authority must be approved by the national chain of command. The combined or coalition force may be designated as combined or coalition joint task force.
- c. **Theatre commander.** Unless the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) decides to directly command ADF involvement in the operation, CDF will assign theatre command (tcomd) to a subordinate. Theatre command gives the theatre commander the authority to act as the Australian operational-level military point of contact in relationships with other nations' commands, Australian diplomatic missions, other government agencies and agencies of countries in theatre. In most cases, CDF will assign tcomd to the Chief Joint Operations (CJOPS).
- d. **National commander.** The senior officer from each partner designated as the national commander and exercising national command (natcomd) over national personnel. The national commander maintains access to their military representatives on purely national matters involving the employment and conditions of service of their national forces. The national commander has no operational authority over deployed ADF forces unless separately assigned by the theatre commander.

7.11 In the ADF, full command is retained by CDF at all times. No international commander can exercise full command over ADF forces.

7.12 Theatre command, which is an authority unique to Australia, is retained by CJOPS (or an alternative theatre commander as appointed by CDF) and is not delegated. Operational command (opcomd) and operational control (opcon) can be delegated to CFC by the Australian theatre commander (although opcomd would not usually be delegated). Tactical command and tactical control (tacon) can be delegated to commanders at the tactical level.

7.13 Interpretation of the degree of authority implied by each state of command in a multinational system differs markedly between nations and Services and, like any aspect of doctrine, is subject to flexible interpretation by the key personalities in the chain of command at the time. It is important for both superior and subordinate commanders to be absolutely clear about any restrictions on the use of force elements, and to be pragmatic about what needs to be achieved to realise the commander's intent.

7.14 When Australian force elements are working under United States of America (USA) authority, further constitutional complications arise because of the direct strategic links that USA combatant commanders have with their national command authority comprising the President of the United States and the Secretary of Defense. It is important that Australia identifies early in the operation where influence and additional coordination should be applied in order to match responsiveness in decision-making.

Foreign nation states of command

7.15 Many of Australia's potential military partners adhere to or refer to the NATO model and its definitions for command, which have subtle differences to Australian terminology. Significantly, the NATO acronym for operational command (opcomd) is OPCOM, and the NATO acronym for tactical command (tacomd) is TACOM.

7.16 Further complicating multinational operations, the operational command authorities that define command relationships vary in term and/or definition between nations.

7.17 To aid interoperability, the operational command authorities used by the UN are listed in Annex 7A. The equivalent USA and NATO command authorities are detailed in Annex 7B.

7.18 The British Armed Forces and Canadian forces use NATO states of command and operational command authorities. The New Zealand Defence Force uses the same states of command and operational command authorities as the ADF, with the exception of theatre command (tcomd).

Australian national command arrangements

7.19 **Commander Australian Contingent.** Each TCN contributing to a multinational operation, or TCC contributing to a UN operation, appoints a national contingent commander to represent national interests.

7.20 In general, an ADF officer so appointed is designated Commander Australian Contingent (COMAUSC). The roles of a COMAUSC include:

- a. representing national concerns to the CFC
- b. keeping Australian authorities informed
- c. coordinating and fostering international component relations in support of the commander's mission.

7.21 Tasks for a COMAUSC may include:

- a. exercise command as directed by CDF and/or the theatre commander, keeping them informed of the situation in-theatre, with particular emphasis on developments that may affect national political objectives or require changes

- in rules of engagement, the concept for operations or the commitment of additional national resources
- b. advise the CFC on specific capabilities of Australian forces and any constraints limiting their employment
 - c. facilitate liaison support to the staff of the CFC
 - d. ensure, through the Australian chain of command, that administrative and logistic support is available for Australian forces to achieve and sustain their operational readiness
 - e. integrate the Australian communication and information systems (CIS) with other components of the force
 - f. facilitate the integration of Australian intelligence architecture into the force while ensuring the integrity of national security
 - g. coordinate and cooperate with other national commanders to ensure unity of effort as directed by the CFC
 - h. recommend to CDF and/or theatre commander changes to the national C2 arrangements under which Australian forces are assigned or attached to the force
 - i. implement Australian information operations with due regard to any instructions issued by the CFC
 - j. exercise other national command responsibilities (as described in Chapter 5).

7.22 The distinction between representing Australian national concerns and exercising command over Australian force elements should be clearly articulated and may change during the course of an operation. COMAUSC may not be assigned a command authority (beyond natcomd) for the deployed force elements, as deployed force elements may be under the command of another Australian commander or under the direct command of CDF or the theatre commander. Alternatively, the commander of an Australian JTF may also be COMASC and have natcomd authorities.

7.23 Directives to the national commander and to force elements should contain provisions for changing circumstances to avoid confusion that can arise in the absence of clear written directives or from the need to reinterpret extant directives.

7.24 **National limitations.** The governments of TCC and/or TCN maintain an administrative channel of communications to their contingents, commanders and personnel on operational matters. In the case of UN operations, they must not, however, issue any instructions to their military personnel contrary to UN policies and the implementation of its mandated tasks.

7.25 On occasion, the separate chains of command in multinational operations will present conflicting information and/or tasks to a commander. The force may request a particular task be conducted that falls outside national guidance or tasking. Accordingly, permission to conduct the task may be refused by the Australian commander exercising national command. Methods to assist in dealing with such situations include:

- a. ensuring that CFC, UN head of mission (HOM) or other operational commanders understand any limitations that apply to Australian force elements under their control before such situations arise

- b. appreciating that neighbouring force elements supplied by other TCC/TCN may have different powers or limitations from Australian force elements, and making the effort to understand theirs as much as they would understand any Australian national limitations
- c. actively implementing measures such as briefings and coordination conferences, within operations security considerations, to minimise cross-cultural or multiagency misunderstandings.

7.26 While these measures may not necessarily prevent ill-feeling when a task is refused, reinforcing the ground rules at the outset enhances mutual respect and helps to minimise long-term damage. Once deployed, it is normal practice that, if any planning will affect national contingents, CFC will consult with the commander of that national contingent.

HISTORICAL EXAMPLE

AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS DURING OPERATIONS IN IRAQ, 2003

In early 2003, ADF personnel were pre-deployed to the Middle East to support international efforts in Iraq. Operation BASTILLE was the name given to the initial pre-deployment of forces, acclimatisation activities and in-theatre training. Operation FALCONER was the name given to combat operations in support of disarmament, and Operation CATALYST was the name given to stabilisation and recovery efforts.

During these operations, Australia retained C2 of ADF force elements at all times, while still working effectively within the coalition. CDF retained full command of all Australian force elements. Commander Australian Theatre (COMAST) based in Sydney maintained theatre or operational command (tcomd/opcomd) of forces assigned to operations in the Middle East Area of Operations (MEAO). The Commander Australian National Headquarters (HQ)-MEAO exercised national command (natcomd) of ADF force elements deployed under Operations BASTILLE, FALCONER and CATALYST. To ensure effective overall strategic direction of Australia's efforts in Iraq, the Strategic Command Group met frequently, supported by video links with COMAST and the natcomd headquarters in the MEAO. CDF and the Secretary of the Department of Defence then briefed the National Security Committee of Cabinet and received additional guidance from the Prime Minister and Minister for Defence.

Australian force elements were assigned to the coalition component commander under opcon. This arrangement allowed the component commander to provide direction to ADF force elements, while they remained under their Australian commanding officers at unit level. Although ADF force elements worked toward the overall coalition plan, there were processes in place to ensure that Australian forces were always employed in accordance with Australian Government policies. Royal Australian Air Force and special operations forces were placed in the Coalition Air Operations Centre (CAOC) to ensure that targets assigned to ADF units were appropriate and lawful under Australian rules of engagement. Australian commanders had ADF legal officers to advise them on the laws of armed conflict during the process of allocating targets. RAAF commanders were also appointed as Director of the CAOC at certain points during these operations. In this role, they directed coalition as well as Australian missions.



F/A-18 flight line crews from 75 Squadron conduct pre-flight checks before missions over Iraq as part of Operation BASTILLE

Occasionally, Australia was allocated targets on the USA-developed strike lists, but they were always assessed according to Australia's own legal obligations. Several target categories were subject to Australian ministerial approval before they could be engaged. Australian pilots could, and on occasion did, abort missions to avoid the risk of unintended casualties if their target could not be clearly identified from the air. These arrangements permitted smooth, effective integration of ADF elements within the coalition, and were testimony to the routine high levels of interoperability with our allies. Improvements in communications and web technology greatly assisted high-level decision making.

Operational command arrangements

7.27 Major considerations for C2 architecture within a multinational joint task force are as follows:

- a. **Scale and duration.** The scale, nature, range and likely duration of the operation, including the number and status of other concurrent operations.
- b. **Influence.** Where and how best to influence partner nations and key decision-makers.
- c. **Command.** Where and how best to exercise command of the JTF or Australia's contribution, reflecting the ADF approach to command.
- d. **Communications.** The capacity and suitability of available CIS infrastructure, which should enable, not hamper, C2.

7.28 **Campaign arrangements.** CJOPS may have to conduct a campaign, coordinating several operations, and use a combination of types of command arrangements. This is especially the case where Australia is the lead nation.

7.29 **Lead nation.** The Australian term 'lead nation' is equivalent to the NATO term 'framework nation'. Australian doctrine uses the term lead nation because it

suggests greater emphasis on will, capability, competence and influence. Where Australia is the lead nation, the majority of forces are usually drawn from the ADF.

7.30 **Command attributes.** The CFC must understand the strengths and weaknesses not only of ADF forces under their command, but also forces from other nations. This task requires political awareness, patience, tact and mutual understanding based on knowledge of other nations' languages, history and culture. The posting of high-calibre commanders and staff officers to multinational headquarters in peacetime prepares commanders for this level of understanding. This extends to attachés, exchange officers and liaison officers.

7.31 Elements from other nations embedded in each component are responsive to their national chain of command, which can cause friction. The commander should strive to overcome this friction by combining national contingents together into a strong and coordinated team. At the same time, the commander must balance the burden and risk-sharing in order to ensure that no one nation either sustains disproportionate casualties or receives disproportionate credit, both of which may weaken the cohesion of the alliance or coalition.

7.32 Conflicting national pressures and/or exploitation by the adversary will inevitably strain force unity. The commander has to call on leadership skills, including personal example and strength of character, to build and maintain the morale of the force and the confidence of the alliance or coalition. If the commander can emphasise that although political problems may exist, the real task of the commander and allied subordinates is to produce a military solution to a military problem, then cooperation is more likely to be put on a sound basis without offending national sensitivities. The operational-level commander should take every opportunity to discuss military problems with ministers, chiefs of staff and senior officers from contributing nations who visit the operational area.

Operational command authorities

7.33 When necessary and appropriate, the Australian Government will authorise the assignment and employment of Australian forces under foreign commanders. The respective commanders are:

- a. the CFC, the strategic-level commander in a multinational force, or in a combined or coalition operation
- b. the component commander in a combined or coalition operation
- c. the force commander (FC), the operational-level commander in a UN mission.

7.34 The commander will exercise the operational command authority over assigned forces agreed by the appropriate national chain of command. Changes to the operational command authority can only occur with the approval of the national chain of command.

HISTORICAL EXAMPLE

AUSTRALIA AS A LEAD NATION: INTERNATIONAL FORCE FOR EAST TIMOR, 1999–2000

The situation in East Timor rapidly deteriorated in early 1999 as armed groups

opposing East Timorese independence from Indonesia resorted to destruction, violence and intimidation. It soon became clear to the international community that armed intervention would be required to end the violence.

On 15 September 1999, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1264, which called for a multinational force to be created to restore peace and security in East Timor, to protect and support the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) in carrying out its tasks, and to facilitate humanitarian assistance operations. The International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) was subsequently formed, with Australia as the lead nation.

As operational planning for INTERFET progressed, it became clear that a variety of multinational partners was required, not just for political expediency, but also to assist with logistical sustainment and to provide additional capability. When it became clear that the ADF would have to build a coalition, senior ADF commanders drew upon long-term relationships with their counterparts throughout the region to facilitate a workable coalition. Australians quickly learnt that trust could not be 'surged'. Many years of international engagement by Australia's three Services provided the foundation upon which the INTERFET coalition was constructed.

Just after dawn on 20 September 1999, INTERFET troops deplaned at Dili airport. Meanwhile, in Dili harbour, the visible presence of four coalition warships helped persuade the East Timorese population, as well as any potentially hostile armed groups, that INTERFET was numerically strong and militarily powerful.

INTERFET eventually included over 11,000 personnel from 22 nations, including the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, New Zealand, France, Italy, Britain, the United States of America and Canada. The coalition also included 22 ships from nine navies (the Royal Australian Navy provided 14 of these). More than 130 fixed and rotary-wing aircraft, from 9 air forces and 10 military air services, were also allocated to INTERFET. Almost every operational unit in the ADF was either deployed or on standby in support of operations. Under the command of (then) Major General Peter Cosgrove, INTERFET quickly achieved its mission of restoring order within East Timor, allowing command of the operation to be transitioned to the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) on 28 February 2000.

PEACE OPERATIONS

7.35 The ability of the ADF to conduct operations across the spectrum of armed conflict enables the effective conduct of peace operations. Australia has acted as the lead nation for several peace operations, and has provided several senior officers to command appointments on UN or UN-sanctioned missions.

7.36 The composition and C2 of the military component of a peace operation depends on the type and intensity of the operation. Force members must understand the mission and the mandate, accepting that although the military is a key player, a military solution will not necessarily be the measure of success for a mission.

7.37 Within the multinational forces that conduct UN operations, command is made complex because most contributing countries have their own separate chains of command. For the ADF, this usually takes the form of the opcon of the force itself, and national command, which is normally vested in the COMAUSC. It is important to

gain an understanding of the capabilities and limitations each contributing country's respective commands, prior to deploying if possible.

7.38 In the field, it is essential that effective command relationships be implemented among the TCC and the UN. In the transition to peace operations, whether it be under multinational or UN auspices, it is important to recognise the following C2 aspects:

- a. The UN HOM of a peacekeeping operation—usually called a Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG)—will be a civilian official, as opposed to military or national leadership. Appointments below the SRSG are generally considered equal in status, except when the mission is structured along functional lines (such as peacekeeping, governance and administration). The SRSG has a direct relationship to the UN Secretary-General (UNSG) and staff, and component commanders/heads work for the SRSG with links to respective offices or departments in UN New York or UN Geneva.
- b. The SRSG represents the UNSG, leads political engagement and speaks on behalf of the UN within the mission area.
- c. The roles of FC and Chief Military Observer (CMO) in exercising leadership and command over ADF personnel serving as a UN military observer. Depending on the nature of the mission, the CMO may be an independent appointment or may serve under the opcon of the FC.
- d. The role of the FC in exercising leadership and command over ADF personnel serving as a UN military liaison officer.
- e. In UN operations, the Director or Chief of Mission Support (D/CMS) is appointed by the Under-Secretary-General for field support at UN Headquarters and leads the mission's division of administration. The D/CMS reports to HOM and is accountable to the HOM for the efficient and effective provision of administrative and logistic support to all mission components. The D/CMS exercises financial authority in consultation with the HOM."
- f. The role of the civil authority and cooperation with local civilian police (civpol) forces and UN civpol. Given the internal security responsibilities of both local and UN civpol and the responsibilities of the military component, good working relationships with members of these organisations at the operational and tactical levels are essential.

7.39 Further information about the UN chain of command is given in Annex 7C. For further information about the conduct of peace operations see [ADDP 3.8—Peace Operations](#).

HISTORICAL EXAMPLE

AUSTRALIA'S COMMITMENT TO PEACE OPERATIONS: CAMBODIA, 1992-1993

The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) comprised components for human rights, electoral, military, civil administration, civil police, repatriation and rehabilitation. The military component of UNTAC consisted of 15,000 personnel, drawn from 15 countries. The ADF provided a contingent of 1,215 personnel, comprising a Force Communications Unit, a helicopter squadron and a Movement Control Unit.



The UNTAC Force Commander, Lieutenant General John Sanderson (Australia), with his deputy, Major General Tamlicha Ali (Indonesia), and headquarters staff



Aviation tasks included collection of ballot boxes for elections organised by UNTAC

Annexes:

- 7A United Nations operational command authorities
- 7B United States and NATO states of command
- 7C United Nations chain of command

ANNEX 7A

UNITED NATIONS OPERATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITIES

1. Through the 1990s, the United Nations (UN) was confronted with many systems and procedural difficulties directly related to how it exercised command and control (C2) of military forces placed at its disposal for the prosecution of a UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR). These were largely resolved as a result of various reviews, and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) issued formal guidance in 2001 regarding C2 of military components in UN peacekeeping operations.¹
2. Command relationships within the UN are determined by operational command authorities, which empower a force commander (FC) or chief military observer (CMO) to properly employ the operational capability of assigned forces to achieve the designated mission. In common with most defence forces, the UN uses a framework of operational authority for simplicity and consistency.
3. The UN operational command authorities are defined below.
 - a. **United Nations Operational Authority.** The authority transferred by the member states to the UN to use the operational capabilities of their national military contingents, units, formed police units and/or military and police personnel to undertake mandated missions and tasks. Operational authority over such forces and personnel is vested in the Secretary-General, under the authority of the UN Security Council (UNSC). United Nations Operational Authority involves the full authority to issue operational directives within the limits of:
 - (1) a specific mandate of the UNSC
 - (2) an agreed period of time, with the stipulation that an earlier withdrawal of a contingent would require the contributing country to provide adequate prior notification
 - (3) a specific geographic area (the mission area as a whole).
 - b. The UN Operational Authority does not include responsibility for certain personnel matters of individual members of military contingents and formed police units, such as pay, allowances, and promotions. These functions remain a national responsibility. In regard to disciplinary matters, while the discipline of military personnel remains the responsibility of the troop-contributing countries the UN may take administrative steps for misconduct, including repatriation of military contingent members and staff officers. With

¹ The 2001 guidance document has since been superseded by: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *Authority, Command and Control in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, UN Policy Document, Reference No. 2008.4, approved 15 February 2008.

respect to the Experts on Mission, including UN police officers and military observers, the UN will take administrative actions and disciplinary measures in accordance with the UN Directives for Disciplinary Matters Involving UN Police Officers and Military Observers.

- c. **Command.** The authority granted to a military commander in a UN peacekeeping operation to direct assigned forces in order to achieve specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location (or a combination), to deploy units concerned and/or military personnel, and to retain or assign tactical command (tacomd) or tactical control (tacon) of those units/personnel. Operational control (opcon) includes the authority to assign separate tasks to sub units of a contingent, as required by operational necessities, within the mission area of responsibility, in consultation with the contingent commander and as approved by the United Nations Headquarters (HQ).
- d. **United Nations operational control.** Opcon is the authority granted to a military commander in a UN peacekeeping operation to direct assigned forces in order to achieve specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location (or a combination), to deploy units concerned and/or military personnel, and to retain or assign tacomd or tacon of those units/personnel. Opcon includes the authority to assign separate tasks to sub units of a contingent, as required by operational necessities, within the mission area of responsibility, in consultation with the contingent commander and as approved by the UN HQ.
- e. **United Nations tactical command.** The authority delegated to a military or police commander in a UN Peacekeeping operation to assign tasks to forces under their command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority.
- f. **United Nations tactical control.** Tactical control (tacon) is the detailed and local direction and control of movement or manoeuvres necessary to accomplish mission or tasks assigned. As required by operational necessities, the Head of Military Component (HOMC) and Head of Police Component (HOPC) may delegate tacon of the forces assigned to the UN peacekeeping operation to subordinate sector and/or unit commanders.
- g. **Administrative control.** The authority over subordinate or other organisations within national contingents for administrative matters such as personnel management, supply, services and other non-operational missions of the subordinate or other organisations. Administrative control is a national responsibility given to the National Contingent Commander (NCC) in peacekeeping operations.
- h. **Tasking authority.** The authority vested in specified senior appointments (Head of Military Component (HOMC), Head of Police Component (HOPC) or Director of Mission Support/Chief of Mission Support (DMS/CMS)) of UN peacekeeping operations to assign tasks to enabling units. Tasking authority includes the authority to deploy, redeploy and employ all or part of an enabling unit to achieve the mission's mandate. Enabling units comprise aviation, engineering, logistics, medical, signals, transport and explosive

ordnance disposal units. Tasking authority over military or police personnel/units, when exercised by civilians, is applicable for their routine and day-to-day employment and does not include tacon of military/police resources exercised purely in pursuance of military or police operations.

- i. **Technical reporting.** Technical reporting is an information and technical advisory communication link not relating to the C2 of operations or to national administrative control. This link does not circumvent the primary reporting line and command/supervisory relationships, through which formal direction and tasking is issued.
- j. **Transfer of authority.** The transfer of authority between national contingents and military personnel to the UN-designated commander must be completed immediately before these forces come under control of the UN. This process may take place when personnel arrive in the mission area, or it may be transferred immediately prior to deployment from home locations. The exact timing for this transfer is decided during the negotiations between the UN and national authorities. Contributing member states negotiate with UN HQ the specific date and location that the UN will assume 'UN Operational Authority' over their uniformed personnel and units. The Operational Authority over military and police 'Experts on Mission', which includes military observers and Individual police officers/advisers, is considered to be automatically transferred to the UN when a contributed Expert on Mission reports to the designated UN authority for his/her duties in the operational area of responsibility. The operational authority is reverted to the respective national authorities on completion of assignment with the UN, or at the time of repatriation.
- k. **Memorandum of understanding.** Troop contributing countries (TCC) establish a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the UN. The MOU formalises numbers of troops to be deployed, equipment and capabilities available for tasking. The MOU also includes agreed levels of administration support to be provided to the contingent by the UN DMS/CMS. This includes quantities and types of rations, and quantity and quality of water as examples.

ANNEX 7B

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND NATO STATES OF COMMAND

Table 7B.1: United States of America and NATO states of command

ACTIVITY	US Combatant Command ¹	US OPCON ²	NATO OPCOM ³	NATO OPCON	NATO TACOM ⁴	US and NATO TACON ⁵
Assign tasks	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No
Direct/employ forces	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Reassign forces	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No
Deploy forces within theatre	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Assign separate employment of unit components	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Administrative/logistic responsibility	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Deploy units	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Delegate equal command status	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Delegate lower command status	Yes	Yes	Yes ⁶	Yes	No	No
REMARKS	¹ US Combatant Command is broadly equivalent to the command authority held under theatre command. ² Operational Control (opcon) ³ NATO Operational Command (OPCOM). (Australia opcomd) ⁴ Tactical Command (Australia tacomd). ⁵ Tactical Control. ⁶ NATO OPCOM authority only allows commanders to delegate opcon with prior approval.					


ANNEX 7C

UNITED NATIONS CHAIN OF COMMAND

1. This annex defines and describes the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping chain of command and authorities. Command and control (C2) exists at three separate but overlapping levels:

- a. the strategic level
- b. the operational level
- c. the tactical level.

Figure 7C.1: Levels of authority, command and control in United Nations peacekeeping operations



Strategic level

2. The management of a peacekeeping operation at UN Headquarters (HQ) level is at the strategic level of authority and C2. The chain of command is:

- a. **United Nations Security Council.** The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is responsible for the overall political direction of the peacekeeping operation. It provides the legal authority, high-level strategic direction and political guidance for all UN peacekeeping operations, and it vests the operational authority for directing these operations in the Secretary General of the UN. The UNSC authorises the mandate of the mission through a UNSC Resolution.
- b. **Secretary General.** The Secretary General is responsible for the executive direction and control of the mission. Member States transfer 'Operational Authority' over their military forces and personnel to the UN. This authority is vested in the Secretary General, who exercises it on behalf of the UNSC.
- c. **Under Secretary General of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.** The Under-Secretary General (USG) of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has been delegated responsibility from the Secretary General for the administration of, and provision of executive direction for, all UN peacekeeping operations.¹ Specifically, the USG DPKO:
 - (1) directs and controls UN peacekeeping operations
 - (2) formulates policies and develops operational guidelines based on UNSC resolutions (mission mandates)
 - (3) prepares reports of the Secretary General to the UNSC on each peacekeeping operation with appropriate observations and recommendations
 - (4) advises the Secretary General on all matters relating to the planning, establishment and conduct of UN peacekeeping operations
 - (5) acts as a focal point between the Secretariat and Member States seeking information on all matters related to UN peacekeeping missions
 - (6) is responsible and accountable to the Secretary General for ensuring that the requirements of the UN security management system are met within DPKO-led field missions.

¹ There are two USG accountable to the Secretary General for the conduct of peacekeeping operations that include military elements: the USG DPKO and the USG for the Department of Political Affairs (DPA). USG DPA has responsibility for Special Political Missions, some of which include military elements. Some UN Missions for which USG DPA is responsible are managed by USG DPKO.

3. In addition to the responsibilities mentioned above, it is important to be aware of additional UN-system responsibilities for financial authority and for the safety and security of UN staff, which lie outside of the authority of the USG DPKO but which affect UN peacekeeping operations. These are:

- a. The Under Secretary General of the Department of Management. The USG of the Department of Management is delegated financial authority and responsibility from the Secretary General for all financial matters relating to UN peacekeeping operations.
- b. The Under Secretary General of the Department of Safety and Security. The USG of the Department of Safety and Security is directly accountable and responsible to the Secretary General for the executive direction and control of the UN security management system and for the overall safety and security of UN civilian personnel and their recognised dependents at both HQ locations and in the field.
- c. The Under Secretary General of the Department of Field Support. On behalf of the Secretary General, the USG of the Department of Field Support (DFS) directs all support for peacekeeping operations by providing necessary strategic direction to guide the work programme of DFS. Under direction of the USG DFS, the DFS is responsible for delivering dedicated support to field operations, including on personnel, procurement, information technology, logistics, finance, communications, and other administrative and general management issues.

4. **The Military Adviser.** The Military Adviser (MILAD) is the senior uniformed person at UN HQ in New York. The MILAD is established as a line position heading the Office of Military Affairs within the DPKO, however the MILAD is accountable directly to both the USG DPKO and the USG of the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) for management of military elements deployed on peacekeeping operations under their respective authorities.

5. **Contributing Member States.** Member States that provide military and police personnel to UN peacekeeping operations retain full and exclusive strategic level command and control of their personnel and equipment. Contributing Member States may assign these personnel and assets to serve under the authority of the Secretary General of the UN and under the operational control of the Head of Military Component (HOMC) of a UN peacekeeping operation for specified periods and purposes as agreed in a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with UN HQ. Member States may withdraw their military and police personnel and the operational control of those personnel from the UN through formal communication with UN HQ.

Operational level

6. The field-based management of a peacekeeping operation at the Mission HQ is considered to be the operational level. The following senior officials hold operational level authority and C2 responsibilities at the Mission HQ level:

- a. Head of Mission (HOM)
- b. Head of Military Component

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- c. Head of Police Component (HOPC)
- d. Deputy Special Representative(s) of the Secretary General (DSRSG)
- e. Director of Mission Support/Chief of Mission Support (DMS/CMS).

7. In addition, there are several joint, integration and coordination structures that support mission-wide coherence at the operational level. These are not C2 structures, but they support integration of effort across the peacekeeping operation under the authority of the HOM.

Head of Mission

8. The HOM of a peacekeeping operation is generally a Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG). The HOM reports to the Secretary General through the USG DPKO. The HOM is the senior UN Representative and has overall authority over the activities of the UN in the mission area. The HOM represents the Secretary General, leads UN political engagement and speaks on behalf of the UN within the mission area. The HOM leads and directs the heads of all mission components and ensures unity of effort and coherence among all UN entities in the mission area, in accordance with the UN Integrated Strategic Framework for the mission.

9. The HOM provides political guidance for mandate implementation and sets mission-wide operational direction, including by making decisions about resource allocation in case of competing priorities. The HOM delegates the operational and technical aspects of mandate implementation to the heads of all components of the mission. The HOM provides direction to those components through the component heads.

Head of Military Component

10. In peacekeeping operations the HOMC is generally designated as the Force Commander (FC). If the military component comprises Military Observers only, a Chief Military Observer (CMO) or Chief of Staff (COS) will be appointed as the HOMC. The CMO reports directly to the HOM and exercises operational control over all Military Observers.

11. The HOMC establishes the military operational chain of command in the field and may establish subordinate Sector Commands, as appropriate. In doing so, the HOMC places military units under the tactical control of military commanders in the operational chain of command.

12. The HOMC maintains a technical reporting and communication link with the DPKO Military Adviser at UN HQ. This technical reporting link must not circumvent or substitute the chain of command between the USG DPKO and the HOM, nor should it interfere with decisions taken by the HOM in accordance with this policy directive.

Head of Police Component

13. The HOPC reports to the HOM, exercises operational control and provides direction to all members of the police component of the mission. This includes all UN Police Officers (including all members of Formed Police Units) and relevant civilian staff serving in the police component. The HOPC, in consultation with DPKO,

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establishes the police chain of command. The HOPC also establishes appropriate succession arrangements within the police component to ensure effective C2 in his/her absence.

14. The HOPC maintains a technical reporting and communication link with the DPKO Police Adviser at UN HQ. This technical reporting link must not circumvent or substitute the command chain between the USG DPKO and the HOM, nor should it interfere with decisions taken by the HOM in accordance with this policy directive.

Deputy Special Representative(s) of the Secretary General

15. Peacekeeping operations generally have at least one DSRSG to support the HOM in executing the substantive civilian functions of the mission. DSRSG report to the HOM and they exercise managerial authority over those mission components that have been assigned to them. When a DSRSG is designated as the Deputy HOM, he/she shall support the SRSG through the performance of any specifically delegated HOM responsibilities and shall officiate as HOM in the absence of the SRSG.

16. In integrated missions, the Resident Coordinator (and Humanitarian Coordinator, as appropriate) of the UN Country Team may be appointed as DSRSG to co-ordinate the mission's activities with UN agencies, funds, programs and other development and humanitarian entities operating in the mission area.

Director of Mission Support/Chief of Mission Support

17. The DMS/CMS reports to the HOM and is accountable to the HOM for the efficient and effective provision of administrative and logistic support to all mission components. The DMS/CMS advises the HOM on the rules and regulations relating to the commitment of UN financial resources to ensure the provision of efficient and effective administrative and logistics support to all mission components. The DMS/CMS has sole UN authority in the field to commit UN financial resources for any purpose, including any contractual arrangements for the use of local resources. The DMS/CMS is responsible for the strict observance of, and compliance with, UN technical and administrative regulations related to the administration of the mission and logistics management.

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GLOSSARY

The source for approved Defence terms, definitions and abbreviations is the Australian Defence Glossary (ADG), available on the Defence Restricted Network at <http://adg.eas.defence.mil.au/adgms/>. Note: The ADG is updated periodically and should be consulted to review any amendments to the data in this glossary.

TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

administrative control

Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organisations in respect to administrative matters such as personnel management, supply services and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organisations.

Note: Local administration is a subset of administrative control.

campaign design

The manner in which the operational commander expresses a vision of how the campaign may unfold and how desired objectives will be sequenced and synchronised.

coalition

Forces of two or more nations, which may not be allies, acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission.

combined

Forces of two or more allied nations, acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission.

command

The authority which a commander in the military Service lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment.

Notes:

1. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of, organising, directing, coordinating and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions.
2. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale and discipline of assigned personnel.

command and control

The process and means for the exercise of authority over, and lawful direction of, assigned forces.

control

The authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate organisations, or other organisations not normally under their command, which encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or directives.

Note: All or part of this authority may be transferred or delegated.

coordinating authority

The authority granted to a commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more countries or commands, or two or more services or two or more forces of the same service.

Notes:

1. The commander has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved or their representatives but does not have the authority to compel agreement.
2. In case of disagreement between the agencies involved, the commander should attempt to obtain essential agreement by discussion.
3. In the event essential agreement cannot be obtained the matter will be referred to the appropriate authority.

direct support

The support provided by a unit or formation not attached to or under command of the supported unit or formation commander but required to give priority to the support required by that unit or formation.

direct liaison authorised

That authority granted by a commander (any level) to a subordinate to directly consult or coordinate an action with a command or agency within or outside of the granting command. Direct liaison authorised is more applicable to planning than operations and always carries with it the requirement of keeping the commander granting direct liaison authorised informed. Direct liaison authorised is a coordination relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised.

force element

A component of a unit, a unit, or an association of units having common prime objectives and activities.

full command

The statutory authority of the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF), under Section 9 of the *Defence Act 1903*, to issue orders to all members of the Australian Defence Force. Full command covers every aspect of military operations and administration. It includes responsibility to advise the Minister for Defence on matters relating to command of the ADF.

in support of

Assisting another formation, unit or organisation while remaining under the initial command.

joint command

The enduring authority given by the Chief of the Defence Force to ADF group chiefs to command joint organisations in the ADF. Joint command does not include authority to conduct operations, determine single-service personnel policy or conduct career management.

leadership

The process of influencing others in order to gain their willing consent in the ethical pursuit of missions.

levels of conflict

The recognised levels of conflict from which the levels for the planning and command of operations are derived. Note: They are strategic, operational and tactical.

line of communication

A land, water or air route that connects an operating military force with one or more bases of operations, and along which supplies and reinforcements move.

local administration

Direction or exercise of administration controlled by a local commander and related specifically to the troops or to the operation in the commander's area. Note: Local administration is a subset of administrative control.

management

The process of planning, organising, directing and controlling organisational resources in the pursuit of organisational goals.

mission command

A philosophy of command and a system for conducting operations in which subordinates are given a clear indication by a superior of their intentions. Note: The result required, the task, the resources and any constraints are clearly enunciated, however subordinates are allowed the freedom to decide how to achieve the required result.

multinational operation

A military action conducted by forces of two or more nations, undertaken within the structure of a coalition, an alliance or under the supervision of an international organisation such as the United Nations. Note: It is used to encompass all related terms such as allied, bilateral, coalition, combined, or multilateral.

national command

The authority, conferred upon an appointed Australian commander, to safeguard Australian national interests during multinational operations.

operation

A series of tactical actions with a common unifying purpose, planned and conducted to achieve a strategic or campaign end state or objective within a given time and geographical area.

operational art

The skilful employment of military forces to attain strategic goals through the design, organisation, sequencing and direction of campaigns and major operations.

Notes:

1. Operational art translates strategic into operational and ultimately tactical actions.
2. It requires a commander to:
 - (a) identify the military conditions or end-state that constitute the strategic objective;
 - (b) decide the operational objectives that must be achieved to reach the desired end state;
 - (c) order a sequence of actions that lead to fulfilment of the operational objectives; and
 - (d) apply the military resources allocated to sustain the desired sequence of actions.

operational command

The authority granted to a commander to specify missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to re-assign forces and to retain or delegate operational control, tactical command and/or tactical control as may be deemed necessary. Note: It does not of itself include responsibility for administration or logistics.

operational control (opcon)

The authority delegated to a commander to:

- a. direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time or location;
- b. deploy units concerned and retain or delegate tactical control of those units.

Notes:

1. It does not include authority to allocate separate employment of components of the units concerned.
2. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control.

raise, train and sustain

The generation, preparation, and maintenance of Defence capability by designated capability managers at the level of capability specified in preparedness directives.

service command

The enduring authority given by the Chief of the Defence Force to service chiefs to command their services. Service command does not include authority to conduct operations.

tactical command

The authority delegated to a commander to specify missions and tasks to forces under his command for the accomplishment of the mission specified by higher authority.

tactical control (tacon)

The detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or manoeuvres necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.

technical control (techcon)

The provision of specialist and technical advice by designated authorities for the management and operation of forces.

Notes:

1. Capability managers exercise technical control and will not normally delegate it. Technical control advice is not included in a delegation of theatre command.
2. Capability managers exercise technical control through advice to the theatre commander for assigned forces.
3. Technical control advice may not be modified but may be rejected in part or in total by a commander in consideration of operational factors and within their span of command.
4. A commander is accountable for the consequences of rejecting the advice.

theatre command

The authority given by the Chief of the Defence Force to a subordinate to command assigned forces to prepare for and conduct operations (campaigns, operations, combined and joint exercises, and other activities as directed). Theatre command does not include authority to determine single-service personnel policy or conduct career management.

ABBREVIATIONS

1JMU	1 Joint Movement Unit
AAP	Australian Air Publication
ACAUST	Air Commander Australia
ADDP	Australian Defence Doctrine Publication
ADDP-D	Australian Defence Doctrine Publication-Doctrine
ADF	Australian Defence Force
ADFHQ	Australian Defence Force Headquarter
ADFP	Australian Defence Force Publication
ADFWC	Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre
AIF	Australian Imperial Force
C2	command and control
CAS	Chief of Staff
CASG	Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group
CAOC	coalition air operations centre
CC	component commander
CDF	Chief of the Defence Force
CDJFHQ	Commander Deployable Joint Force Headquarters
CDRUSPACOM	Commander United States Pacific Command
CFC	Combined (or Coalition) Force Commander
CJC	Commander Joint Capabilities
CIS	communication and information system
CINCPAC	Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (USA)
civpol	civilian police
CJLOG	Commander Joint Logistics
CJOPS	Chief Joint Operations
CJTF	commander joint task force
CMO	Chief Military Observer
CMS	Chief of Mission Support
COMAST	Commander Australian Theatre
COMAUSC	Commander Australian Contingent
COMAUSFLT	Commander Australian Fleet
comd	commander
conops	concept of operations
COP	common operating picture
COS	chief of staff
COSC	Chiefs of Service Committee
Cth	Commonwealth
DACC	Defence Assistance to the Civil Community
DC	Defence Committee
DCJOPS	Deputy Chief Joint Operations
DEPSEC	Deputy Secretary
DFACA	Defence Force Aid to the Civil Authority
DFS	Department of Field Support
DGACOPS	Director-General Air Command Operations
DGAIR	Director-General Air
DIRLAUTH	direct liaison authorised
DJFHQ	Deployable Joint Force Headquarters

DMS	Director of Mission Support
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DSRSG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General
FC	force commander
FE	force element
FORCOMD	Commander Forces Command
fullcomd	full command
HOM	head of mission
HOMC	Head of Military Component
HOPC	Head of Police Component
HQ	headquarters
HQ 1 Div	Headquarters 1st Division
HQJOC	Headquarters Joint Operations Command
HQMNF-1	Headquarters Multinational Force Command
INTERFET	International Force for East Timor
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
jcomd	joint command
JFAO	joint force area of operations
JLC	Joint Logistics Command
JOC	Joint Operations Command
JTF	joint task force
LOAC	law of armed conflict
MEAO	Middle East Area of Operations
MER	Middle East Region
MILAD	Military Advisor
MINDEF	Minister for Defence
MNF	multinational force
MNO	multinational operation
MOU	memorandum of understanding
natcomd	national command
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCC	National Contingent Commander
NSC	National Security Committee of Cabinet
OE	operational environment
OGD	other government departments
OPD	operational preparedness directive
opcomd	operational command
opcon	operational control
opord	operation order
PADFA	Program of Australian Defence Force Activities
PULSE	Profile of Unit Leadership, Satisfaction and Effectiveness

RAAF	Royal Australian Air Force
RAN	Royal Australian Navy
RN	Royal Navy
ROE	rules of engagement
RSO&I	reception, staging, onward movement and integration
SCAC	Secretary and Chief of the Defence Force's Advisory Committee
SCG	Strategic Command Group
SCNS	Secretaries Committee on National Security
scomd	service command
SECDEF	Secretary of the Department of Defence
SOCAUST	Special Operations Commander Australia
SOCOMD	Special Operations Command
SP&IG	Strategic Policy and Intelligence Group
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
tacomd	tactical command
tacon	tactical control
TCC	troop-contributing country
TCN	troop-contributing nation
tcomd	theatre command
techcon	technical control
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
UNSG	United Nations Secretary-General
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
USA	United States of America
USG	Under-Secretary-General
VCDF	Vice Chief of the Defence Force
WHS	Workplace Health and Safety



ADF PHILOSOPHICAL DOCTRINE

0 Series | Command

Command and Control



Edition 2

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ADF PHILOSOPHICAL DOCTRINE

Command and Control

0 Series | Command

Edition 2



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Angus J Campbell, AO, DSC

General

Chief of the Defence Force

Department of Defence

CANBERRA ACT 2600

27 September 2021

PREFACE

Military doctrine describes the fundamental principles that guide actions by armed forces to achieve their objectives. While authoritative, doctrine requires judgement in application.

Australian Defence Force (ADF) doctrine describes principles that guide the employment and operational effectiveness of a joint force. ADF doctrine publications are designed to concisely describe these principles, and so promote coordinated actions in support of missions and the commander's intent. ADF doctrine publications are written at several levels—capstone, philosophical, application and procedural.

The content of this publication has been derived from general principles and doctrine contained in other relevant publications, Defence manuals, and allied publications and agreements. Every opportunity should be taken by users of this publication to examine its contents for applicability and currency. The Lessons and Doctrine Directorate invites assistance from you, the reader, to improve this publication. Please report any deficiencies, errors or potential amendments.

Aim. The aim of ADF-P-0 *Command and Control* is to provide guidance about command and control of joint and multinational operations. This publication assists strategic and operational planning, and contributes to Australian Defence Force (ADF) education and training.

Audience. This publication is for use by commanders, their staff and other personnel at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. It is also applicable to those involved in capability management, and for other government agencies who work with the ADF.

Scope. This publication provides philosophical and application level doctrine on command and control in the ADF. It describes the nature and extent of types and states of command used from the strategic to the tactical levels.

ADF-P-0 *Command and Control*, Edition 2, Amendment List 1 contained a number of changes from Edition 2. The significant changes are as follows:

- a. The title of Chapter 5 was changed from 'States of command' to 'Command and administrative authorities'.
- b. The definition and use of 'full command' was amended to clarify that it is an authority retained exclusively by Chief of the Defence Force (as per changes made to the *Defence Act 1903* in 2016).
- c. The terms 'service command' and 'joint command' were introduced for the command statuses held respectively by Service Chiefs and Joint Chiefs (Vice Chief of the Defence Force, Chief of Joint Operations and Chief of Joint Capabilities).
- d. The definition of 'theatre command' was revised to reflect that the Chief of the Defence Force can assign this authority to any officer (not just Chief of Joint Operations).
- e. The definition of 'national command' was revised.
- f. The Uruzgan historical example (Chapter 5) was revised to improve clarity.
- g. The passage on 'supported and supporting commanders' was removed from Chapter 5 (it was already addressed in more detail in Chapter 6).

Amendment List 2 contains additional changes, notably updating the definition of 'leadership' and updating discussion of mission command relative to that revised definition. The relationship between the Governor-General, Australian Government and Chief of the Defence Force is clarified. It also uses the revised format and naming conventions adopted for 2021 Doctrine Modernisation.

AMENDMENTS

Proposals to amend ADF-P-0 *Command and Control* may be sent to:

Deputy Director Doctrine
Lessons and Doctrine Directorate
Capability Interoperability Test and Evaluation Branch
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PO Box 7909 | Canberra BC | ACT 2610
[Lessons and Doctrine Directorate](#)

Amendment number	Chapter(s)	Amendment	Effected date
AL1	Ch 5, glossary	Revised definition of 'full command', introduced 'service command' and 'joint command'. Re-categorised 'theatre command' and 'national command'.	01 Mar 2019
AL1	Other chapters	Minor editorial amendments	01 Mar 2019
AL2	Ch 1, glossary Ch 2 Ch 4 Format, references to other doctrine publications	Updated definition of 'leadership' Updated discussion of mission command. Clarified relationship between the Governor-General, Australian Government and Chief of the Defence Force. Updated per 2021 ADF Doctrine Modernisation.	27 Sept 2021

DOCTRINE PUBLICATION HIERARCHY

The hierarchy of ADF doctrine, and the latest electronic version of all ADF doctrine publications, are available on:

*Defence Protected Network [ADF Doctrine Library](http://drnet/vcdf/ADF-Doctrine)
(<http://drnet/vcdf/ADF-Doctrine>)*

and

*Defence Secret Network [ADF Doctrine Library](http://collab.defence.gov.au/vcdf/org/FDD-FID-MSCD/CITEB/doctrine/SitePages/home.aspx)
(<http://collab.defence.gov.au/vcdf/org/FDD-FID-MSCD/CITEB/doctrine/SitePages/home.aspx>)*

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Chapter 1 – Introduction

The art of command requires refinement of a number of professional and personal attributes, including mental discipline, operational experience, a clear sense of professional judgment and a rigorous approach to the use of time.

General Sir Peter Cosgrove, AK, MC, KStJ

Commanders are appointed to conduct campaigns and operations. They are assigned military forces and have the authority to commit military personnel to battle in potentially life-threatening circumstances. Commanders therefore have a vitally important responsibility. They are accountable for their actions or inaction.

Command and control (C2) is the process and means for the exercise of authority over, and lawful direction of, assigned forces. C2 provides a system for empowering designated personnel to exercise lawful authority and direction over assigned forces for the accomplishment of missions and tasks.

Definitions

Command: The authority which a commander in the military Service lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment.

Notes:

1. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of organising, directing, coordinating and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions.
2. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale and discipline of assigned personnel.

Definitions (cont.)

Control: The authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate organisations, or other organisations not normally under their command, which encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or directives.

Note: All or part of this authority may be transferred or delegated.

Command and control: The process and means for the exercise of authority over, and lawful direction of, assigned forces.

Command is the authority that a commander in the military service lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command provides legal authority to an individual to direct, coordinate or control military forces. A commander's key duty is decision-making, and the ability to make correct decisions in a timely manner is therefore a key measure of a successful commander.

Decision-making, however, is not all that is required of a successful commander. Command encompasses the authority, responsibility and accountability for deploying and assigning forces to achieve missions. Authority involves the right to enforce obedience and discipline when necessary. Although a commander can delegate certain authorities they nonetheless retain overall responsibility for command (see Chapter 5). Responsibility includes ensuring that the health, welfare, morale and discipline of assigned personnel is effectively maintained. Finally, accountability encompasses the need to comply with constitutional and legislative accountabilities (such as workplace health and safety legislation), corporate governance requirements, and the laws of armed conflict.

Command is one of the six Australian Defence Force joint functions.¹ Each function is a set of related joint capabilities and activities, grouped together to help joint commanders integrate, synchronise and direct campaigns and operations. Successful campaigning requires coordination across the functions and commanders should therefore be familiar with each of them. For further details, see

¹ The other ADF joint functions are: situational understanding; force generation and sustainment; force projection; force protection; and force application.

[Australian Defence Force – Philosophical – 3 \(ADF-P-3\) Campaigns and Operations.](#)

In contrast to command, control is the authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate organisations, or other organisations not normally under their command, which encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or directives.

Control can be permissive or restrictive. The former allows specific actions to occur, while the latter limits or proscribes certain actions. Primary control measures include planning guidance, operation orders, rules of engagement, airspace control measures, fire support coordination measures, and manoeuvre control measures, such as axes of advance, boundaries, phase lines and objectives.

The terms command and control are closely related and are often abbreviated together as C2. However, they are not synonymous and there is a subtle but important difference between them. While commanders assign responsibilities, control enables coordination between elements of a force and other organisations, imposes restrictions and limits, and establishes guidelines to regulate freedom of action.

Command, leadership and management

Although this publication does not focus on leadership or management, both concepts are related to command and the relationship between the three terms is important.

Definitions

Leadership: The art of positively influencing others to get the job done.

Management: The process of planning, organising, directing and controlling organisational resources in the pursuit of organisational goals.

The Australian Defence Force can rely on the exercise of authority to meet basic responsibilities, but achieving the best and most effective results requires leadership. A member of the military may be assigned a leadership position with the legitimate and related powers

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of command, and yet display little or no positive leadership behaviour. With command comes the power and authority over subordinates that the leader needs to achieve tasks.

Leadership and command are not the same. Leadership is the art and projection of personality and character to inspire others to achieve a desired outcome. There is no prescription or endorsed style for leadership. The commander's leadership approach will need to adapt to the situation at any given time. It ensures subordinate commitment to purpose and willingness to continually pursue military objectives, even when unobserved. Without leadership, subordinates are unlikely to receive the guidance and encouragement necessary to fight as a cohesive unit towards the assigned objective. While the 'line of credit' provided by command authority is essential, leadership is critical to mission success.

A more comprehensive treatment of leadership is contained in [Australian Defence Force – Philosophical – 3 ADF Leadership](#).

Like leadership, management is related to command but the two terms mean different things. Management is the science: an impersonal, rational act involving activities such as planning, budgeting, performance measurement and resource allocation. In management theory, people are viewed as one of a number of resources, although astute managers realise that people perform more effectively if they are led, rather than simply being tasked in the manner that a manager may allocate other resources. In challenging circumstances or a crisis, the team needs to be led, not managed.

Personnel in management roles may or may not have command of subordinates, but there is always a personnel management aspect to command. Furthermore, although civilians are not eligible to command military personnel they may, in some circumstances, be appointed as their manager.

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Historical example

General Monash's use of command and control at Hamel, France, 4 July 1918



Portrait of General Sir John Monash

By mid-1918, the strategic and operational setting for the Western Front made conditions favourable for a more mobile style of operation that, when combined with technological advances, encouraged combined arms methods.

One early proponent of these methods was the newly-appointed commander of the 1st Australian Corps, Lieutenant General John Monash. In his first major battle leading this formation, Monash developed and executed a plan that led to a stunning success. Within 93 minutes, 1st Australian Corps overcame a prepared German position in the hills and woods around the village of Hamel in northern France. Furthermore, the casualties suffered in the attack were moderate by World War I standards and the Corps was poised to hold against counterattack. Monash's employment of command and control was an outstanding feature of this battle.

In terms of command, Monash prepared his formations to operate with other combat arms, including through rehearsals. He employed tanks in direct support of the infantry, and used carrier tanks to carry supplies forward. Aircraft were tasked to identify enemy dispositions, contribute to security by reporting on breaches

of camouflage, attack possible German reserves, cover the noise of preparations, and conduct ammunition resupply. Deception was employed to make the Germans believe there was no build-up on that part of the front.

Further, no registration artillery fire was permitted and gas was interspersed with smoke in regular pre-determined pre-dawn fire missions. In the attack, smoke (without gas) was used to blind the German defenders, and a creeping artillery barrage covered the assaulting infantry-tank force and inhibited counterattacks during consolidation.

Monash's command style might be described as either meticulous or micro-managing, but he was undoubtedly thorough in preparation. He used conferences of the key staff involved to work through details and options—and changed his mind at times when subordinate commanders developed rational counter-proposals. He made personal visits to battalion-level commanders, ensuring they understood their roles while improving his understanding of their situation. Monash also clearly assigned his formations and supporting forces through well-prepared written orders, using command terminology that might seem quaint or ambiguous today. Nevertheless, phrases such as 'at the disposal of' and 'the main function of'—which he used to assign artillery, tanks and supporting arms to his formations—were understood and authoritative.

The control measures employed by Monash were similarly clear. Maps were marked with assembly areas and routes, defined start lines, and a 'blue line' to denote the limit of exploitation. He encouraged his infantry-tank teams to exploit to the blue line, rather than capture objectives, and was willing to bypass strongpoints to maintain momentum. Orders also provided clear guidance on timings, liaison and reserves. His plan maintained discipline and did not permit exploitation beyond the blue line, ensuring his forward troops were under a protective artillery umbrella at all times.

Monash and 1st Corps' success at Hamel was an early exemplar of the efficacy of combined arms warfare. Similar approaches would be employed on larger scales into the final Allied offensives of the Great War.

Annex:

- 1A The evolution of Australian Defence Force command arrangements since 1973

Annex 1A

The evolution of Australian Defence Force command arrangements since 1973

Prior to 1973, each of the Services had their own Service Board and Department, and the Service Chiefs answered to a minister for that Service. The implementation of the 1973 Tange Report (officially titled *Australian Defence: Report on the Reorganisation of the Defence Group of Departments*) led to the abolition of the Boards and the amalgamation of the Departments into a single Department of Defence. In 1976, associated reforms created the Australian Defence Force (ADF) as a joint organisation. The implementation of the Tange Report also established a diarchy between the Secretary of Defence (SECDEF) and the Chief of the Defence Force Staff (later re-titled Chief of the Defence Force (CDF)) and subordinated the Service Chiefs to the CDF (see further details on the diarchy in Chapter 4).

Although the creation of the diarchy resulted in SECDEF and CDF having equal responsibility for administering Defence, CDF exclusively has full command of the ADF (see details of 'full command' in Chapter 5). Following further reforms from November 1985 to January 1997, CDF exercised the operational element of full command directly from Headquarters Australian Defence Force (HQADF) through the Assistant Chief, Operations, with Operations Division providing staff support. Operational-level functions were split between Operations Division and the three environmental (sea, land and air) commanders (see details of the 'levels' of command in Chapter 4).

In 1995, then-CDF General John Baker initiated a fundamental review of ADF command arrangements with the intent to strengthen joint command effectiveness at the operational level. At that time, it was accepted that the principal function of the ADF was to defend Australia and that responses to other threats, although possible, were

not likely. The paradigm of 'structure for war, adapt for peace' predominated.

In 1997, ADF command arrangements were formally restructured to separate those command structures primarily focused on the military strategic level from those primarily focused on the operational level. CDF delegated command at the operational level to a permanent Commander Australian Theatre, who would be in command of a single headquarters—Headquarters Australian Theatre. Environmental commanders were designated component commanders for operations. The component commanders also retained responsibility to their respective Service Chiefs for raising, training and sustaining forces.

These command and control (C2) arrangements were developed and implemented in a relatively stable strategic environment where the major threats were perceived as likely to originate from conventional military forces. In accordance with strategic guidance contained in the 1987 and 1994 Defence White Papers, it was also presumed that operations in defence of Australia would be conducted in vulnerable northern areas of the country. As a result of this presumption, some C2 infrastructure was relocated to northern Australia.

The 1999 deployment of the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) resulted in the ADF's highest operational tempo since 1972. The need for a review of C2 doctrine in the ADF was also recognised in 1999, but for some time this did not occur due to the operational tempo. In 2000, the Chiefs of Service Committee (COSC) formalised two new command authorities—'theatre command' and 'national command'—as integral elements of ADF C2 (see details of COSC in Chapter 4). These concepts were detailed in the doctrine pamphlet 'ADF Operational Command and Control', provisional edition.

In 2003, then-CDF General Peter Cosgrove initiated two further reviews that, in light of the experience of recent operations, identified several key strategic issues affecting the ADF's C2 requirements. Both the 2000 Defence White Paper and the 2003 Defence Update found that the strategic environment was now characterised by a mixture of traditional military threats and asymmetric threats arising from

terrorism and globalisation. The need to succeed within this strategic environment drove the development of revised operating concepts. These concepts encompassed a continuum of operations that ranged from armed conflict to operations designed to shape and influence regional and world views.

Other key issues identified by the 2003 reviews included closer Government interest in operations with potentially high strategic consequences, and the effects of technology on C2 and information management. The reviews recommended a simpler and flatter command structure for operations and a separate appointment with command responsibility for all ADF joint operational activity.

In 2004, the Minister for Defence announced the establishment of Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQJOC), with CDF's operational command of the ADF to be executed through Vice Chief of the Defence Force (VCDF), who would have a dual capacity as Chief of Joint Operations (CJOPS).

In 2005, then-CDF Air Chief Marshal Angus Houston initiated another review into the ADF's higher C2 arrangements. The officially titled *Report on the Review of Australian Defence Force High Command and Control Arrangements* was known as the 'Wilson Review' after the officer appointed to conduct it, Major General Richard Wilson. This review examined the concepts of command and control, and the broader national and Defence context of the ADF's higher C2 arrangements. It confirmed Government intent through a re-appraisal of strategic guidance and made an assessment of likely future trends in warfare as they affected C2.

COSC accepted the majority of the Wilson Review's recommendations, the most significant of which was the reorganisation of HQJOC. Prior to this, HQJOC had been structured as a fragmented, component-based headquarters. As a result of this review, component commanders were removed from the joint operational command structure and a single integrated headquarters was established, organised in accordance with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) common joint staff system (see [Australian Defence Force – Integration – 5 Military Planning Processes Annex 1B](#)).

In 2007 following approval from the Minister for Defence, the VCDF and CJOPS roles were separated. It was a response to a Defence Management Report initiative that sought to strengthen the command and leadership of ADF operations while ensuring that Government is provided with high quality and timely operational and strategic advice. Since then VCDF has been responsible for Defence business at the strategic level, specifically supporting the Government and CDF, while CJOPS has been responsible to CDF for the conduct of operations (see details in Chapter 4).

The Prime Minister officially opened the purpose-built HQJOC facility at Bungendore in 2009 and enabled for the first time all of the elements of HQJOC to be located within a single facility. This has since ensured that CJOPS is able to exercise effective C2 of operations from a single location. Also in 2009, the ADF published a new C2 doctrine manual, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 00.1—*Command and Control*, Edition 1.

In 2014, the First Principles Review of Defence (the Review) was conducted. Published in 2015, the Review found a proliferation of structures, processes and systems with unclear accountabilities, which in turn caused institutionalised waste, delayed decisions, flawed execution, duplication, over-escalation of issues for discussion and low engagement levels among employees in parts of the organisation.

The focus of the Review was on ensuring that Defence was fit for purpose, could respond to future challenges, and could deliver against its outputs with the minimum resources necessary. The Review recommended substantial change across Defence to ensure it can deliver on the plans in the Defence White Paper. The Government agreed, or agreed in principle, to 75 of the 76 recommendations.

The Review recommended Defence move from a federated approach into a single, integrated end-to-end organisation that would deliver enhanced joint capability—the 'One Defence' approach. Headquarters' arrangements were re-assessed, and the result supported a more integrated approach to the management, development of advice and planning for the ADF—the integrated Australian Defence Force Headquarters (ADFHQ).

The functionality of the ADFHQ organisation has progressed since the release of the Review. In 2016, the Government amended the *Defence Act 1903* and repealed the *Naval Defence Act 1910* and *Air Force Act 1923*. In sum, these changes reinforced the command authority of VCDF relative to the Service Chiefs. Other key changes occurred in 2017 with the designation of VCDF as the Joint Force Authority, the establishment of the Chief of Joint Capabilities and the appointment of an ADFHQ chief of staff.

Chapter 2 – The Australian Defence Force approach to command

Executive summary

- There are eight principles of command: unity of command, span of command, clarity, redundancy, delegation of command, control of significant resources, obligation to subordinates, and accountability.
- Commanders need to consider a wide range of factors that exist within the operational environment, including political, legal, cultural and social issues, in addition to traditional military considerations.
- The Australian Defence Force approach to command is known as mission command.
- Under mission command, in its simplest form, the superior commander directs what is to be achieved but leaves subordinate commanders free to decide how to achieve assigned tasks.
- Flexibility and the use of initiative are encouraged at all levels of command.

Introduction

There are two components of command. The first is the underlying approach within an organisation that determines the style in which its members go about developing a personal command philosophy. This component is covered below. The second component is organisational, functional and legal, covering the structures and mechanisms empowering designated commanders to exercise specified lawful authority and direction over assigned forces for missions and tasks. This component is addressed in subsequent chapters.

Principles of command

As with the principles of war, certain principles of command have been identified as consistent over time. There are eight principles of command:

- unity of command
- span of command
- clarity
- redundancy
- delegation of command
- control of significant resources
- obligation to subordinates
- accountability.

Unity of command

The first and foremost principle of command is that there can only be one recognised command authority at any time. A subordinate can only have one superior. The command authority may change as tasks change, but the principle of unity of command, with one designated commander clearly responsible for each task, must be maintained. This is particularly important in multi-phased joint operations such as airborne or amphibious operations, where lack of unity of command could create doubt as to who is in command of the operation at various phases.

Historical example

Unity of command: Operation OBOE

The allied invasion of Borneo in 1945, codenamed Operation OBOE, encompassed the battles of Tarakan (Operation OBOE I, 1 May–21 June), North Borneo (Operation OBOE VI, 10 June–5 August) and Balikpapan (Operation OBOE II, 1–21 July 1945). All three battles involved the conduct of amphibious landings.



Troops of the 7th Division, Australian Imperial Force, landing at Balikpapan, Borneo, 1 July 1945

Due to the overall command structure established by the Commander-in-Chief of the South–West Pacific Area, United States of America's Army General Douglas MacArthur, there was no overall task force commander for Operation OBOE. Instead, MacArthur had established separate commands for allied naval, land and air forces. For Operation OBOE, 1st Australian Corps, under the command of Lieutenant General Sir Leslie Morshead, provided the land forces. The allied air force units involved were commanded by RAAF Air Vice Marshal William Bostock, and naval units involved were under overall command of US Navy Vice Admiral Thomas Kinkaid. Each of these officers reported to the commander for their respective environment, rather than to a single task force commander.

Operational success therefore depended entirely on informal cooperation between these commanders, and between their

subordinate commanders. This arrangement resulted in operational outcomes that were less than ideal:

At Balikpapan, for example, the Navy disagreed with the Army's choice of landing beach because it was in the area where Japanese defences were strongest. This choice would mean the minesweepers having to operate close under the enemy's guns while supporting warships would have to stand further offshore ... Navy, however, was overruled and Army opinion prevailed.²

Another problem was personality conflict between RAAF commanders. Specifically, Air Vice Marshal Bostock had a dysfunctional relationship with Air Vice Marshal George Jones, Australia's Chief of the Air Staff (CAS). Originally close friends, their relationship soured when Jones was promoted to CAS despite Bostock being considered 'next in line' due to rank and experience. Ongoing conflict between the two men resulted in Jones manipulating maintenance policy to prevent RAAF bomber squadrons providing support to Bostock during Operation OBOE I. This resulted in deficiencies in the level of air support provided to the landing force.

Even though Operation OBOE was ultimately successful, it remains a poignant example of the importance of establishing unity of command, and of the costs of failing to do so.

Span of command

There is a limit to the number of subordinate force elements that can be commanded effectively. Analysis of past operations indicates that an ideal span is between three and six subordinate force elements. The optimum number depends on a number of factors so no precise number can be prescribed.

While all command and control (C2) arrangements must be sufficiently flexible to cope with additional subordinate force elements, the commander must not be overloaded to the point

² David Stevens, 'Maritime Aspects of Australian Amphibious Operations', in Lt Col Glenn Wahlert, (Ed.), *Australian Army Amphibious Operations in the South-West Pacific: 1942-45*, Sydney: Australian Army Doctrine Centre, 1995, p. 108.

where it is not possible to command effectively. The establishment of subordinate commanders and headquarters (HQ) should be used to ensure span of a command does not become too wide.

There is a range of degrees of authority from which to match mission and responsibility (see Chapter 5 for information about degrees of authority). An operational commander needs to be assigned the mix of combat, combat support and combat services support necessary to achieve the mission. Assigning lesser degrees of authority may be appropriate in the case of force elements that provide temporary, spasmodic or external support. The allocation of additional force elements vital to a plan should be achieved with consideration to ensure that the commander is not burdened with C2 responsibilities for other force elements where cooperative support would suffice.

For force elements, the limits of a viable span of command depend on subordinate and technical command requirements, effective combat groupings and communications feasibility. There is usually no need for transient maritime and air force elements to be under the command of a deployed operational commander. For example, in East Timor in 1999 the span of command for Major General Peter Cosgrove's Joint Task Force 631 (JTF 631) was immediately over-extended because contingents were deployed from 22 nations. A substantial air and sea line of communication between East Timor and Australia was also established. If the forces conducting this task had also been placed under JTF 631, General Cosgrove's span of command would probably have become unmanageable.

Clarity

The principle of clarity, though closely related to unity of command, focuses on the military chain of command. It requires commanders at each level to respond to directions from higher HQ, and in turn issue directions to subordinates. Consequently, each HQ normally reports to only one superior HQ, thereby following an unambiguous chain of command. All elements in the chain must be aware of their superior and subordinate HQ and the C2 relationships with other force elements operating in the same theatre or joint force area of operations.

Redundancy

To provide command redundancy, alternative commanders and HQ must be nominated at all levels. Procedures established and practised to allow command to be passed to the alternative commanders in such a way that operations are not adversely affected. The purpose of this process is to ensure that ongoing operations are not disrupted during a transfer of authority.

The provision of staff, communications and information systems for alternative HQ is factored into planning. Navy force elements, having a network of ships equipped with command centres and communications, have an inherent redundancy. Air bases are similarly equipped, and generally are in continuous contact with aircraft. In the land environment, command redundancy is inherent in the chain of command, which specifies a second-in-command and so on. This applies from the lowest level—the section commander and section second-in-command—to the highest level—the Chief and Deputy Chief of Army.

Delegation of command

Delegation of command must be legal and within the scope of authority of the commander making the delegation (see Chapter 5). When delegating command authority, the commander must ensure that the delegation:

- is unambiguous
- clearly defines the degree of authority and responsibilities transferred, including any related conditions and limitations
- clearly specifies the point at which the authority becomes effective
- gives guidance to the action to be taken in the event of a contingency or opportunity—this guidance should specifically address those contingencies where the commander cannot be contacted or is unable to perform their duties for a period of time.

For the smooth and robust delegation of command it is necessary for the commander's vision to be clearly articulated and understood.

Subordinate personnel who are likely to be appointed to an acting command position must familiarise themselves with all aspects of their commander's responsibilities. They must position themselves to anticipate having to discharge these duties or respond to contingencies where communication with the commander is lost, or the commander is incapacitated.

Control of significant and limited resources

Some resources are designated as significant resources due to of their wide utility but limited availability, or the limited availability of expert control cells. Examples include submarines, special forces and some aircraft types. C2 of significant resources is normally retained at the highest practicable level. Delegation of authority over such resources is rare and invariably involves procedures for the rapid return of the authority if, and when, circumstances change.

Constant liaison between the strategic, operational and tactical-level planning staffs, together with selection of the most appropriate type and duration of C2 arrangements, is essential to ensure best use is made of scarce resources.

Obligation to subordinates

Commanders are obliged to consider the interests and wellbeing of their subordinates and represent them in the chain of command. This includes responsibility for safety, health, welfare, morale and discipline of assigned personnel. Commanders are also obliged to exercise appropriate C2 over their subordinates.

Command obligation is a feature of military culture and is facilitated by the philosophy of mission command. The ADF national command system has an obligation to establish, without lavish or wasteful use of resources, support systems additional to the host and multinational lead nations' in-theatre standards that meet the usual aspirations and legitimate needs of ADF personnel.

Accountability

Commanders are accountable for their actions. There are several aspects to this accountability, including the need to comply with

constitutional and legislative accountabilities (such as workplace health and safety legislation), corporate governance requirements, and compliance with the law of armed conflict (LOAC).

Historical example

Obligation to subordinates:

Personnel support in Great Britain, First and Second World Wars

The evolution of personnel support arrangements in the United Kingdom (UK) during the First and Second World Wars provides an example of Australian support for personnel serving overseas as part of multinational forces.

During the First World War, HQ Australian Imperial Force (AIF) established administrative, training, medical, convalescent and recreational facilities in the Middle East and UK. While the British Army was willing to provide such services, the Australian Government and HQAIF determined that Australian services should provide for the needs of its force. Accordingly, 55,000 of the AIF's 300,000 members provided administrative support from the UK, and another administrative cadre in the Middle East.

Support in the UK in the Second World War was not as well organised. The agreement covering the Empire Air Training Scheme provided that Dominion output would serve in national squadrons. This never eventuated, with nominal Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) squadrons containing a mix of nationalities, and half of RAAF aircrew directly allotted to Royal Air Force (RAF) squadrons. The British Government provided administrative support and attempts to form a RAAF base were circumvented to avoid diminution of the Air Ministry's ability to employ RAAF elements and individuals piecemeal within RAF wings and squadrons.

Concern about this lack of support resulted in the dispatch of Air Marshal Sir Richard Williams to London in 1941 to establish a RAAF counterpart of HQAIF. This was to fulfil the Australian Government desire 'that RAAF personnel shall be under the command of RAAF officers ... to the fullest possible extent', and that they be provided with adequate, specifically-Australian amenities. It was not until the establishment of Air Officer Commanding Overseas HQ RAAF in 1941 that 15,000 RAAF aircrew overseas began to receive the support and amenities appropriate and usual for Australian forces.

Command and the operational environment

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The operating environment faced by today's commander is one characterised by a mixture of change, complexity and uncertainty. Commanders in this environment need to consciously consider a wide range of factors including political, legal, cultural and social issues, in addition to traditional military considerations.

Factors affecting the exercise of command

The effective exercise of command is intimately linked to the nature of the operational environment, including the strategic context and the technology available. For details about the personal aspect of command, see Chapter 3. Factors that should be taken into account by the commander include:

- complexity
- diversity of actors
- geographical non-linearity
- limitations
- the effects of technology.

Complexity. There are two types of complexity: structural and interactive. Structural complexity exists in a system made up of many parts, but these parts interact in a predictable (usually linear) way. Interactive complexity exists in a system that is made up of many parts, but where those parts are able to interact with each other and the system itself in many possible ways, and which may change significantly over time. The effects of this variety of interaction are very difficult to predict accurately, and are pervasive to the extent that they may even change the structure of the system itself.

Although operations have always been structurally complex, today it is widely understood that they are also interactively complex. As a result, the effects of any action cannot necessarily be taken for granted. All operational plans need to be developed and enacted with enough flexibility to enable unexpected situations to be addressed.

Diversity of actors. The operational environment is characterised by a diverse and sometimes ambiguous array of actors, including:

- conventional military forces, including multinational forces

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- host nation government officials, including police and service providers
- non-conventional forces
- non-state actors—for example, terrorist organisations, mercenaries, pirates, organised criminal groups
- international organisations—for example, United Nations, International Committee of the Red Cross
- non-governmental organisations—for example, Oxfam, Médecins sans frontières
- multinational corporations
- civilians.

Each of these actors may be a threat, friendly or neutral, and may change between these categories over time. Each actor has its own attributes, internal dynamics and intentions that need to be analysed and understood. The commander must develop a situational understanding of key actors and their relationships that may affect mission achievement.

Geographical non-linearity. The contemporary operational environment does not necessarily include well-defined fronts, flanks and rear areas. As a result, force protection is an important command consideration, regardless of where forces are located.

Limitations. The conduct of operations is invariably subject to limitations. These limitations can circumscribe the political and/or strategic aims of an operation, the intensity of combat operations, the geographic extent of military action, the duration of hostilities, support of national objectives by the host and home populations, and the kinds of operations and activities conducted. Limitations consist of constraints and restrictions as follows:

- **Constraints.** Constraints are actions imposed by a superior commander or other authority, which must be undertaken. Constraints may be derived from specified or implied tasks. An example is the tasking of a subordinate commander to maintain a reserve for employment that may be employed by the superior commander on order.

- **Restrictions.** Restrictions are prohibitions on activities that a superior commander or another authority might impose. Restrictions may be legal (imposed by international and domestic laws); moral and ethical (these limitations are now very largely absorbed into international norms and values); or political (which include, in the case of multinational operations, what is considered acceptable by all contributing countries).

Effects of technology on information. Technology—and accompanying social changes—has increased the speed, reach, volume and scope of information available. There are several aspects to this change. The first is a raised expectation by commanders at all levels to be continually informed. This expectation needs to be satisfied by a sound system and process for passing information and advice, and an understanding of the broader implications of events by commanders and staffs.

A second aspect is a faster and more streamlined passage of information, a situation with benefits and risks. This factor can boost shared situational understanding and lead to better informed decision-making. However, this change also risks increased political and command intervention in tactical matters. While increased higher-level involvement can and should be positive, its exercise requires discipline to avoid micro-management. A streamlined information flow can also cause 'information overload' which, unless managed, may lead to indecisiveness as commanders and their staff wait until they have 'all the information'. At the same time, senior leaders can access information from a broad range of connected sources that transmit straight from the area of operations to a global audience. This 'CNN effect' is now well established and complemented by social media, which bypasses 'traditional' methods of information verification.

A third aspect, which has a close relationship to the second, is the compression of the decision-making cycle that results from an increased information flow. Militaries are now using communication and information systems to display a common operational picture and are using software-aided decision-making tools to develop possible courses of action. This technology is developing rapidly. In the near future, simultaneous transmission of situation pictures to

commanders at all levels will offer unparalleled visibility of the operational environment.

Overall, reliance on sophisticated technologies creates opportunities and vulnerabilities—for both the ADF and potential adversaries. Despite technological advances, command remains a human activity and the ADF employs mission command to capitalise upon that.

Mission command

Mission command promotes flexibility by encouraging initiative, ingenuity, innovation, resourcefulness and devolution of authority to achieve the commander's intent.

Definition

Mission command: A philosophy for command and a system for conducting operations in which subordinates are given clear direction by a superior of their intentions.

Note: The result required, the task, the resources and any constraints are clearly enunciated, however subordinates are allowed the freedom to decide how to achieve the required result.

Mission command has been adopted because it aligns well with the ADF's overall approach to warfare. The ADF's approach to warfare is a combination of manoeuvre, interoperability, networking and decision superiority. For further details about the ADF approach to warfare see [Australian Defence Force – Capstone – 0 Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine](#).

Mission command promotes decentralised execution, freedom, and speed of action and initiative, but is responsive to superior direction. Under mission command, in its simplest form, the superior commander directs **what** is to be achieved but leaves the subordinate commander free to decide **how** to achieve assigned tasks.

Mission command can only succeed through the combined efforts of superior and subordinate commanders. Superior commanders maintain the ultimate responsibility for achieving the mission and must ensure that they do not misapply mission command to avoid

their own command responsibilities. Subordinate commanders must be fully aware of the superior commander's intent, and continually monitor and assess developing situations, while maintaining excellent communication through their chain of command and with supporting force elements. It requires back briefing the commander with clarity and regularity.

Successful application of the philosophy of mission command depends on the following prerequisites:

- **Doctrine.** Mission command is most successful when supported by doctrine. Military doctrine describes fundamental principles that guide actions by armed forces to achieve their objectives. While authoritative, doctrine requires judgement in application. Good doctrine is based on the thorough analysis of experience, information such as lessons, and new concepts and trends. It is used in professional military education, and can be used by operators facing unfamiliar situations so they can draw upon the organisation's collective experience.
- **Reliability.** Commanders rely on subordinates to provide accurate and timely information to achieve operational success. High demands are made on the leadership qualities of subordinates, on their initiative and on their sense of responsibility to carry out their assigned tasks.
- **Trust.** Mission command requires a high level of mutual trust at all levels of command that is established through intensive, realistic training and reinforced by success on operations. Subordinates are trusted by being allocated sufficient resources to carry out their missions, and commanders should keep control to a minimum so as not to constrain their subordinates' freedom of action.
- **Understanding.** Commanders ensure that subordinates understand the commander's intentions, their own missions, and the strategic, operational and tactical context. Subordinates are told what objectives they need to achieve and the reasons why achieving them is necessary. The alternative for commanders is to resort to ponderous,

detailed orders, which can stifle initiative and slow the tempo of operations.

- **Risk.** Gaining and holding the initiative is critical in a rapidly moving situation. Hesitation, indecision and time-wasting by seeking confirmation from higher command may be riskier than a flawed but timely decision based on the best available information.
- **Disciplined initiative.** Empowering people so they can identify and seize opportunities that can turn the situation in our favour. It creates a direct connection between initiative, innovation and creativity. This is not a blank cheque but rather empowerment in accordance with intent, direction and the assigned mission. Disciplined initiative requires subordinate commanders to align the freedom of action given with an unwavering focus on the commander's intent.
- **Check and verify.** Responsibility for mission outcome rests with the commander, who needs to check and verify subordinates' mission execution. The commander must know, track and understand the situation and context in which subordinates are operating. Done with forethought and care, this reinforces trust and avoids micro-management. The art of mission command requires focus on checks at the right time and place. Rather than 'set and forget', mission command is 'set, follow, check, support and adapt'.

Increasingly, legislative and regulatory requirements, together with resource constraints, compound to work against mission command. These constraints can lead to conservatism, indecisiveness, or micro-management, potentially creating a tendency towards risk aversion. Even though mission command must be accompanied by the implementation of appropriate risk management measures, operations will always require a degree of risk taking. Therefore, mission command should be applied during peacetime to develop decisiveness, moral courage, initiative and daring, which can be easily translated into the operational environment.

Application of mission command

Commanders at all levels had to act more on their own; they were given greater latitude to work out their own plans to achieve what they knew was the Army Commander's intention. In time they developed to a marked degree the flexibility of mind and a firmness of decision that enabled them to act swiftly to take advantage of sudden information of changing circumstances without reference to their superiors. This acting without orders, in anticipation of orders, or without waiting for approval, yet always within the overall intention, must become second nature and must go down to the smallest units.

**Field Marshal Sir William Slim
Governor General of Australia 1953–60**

Although philosophical in nature, mission command is not all theory. Its practical application in the ADF stresses five key concepts which are discussed in the following paragraphs.

Learning through practice

Mission command requires practice during training, not just for a particular operation, but for operations in general. Questioning should be encouraged to provide insight by engaging experience and creativity. Sufficient instruction and training should occur in a benign environment, in which honest mistakes are accepted and discussed, and unorthodox solutions are encouraged.

A deeper understanding of what constitutes commander's intent should be the subject of continual development. Progressive thinking should be used to translate a higher commander's intent into lower-level objectives and foster an outcome-driven approach. Mission command cannot function without the unifying purpose of commander's intent.

Wise application

Commanders have a right to be satisfied that subordinates not only understand their intentions but are also acting on them. The use of orders groups, back briefs before mission execution and face-to-face communication during the conduct of operations not only develops trust and mutual understanding of the plan, but also strengthens collective and individual confidence, purpose and resolve.

Although commanders should practise mission command whenever possible, judgement in application is required. Mission command does not necessarily apply to all situations and to all personnel. For example, mission command may not be compatible with, or acceptable to, some potential partners. Mission command should be applied with particular care in a multinational environment (see Chapter 7). While over-direction will often cause offence, too little direction may fail to achieve results in a timely fashion, or at all.

Flexibility and adaptability

Mission command must remain dynamic and agile. It should be applied flexibly, reflecting the understanding that doctrine itself is not immutable, and it should be adapted for a particular campaign, operation or situation. A commander's style of command must also reflect the situation, including the capability and understanding of subordinates. The characteristics of persuasion, compulsion, loyalty and leadership by example combine to create an individual command style, but the relative proportion of each must be tempered to suit the situation.

In exceptional circumstances, there may be brief occasions when commanders have to skip an echelon and 'reach down' at least one level of command. Historical evidence provides many examples of this: Napoleon, Rommel and Patton all intervened at a decisive point and brought about startling tactical successes. Endorsement of such action by a commander should not be seen as an encouragement of micro-management. It is a technique that should be applied sparingly, based on higher strategic knowledge, to turn the tide in a wavering operation or to seize the initiative where none was previously seen to exist.

Risk taking

Increasingly, tight legislative and regulatory requirements, together with resource constraints, compound to work against mission command. These constraints can breed conservatism and indecisiveness, potentially creating a tendency towards risk aversion in a wider operational environment. Nevertheless, the law of armed conflict applies in combat and commanders must take calculated risks and make judgements about what risks are necessary and acceptable to achieve mission objectives. Therefore, mission command should be used during peacetime, with appropriate risk management measures, to develop decisiveness, moral courage, initiative and daring that can be easily translated into a war fighting environment.

Delegation

The ADF's mission command philosophy is realised in the commander's confidence in delegating responsibility to subordinates, and the professional discharge of those responsibilities of command by subordinates. This is of particular importance in response to fleeting windows of opportunity during the conduct of operations, and contingencies where no specific direction has been given to the subordinate.

Historical example

Application of mission command: Al Muthanna Task Group, 2005

The first Al Muthanna Task Group deployed to southern Iraq from April to November 2005. During its 191 days in Iraq, the 450-strong Task Group conducted 2,359 discrete tactical tasks in an operational environment characterised by a complex mixture of human, physical and informational factors.



Australian Light Armoured Vehicles and support vehicles of Combat Team Courage, Al Muthanna Task Group, in southern Iraq

Throughout the deployment, the commander, Lieutenant Colonel Noble, relied heavily on mission command to ensure success in the complex operational environment. This involved emphasising the importance of subordinates complying with the commander's intent in all of their actions, while also ensuring that subordinates were allowed the flexibility to plan and execute their own courses of action. Reflecting on the deployment, Noble later wrote:

The key to effective, focused action is mission command. Mission command must be believed in and nurtured. For it to be effective, it must be built on the intellectual components of clear intent, trust and accountability. The central moral component is trust. A physical control framework must also be established to support decision makers at every level, especially those in the midst of chaos and in close contact with the adversary.

Chapter 3 – Personal command philosophy

Executive summary

- The purpose of a command philosophy is for the commander to declare what they expect of their command and what their command can expect of them.
- Commanders should develop a personal command philosophy based on vision, values, leadership expectations and personal convictions.
- Commanders must create and sustain an effective command climate that fosters a common understanding with subordinates, a sense of involvement in decision-making and a shared commitment.

The underlying philosophy of leaders has a significant impact on the way they relate to others, attempt to influence others, judge the actions of others, and make decisions affecting others.

Steven J. Mayer

Introduction

Taking command is an extremely personal business. From the moment a commander takes command they begin to develop a command philosophy, either consciously or subconsciously, that considerably influences their personal life, their work and that of their subordinates.

In the Australian Defence Force (ADF) commanders are encouraged to consciously consider their approach to command. The joint professional military education continuum requires participants to prepare a command philosophy. As a result, by the time most members of the ADF are appointed to a command position, they have already considered their approach to command and are developing their personal command philosophy.

Personal command philosophy

The purpose of a command philosophy is to declare what the commander expects of their people and what their people can expect of them. How this is communicated by a commander to their subordinates ultimately depends on a commander's personality and approach to command; however, a new commander can use their command philosophy as a tool to assist in establishing a rapport with their subordinates by clearly defining their philosophy up front through a verbal address and/or written guidance. This should be continually reinforced by the commander in subsequent interactions with subordinates to ensure a consistent message.

A command philosophy is relevant at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, and to non-operational and operational command appointments. Regardless of the level and type of command appointment, a good command philosophy will:

- indicate those aspects of organisational activity most important to the commander
- give insight into the commander's leadership style so others in the command can coordinate their actions with those of the commander
- be broad enough to provide reference points for ethical, personal leadership style, as well as managerial style preference issues
- provide a foundation of understanding by which the commander and their subordinates can build a relationship of respect, trust and mutual expectation.

A good command philosophy will not simply be a one-way list of expectations that a commander has of subordinates. Rather, it is a statement of what subordinates can expect of the commander—a two-way performance contract. In addition, commanders must guard against command philosophies that simply make obvious statements such as 'embracing the ADF's values' without providing clear direction as to what the commander personally believes that to mean.

A command philosophy that a commander does not personally believe in or represent should not be promoted. The damage that such a philosophy will do to the trust and respect in which a commander is held cannot be over-emphasised, as its promulgation of it is likely to lead to accusations of hypocrisy and double standards.

Components of a personal command philosophy

In general, a command philosophy has the following four components:

- **Vision.** Every success is based on an initial concept. A commander's vision provides the initial common focus for an organisation's energy and allows priorities to be determined, which set the conditions for success.
- **Values.** Members in an organisation who share the same values view tasks from a common perspective and act accordingly. A commander has the responsibility to draw together the common values within subordinates, making them robust enough to withstand external pressures and influences.
- **Leadership expectations.** Subordinate leaders have specific responsibilities and obligations, and these must be clearly articulated and understood by them and their subordinates. By clearly articulating and reinforcing expectations, galvanising all components with an overall purpose, a commander has the opportunity to create synergistic effects.
- **Personal convictions.** A commander is expected to possess attributes such as moral and physical courage, integrity, humility, fairness and diligence. A commander should also display a sophisticated level of personal engagement or 'people skills'. Not only must a commander's character be visible to subordinates, but subordinates must understand the personal convictions of their commander to best be able to interpret and carry out their commander's intent.

Historical example

Philosophy of Higher Operational Command Deputy Chief Of Staff For Operations, Headquarters Multinational Force—Iraq, 2004–05

Between August 2004 and April 2005, Australian Army Major General Jim Molan served as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations within Headquarters Multinational Force—Iraq (HQ MNF-I). In this role, Molan reported directly to the Commanding General, United States Army General George Casey, Jr., and was responsible for implementing operational plans across Iraq. During this period, MNF-I comprised 160,000 soldiers, most of them American. Major operations included the November 2004 Battle of Fallujah and the January 2005 Iraqi national election.

Although in a senior staff rather than a command position, Molan nevertheless promulgated a personal command philosophy that he used to guide his own conduct and to provide guidance to his staff. This command philosophy read:

Be technically proficient.

Understand the politics.

Understand war in general.

Understand the principles of command and control and the technicalities of headquarters.

Confidently know your strengths and weaknesses.

Be prepared to apply both extreme violence and extreme humanity.

Understand the specific war, your enemies, allies and own forces, especially joint.

Develop a simple vision simply expressed.

Be courageous (physically and morally).

Be confident that you learn wars by doing.

Command so that people know that you are commanding.

Your soldiers understand their unlimited liability—they know that they may be killed.

Do not be surprised that you are being surprised (expect uncertainty and risk).

Watch your back.

*Act legally and morally based on your ethics.
Care for your people and your mission.
Test your decision but trust your judgement (intuition).
Be very, very lucky.³*

Command climate

To the fundamental skills of battle management and combat must be added cultural awareness and historical knowledge, as well as a firm foundation of ethical understanding. Leaders must be able to lead, but they must also be ready to liaise, persuade and cooperate, however alien the protagonist or strange the environment.

**General David Hurley, AC, DSC
Chief of the Defence Force, 2011–14**

Whether during peace or on operations, a commander, by force of personality, leadership style, command presence and general behaviour, has a considerable influence on the morale, sense of direction and performance of their staff and subordinate commanders. Thus, it is a commander's responsibility to create and sustain an effective command climate.

This command climate must encourage subordinate commanders at all levels to think independently and take the initiative. Subordinates expect commanders to keep them informed and, when possible, to explain reasons for instructions. Commanders need to work hard at building relationships based on mutual respect and open communication. This fosters a common understanding, a sense of involvement in decision-making and a shared commitment.

³ Major General Jim Molan, *Operations in the Land of Two Rivers*, Command Papers 6/2005, Canberra: Centre for Defence Leadership and Ethics.

Measuring the command climate

The ADF uses a range of tools to measure the command climate of units. One of these is the Profile of Unit Leadership, Satisfaction and Effectiveness (PULSE). PULSE is a unit climate survey specifically designed for military units in Australia. It is grounded in research literature on organisational climate and military unit effectiveness and has evolved from collaborative work between Canadian and Australian Defence researchers in psychology.

PULSE provides commanders with a measure of the climate within their organisation. PULSE is administered through a questionnaire that addresses a range of issues related to the human component of military capability, including the core dimensions of leadership, teamwork, job satisfaction, work motivation, satisfaction with communication, and job stressors.

The theoretical model of PULSE proposes that there are two basic sets of forces acting on an individual in an organisational setting (in a military context).

- The first force, Job Demands—such as work overload, high tempo, poor conditions, role conflict and harassment—can put the individual under pressure and may have a negative effect on the physical and mental health of individuals.
- The second set of forces, Job Resources, are factors within the workplace that help an employee deal successfully with job demands and develop into a more capable employee. Examples include confidence in leadership, organisational support, a sense of autonomy, a sense of being treated fairly, and satisfaction with communication across the unit. Job resources help the individual cope with the pressure of job demands and bolster resilience.

PULSE is designed to inform commanders of perceived personnel strengths and weaknesses, and to provide a framework for future decision-making regarding the management of the unit. In this way, PULSE can enable commanders to assess a unit's current command climate and, where necessary, to chart a course towards improvement.

Chapter 4 – Command of the Australian Defence Force

Executive summary

- Three levels are used to describe the differing roles and functions of command: these are known as the strategic, operational and tactical levels. In practice, matching command authorities to each level is not straightforward due to their overlapping nature.
- The strategic level is concerned with the coordination and direction of national power to achieve national objectives. It is subdivided into the national strategic and military strategic levels. At the national strategic level, the Australian Government, through the Minister for Defence, provides direction to the Chief of the Defence Force and the Secretary of Defence.
- Command at the military strategic level is concerned with organising and applying military power to achieve national strategic objectives. The Chief of the Defence Force has full command of the Australian Defence Force.
- Command at the operational level is concerned with planning and executing campaigns and operations to support military strategic objectives.
- Command at the tactical level is concerned with planning and conducting military tasks and actions to achieve operational objectives.

Introduction

Command and control (C2) doctrine in the Australian Defence Force (ADF) is applied at three levels: strategic (sub-divided into national strategic and military strategic), operational and tactical. These levels provide a framework for the C2 of campaigns and operations, and for

the analysis of politico-military activity conducted before, during and after a campaign or operation.

The ADF's command system is derived from law, directives and convention and leads to a culture of civilian control of the military. Under the Defence Act 1903 the Minister for Defence (MINDEF), who is also a member of Cabinet, has general control and administration of the Defence Force. In performing and exercising functions and powers under the Defence Act 1903 Part II, the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) and Secretary of Defence (SECDEF) must comply with directions of MINDEF.

CDF commands the ADF while Service Chiefs exercise service command of their respective Services (see Chapter 5). When directed by MINDEF and Cabinet, CDF's command includes direct authority for operations. In practice, Chief of Joint Operations (CJOPS) typically exercises theatre command at the operational level on behalf of CDF. Tactical-level commanders are appointed to lead joint task forces (JTF) or force elements such as task groups and task units to achieve assigned missions. These key appointments form the ADF's command chain, and ensure a coherent link between strategic aims and tactical action.

The strategic, operational and tactical levels

Levels of command

An understanding of the strategic, operational and tactical levels—and their limitations—is vital to a commander's grasp of the application of military force.

Strategic level. The strategic level is concerned with the coordination and direction of national power to secure national objectives. The strategic level includes:

- **National strategic.** The national strategic level is concerned with the broad political dimension of national activities, both domestically and internationally, and is the exclusive province of Government. Cabinet, which is advised by a variety of departments and agencies, provides national strategic objectives and overall direction to government agencies.

National government, military and industrial resources are mobilised at this level.

- **Military strategic.** The military strategic level plans and directs military campaigns and operations to meet national strategic objectives.

Operational level. At the operational level, campaigns and operations are planned and conducted to achieve strategic objectives. This level is primarily the responsibility of a theatre commander (usually CJOPS, see Chapter 5). The focus of command at the operational level is on forming joint forces, deploying them into areas of operations, monitoring and controlling operations, and sustaining them logistically.

Historical example

Operation AUGURY–Philippines 2017

As the military strategic planning guidance for Operation AUGURY–PHILIPPINES was developed within the Australian Government in 2017, staff officers from Military Strategic Commitments and Headquarters Joint Operations Command drafted the military strategic objectives for CDF’s approval prior to inclusion in the Cabinet Submission for Government consideration. This example demonstrates the close link required between the strategic and operational levels, and helps to ensure strategic direction can be implemented with the means available.

Tactical level. Most JTF and their commanders act at the tactical level. At this level, tasks are planned and conducted to achieve operational objectives through manoeuvre and the generation of lethal and non-lethal effects.

Although these levels of command were originally developed with war fighting in mind, they can be applied to all military activities (see [Australian Defence Force – Philosophical – 3 \(ADF-P-3\) Campaigns and Operations](#)). As shown in Figure 4.1, the levels of command are linked and interdependent, and distinctions between levels can be imprecise.




Figure 4.1: The strategic, operational and tactical levels and corresponding command arrangements

The national strategic level

The national strategic level in Australia is established through constitutional arrangements, conventions, law and a culture that gives effect to civilian control of defence and the military. The key bodies and appointments at the national strategic level include Cabinet and related committees, and the Minister of Defence.

Civil control of defence activities

Defence activities are governed by the principle of civil control, which is established in the legal and constitutional framework governing Australia, and given effect through the roles of Parliament and the Government.

Legal and Constitutional basis. Section 68 of the Constitution states 'the command in chief of the naval and military forces of the Commonwealth is vested in the Governor-General as the Queen's representative'. The Governor-General acts upon the advice of

Ministers (who form the Cabinet) and command of the ADF is exercised by CDF. Committing Australian forces to operations is therefore a decision of the Australian Government, led by the Prime Minister and supported by Cabinet.⁴ In short, the ADF is commanded by CDF and directed by the Government of the day.

Parliament and the Government. The constitutional authority for setting strategic and defence policy is established in Section 51 of the Constitution. This means the Australian Parliament can enact laws concerning national security agencies, while direction to those agencies is provided by the Government. In practical terms, the authority to direct the ADF and associated entities such as the relevant intelligence agencies, is exercised by the Cabinet, the National Security Committee of Cabinet (NSC) and MINDEF. Cabinet and NSC mechanisms ensure that decisions to deploy the ADF reflect a whole-of-government approach.



Figure 4.2: The Australian Government identifies the national strategic objectives that guide Australia's military strategy

⁴ *Defence Act 1903*, Part IIIAAA provides a specific process for calling out the ADF to protect Commonwealth interests and states and self-governing territories against domestic violence.

Cabinet and the Minister for Defence

The Cabinet, which exists by convention, is composed of the Government's most senior Ministers. Cabinet is appointed by the Governor-General on the advice of the Prime Minister. Cabinet makes the decision to commit the ADF to operations, as well as making policy decisions that influence military operations in other ways. For example, Cabinet decisions to regulate aspects of the national economy may have military implications. Cabinet also makes decisions about the resources available for military forces through the budget. The Cabinet delegates many aspects relating to the strategic direction of operations to the NSC, and to MINDEF, who is a member of Cabinet and responsible for the general control and administration of the ADF (under the *Defence Act 1903*).

Within the remit given by the Cabinet, the NSC directs national strategy and provides coherence to policy, including its military and non-military aspects. The NSC usually comprises the Prime Minister (Chair), Deputy Prime Minister, MINDEF, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Treasurer, Attorney-General and Minister for Home Affairs. Additional members may be coopted permanently or as required, or appointed to serve on the NSC at the discretion of the Prime Minister. SECDEF and CDF are permanent invitees to the NSC and provide subject matter expertise as required. Other Defence officials may be invited for specific submissions.

The NSC's broad responsibilities in regards to the national strategic direction of the ADF include:

- recommending to Cabinet (or determining) the political objectives to be achieved, and monitoring progress towards their achievement
- stipulating and monitoring limitations and conditions to be imposed on military activity, including circumstances in which military activity should cease.

The Secretaries Committee on National Security

The Secretaries Committee on National Security (SCNS) supports the NSC. The role of SCNS is to ensure that whole-of-government implications of policy submissions are considered, facts are agreed,

and differences at the officials' level are resolved as far as possible before being considered by the NSC. Membership of the SCNS consists of the Secretaries of several government departments and agencies with responsibilities for Australia's security, including SECDEF and CDF.

The military strategic level

The ADF command structure begins at the military strategic level and continues through to the tactical level. Command arrangements at each level reflect the distribution of responsibilities for planning and directing resources for campaigns, operations, combined and joint exercises, and other directed activities. The ADF command structure therefore:

- facilitates the efficient and effective employment of capabilities and resources to execute Government direction
- enables commanders at all levels to achieve their mission and be accountable for their actions
- adapts to any campaign or operation.

Military strategic command, policy and administration

Command at the military strategic level is legitimate only when it is exercised in response to lawful direction from the Government. Defence and the ADF will lose the confidence of the Government and the people if it fails to act legitimately and in accordance with direction.

The Defence Act 1903 was amended by the *Defence Legislation Amendment (First Principles) Act 2015*. The 2015 legislation has determined the command structure of the ADF to be as follows:

- CDF exercises full command of the ADF
- Vice Chief of the Defence Force (VCDF) assists the CDF in the command of the ADF, and must act as CDF during any absence or where the CDF role is vacant
- Service Chiefs are explicitly subject to direction by CDF

- the dual leadership system of Defence and the ADF is retained.

The high-level architecture of Defence's command and management system reflects policy direction from Government that includes the Defence White Paper, the Integrated Investment Program, the Defence Industry Policy Statement, the First Principles Review and the Defence budget.

At the military strategic level, Defence develops and implements plans to give military substance and effect to Government guidance. These plans include the Defence Planning Guidance incorporating Australia's Military Strategy.

Under the *Defence Act 1903*, CDF and SECDEF jointly administer Defence, except with respect to matters relating to command of the ADF and any other matters prescribed by MINDEF. This joint administration is commonly known as the diarchy.

The diarchy is a governance structure unique in the Commonwealth public service. It reflects the amalgamation into one Defence organisation what were previously discrete entities. Since the mid-1990s, respective MINDEF have usually issued a joint ministerial directive to CDF and SECDEF. Recent directives have unambiguously established MINDEF as the **customer for**, and **owner of**, outputs delivered by CDF and SECDEF. Such directives detail the respective roles, responsibilities and accountabilities of CDF and SECDEF, ministerial expectations, and implementation directions.

CDF is supported by officers including the VCDF, Service Chiefs, CJOPS and Chief of Joint Capabilities (CJC). CDF and SECDEF jointly manage their responsibilities through senior Defence committees that provide the primary decision-making committees in the Department of Defence and ADF.

Chief of the Defence Force

In addition to exercising full command of the ADF and being responsible for delivering capability outcomes, CDF is the principal military adviser to MINDEF. In this role, CDF is responsible for:

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- advising Government on the deployment of the ADF to achieve Government objectives, including identifying strategic objectives, assessing their feasibility and identifying the desired strategic end state
- planning and executing military operations, including establishing the command organisation specific to an operation and approving the operational-level commander's objectives and concept of operations
- assigning command authorities to subordinates, including the Service Chiefs and joint group commanders (usually through a charter letter outlining responsibilities and delegations)
- directing forces and resources to be assigned (including with regard to multinational partner capabilities and needs)
- employing the ADF to enhance national strategic interests, alliance relationships and regional security
- preparing forces for operations consistent with Government requirements
- preparing military policy and plans
- maintaining stewardship of the military workforce
- providing operational logistics
- managing military information and communications technology.

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Figure 4.3: Australian Defence Force changing of command ceremony, July 2014

Secretary of Defence

SECDEF is the principal civilian adviser to MINDEF and carries out the functions of a departmental head. In that context, SECDEF exercises statutory responsibilities under the *Public Service Act 1999* and responsibilities under the *Public Governance Performance and Accountability Act 2013* (PGPA Act) in relation to the efficient, effective and ethical use of resources. MINDEF consults SECDEF for advice on departmental issues and the proper use of resources in Defence.

Under the PGPA Act, SECDEF is the accountable authority for the Department (including the ADF), and associated regulations and Chief Executive Instructions. ADF members are officials of the Department of Defence for the purposes of the PGPA Act and are required to comply with its requirements.

Vice Chief of the Defence Force

VCDF is appointed by the Governor-General in accordance with Section 12(2) of the Defence Act 1903. VCDF is the military deputy to CDF and acts as CDF in the CDF's absence. VCDF's day-to-day role is to assist CDF with the command and administration of the ADF. VCDF is the Joint Force Authority for the ADF and leads as the primary integrator of military forces. VCDF advises CDF on Defence preparedness, and on contemporary and future military strategies. VCDF is also the chair of the Investment Committee (see below). VCDF exercises joint command (see Chapter 5) of the VCDF Executive.

Service Chiefs

The three Service Chiefs are Chief of Navy, Chief of Army and Chief of Air Force. Each is accountable to CDF, receive separate charters from CDF, and have service command of their respective Services and assigned elements.

As capability managers, the Service Chiefs raise, train and sustain their Service to deliver Service capabilities, including combat-ready forces. The Service Chiefs provide CDF advice on the present and future force. They may advise ministers in matters relating to their responsibilities.

Chief of Joint Operations

CJOPS exercises joint command of Joint Operations Command (JOC) and direct command units. When delegated by CDF, CJOPS has theatre command of assigned forces for planning and conducting campaigns, operations, joint exercises and other activities. CJOPS may appoint commanders and delegate command within assigned forces.

CJOPS is a principal adviser to CDF at the military strategic level for operations. CDF retains the right to command operations or assign theatre command to any ADF officer, although in practice CJOPS usually exercises theatre command of assigned forces for operations, joint exercises and activities on behalf of CDF (see Chapter 5).

Chief of Joint Capabilities

CJC exercises joint command of Joint Capabilities Group, and is responsible to CDF for the provision of joint health, logistics, information warfare, reserve and cadet policy, joint military police, education and training, and other functions as directed. CJC also manages agreed joint projects, and their sustainment, to support joint capability requirements.

Senior Defence Committees

CDF's command of the ADF is supported by senior Defence committees. The Defence Committee, of which CDF is a member, is pre-eminent. It is supported by an Enterprise Business Committee (EBC) and an Investment Committee (IC). CDF obtains military advice through the Chiefs of Service Committee and Strategic Command Group. In addition, the Strategic Policy Committee may make decisions that influence operations or related activities such as international engagement.

Defence Committee. The Defence Committee is the primary decision-making committee in Defence. It comprises SECDEF as Chair, CDF, VCDF, the Associate Secretary, Deputy Secretary Strategic Policy and Intelligence (DEPSEC SP&I) and Chief Finance Officer. In the absence of SECDEF, CDF assumes the chair. The committee is responsible for setting top-level organisational goals and driving delivery of the Department's commitments to Government and the community. It has a focus is on major capability and resource trade-offs, and the shared accountabilities which include:

- integration of strategic and policy advice to Government, including bi-annual assurance to the Defence Ministers that strategy, capability and resources are aligned
- setting and monitoring top-level resource allocations, including the appropriate balance of resources between capital, operating and personnel costs
- approval of plans and scrutiny of performance against those plans, including the Corporate Plan, the associated Annual Plan and the Investment Plan as recommended by the respective committees

- endorsement of the investment portfolio and capability proposals recommended by the Investment Committee
- consideration of significant risks in relation to the Defence enterprise escalated by the EBC and Investment Committee.

Enterprise Business Committee. The EBC is a subsidiary committee of the Defence Committee. It is responsible for the effective running of Defence. The EBC's remit includes corporate planning, performance monitoring and reporting, enterprise risk management, information management, and service delivery reform. It is chaired by the Associate Secretary; the alternative chair is VCDF. The decisions of the committee are binding across Defence.

Investment Committee. Chaired by VCDF, the Investment Committee is responsible for bringing the future force and supporting enablers into being. It ensures proposals are consistent with strategic guidance, integrated and interoperable, affordable, tailored and technically and commercially feasible. Investment Committee outcomes are a standing item at the Defence Committee, and all decisions of the Investment Committee are binding across Defence.

Chiefs of Service Committee. The Chiefs of Service Committee is responsible for exercising military control over issues affecting the design, generation, operational concepts, preparedness and management of ADF capabilities to achieve Government objectives. It provides CDF with advice on the following:

- preparedness, including joint collective training
- current requirements for enabling functions
- ADF-specific policy
- the ADF workforce framework, including employment frameworks, diversity and joint force establishments
- ADF conditions of service
- stewardship of the military workforce.

The COSC permanent members comprise CDF (Chairman), SECDEF, VCDF, Service Chiefs, CJOPS and CJC. Permanently invited members are the Associate Secretary, DEPSEC SP&I, Deputy Secretary Defence

People, Head Force Design, Head Force Integration and Gender Adviser to CDF. The chiefs of staff to CDF, SECDEF and VCDF are nominated as advisers to COSC. Only CDF may vary the composition of the committee.

Strategic Policy Committee. The Strategic Policy Committee is chaired by SECDEF. It is responsible for exercising strategic guidance for major capability decisions, development of Cabinet submissions on major policy issues, Defence policy for major initiatives or international engagements, and consideration of Defence's position for significant international dialogues.

Strategic Command Group. The Strategic Command Group (SCG) is the primary advisory forum that supports CDF as commander of the ADF. It provides situational awareness of ADF operations, critical incidents and strategic matters. The CDF uses the SCG to issue direction and guidance on ADF matters, and to coordinate responses to major incidents while ensuring Groups and Services have a common understanding of issues and priorities.

Support from other sources

Other government agencies may support Defence and deployed commanders in a whole-of-government approach. This support should be coordinated at the highest practicable level. Government legislation, conventions, departmental instructions, contracts and memoranda of understanding govern the relationship between Defence and these agencies. In the case of agencies with legislative obligations, direction is conducted through the Minister responsible for that agency. In the case of contractors, supervision is the responsibility of the contracting Defence Group.

The operational level

The operational-level commander exercises command of assigned forces.⁵ This includes providing direction and resources to the forces taking military action. The focus of command at this level is on

⁵ The command and administrative authorities relevant to the operational level are described in Chapter 5.

forming the JTF, deploying the force into the area of operations, sustaining the force, allocating resources and providing guidance to best achieve strategic objectives and effects. The operational-level commander links military strategic objectives with all tactical activity in the theatre and directs military resources to achieve the end state.

In the ADF, the operational level is the primary responsibility of CJOPS, who uses operational art and campaign design (see below and [ADF-P-3 Campaigns and Operations](#) and [ADF-P-5 Planning](#)).

Definitions

Campaign design: The manner in which an operational commander expresses a vision of how the campaign may unfold and how desired objectives will be sequenced and synchronised.

Operational art: The skilful employment of military forces to attain strategic goals through the design, organisation, sequencing and direction of campaigns and major operations.

Notes:

1. Operational art translates strategic into operational and ultimately tactical actions.
2. It requires a commander to:
 - (a) identify the military conditions or end state that constitute the strategic objective
 - (b) decide the operational objectives that must be achieved to reach the desired end state
 - (c) order a sequence of actions that leads to fulfilment of the operational objectives
 - (d) apply the military resources allocated to sustain the desired sequence of actions.

ADF commanders at the operational level include:

- CJOPS
- Deputy Chief of Joint Operations (DCJOPS)
- single-Service environmental commanders, including Commander Deployable Joint Force Headquarters
- Special Operations Commander Australia (SOCAUST)
- Commander Joint Logistics (CJLOG).

Operational command by a theatre commander

Depending on the nature and scale of an operation, and by means of a charter letter or directive, the CDF will usually direct a subordinate to command operations. Within the constraints specified by CDF, this subordinate exercises theatre command over assigned forces. The theatre commander designs a campaign or operational plan, commands assigned forces and directs the major operations of a campaign.

For most operations, CDF will usually assign CJOPS as theatre commander. In addition to the command function described above, and with the support of Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQJOC), CJOPS:

- identifies Defence response options through the development of contingency and operational plans
- manages operational and HQJOC organisational risks
- develops and manages joint collective training of the ADF in accordance with CDF's annual training guidance
- certifies assigned forces as ready for operations
- conducts and evaluates activities assigned to JOC within the Program of Australian Defence Force Activities.

CJOPS also has other responsibilities, including as the ADF search and rescue authority, the coordinator for Defence Assistance to the Civil Community and Defence Force Aid to the Civil Authority, and governance coordination for Defence simulation.

Deputy Chief Joint Operations

DCJOPS is responsible for coordinating the HQ staff effort through the HQJOC Branch Heads to plan, control and coordinate campaigns, as well as joint and combined operations and exercises (see [ADF-P-5 Planning](#)).

Single-Service environmental commanders

Environmental commanders are responsible to their respective Service Chiefs for raising, training and sustaining forces under their command.

Commander Australian Fleet. Commander Australian Fleet is responsible to Chief of Navy for the force generation of naval elements for subsequent employment on operations by CJOPS. This responsibility includes group training (ie task group level) and the naval aspects of joint collective training, together with the mounting process to provide assurance that the required level of capability has been met.

Commander Forces Command. Commander Forces Command (COMD FORCOMD) is responsible to Chief of Army for generating Army force elements through a single training continuum that unifies individual and collective training. COMD FORCOMD then assigns force elements to Headquarters 1st Division (HQ 1 Div) to undertake mission-specific training, assessment and certification prior to force assignment to a theatre commander for operations.

Air Commander Australia. Air Commander Australia (ACAUST) is responsible to Chief of Air Force (CAF) for the capability management of operational forces and for the raising, training and sustainment of Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) forces. ACAUST reports directly to CAF on all aspects relating to the delivery of RAAF capability to meet CAF and CJOPS tasking.

Other joint commanders

Special Operations Commander Australia. SOCAUST commands Special Operations Command (SOCOMD), and has higher command relationships with CDF, Chief of Army and CJOPS. SOCOMD is allocated theatre command to CJOPS for Special Operations planning and conducting campaigns, operations, joint and combined exercises, and other directed activities. For domestic counterterrorism and other sensitive strategic operations, SOCAUST has a direct relationship with CDF. SOCAUST is responsible to Chief of Army for generating and preparing assigned units, and for providing a scalable headquarters (see [Australian Defence Force – Integration – 3 Special Operations](#)).

Commander Joint Logistics. CJLOG leads the Defence logistics system that provides global support to operations. In this capacity, CJLOG has operational responsibilities to CJOPS and other operational commanders for the provision of:

- logistics support to campaigns, operations, exercises and other activities
- logistics advice
- the coordination of support to operations by the enabling groups.

Joint Logistics Command (JLC) provides logistics and movement support to operations; force preparation; and raise, train and sustain activities. JLC develops tactical-level guidance, taken from HQJOC guidance, to sustain operational forces (see [ADF-P-4 Logistics](#)).

Commander 1st Division and Deployable Joint Force

Headquarters. The primary role of Commander 1st Division is to prepare and command assigned forces to meet directed operational requirements. Commander 1st Division is also Commander Deployable Joint Force Headquarters. This arrangement gives the ADF a two-star-level headquarters that can be deployed at short notice. Commander Deployable Joint Force Headquarters' key tasks include providing a scalable HQJTF to meet preparedness priorities, generating and certifying forces, and leading development of amphibious capabilities. Deployable Joint Force Headquarters is under operational control of CJOPS for operational planning (see Chapter 5).

Commander joint task force. Commander joint task force (CJTF), who may operate at the operational or tactical levels, is appointed as required to undertake planning (see [ADF-P-5 Planning](#)).

Authority for orders in the joint environment

CDF directs that any officer, warrant officer or non-commissioned officer may give lawful orders when in joint units or where joint responsibilities are held. The exercise of command power will occur primarily within existing chains of command. However, this will not prevent ADF members, regardless of their Service, exercising command to maintain safety or military discipline, or to uphold ADF values.

The tactical level

ADF force elements generally operate at the tactical level. At the tactical level, JTF commanders execute the campaign or operation plan employing subordinate force elements commensurate with the task, operation or activity. The elements of the ADF tactical command structure are described below.

Joint task forces

A JTF is established when required to coordinate force elements of two or more Services, other joint force activities, or with another government agency or a non-governmental organisation. For further details of the command and control aspects of multiagency operations see Chapter 7. The JTF is dissolved on order of the theatre commander, usually once the mission and end state have been achieved.

The composition of JTF may vary from small and specialised to very large, perhaps comprising a significant portion of the ADF. The composition of a JTF is largely determined by the mission and situation, and is outlined in the CDF order establishing the force. This order also details the broad command arrangements for the operation and assigned force elements.

Force elements are subordinate elements of a JTF and are known, in order from highest to lowest, as task groups, task units and task elements. These force elements may be single-Service tactical organisations (for example, Navy task groups or Army battle groups),

or joint forces assembled into environmental or functional components. A mixture of structures may be used (see Chapter 6).

Joint task force commanders

A CJTF is designated by CDF or CJOPS and is responsible for operations as directed. Commanders of JTFs plan and execute operations, often supported by component commanders.

The authority establishing a JTF appoints the CJTF and assigns the mission and subordinate force elements. CJTF is responsible for making recommendations to the establishing commander on the proper employment of forces to achieve the mission.

The responsibilities of a CJTF include:

- exercising C2 over assigned and attached force elements
- developing a detailed plan for approval by the establishing authority
- requesting rules of engagement to accomplish the assigned mission
- notifying the establishing authority when prepared to assume responsibility for the assigned joint force area of operations
- ensuring that the JTF operates as an effective, mutually supporting team
- using assigned or attached force elements effectively to achieve the mission
- providing guidance to force elements for the planning and conduct of operations
- monitoring the operation and keeping the superior commander informed
- coordinating with other forces and agencies not assigned or attached, including friendly forces and governments
- establishing, if necessary, a coordinating procedure for specific functions or activities among assigned, attached and supporting force elements

- establishing the succession of command within the JTF
- allocating tasks to subordinate commanders.

Task group commanders

The CJTF will usually exercise command through subordinate task group commanders, which may be a component if designated (see Chapter 6). Task group commanders are responsible for commanding their task groups (which may include land, maritime, air, special operations or logistics elements) to achieve their allocated tasks in support of CJTF's objectives.

The responsibilities of a task group commander include:

- exercising C2 of assigned, attached and supporting force elements
- coordinating with other task group commanders to ensure the effective and efficient conduct of operations
- planning and executing operations in accordance with CJTF guidance and plans
- monitoring the operation and, as required, passing information to CJTF
- ensuring administrative and logistics support for the force
- providing liaison personnel to CJTF and other task group commanders as directed.

Chapter 5 – Command and administrative authorities

Executive summary

- The Chief of the Defence Force has full command of the Australian Defence Force. Subordinate commanders exercise authority in accordance with their rank, appointment and direction under a standing or operational command authority.
- The standing command authorities are full command, service command and joint command.
- The operational command authorities are theatre command, national command, operational command, tactical command, operational control and tactical control. Commanders can also apply these command authorities (except theatre command and national command) to raise, train and sustain activities.
- Other administrative, support and coordination arrangements can supplement command authorities. These arrangements can ease the commander's span of command.
- The administrative authorities are administrative control, local administration and technical control.
- The forms of operational or administrative support are direct support and in support of.
- There are two coordination authorities: coordinating authority and direct liaison authorised.

Defining the battlespace and establishing a clear command and control system should be regarded as the very essence of effective planning at the operational level of war. All other operational functions—including manoeuvre, fires, logistics, intelligence and force protection—rely on a clear demarcation by an operational headquarters of battlespace parameters and command and control organisation.

Lieutenant Colonel Chris Field
Planning in Operation Iraqi Freedom
2003

Introduction

Commanders delegate authority so subordinate commanders can carry out their operational and administrative responsibilities. Command authorities provide a simple and consistent framework to communicate the extent of authority that a commander is delegating. Assigning a particular command authority specifies the subordinate commander's ability to assign forces, missions and tasks. It also conveys limitations on further delegation of authority. Command authorities are independent of the levels of command detailed in Chapter 4.

Various administrative authorities support the command of assigned forces. Administrative authorities define an officer's ability to give direction regarding the provision of support or the administration within a defined locality or task. This may include authority over force elements or personnel that are not within the officer's chain of command.

In the Australian Defence Force (ADF), there are two types of authorities—standing and operational. Standing authorities are enduring and continue to exist, in part, even when a commander's subordinates have been assigned to another operational commander. An instrument of appointment (or similar document) will specify a commander's standing command authority.

Operational command authorities apply only for the duration of a specified operation or activity. A commander will promulgate these command authorities in the directive or operation order (opord) applicable to the operation or exercise. Operational planners must be cognisant of the requirement to be clear about command authorities and relationships in operational documents.

Standing command authorities

Command

Command is the authority that a commander in the military Service lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command provides an officer with authority to execute their responsibilities. It allows the commander to plan and direct the effective use of available resources for assigned missions. Command authority also allows the exercise of responsibilities for the health, welfare, morale and discipline of assigned personnel.

In general, commanders may delegate aspects of their authority within the limits of legislation, defence policy and their instruments of appointment. When delegating authority, the statement of delegation must:

- be unambiguous
- clearly define the degree of authority
- clearly specify the time at which the authority becomes effective.

Standing command authorities allow the ADF to function on an enduring basis. They provide authority for the necessary activities to create and prepare the ADF for operations, while ensuring accountability for outcomes. These authorities are full command, service command and joint command.

Definitions

Full command: The statutory authority of the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF), under Section 9 of the *Defence Act 1903*, to issue orders to all members of the ADF. Notes:

1. Full command covers every aspect of military operations and administration.
2. It includes responsibility to advise the Minister for Defence on matters relating to command of the ADF.

Service command: The enduring authority given by the Chief of the Defence Force to Service Chiefs to command their services. Note: Service command does not include authority to conduct operations.

Joint command: The enduring authority given by CDF to ADF joint chiefs to command joint organisations in the ADF. Note: Joint command does not include authority to conduct operations, determine single-Service personnel policy or conduct career management.

Full command

Section 9 of the *Defence Act 1903* specifies that CDF has command of the ADF. The Vice Chief of the Defence Force (VCDF) assists the CDF to exercise command and acts as the CDF in circumstances as defined under Section 13 of the *Defence Act*. The Governor-General appoints CDF and VCDF under Section 12 of the *Defence Act*.

Full command gives the CDF complete operational and administrative authority over the ADF. Responsibilities for resource utilisation, administration, planning and control of the entire ADF are inherent in full command. No other commander has full command over ADF forces.

CDF exercises command of the ADF through Service and Joint Chiefs by assigning service command, joint command and theatre command as elements of full command. The CDF specifies the division of responsibilities and authorities in a Charter Letter to each Chief. Further assignment of command below Service and Joint Chiefs is detailed in directives, orders or instructions. CDF retains full

command of the ADF at all times, regardless of any authorities the CDF assigns to subordinate commanders.

The CDF has the authority to conduct operations when directed by the Minister for Defence (MINDEF) and Cabinet. MINDEF and/or Cabinet will also provide CDF with authority for the use of force where necessary to pursue national objectives.

Cadets. Officers, instructors and cadets from the Australian Defence Force Cadets are not members of the ADF and are not 'under command' of CDF. However, CDF directs and administers cadets. The CDF can delegate responsibilities to assist with the direction and administration of cadets to any member of the ADF.

Service command

Service command gives Service Chiefs authority to raise, train and sustain the force elements of their Service for operations, and for advising CDF on matters relating to command of force elements within their Service. It also includes authority to direct and administer cadets.

A Service Chief remains responsible for Service-specific command aspects of military personnel working within other Groups or Services at all times. Service-specific command aspects include career management and single-Service personnel policy, but does not include authority to conduct operations.

Joint command

CDF assigns joint command to VCDF, Chief of Joint Operations (CJOPS) and Chief of Joint Capabilities (CJC) to exercise command over their respective organisations. These commanders raise, train and sustain the capabilities within their organisations and advise CDF on the matters relating to their command. Joint command does not include the authority to conduct operations.

Service Chiefs retain authority for career management or single-Service personnel policy.

Exercise of command

Service or joint command includes authority over both permanent/regular and reserve personnel. A military officer derives the authority from Defence Instruction Administrative Policy to direct Australian Public Service members within their organisation.

A Service or Joint Chief can delegate any component of their authority or responsibilities to subordinate officers where consistent with higher direction. However, the Service or Joint Chief retains accountability to the CDF. Any subordinate commander may likewise further delegate their standing authorities and responsibilities within the chain of command and again remains accountable to the delegating officer and, ultimately, CDF.

Operational command authorities

Operational command authorities detail command arrangements for a specific operation, operational activity or exercise. They are effective for a specific time, task and/or function. The operational command authorities are theatre command (tcomd), national command (natcomd), operational command (opcomd), operational control (opcon), tactical command (tacomd) and tactical control (tacon). Use of these authorities is not exclusive to the conduct of operations. Except for tcomd or natcomd, commanders may also apply these command authorities to create force groupings and appoint commanders for raise, train and sustain activities.

Definitions

Theatre command: The authority given by CDF to a subordinate to command assigned forces to prepare for and conduct operations (campaigns, operations, combined and joint exercises, and other activities as directed). Note: Theatre command does not include authority to determine single-Service personnel policy or conduct career management.

National command: The authority, conferred upon an appointed Australian commander, to safeguard Australian national interests during multinational operations.

Operational command: The authority granted to a commander to specify missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to re-assign forces and to retain or delegate operational control, tactical command and/or tactical control as may be deemed necessary.

Note: It does not of itself include responsibility for administration.

Tactical command: The authority delegated to a commander to specify missions and tasks to forces under command for the accomplishment of the mission specified by higher authority.

Operational control: The authority delegated to a commander to:

- direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time or location
- deploy units concerned and retain or delegate tactical control of those units.

Note:

1. It does not include authority to allocate separate employment of components of the units concerned.
2. It does not, of itself, include responsibility for administration or logistics control.

Tactical control: The detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or manoeuvres necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.

Theatre command

Theatre command is the mechanism by which CDF can delegate authority to a subordinate officer to prepare for or conduct campaigns and operations. Theatre command force assigns elements to the nominated theatre commander. CDF is the only authority who can direct Service or Joint Chiefs to assign forces under tcomd. The appointed theatre commander cannot delegate or transfer tcomd. Orders issued by CDF will specify limits on the function and assignment of tcomd.

The CDF assigns tcomd in the following circumstances:

- **In anticipation of Government direction to conduct an operation.** Theatre command gives authority to move, equip, reorganise, train or otherwise prepare force elements for an impending operation. CDF assigns tcomd by an alert order (alerto).
- **To conduct an operation.** In this circumstance, tcomd additionally includes the authority to exercise or delegate opcomd. CDF assigns this authority in an execute order (executo).
- **To prepare force elements for joint operations.** This involves the temporary and non-operational force assignment to conduct joint exercises. CDF assigns tcomd through directives to relevant Service and Joint Chiefs in support of the CDF's Preparedness Directive.

CJOPS is the officer to whom the CDF will usually delegate tcomd over all ADF forces in a designated operational theatre. For example, CJOPS exercised tcomd over all ADF forces deployed to the Middle East Region during the last decade, regardless of their Service.

When CDF assigns forces under tcomd, the theatre commander determines the level of administrative responsibility necessary for the effective and efficient conduct of operations. The residual administrative responsibilities remain the responsibility of the Service or Joint Chiefs. Service and Joint Chiefs also retain technical control (techcon)—see later section—and authorities for single-Service personnel policy and career management. The specific division of

responsibilities between the theatre commander and Service/Joint Chiefs is not definitive. This will vary according to the nature and duration of the operation or exercise; forces assigned; location of the deployment; and the rotation plan for personnel and equipment. CDF will detail these arrangements in the relevant order and/or directive.

Depending on the size of the operation, tcomd can be a significant and complex responsibility. To alleviate this, the theatre commander usually exercises tcomd through:

- national commanders, during multinational operations
- JTF commanders
- any other commander conducting operations or activities.

Although the theatre commander can assign and task forces, they cannot delegate tcomd to a subordinate commander. They may delegate opcomd, opcon, tacomd, tacon and/or natcomd of assigned forces to subordinate commanders.

Unless otherwise directed by CDF, tcomd implies the authority to act as the Australian operational-level military point of contact in relationships with other nations' commands, Australian diplomatic missions, other Australian agencies and agencies of countries in-theatre. For example, a defined relationship exists between CDF, CJOPS and the Commander United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM). CDF deals with Commander USINDOPACOM at the strategic level as a result of the strategic responsibilities assigned to Commander USINDOPACOM by the US National Command Authority. Meanwhile, CJOPS deals with Commander USINDOPACOM at the operational level.

CDF will usually assign force elements under tcomd of CJOPS for the conduct of specified joint training activities.

National command

National command is an operational command authority, conferred upon an appointed Australian commander, to safeguard Australian national interests during multinational operations. The theatre commander may assign natcomd to any force assigned ADF officer,

through provision of a command directive and any associated executive documents.

In most circumstances, the senior Australian commander in the joint force area of operations has natcomd over deployed forces. However, all deployed ADF personnel have an innate responsibility to advise their chain of command when they become aware of a condition or action that has potential to undermine national interests. Actions such as the abuse of prisoners, contraventions of rules of engagement, or planned operations outside any national caveat are examples of matters to be reported to the national commander.

Unless specified otherwise, the theatre commander is the conduit of natcomd functions between CDF and the Australian national commander of forces assigned tcomd. For example, forces deployed to the Middle East Region in the 2000s and 2010s were under tcomd of CJOPS, who delegated natcomd to the senior deployed ADF commander (Commander Australian Contingent).

National command provides for the oversight of assigned national forces. This may include some or all of the following responsibilities:

- **Liaison.** Conduct liaison with the multinational force commander and the Australian chain of command regarding changes to operational command authority.
- **Engagement.** Engage with multinational, host-nation and other military and civil stakeholders to maintain visibility of partner planning and future intentions.
- **Oversight.** Maintain situational awareness to ensure that Australian operations remain within the envelope of Australian Government–approved policy.
- **Detention management.** Ensure that the treatment and handling of detainees apprehended by Australian forces—from point of capture through to release or sentencing—is conducted in accordance with policy and law.
- **Force communication.** Ensure access to national communication and information systems (CIS) capabilities and coordination with partner CIS services.

- **Personnel management.** Provide timely national-specific personnel and administrative advice, guidance and support to Defence personnel in the area of operations.
- **Rules of engagement.** Supervise adherence to Australian Government– authorised rules of engagement and manage requests to modify rules of engagement as appropriate to changing operational circumstances.
- **Media access.** Facilitate access to Australian forces by national or international media in a manner consistent with Australian policy.

National command does not include operational command authorities, nor does it include administrative functions. However, the theatre commander may authorise an ADF commander to exercise natcomd together with other operational command authorities and/or administrative functions concurrently. Chapter 7 provides further details on the exercise of natcomd on multinational operations.

Historical example

National command of Australian forces deployed overseas

During the Anglo-Boer War in South Africa (1899–1902), Colonial and later Australian forces were placed entirely at the disposal of the British command. That experience, together with Federation, led to an Australian determination to maintain the national identity of forces deployed overseas.

In the First World War, the Australian Imperial Force (AIF) was assigned under operational command of the Imperial General Staff but was administered by the AIF commander. The latter reported to the Australian Government and was directed to keep the force intact, uniquely Australian, and committed strategically in accordance with national direction. This set a precedent for the Second World War and subsequent deployments in Korea and South East Asia.

The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) was controlled differently, as it had been agreed at the 1911 Imperial Conference that upon a declaration of war, the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board and naval services would come under direct control of the British Admiralty. The Australian fleet would become a squadron of the Royal Navy, taking orders directly from London, or from the Royal Navy officer under whose command they were placed.

During the Second World War, the RAN was again placed under command of the Royal Navy, as well as United States Navy commanders. The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) dispatched large numbers of aircrew to Britain, the Middle East and Burma. Although there were RAAF squadrons, many individuals were absorbed into Royal Air Force units. An attempt at forming a RAAF headquarters (HQ) in Britain, as the AIF had, was ineffective. In the South-West Pacific Area, however, HQ RAAF Command maintained RAAF forces as an Australian entity.

With the increasing commitment of the ADF to United Nations and multinational operations from the 1990s and the increasing emphasis on joint command and control, it has now become standard to establish a national responsible for forces of the three Services. For the 2003 commitment to Iraq, Minister of Defence Senator Robert Hill stated:

The commander of Australian troops is Australian. Australian commanders command Australian troops in a coalition of the willing led by the United States of America (USA) would in effect be managed by the USA. So in terms of the management of the total coalition, that would be USA leadership with Australia in the loop. But decisions relating to commitment of our forces, targeting by our forces, their rules of engagement are all Australian decisions.

The delegation of operational command authorities

Commanders delegate lower-level operational command to empower subordinate commanders to employ assigned forces. The delegating commander should state the operational command authority granted to a commander with clarity and precision. The commander and subordinate commanders need a shared understanding of the command and control arrangements for the operation.

The degree of authority delegated should be sufficient to allow a commander to direct and deploy assigned forces to complete tasks without reference to a higher authority. A commander should not be assigned more forces than required or be given excessive authority over forces, as this may prevent the most efficient use of resources.

Levels of authority and responsibility may be:

- directed by common usage
- specified in detailed subordinate doctrine, alliance agreements, memorandums of agreement and memorandums of understanding
- promulgated on a case-by-case basis in documents such as directives and opords.

Table 5.1 summarises what a commander is authorised to do with assigned forces. For details of multinational operations see Chapter 7.

Transfer of authority

Commanders can delegate or transfer elements of their authority within the definition of the relevant command authority. A commander will promulgate a written mechanism, such as an opord, to specify the authorities that they are transferring to whom and the duration of the transfer. Forces are transferred using the terms 'assign' when passing from one commander to another, and 'attach' when joining a force element. The delegating commander should specify the receiving commander's responsibility for administration and logistics, as these are not inherent within the operational command authorities.

The process of transferring force elements equally applies to exercises as well as operations. Using the same process for exercises and operations provides a consistent approach and ensures clarity of command authorities for all force elements involved.

The assignment and reassignment of force elements must align with a recognised phase of an operation and balance the needs and timing imperatives of the single-Services and the theatre commander. Requirements for the handover and/or handback of force elements will vary by operation and by force elements. Precise details for each handover and/or handback of force elements are included in opords, directives and procedures.

	natcomd	tcomd	opcomd	tacomd	opcon	tacon
Safeguard Australian national interests	Yes	Yes ¹	Yes ¹	Yes ¹	Yes ¹	Yes ¹
Specify missions	No	Yes ²	Yes	Yes ³	No	No
Specify tasks	No	Yes	Yes	Yes ³	No	No
Direct forces for specific mission/task	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes (local direction)
Deploy force elements	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Allocate separate employment of force elements	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Administrative responsibility	No	As specified	If specified	If specified	If specified	If specified
Further delegate operational authorities	No ⁴	natcomd ⁴ opcomd tacomd opcon tacon	opcomd ⁵ tacomd opcon tacon	tacomd tacon	opcon tacon	tacon

Notes:

1. In support of the national commander
2. Aligned to the responsibilities given by the CDF
3. To accord with the mission given by the higher authority
4. Natcomd may not be delegated
5. May only delegate opcomd where specified by higher commander

Table 5.1: Australian Defence Force operational command authorities

Operational command

Operational command is the highest degree of operational authority. It provides a commander with the authority to task assets over the range of their capabilities without further approval from a higher commander.

In the context of joint operations, CDF may exercise or assign opcomd after direction from Government. If assigning opcomd, CDF will usually assign force elements under opcomd of a theatre commander by an executo. The theatre commander may exercise opcomd directly or delegate it to a force-assigned subordinate—usually by an operational instruction or directive. If electing to delegate, the theatre commander will usually delegate opcomd for the duration of an operation.

Service or Joint Chiefs may also delegate opcomd to subordinates to conduct raise, train and sustain activities.

Only one commander exercises opcomd of assigned forces. Defence will not normally assign opcomd of ADF force elements to a non-ADF commander.

A commander assigned opcomd may:

- specify missions and tasks
- reassign them
- allocate separate employment of force element components
- delegate tacomd, opcon or tacon to a subordinate commander
- specify the requirements for reception, staging, onward movement and integration of forces moving into their operational area
- specify reputation management requirements with their operational area, including the conduct of military public affairs activities.

Operational command does not of itself include responsibility for administration or logistics support. However, commanders holding

opcomd clearly require and invariably hold a level of authority and a level of responsibility for both administration and logistics support, and for other aspects of operational importance. Levels of authority and responsibility vary according to environment, Service, country and circumstances.

A commander assigned forces under opcomd cannot delegate opcomd to a subordinate commander unless specified. Under opcomd, a commander may delegate lower levels of command (tacomd, opcon or tacon) to subordinate commanders.

Tactical command

Tactical command is commonly used below opcomd in single-Service environments. Tactical command allows a commander freedom to task forces and to group and regroup forces as required.

A commander assigned tacomd of forces may:

- specify missions and tasks provided they accord with the mission given by higher authority
- allocate separate employment of components of force elements involved
- delegate tacomd or tacon to a subordinate commander.

Tactical command is normally the highest operational authority that can be assigned to a non-ADF commander over ADF force elements in multinational operations.

Operational control

Operational control is similar to tacomd, except that it does not authorise a commander to specify missions and tasks, or to group and regroup forces. Multinational commanders may be given opcon of ADF force elements.

A commander assigned opcon of forces may:

- direct assigned or attached forces, limited by function, time or location
- delegate opcon or tacon to a subordinate commander.

Tactical control

Tactical control gives a commander the authority to locally direct a force element. Normally, tacon is not a pre-designated operational authority assigned at the operational level. Rather, it is intended as short-term authority delegated by a local tactical commander for the immediate conduct of tactical activity.

A commander delegated tacon may:

- direct force elements in manoeuvres to accomplish missions or tasks
- delegate tacon to another commander.

A commander assigned tacon of force elements must use those force elements to accomplish the task(s) assigned by a higher commander. A commander cannot assign new missions or tasks to force elements under their tacon.

Administrative authorities

Administrative authorities determine which commander is responsible for addressing the administrative aspects of command. Administrative authorities comprise administrative control and local administration.

Definitions

Administrative control: Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organisations in respect to administrative matters such as personnel management, supply services and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organisations.

Local administration: Direction or exercise of administration controlled by a local commander and related specifically to the troops or to the operation in the commander's area.

Note: Local administration is a sub set of administrative control.

Delegation of administrative authorities

Within service command, Service Chiefs retain overall administrative authority for their respective Services, which they exercise through the chain of command. In the case of force elements assigned under tcomd arrangements, Service Chiefs exercise their administrative responsibilities through the theatre commander and the operational chain of command. Therefore, the assignment of force elements under tcomd includes the administrative control of assigned forces, unless otherwise specified.

Theatre command also authorises the theatre commander to coordinate with subordinate commanders and to approve any joint aspects of administration and support necessary to the conduct of missions and tasks. Theatre command provides the authority to maintain discipline as a function of command. This includes, for example, appointment of commanding officers for discipline purposes in accordance with any powers or delegations that the theatre commander holds under *Defence Force Discipline Act 1982*.

In accordance with any command or support relationships established by CDF (usually in a warning order, alert or executo), tcomd includes the authority to direct or request Commander Joint Logistics or other enabling force elements from other Groups or Services to provide support into or within a theatre of operations. Theatre command also includes the authority for the theatre commander, through Service and Joint Chiefs, to assign priorities to other Defence supporting organisations for the support of

operations. Theatre command provides the administrative authority to use the resources of all forces assigned as necessary to accomplish missions and tasks.

When assigning force elements under opcomd and tacomd, a delegating commander must clearly specify the level of administrative support required and provided. In some cases, the nature and/or location of the tasking of assigned force elements may preclude the use of established procedures for providing support. In these cases, a commander may concurrently assign force elements to one commander under an operational command authority, and to another officer under an administrative authority.

Administrative control

Administrative control is the authority given to a headquarters to address the administrative needs of subordinate force elements. These needs include personnel management, supply of equipment and other stores, and other administrative matters that are not included in the operational missions of the subordinate force elements.

For example, the local combat support unit at an air base may have administrative control of RAAF lodger force elements. In this case, the local combat support unit is responsible for all administrative matters relating to the lodger unit, including such things as housing and feeding its members, and maintaining its vehicle fleet. Specific authorities for administrative control will be as detailed by the delegating commander in an opord or other executive document.

Local administration

Local administration is the authority for a commander to issue direction to force elements within their local area for specified matters not related to their primary operational tasking. The commander delegating local administration may specify these responsibilities in the opord pertaining to each operation. Local administration may involve:

- discipline and administrative sanctions

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- provision of services and administration such as accommodation, water, light, power, care and wellbeing of personnel (including rationing, hygiene and sanitation), fire protection, maintenance of barracks and camps, and supervision of stores accounting and internal checking
- allocation of ranges, training areas and recreation facilities
- local movement of personnel and materiel
- local road traffic control and movement
- security, including preventative measures against vandalism and theft
- honours and awards
- supervision and maintenance of safety
- allocation of any local pool of labour and unit transport
- allocation of local duties.

For example, a commander may temporarily assign an infantry battalion under local administration of a RAAF air base commander. In this case, the air base commander issues direction to the infantry battalion for local administrative issues for the duration of its time in location only. Other administrative issues, such as those requiring action over a longer term than the duration of the battalion's stay at the RAAF base, would remain the responsibility of the headquarters assigned administrative control of the infantry battalion.

Technical control

Technical control advice is from a designated authority appointed to oversee the efficient use of a capability, often across command boundaries. For an operational commander, techcon advice will relate to the employment of capabilities so that they are used within their operating parameters.

A commander may not modify techcon advice received from a delegated authority. However, the commander may reject this advice in part or in whole in consideration of operational factors. The commander is to document the reasons for rejecting the advice and is accountable for the consequences of rejecting the advice. Such

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consequences may include loss of services.

Definition

Technical control: The provision of specialist and technical advice by designated authorities for the management and operation of forces.

Notes:

1. Capability managers exercise techcon and will not normally delegate it. Technical control advice is not included in a delegation of theatre command.
2. Capability managers exercise techcon through advice to the theatre commander for assigned forces.
3. Techcon advice may not be altered but may be rejected in part or in total by a commander in consideration of operational factors and within their span of command.
4. A commander is accountable for the consequences of rejecting the advice.

Technical control, like other authorities, must be assigned. A designated authority with techcon can still offer general advice; it does not exclusively offer only techcon advice. Given the important distinction between the two, a designated authority should clearly state whether the advice it is offering is techcon advice or general advice.

A commander can authorise a delegate to exercise techcon within that commander's authority. If authorised, techcon may be further delegated. Care should be taken with any further delegation of techcon because it is authorising personnel further down the command chain to offer techcon advice to the commander upon which he or she may rely for mission success, which the commander must take into consideration and document reasons for the rejection of technical advice.

The exercising of techcon implies the designated authority has an understanding of the employment of that capability within the commander's environment. The designated authority is likely to rely on reports and returns from within the commander's force elements to have the comprehensive understanding on which advice can be offered. The designated authority can request reports and returns

from force elements not under the designated authorities command authority, but requires the commander to order subordinates to provide reports and returns if it is to be mandatory.

A designated authority may provide technical advice direct to a commander or pass it to the staff for forwarding to the commander. The latter allows the commander's staff to relate the advice to the operational situation in briefing the commander. The staff are to make it clear when the advice is techcon advice and not general advice.

In some circumstances, staff may be able to accommodate the techcon without having to first brief the commander. This would occur when the advice relates to equipment settings for which there is no effect on a commander's plan.

Support arrangements

Support arrangements allow a commander to receive operational or administrative support from force elements that are not under their operational or administrative authority. The two support arrangements used within the ADF are direct support and in support of.

Definitions

Direct support: The support provided by a unit not attached to or under the command of the supported unit of formation, but required to give priority to the support required by that unit or formation.

In support of: Assisting another formation, unit or organisation while remaining under the initial command.

Direct support

Under direct support arrangements, a supporting force element receives support requests directly from the supported force. The supporting element also normally establishes liaison and

communications with, and provides advice to, the supported element.

A force element in direct support has no command relationship with the supported force element. Thus, while tasked in direct support, the force remains under command of its parent formation and may only withdraw support with the agreement of the supported force or direction from a superior authority. Planning and tasking authority remains with the supporting force's parent command but usually in collaboration with the supported force.

A force element cannot provide the same resource in direct support of more than one supported commander. However, they may be concurrently 'in support of' other force elements.

Examples of direct support are:

- gunships from an Army aviation regiment may be in direct support of a brigade for a specific task, such as a river crossing
- a maritime patrol aircraft may be tasked in direct support of a maritime task group for anti-surface warfare or anti-submarine warfare activities.

In support of

In support of is the lowest level of control and does not confer on the supported force element any responsibility or authority for administration or movement of the supporting force element. When in support of multiple force elements, the commander of the supporting force element prioritises support requests to best achieve their higher commander's intent. For example, a joint commander may assign a naval surface combatant in support of an Army force element for naval gunfire support during an assault.

Supported and supporting commanders

Prioritisation and coordination of force elements across a variety of tasks is essential. A useful way for a superior commander to do this is by assigning supported or supporting commanders and designating

the main effort in each phase of an operation. This is not a command status. More detail and explanation is included in Chapter 6.

Coordination authorities

Coordination authorities are mechanisms to achieve coordination between countries, organisations or force elements that do not share a common chain of command. The two coordination authorities are coordinating authority and direct liaison authorised.

Definitions

Coordinating authority: The authority granted to a commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more countries or commands, or two or more Services or two or more forces of the same Service.

Notes:

1. The commander has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved or their representatives, but does not have the authority to compel agreement.
2. In case of disagreement between the agencies involved, the commander should attempt to obtain essential agreement by discussion.
3. In the event essential agreement cannot be obtained the matter will be referred to the appropriate authority.

Direct liaison authorised: That authority granted by a commander (any level) to a subordinate to directly consult or coordinate an action with a command or agency within or outside of the granting command.

Notes:

1. Direct liaison authorised is more applicable to planning than operations and always carries with it the requirement of keeping the commander granting direct liaison authorised informed.
2. Direct liaison authorised is a coordination relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised.

Coordinating authority

A commander with coordinating authority is authorised to coordinate planning by two or more countries, organisations or force elements. This enables the parties involved to achieve complementary objectives by collaborating on specific functions or activities. A commander with coordinating authority has the authority to require consultation between the parties but cannot compel them to agree. In case of disagreement between the agencies involved, the commander should attempt to obtain essential agreement by discussion. If the actors cannot agree, the commander with coordinating authority will refer the issues to their higher authority.

Direct liaison authorised

Direct liaison authorised is that authority granted by a commander to a subordinate to consult directly or to coordinate an action with an element within or outside the granting command.

Direct liaison authorised is more applicable to planning than operations and always carries with it the requirement of keeping informed the commander granting direct liaison authorised. Direct liaison authorised is a coordination relationship; it does not provide command authority.

Historical example

Australian command arrangements in Uruzgan Province, Afghanistan, 2006–2010

Contemporary military operations can require complicated arrangements that use multiple command authorities. Command arrangements for various elements of Joint Task Force 633 (JTF633) in Uruzgan province provide an example.

Australia took a decision not to command any of the International Security Assistance Force's (ISAF) regional commands. Therefore, when the Reconstruction Task Force (RTF) first deployed to Uruzgan in August 2006, it operated under opcon of the Dutch-led Task Force Uruzgan. This arrangement was maintained for the RTF's successor deployments—the Mentoring and Reconstruction Task Force and the Mentoring Task Force—until the Dutch forces relinquished command in August 2010. Commander JTF633 retained natcomd and did on occasion veto the tactical employment of Australian forces where such employment may have been contrary to Australian interests. Good working relations and mutual understanding between Australian and Dutch commanders— particularly regarding respective national caveats— meant this natcomd power was rarely required.



Commander Australian 1st Reconstruction Task Force (part of JTF633) and Dutch Task Force Uruzgan commander in front of a map showing Uruzgan Province, 2007

The Australian Special Operations Task Group (SOTG) deployed to Uruzgan from 2007, which further complicated ADF command and control. SOTG's intended primary mission was to operate in direct support of ISAF elements in Uruzgan, but it worked under opcon of ISAF special operations forces. SOTG was also able—where approved via natcomd—to operate beyond Uruzgan's boundaries.

This combination of command arrangements was complicated. Its implementation depended on goodwill and understanding at all levels. Commanders, especially in multinational settings, need to be pragmatic and adaptable given that the national strategic imperatives of participating nations will often shape command arrangements.

Chapter 6 – Methods of command

Executive summary

- The Australian Defence Force recognises two methods for command and control of joint operations: the direct method and the component method.
- The direct method is useful for campaigns and operations of limited scale and intensity. In this method, task groups, units or elements report directly to the commander joint task force.
- With the component method, subordinate forces are grouped along domain, functional or single-Service lines and have a substantial headquarters to manage their actions. The component method of command may be better suited for campaigns and operations of greater scale and intensity.

Introduction

The Australian Defence Force (ADF) recognises two methods of command and control (C2) of a joint task force (JTF): the direct method and the component method. Selection of the most appropriate C2 method, including joint staff structure, should be guided by the principles of command and should consider the scale and intensity of the campaign or operation.

The direct method

A commander joint task force (CJTF) may exercise command authority directly over assigned forces. The direct method (Figure 6.1) is normally used when the knowledge and capacity of the commander and staff are such that they can employ the capabilities of assigned forces effectively, and when the scale and intensity of the operation is limited. When using the direct method of command, the

headquarters must be appropriately staffed and equipped for the greater span of command.




Figure 6.1: The direct method of command

Historical example

The direct method of command: Operation VIC FIRES ASSIST

Beginning on 7 February 2009, under conditions of extreme heat and wind, up to 400 bushfires swept through the north-east of the state of Victoria. The speed and ferocity with which the fires spread caused a major disaster, responsible for 173 deaths and for the destruction of over 2,000 houses and 3,500 other structures.

On the same day, the Victorian Emergency Management Authority requested Defence Assistance to the Civil Community (DACC). At 2153 h, Chief Joint Operations issued the task order establishing Joint Task Force 662 and Operation VIC FIRES ASSIST. Between 8 February and 14 March, over 850 Defence personnel were deployed on this operation at any one time. Their tasks included providing logistics support, rapid impact assessments, hazardous risk search and fire mapping, and conducting initial environmental damage assessments.



Personnel deployed on Operation VIC FIRES ASSIST conducting a rapid impact assessment

Throughout Operation VIC FIRES ASSIST, JTF 662 used the direct method of command. Under this arrangement, the commanders of contributing unit force elements reported directly to Commander

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JTF 662, Brigadier Michael Arnold. This command arrangement was flexible and allowed for different force elements to be easily added to or removed from the JTF as the operation transitioned from the initial response to the recovery phase.

The component method

When the scale and intensity of the operation is great, the span of command may become too broad to effectively use the direct method of command. An alternative is to divide the force into components, each with its own commander who issues orders consistent with the broad direction of the CJTF. This is known as the component method of command.

Component commanders are usually, though not always, collocated with the CJTF. They require separate staff support and command facilities (large or small, collocated or separate) depending on the operation.

Components may be grouped along domain or single-Service lines, or they may comprise functional groupings of formations, units, sub-units or elements from more than one Service under appropriate states of command (see Chapter 5). An example of the latter is the assignment of tactical fighter aircraft under tactical control (tacon) of a maritime component commander for maritime air defence.

The component method of command is shown in Figure 6.2. The five types of component commanders shown in this figure indicate one possible division between components. In this division, three components (maritime, land and air) are environmentally determined. These may potentially be either single Service or functional in composition. The other two components (special operations and logistics) are functional and joint. Although this division between components is typical (as it aligns with existing ADF command arrangements), it is not universal (see Chapter 4). The division between components, and the assignment of forces to each, is the responsibility of CJTF.

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


Figure 6.2: The component method of command

Roles of component commanders

A CJTF will usually delegate force elements to a component commander under either tactical command (tacomd), operational control (opcon) or tacon arrangements. Component commanders are responsible for C2 of the forces within their component. This includes issuing orders and providing guidance consistent with the broad objectives of CJTF. Component commanders may also be called upon to advise CJTF regarding the employment of force elements within their component.

Historical example

The component method of command: Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR

Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR was the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operation conducted from March to June 2011 to enforce United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, which established a no-fly zone over Libya and an arms embargo against it and demanded an immediate cease fire between President Muammar Gaddafi's forces and rebel groups.



Figure 6.3: North Atlantic Treaty Organization area of operations during Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR

Due to the complex nature of the operation, the size of the operational area and the number of countries contributing forces, it was decided to use the component method of command for the operation. An Allied Joint Force Command (AJFC) was established in Naples, Italy, commanded by Royal Canadian Air Force Lieutenant General Charles Bouchard. Under the overall command of AJFC, two component commands were established: Allied Maritime Component Command, based in Naples and commanded by Italian Navy Vice Admiral Rinaldo Veri; and Allied Air

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Component Command, based in Izmir, Turkey, and commanded by United States Air Force Lieutenant General Ralph Jodice II.

Because of its limited mandate, ground forces were not deployed during the operation. Instead, NATO forces coordinated efforts with Libyan rebels, bringing an extra level of complexity to the operation. Despite this, the lack of NATO ground forces negated the need for a land component command, so one was not established.

Selection of method of command

Selection of the most appropriate method of command, including joint staff structure, should be guided by the principles of command, and by the scale and intensity of the campaign or operation.

Additionally, the following factors may need to be considered:

- the nature of the mission
- the size and composition of the force
- the need to maintain flexibility
- political and geographic considerations
- communications.

Smaller, less complex JTF can often be commanded without the need to create components. Joint task force headquarters staff directly controlling a force element group on behalf of a CJTF permits efficiencies in time and personnel. Examples of these types of JTF include JTF 639 for Operation RESOLUTE and JTF 635 for Operation ANODE.

For larger operations the size of the JTF and the complexity of the mission may dictate the establishment of components. An example of this type of JTF is the Australian commitment to operations in the Middle East in 2003–4. In this case, ADF elements were committed to coalition operations in the Persian Gulf, Iraq and Afghanistan and were placed under operational control of the lead coalition nation, which organised forces using the component method. An Australian national command element was also established to carry out national

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command functions determined by the Australian Government (see Chapter 7).

Joint staff structures

Both methods of command employ the common joint staff system adapted from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization joint staff system (see [Australian Defence Force – Integration – 5 Military Planning Processes](#)). When the direct method of command is selected, all staff will be located within headquarters (HQ) JTF. This is referred to as an integrated staff structure. When the component method of command is selected, a smaller staff is required within HQJTF, however each component commander also maintains their own staff to conduct planning and to provide direction to the force elements being commanded by the component commander. In this instance, the overall structure is referred to as a component staff structure, even though each component's staff, as well as the HQJTF staff, are individually organised along the same lines as an integrated staff.

Supported and supporting commanders

One way for a CJTF to achieve coordination across a variety of operational tasks is by assigning subordinate commanders as either supported or supporting commanders and designating the main effort in each phase of an operation.

Supported commander. Supported commanders have primary responsibility for all aspects of an assigned task and are allocated resource priority. Supported commanders must indicate to supporting commanders their support missions/requirements and associated coordinating instructions.

Supporting commander. Supporting commanders provide forces, equipment, logistics or other support to a supported commander as required. They must advise the supported commander on the availability and most appropriate employment of their assets. Supporting commanders under an 'in direct support' arrangement are responsible for completing the mission/tasks allocated to them

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by the supported commander. Supporting commanders under an 'in support of' arrangement may prioritise their own missions/tasks; however, they must use any remaining capacity to assist the supported commander's mission/tasks.

The assignment of supported and supporting commanders. The assignment of supported and supporting commanders is dynamic and will change according to the needs of the situation. In a complex operation with multiple lines of operation, a supported commander on one line of operation may simultaneously be a supporting commander to another commander on a concurrent line of operation.

For example, the supported/supporting relationship is critical to command of an amphibious operation. In the lodgement phase of an amphibious operation the joint force maritime component commander may be designated the supported commander for the amphibious line of operation, which in this case is also usually designated the main effort. Concurrently the joint force air component commander may be designated the supported commander for the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance line of operation. Due to the multiple capabilities inherent to many ADF force elements, both commanders may also be designated as supporting commanders for the other's line of operation. However, the main effort remains paramount regardless of supported and supporting arrangements. Further discussion of the supported-supporting relationship in this setting is contained in [Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 3.2—Amphibious Operations](#).

Another example is the force assignment of air assets and personnel on the recommendation of Director-General Air Command Operations. Royal Australian Air Force elements are assigned to Chief Joint Operations under theatre command arrangements. In most cases, operational command is delegated to Director-General Air, who is also assigned as a supporting commander to applicable CJTF. Operations where this command arrangement has been in place include Operation RESOLUTE, Operation GATEWAY and Operation SOLANIA.

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Chapter 7 – Command in multinational operations

Executive summary

- Multinational operations include combined operations (those undertaken alongside formal allies), coalition operations (those undertaken with countries unified by a common mission) and operations that may not have a common mission.
- There may be subtle differences in states of command used by multinational partners.
- Before operations are undertaken, governments must agree on the command arrangements at the national, military strategic and operational levels.
- When necessary and appropriate, Government authorises the assignment and employment of Australian forces under international commanders.
- No international commander can exercise full command over Australian forces that are assigned to a multinational force. The Chief of the Defence Force retains full command.
- Contributing nations appoint a national contingent commander to represent national interests at the operational level. The designated Australian Defence Force officer is commander Australian contingent.

Introduction

Multinational joint operations are part of an Australian whole-of-government approach that includes other government departments (OGD) as well as Defence. They are conducted in a multinational environment, alongside other agencies, to meet both military and non-military national strategic objectives. Multinational operations require a clear understanding of both national command and control (C2) arrangements and the multinational C2 arrangements.

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A comprehensive multinational approach responds effectively to complex crises by coordinating military and non-military activities (further details in [Australian Defence Force – Philosophical – 0 Campaigns and Operations](#)).

Multinational operations are conducted by agencies. An agency is any sized organisation, group or element, of any type—whether national, international, military, non-military, governmental or non-governmental. Agencies usually broadly agree about desired outcomes yet each agency in the operational environment has its own aims, objectives and methods. From a military perspective, strategic and operational planners should, as far as practicable, accommodate disparate agencies that are working toward a common goal.

The Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands represented a new model of regional intervention using the full assets of diplomatic, economic, police and military assets in a coordinated, whole-of-government approach. The command arrangement was unconventional and accepted risk—but it proved appropriate. It was important that the response was not unilateral on Australia's part but rather a multilateral Pacific effort to help a neighbour in need—and five nations committed military forces.

**Lieutenant Colonel John Frewen
Commander, Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon
Islands
2003**

The command arrangements for multinational operations require consideration of agencies and foreign nation states of command, Australian national command arrangements, operational command arrangements and operational authorities. In multiagency operations the command and control (C2) arrangements requires clear guidance.

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Multinational operations

Multinational forces are composed of forces of two or more nations undertaking operations within the structure of a coalition, alliance or under the supervision of an international organisation. This categorisation includes allied, bilateral, coalition, combined or multilateral arrangements. Most multinational operations will be conducted within a framework of formal agreements such as:

- **Combined operations:** when conducted with a country that is formally an ally, or with countries that are formally allies.
- **Coalition operations:** when conducted with nations that are not all formally allies but are unified by a common mission.

Definitions

Combined: Forces of two or more allied nations, acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission.

Coalition: Forces of two or more nations, which may not be allies, acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission.

An example of a combined operation is Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR, which was undertaken by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member countries. An example of a coalition operation is the 2003 invasion of Iraq, which was undertaken by 'a coalition of the willing'. Coalition operations are currently the most common form of ADF operation.

Some multinational operations are conducted in an informal and largely uncoordinated manner, with independent national and international agencies unified only by their rapid response to a sudden and urgent need such as a large-scale environmental and/or humanitarian crisis. These informal international responses to crises are referred to simply as multinational operations.

An example of a multinational operation was the response to the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004. The broader international response was characterised by several countries, as well as multinational and other agencies, rapidly reacting to a major disaster in an independent, fragmented and largely uncoordinated manner with the

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common goal of providing disaster relief. These multinational operations were conducted under national command arrangements; however, significant command interaction and liaison with OGD, host-nation and international and non-governmental organisations was required. The ADF component was Operation SUMATRA ASSIST.

Operations involving force contributions from foreign nations are influenced by differences in politics, strategic outlook, language, religion, culture, national customs, equipment and systems, doctrine, and practices. For United Nations (UN) missions, the military component is provided by several troop-contributing countries (TCC). In other multinational operations, the term more commonly used is troop-contributing nations (TCN).

Overview of required command arrangements

Before operations are undertaken, governments must agree on the command arrangements at the national, military strategic and operational levels. The types of command arrangements that might be required are:

- **National command authority.** The national command authority is composed of the national leaders of the defence forces involved in the operations, such as the Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand and the President of the United States, or their representatives.
- **Combined (or coalition) force commander.** A combined (or coalition) force commander (CFC) and deputy combined (or coalition) force commander must be mutually agreed and appointed to ensure unity of command. Staff representation on the combined force headquarters should also be agreed. The combined or coalition force commander will exercise operational authority over assigned forces agreed by the appropriate national chain of command. Changes to operational authority must be approved by the national chain of command. The combined or coalition force may be designated as combined or coalition joint task force.
- **Theatre commander.** Unless the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) decides to directly command ADF involvement in the

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operation, CDF will assign theatre command (tcomd) to a subordinate. Theatre command gives the theatre commander the authority to act as the Australian operational-level military point of contact in relationships with other nations' commands, Australian diplomatic missions, other government agencies and agencies of countries in theatre. In most cases, CDF will assign tcomd to the Chief of Joint Operations (CJOPS).

- **National commander.** The senior officer from each partner designated as the national commander and exercising national command (natcomd) over national personnel. The national commander maintains access to their military representatives on purely national matters involving the employment and conditions of service of their national forces. The national commander has no operational authority over deployed ADF forces unless separately assigned by the theatre commander.

In the ADF, full command is retained by CDF at all times. No international commander can exercise full command over ADF forces.

Theatre command, which is an authority unique to Australia, is retained by CJOPS (or an alternative theatre commander as appointed by CDF) and is not delegated. Operational command (opcomd) and operational control (opcon) can be delegated to CFC by the Australian theatre commander (although opcomd would not usually be delegated). Tactical command and tactical control (tacon) can be delegated to commanders at the tactical level.

Interpretation of the degree of authority implied by each state of command in a multinational system differs markedly between nations and Services and, like any aspect of doctrine, is subject to flexible interpretation by the key personalities in the chain of command at the time. It is important for both superior and subordinate commanders to be absolutely clear about any restrictions on the use of force elements, and to be pragmatic about what needs to be achieved to realise the commander's intent.

When Australian force elements are working under United States of America (USA) authority, further constitutional complications arise

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because of the direct strategic links that USA combatant commanders have with their national command authority comprising the President of the United States and the Secretary of Defense. It is important that Australia identifies early in the operation where influence and additional coordination should be applied in order to match responsiveness in decision-making.

Foreign nation states of command

Many of Australia's potential military partners adhere to or refer to the NATO model and its definitions for command, which have subtle differences to Australian terminology. Significantly, the NATO acronym for operational command (opcomd) is OPCOM, and the NATO acronym for tactical command (tacomd) is TACOM.

Further complicating multinational operations, the operational command authorities that define command relationships vary in term and/or definition between nations.

To aid interoperability, the operational command authorities used by the UN are listed in Annex 7A. The equivalent USA and NATO command authorities are detailed in Annex 7B.

The British Armed Forces and Canadian forces use NATO states of command and operational command authorities. The New Zealand Defence Force uses the same states of command and operational command authorities as the ADF, with the exception of theatre command (tcomd).

Australian national command arrangements

Commander Australian Contingent. Each TCN contributing to a multinational operation, or TCC contributing to a UN operation, appoints a national contingent commander to represent national interests.

In general, an ADF officer so appointed is designated Commander Australian Contingent (COMAUSC). The roles of a COMAUSC include:

- representing national concerns to the CFC
- keeping Australian authorities informed

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- coordinating and fostering international component relations in support of the commander's mission.

Tasks for a COMAUSC may include:

- exercise command as directed by CDF and/or the theatre commander, keeping them informed of the situation in-theatre, with particular emphasis on developments that may affect national political objectives or require changes in rules of engagement, the concept for operations or the commitment of additional national resources
- advise the CFC on specific capabilities of Australian forces and any constraints limiting their employment
- facilitate liaison support to the staff of the CFC
- ensure, through the Australian chain of command, that administrative and logistic support is available for Australian forces to achieve and sustain their operational readiness
- integrate the Australian communication and information systems (CIS) with other components of the force
- facilitate the integration of Australian intelligence architecture into the force while ensuring the integrity of national security
- coordinate and cooperate with other national commanders to ensure unity of effort as directed by the CFC
- recommend to CDF and/or theatre commander changes to the national C2 arrangements under which Australian forces are assigned or attached to the force
- implement Australian information operations with due regard to any instructions issued by the CFC
- exercise other national command responsibilities (as described in Chapter 5).

The distinction between representing Australian national concerns and exercising command over Australian force elements should be clearly articulated and may change during the course of an operation. COMAUSC may not be assigned a command authority (beyond

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natcomd) for the deployed force elements, as deployed force elements may be under the command of another Australian commander or under the direct command of CDF or the theatre commander. Alternatively, the commander of an Australian JTF may also be COMASC and have natcomd authorities.

Directives to the national commander and to force elements should contain provisions for changing circumstances to avoid confusion that can arise in the absence of clear written directives or from the need to reinterpret extant directives.

National limitations. The governments of TCC and/or TCN maintain an administrative channel of communications to their contingents, commanders and personnel on operational matters. In the case of UN operations, they must not, however, issue any instructions to their military personnel contrary to UN policies and the implementation of its mandated tasks.

On occasion, the separate chains of command in multinational operations will present conflicting information and/or tasks to a commander. The force may request a particular task be conducted that falls outside national guidance or tasking. Accordingly, permission to conduct the task may be refused by the Australian commander exercising national command. Methods to assist in dealing with such situations include:

- ensuring that CFC, UN head of mission (HOM) or other operational commanders understand any limitations that apply to Australian force elements under their control before such situations arise
- appreciating that neighbouring force elements supplied by other TCC/TCN may have different powers or limitations from Australian force elements, and making the effort to understand theirs as much as they would understand any Australian national limitations
- actively implementing measures such as briefings and coordination conferences, within operations security considerations, to minimise cross-cultural or multiagency misunderstandings.

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While these measures may not necessarily prevent ill-feeling when a task is refused, reinforcing the ground rules at the outset enhances mutual respect and helps to minimise long-term damage. Once deployed, it is normal practice that, if any planning will affect national contingents, CFC will consult with the commander of that national contingent.

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Historical example

Australian national command arrangements during operations in Iraq, 2003

In early 2003, ADF personnel were pre-deployed to the Middle East to support international efforts in Iraq. Operation BASTILLE was the name given to the initial pre-deployment of forces, acclimatisation activities and in-theatre training.

Operation FALCONER was the name given to combat operations in support of disarmament, and Operation CATALYST was the name given to stabilisation and recovery efforts.

During these operations, Australia retained C2 of ADF force elements at all times, while still working effectively within the coalition. CDF retained full command of all Australian force elements. Commander Australian Theatre (COMAST) based in Sydney maintained theatre or operational command (tcomd/opcomd) of forces assigned to operations in the Middle East Area of Operations (MEAO). The Commander Australian National Headquarters (HQ)-MEAO exercised national command (natcomd) of ADF force elements deployed under Operations BASTILLE, FALCONER and CATALYST. To ensure effective overall strategic direction of Australia's efforts in Iraq, the Strategic Command Group met frequently, supported by video links with COMAST and the natcomd headquarters in the MEAO. CDF and the Secretary of Defence then briefed the National Security Committee of Cabinet and received additional guidance from the Prime Minister and Minister for Defence.

Australian force elements were assigned to the coalition component commander under opcon. This arrangement allowed the component commander to provide direction to ADF force elements, while they remained under their Australian commanding officers at unit level. Although ADF force elements worked toward the overall coalition plan, there were processes in place to ensure that Australian forces were always employed in accordance with Australian Government policies. Royal Australian Air Force and special operations forces were placed in the Coalition Air Operations Centre (CAOC) to ensure that targets assigned to ADF units were appropriate and lawful under Australian rules of engagement. Australian commanders had ADF legal officers to advise them on the laws of armed conflict during the process of allocating targets. RAAF commanders were also appointed as

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Director of the CAOC at certain points during these operations. In this role, they directed coalition as well as Australian missions.



Figure 7.1: F/A-18 flight line crews from 75 Squadron conduct pre-flight checks before missions over Iraq as part of Operation BASTILLE

Occasionally, Australia was allocated targets on USA-developed strike lists, but they were always assessed according to Australia's own legal obligations. Several target categories were subject to Australian ministerial approval before they could be engaged. Australian pilots could, and on occasion did, abort missions to avoid the risk of unintended casualties if their target could not be clearly identified from the air. These arrangements permitted smooth, effective integration of ADF elements within the coalition, and were testimony to the routine high levels of interoperability with our allies. Improvements in communications and web technology greatly assisted high-level decision-making.

Operational command arrangements

Major considerations for C2 architecture within a multinational joint task force are as follows:

- **Scale and duration.** The scale, nature, range and likely duration of the operation, including the number and status of other concurrent operations.

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- **Influence.** Where and how best to influence partner nations and key decision-makers.
- **Command.** Where and how best to exercise command of the JTF or Australia's contribution, reflecting the ADF approach to command.
- **Communications.** The capacity and suitability of available CIS infrastructure, which should enable, not hamper, C2.

Campaign arrangements. CJOPS may have to conduct a campaign, coordinate several operations, and use a combination of types of command arrangements. This is especially the case where Australia is the lead nation.

Lead nation. The Australian term 'lead nation' is equivalent to the NATO term 'framework nation'. Australian doctrine uses the term lead nation because it suggests greater emphasis on will, capability, competence and influence. Where Australia is the lead nation, the majority of forces are usually drawn from the ADF.

Command attributes. The CFC must understand the strengths and weaknesses not only of ADF forces under their command, but also forces from other nations. This task requires political awareness, patience, tact and mutual understanding based on knowledge of other nations' languages, history and culture. The posting of high-calibre commanders and staff officers to multinational headquarters in peacetime prepares commanders for this level of understanding. This extends to attachés, exchange officers and liaison officers.

Elements from other nations embedded in each component are responsive to their national chain of command, which can cause friction. The commander should strive to overcome this friction by combining national contingents together into a strong and coordinated team. At the same time, the commander must balance the burden and risk-sharing to ensure that no one nation either sustains disproportionate casualties or receives disproportionate credit, both of which may weaken the cohesion of the alliance or coalition.

Conflicting national pressures and/or exploitation by the adversary will inevitably strain force unity. The commander has to call on leadership skills, including personal example and strength of

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character, to build and maintain the morale of the force and the confidence of the alliance or coalition. If the commander can emphasise that although political problems may exist, the real task of the commander and allied subordinates is to produce a military solution to a military problem, then cooperation is more likely to be put on a sound basis without offending national sensitivities. The operational-level commander should take every opportunity to discuss military problems with ministers, chiefs of staff and senior officers from contributing nations who visit the operational area.

Operational command authorities

When necessary and appropriate, the Australian Government will authorise the assignment and employment of Australian forces under foreign commanders. The respective commanders are:

- the CFC, the strategic-level commander in a multinational force, or in a combined or coalition operation
- the component commander in a combined or coalition operation
- the force commander (FC), the operational-level commander in a UN mission.

The commander will exercise the operational command authority over assigned forces agreed by the appropriate national chain of command. Changes to the operational command authority can only occur with the approval of the national chain of command.

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Historical example

Australia as a lead nation: International Force for East Timor, 1999–2000

The situation in East Timor rapidly deteriorated in early 1999 as armed groups opposing East Timorese independence from Indonesia resorted to destruction, violence and intimidation. It soon became clear to the international community that armed intervention would be required to end the violence.

On 15 September 1999, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1264, which called for a multinational force to be created to restore peace and security in East Timor, to protect and support the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) in carrying out its tasks, and to facilitate humanitarian assistance operations. The International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) was subsequently formed, with Australia as the lead nation.

As operational planning for INTERFET progressed, it became clear that a variety of multinational partners was required, not just for political expediency, but also to assist with logistical sustainment and to provide additional capability. When it became clear that the ADF would have to build a coalition, senior ADF commanders drew upon long-term relationships with their counterparts throughout the region to facilitate a workable coalition. Australians quickly learnt that trust could not be 'surged'. Many years of international engagement by Australia's three Services provided the foundation upon which the INTERFET coalition was constructed.

Just after dawn on 20 September 1999, INTERFET troops deplaned at Dili airport. Meanwhile, in Dili harbour, the visible presence of four coalition warships helped persuade the East Timorese population, as well as any potentially hostile armed groups, that INTERFET was numerically strong and militarily powerful.

INTERFET eventually included over 11,000 personnel from 22 nations, including the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, New Zealand, France, Italy, Britain, the United States of America and Canada. The coalition also included 22 ships from 9 navies (the Royal Australian Navy provided 14 of these). More than 130 fixed and rotary-wing aircraft, from 9 air forces and 10 military air services, were also allocated to INTERFET. Almost every operational unit in the ADF was either deployed or on standby in support of operations. Under the command of (then) Major General Peter Cosgrove, INTERFET quickly achieved its

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mission of restoring order within East Timor, allowing command of the operation to be transitioned to the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) on 28 February 2000.

Peace operations

The ability of the ADF to conduct operations across the spectrum of armed conflict enables the effective conduct of peace operations. Australia has acted as the lead nation for several peace operations, and has provided several senior officers to command appointments on UN or UN-sanctioned missions.

The composition and C2 of the military component of a peace operation depends on the type and intensity of the operation. Force members must understand the mission and the mandate, accepting that although the military is a key player, a military solution will not necessarily be the measure of success for a mission.

Within the multinational forces that conduct UN operations, command is made complex because most contributing countries have their own separate chains of command. For the ADF, this usually takes the form of the opcon of the force itself, and national command, which is normally vested in the COMAUSC. It is important to gain an understanding of the capabilities and limitations of each contributing country's respective commands, prior to deploying if possible.

In the field, it is essential that effective command relationships be implemented among the TCC and the UN. In the transition to peace operations, whether it be under multinational or UN auspices, it is important to recognise the following C2 aspects:

- The UN HOM of a peacekeeping operation—usually called a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG)—will be a civilian official, as opposed to military or national leadership. Appointments below the SRSG are generally considered equal in status, except when the mission is structured along functional lines (such as peacekeeping, governance and administration). The SRSG has a direct relationship to the UN Secretary-General (UNSG) and staff, and component commanders/heads work for the SRSG with

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links to respective offices or departments in UN New York or UN Geneva.

- The SRSG represents the UNSG, leads political engagement and speaks on behalf of the UN within the mission area.
- The roles of FC and Chief Military Observer (CMO) in exercising leadership and command over ADF personnel serving as a UN military observer. Depending on the nature of the mission, the CMO may be an independent appointment or may serve under the opcon of the FC.
- The role of the FC in exercising leadership and command over ADF personnel serving as a UN military liaison officer.
- In UN operations, the Director or Chief of Mission Support (D/CMS) is appointed by the Under-Secretary-General for field support at UN Headquarters and leads the mission's division of administration. The D/CMS reports to HOM and is accountable to the HOM for the efficient and effective provision of administrative and logistic support to all mission components. The D/CMS exercises financial authority in consultation with the HOM.
- The role of the civil authority and cooperation with local civilian police (civpol) forces and UN civpol. Given the internal security responsibilities of both local and UN civpol and the responsibilities of the military component, good working relationships with members of these organisations at the operational and tactical levels are essential.

Further information about the UN chain of command is given in Annex 7C. For further information about the conduct of peace operations see [Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 3.8—Peace Operations](#).

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Historical example

Australia's commitment to peace operations: Cambodia, 1992–1993

The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) comprised components for human rights, electoral, military, civil administration, civil police, repatriation and rehabilitation. The military component of UNTAC consisted of 15,000 personnel, drawn from 15 countries. The ADF provided a contingent of 1,215 personnel, comprising a Force Communications Unit, a helicopter squadron and a Movement Control Unit.



Figure 7.2: The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia Force Commander, Lieutenant General John Sanderson (Australia), with his deputy, Major General Tamlichha Ali (Indonesia), and headquarters staff



Figure 7.3: Aviation tasks included collection of ballot boxes for elections organised by United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia

Annexes:

- 7A United Nations operational command authorities
- 7B United States of America and North Atlantic Treaty Organization states of command
- 7C United Nations chain of command

Annex 7A

United Nations operational command authorities

Through the 1990s, the United Nations (UN) was confronted with many systems and procedural difficulties directly related to how it exercised command and control (C2) of military forces placed at its disposal for the prosecution of a UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR). These were largely resolved as a result of various reviews, and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) issued formal guidance in 2001 regarding C2 of military components in UN peacekeeping operations.⁶

Command relationships within the UN are determined by operational command authorities, which empower a force commander (FC) or chief military observer (CMO) to properly employ the operational capability of assigned forces to achieve the designated mission. In common with most defence forces, the UN uses a framework of operational authority for simplicity and consistency.

The UN operational command authorities are defined below.

- **United Nations Operational Authority.** The authority transferred by the member states to the UN to use the operational capabilities of their national military contingents, units, formed police units and/or military and police personnel to undertake mandated missions and tasks. Operational authority over such forces and personnel is vested in the Secretary-General, under the authority of the UN Security Council (UNSC). United Nations Operational Authority involves the full authority to issue operational directives within the limits of:
 - a specific mandate of the UNSC

⁶ The 2001 guidance document has since been superseded by: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *Authority, Command and Control in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, UN Policy Document, Reference No. 2008.4, approved 15 February 2008.

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- an agreed period of time, with the stipulation that an earlier withdrawal of a contingent would require the contributing country to provide adequate prior notification
- a specific geographic area (the mission area as a whole).
- The UN Operational Authority does not include responsibility for certain personnel matters of individual members of military contingents and formed police units, such as pay, allowances, and promotions. These functions remain a national responsibility. In regard to disciplinary matters, while the discipline of military personnel remains the responsibility of the troop- contributing countries the UN may take administrative steps for misconduct, including repatriation of military contingent members and staff officers. With respect to the Experts on Mission, including UN observers, the UN will take administrative actions and disciplinary measures in accordance with the UN Directives for Disciplinary Matters Involving UN Police Officers and Military Observers.
- **Command.** The authority granted to a military commander in a UN peacekeeping operation to direct assigned forces in order to achieve specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location (or a combination), to deploy units concerned and/or military personnel, and to retain or assign tactical command (tacomd) or tactical control (tacon) of those units/personnel. Operational control (opcon) includes the authority to assign separate tasks to sub units of a contingent, as required by operational necessities, within the mission area of responsibility, in consultation with the contingent commander and as approved by the United Nations Headquarters (HQ).
- **United Nations operational control.** Opcon is the authority granted to a military commander in a UN peacekeeping operation to direct assigned forces in order to achieve specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location (or a combination), to deploy units concerned and/or military personnel, and to retain or assign

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tacomd or tacon of those units/personnel. Opcon includes the authority to assign separate tasks to sub units of a contingent, as required by operational necessities, within the mission area of responsibility, in consultation with the contingent commander and as approved by the UN HQ.

- **United Nations tactical command.** The authority delegated to a military or police commander in a UN Peacekeeping operation to assign tasks to forces under their command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority.
- **United Nations tactical control.** Tactical control (tacon) is the detailed and local direction and control of movement or manoeuvres necessary to accomplish mission or tasks assigned. As required by operational necessities, the Head of Military Component (HOMC) and Head of Police Component (HOPC) may delegate tacon of the forces assigned to the UN peacekeeping operation to subordinate sector and/or unit commanders.
- **Administrative control.** The authority over subordinate or other organisations within national contingents for administrative matters such as personnel management, supply, services and other non-operational missions of the subordinate or other organisations. Administrative control is a national responsibility given to the National Contingent Commander (NCC) in peacekeeping operations.
- **Tasking authority.** The authority vested in specified senior appointments (Head of Military Component (HOMC), Head of Police Component (HOPC) or Director of Mission Support/Chief of Mission Support (DMS/CMS)) of UN peacekeeping operations to assign tasks to enabling units. Tasking authority includes the authority to deploy, redeploy and employ all or part of an enabling unit to achieve the mission's mandate. Enabling units comprise aviation, engineering, logistics, medical, signals, transport and explosive ordnance disposal units. Tasking authority over

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military or police personnel/units, when exercised by civilians, is applicable for their routine and day-to-day employment and does not include tasking of military/police resources exercised purely in pursuance of military or police operations.

- **Technical reporting.** Technical reporting is an information and technical advisory communication link not relating to the C2 of operations or to national administrative control. This link does not circumvent the primary reporting line and command/supervisory relationships, through which formal direction and tasking is issued.
- **Transfer of authority.** The transfer of authority between national contingents and military personnel to the UN-designated commander must be completed immediately before these forces come under control of the UN. This process may take place when personnel arrive in the mission area, or it may be transferred immediately prior to deployment from home locations. The exact timing for this transfer is decided during the negotiations between the UN and national authorities. Contributing member states negotiate with UN HQ the specific date and location that the UN will assume 'UN Operational Authority' over their uniformed personnel and units. The Operational Authority over military and police 'Experts on Mission', which includes military observers and Individual police officers/advisers, is considered to be automatically transferred to the UN when a contributed Expert on Mission reports to the designated UN authority for his/her duties in the operational area of responsibility. The operational authority is reverted to the respective national authorities on completion of assignment with the UN, or at the time of repatriation.
- **Memorandum of understanding.** Troop contributing countries (TCC) establish a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the UN. The MOU formalises numbers of troops to be deployed, equipment and capabilities available for tasking. The MOU also includes agreed levels of administration support to be provided to the contingent by

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the UN DMS/CMS. This includes quantities and types of rations, and quantity and quality of water as examples.

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Annex 7B

United States of America and North Atlantic Treaty Organization states of command

ACTIVITY	US Combatant Command ¹	US OPCON ²	NATO OPCOM ³	NATO OPCON	NATO TACOM ⁴	US and NATO TACON ⁵
Assign tasks	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No
Direct/employ forces	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Reassign forces	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No
Deploy forces within theatre	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Assign separate employment of unit components	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Administrative/ logistic responsibility	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Deploy units	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Delegate equal command status	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Delegate lower command status	Yes	Yes	Yes ⁶	Yes	No	No
REMARKS	¹ US Combatant Command is broadly equivalent to the command authority held under theatre command. ² Operational Control (opcon) ³ NATO Operational Command (OPCOM). (Australia opcomd) ⁴ Tactical Command (Australia tacomd) ⁵ Tactical Control ⁶ NATO OPCOM authority only allows commanders to delegate opcon with prior approval.					

Table 7B.1: United States of America and North Atlantic Treaty Organization states of command

Annex 7C

United Nations chain of command

This annex defines and describes the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping chain of command and authorities. Command and control (C2) exists at three separate but overlapping levels:

- the strategic level
- the operational level
- the tactical level.




Figure 7C.1: Levels of authority, command and control in United Nations peacekeeping operations

Strategic level

The management of a peacekeeping operation at UN Headquarters (HQ) level is at the strategic level of authority and C2. The chain of command is:

- **United Nations Security Council.** The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is responsible for the overall political direction of the peacekeeping operation. It provides the legal authority, high-level strategic direction and political guidance for all UN peacekeeping operations, and it vests the operational authority for directing these operations in the Secretary-General of the UN. The UNSC authorises the mandate of the mission through a UNSC Resolution.
- **Secretary-General.** The Secretary-General is responsible for the executive direction and control of the mission. Member States transfer 'Operational Authority' over their military forces and personnel to the UN. This authority is vested in the Secretary-General, who exercises it on behalf of the UNSC.
- **Under-Secretary-General of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.** The Under-Secretary-General (USG) of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has been delegated responsibility from the Secretary-General for the administration of, and provision of executive direction for, all UN peacekeeping operations.⁷ Specifically, the USG DPKO:
 - directs and controls UN peacekeeping operations
 - formulates policies and develops operational guidelines based on UNSC resolutions (mission mandates)

⁷ There are two USG accountable to the Secretary-General for the conduct of peacekeeping operations that include military elements: the USG DPKO and the USG for the Department of Political Affairs (DPA). USG DPA has responsibility for Special Political Missions, some of which include military elements. Some UN Missions for which USG DPA is responsible are managed by USG DPKO.

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- prepares reports of the Secretary-General to the UNSC on each peacekeeping operation with appropriate observations and recommendations
- advises the Secretary-General on all matters relating to the planning, establishment and conduct of UN peacekeeping operations
- acts as a focal point between the Secretariat and Member States seeking information on all matters related to UN peacekeeping missions
- is responsible and accountable to the Secretary-General for ensuring that the requirements of the UN security management system are met within DPKO-led field missions.

In addition to the responsibilities mentioned above, it is important to be aware of additional UN-system responsibilities for financial authority and for the safety and security of UN staff, which lie outside of the authority of the USG DPKO but which affect UN peacekeeping operations. These are:

- The Under-Secretary-General of the Department of Management. The USG of the Department of Management is delegated financial authority and responsibility from the Secretary-General for all financial matters relating to UN peacekeeping operations.
- The Under-Secretary-General of the Department of Safety and Security. The USG of the Department of Safety and Security is directly accountable and responsible to the Secretary-General for the executive direction and control of the UN security management system and for the overall safety and security of UN civilian personnel and their recognised dependents at both HQ locations and in the field.
- The Under-Secretary-General of the Department of Field Support. On behalf of the Secretary-General, the USG of the Department of Field Support (DFS) directs all support for peacekeeping operations by providing necessary strategic direction to guide the work programme of DFS. Under direction of the USG DFS, the DFS is responsible for

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delivering dedicated support to field operations, including on personnel, procurement, information technology, logistics, finance, communications, and other administrative and general management issues.

The Military Adviser. The Military Advisor (MILAD) is the senior uniformed person at UN HQ in New York. The MILAD is established as a line position heading the Office of Military Affairs within the DPKO, however the MILAD is accountable directly to both the USG DPKO and the USG of the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) for management of military elements deployed on peacekeeping operations under their respective authorities.

Contributing Member States. Member States that provide military and police personnel to UN peacekeeping operations retain full and exclusive strategic level command and control of their personnel and equipment. Contributing Member States may assign these personnel and assets to serve under the authority of the Secretary General of the UN and under the operational control of the Head of Military Component (HOMC) of a UN peacekeeping operation for specified periods and purposes as agreed in a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with UN HQ. Member States may withdraw their military and police personnel and the operational control of those personnel from the UN through formal communication with UN HQ.

Operational level

The field-based management of a peacekeeping operation at the Mission HQ is considered to be the operational level. The following senior officials hold operational level authority and C2 responsibilities at the Mission HQ level:

- Head of Mission (HOM)
- Head of Military Component
- Head of Police Component (HOPC)
- Deputy Special Representative(s) of the Secretary-General (DSRSG)
- Director of Mission Support/Chief of Mission Support (DMS/CMS).

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In addition, there are several joint, integration and coordination structures that support mission-wide coherence at the operational level. These are not C2 structures, but they support integration of effort across the peacekeeping operation under the authority of the HOM.

Head of Mission

The HOM of a peacekeeping operation is generally a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG). The HOM reports to the Secretary-General through the USG DPKO. The HOM is the senior UN Representative and has overall authority over the activities of the UN in the mission area. The HOM represents the Secretary-General, leads UN political engagement and speaks on behalf of the UN within the mission area. The HOM leads and directs the heads of all mission components and ensures unity of effort and coherence among all UN entities in the mission area, in accordance with the UN Integrated Strategic Framework for the mission.

The HOM provides political guidance for mandate implementation and sets mission-wide operational direction, including by making decisions about resource allocation in case of competing priorities. The HOM delegates the operational and technical aspects of mandate implementation to the heads of all components of the mission. The HOM provides direction to those components through the component heads.

Head of Military Component

In peacekeeping operations the HOMC is generally designated as the Force Commander (FC). If the military component comprises Military Observers only, a Chief Military Observer (CMO) or Chief of Staff (COS) will be appointed as the HOMC. The CMO reports directly to the HOM and exercises operational control over all Military Observers.

The HOMC establishes the military operational chain of command in the field and may establish subordinate Sector Commands, as appropriate. In doing so, the HOMC places military units under the tactical control of military commanders in the operational chain of command.

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The HOMC maintains a technical reporting and communication link with the DPKO Military Adviser at UN HQ. This technical reporting link must not circumvent or substitute the chain of command between the USG DPKO and the HOM, nor should it interfere with decisions taken by the HOM in accordance with this policy directive.

Head of Police Component

The HOPC reports to the HOM, exercises operational control and provides direction to all members of the police component of the mission. This includes all UN Police Officers (including all members of Formed Police Units) and relevant civilian staff serving in the police component. The HOPC, in consultation with DPKO, establishes the police chain of command. The HOPC also establishes appropriate succession arrangements within the police component to ensure effective C2 in his/her absence.

The HOPC maintains a technical reporting and communication link with the DPKO Police Adviser at UN HQ. This technical reporting link must not circumvent or substitute the command chain between the USG DPKO and the HOM, nor should it interfere with decisions taken by the HOM in accordance with this policy directive.

Deputy Special Representative(s) of the Secretary-General

Peacekeeping operations generally have at least one DSRSG to support the HOM in executing the substantive civilian functions of the mission. DSRSG report to the HOM and they exercise managerial authority over those mission components that have been assigned to them. When a DSRSG is designated as the Deputy HOM, he/she shall support the SRSG through the performance of any specifically delegated HOM responsibilities and shall officiate as HOM in the absence of the SRSG.

In integrated missions, the Resident Coordinator (and Humanitarian Coordinator, as appropriate) of the UN Country Team may be appointed as DSRSG to co-ordinate the mission's activities with UN agencies, funds, programs and other development and humanitarian entities operating in the mission area.

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Director of Mission Support/Chief of Mission Support

The DMS/CMS reports to the HOM and is accountable to the HOM for the efficient and effective provision of administrative and logistic support to all mission components. The DMS/CMS advises the HOM on the rules and regulations relating to the commitment of UN financial resources to ensure the provision of efficient and effective administrative and logistics support to all mission components. The DMS/CMS has sole UN authority in the field to commit UN financial resources for any purpose, including any contractual arrangements for the use of local resources. The DMS/CMS is responsible for the strict observance of, and compliance with, UN technical and administrative regulations related to the administration of the mission and logistics management.

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Glossary

The source for approved Defence terms, definitions and abbreviations is the Australian Defence Glossary (ADG), available on the Defence Protected Network at <http://adg.dpe.protected.mil.au/>. Note: The ADG is updated periodically and should be consulted to review any amendments to the data in this glossary.

Terms and definitions

administrative control

Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organisations in respect to administrative matters such as personnel management, supply services and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organisations.

campaign design

The manner in which the operational commander expresses a vision of how the campaign may unfold and how desired objectives will be sequenced and synchronised.

coalition

Forces of two or more nations, which may not be allies, acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission.

combined

Forces of two or more allied nations, acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission.

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command

The authority which a commander in the military Service lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment.

Notes:

1. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of, organising, directing, coordinating and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions.
2. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale and discipline of assigned personnel.

command and control

The process and means for the exercise of authority over, and lawful direction of, assigned forces.

control

The authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate organisations, or other organisations not normally under their command, which encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or directives.

Note: All or part of this authority may be transferred or delegated.

coordinating authority

The authority granted to a commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more countries or commands, or two or more services or two or more forces of the same service.

Notes:

1. The commander has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved or their representatives but does not have the authority to compel agreement.
2. In case of disagreement between the agencies involved, the commander should attempt to obtain essential agreement by discussion.
3. In the event essential agreement cannot be obtained the matter will be referred to the appropriate authority.

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direct support

The support provided by a unit or formation not attached to or under command of the supported unit or formation commander but required to give priority to the support required by that unit or formation.

direct liaison authorised

That authority granted by a commander (any level) to a subordinate to directly consult or coordinate an action with a command or agency within or outside of the granting command.

Notes:

1. Direct liaison authorised is more applicable to planning than operations and always carries with it the requirement of keeping the commander granting direct liaison authorised informed.
2. Direct liaison authorised is a coordination relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised.

force element

A component of a unit, a unit, or an association of units having common prime objectives and activities.

full command

The statutory authority of the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF), under Section 9 of the *Defence Act 1903*, to issue orders to all members of the Australian Defence Force.

Notes:

1. Full command covers every aspect of military operations and administration.
2. It includes responsibility to advise the Minister for Defence on matters relating to command of the ADF.

in support of

Assisting another formation, unit or organisation while remaining under the initial command.

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joint command

The enduring authority given by the Chief of the Defence Force to ADF joint chiefs to command joint organisations in the ADF.

Note: Joint command does not include authority to conduct operations, determine single-service personnel policy or conduct career management.

leadership

The art of positively influencing others to get the job done.

levels of conflict

The recognised levels of conflict from which the levels for the planning and command of operations are derived.

Note: They are strategic, operational and tactical.

line of communication

A land, water or air route that connects an operating military force with one or more bases of operations, and along which supplies and reinforcements move.

local administration

Direction or exercise of administration controlled by a local commander and related specifically to the troops or to the operation in the commander's area.

Note: Local administration is a subset of administrative control.

management

The process of planning, organising, directing and controlling organisational resources in the pursuit of organisational goals.

mission command

A philosophy of command and a system for conducting operations in which subordinates are given a clear indication by a superior of their intentions.

Note: The result required, the task, the resources and any constraints are clearly enunciated, however subordinates are allowed the freedom to decide how to achieve the required result.

multinational operation

A military action conducted by forces of two or more nations, undertaken within the structure of a coalition, an alliance or under the supervision of an international organisation such as the United Nations. Note: It is used to encompass all related terms such as allied, bilateral, coalition, combined, or multilateral.

national command

The authority, conferred upon an appointed Australian commander, to safeguard Australian national interests during multinational operations.

operation

A series of tactical actions with a common unifying purpose, planned and conducted to achieve a strategic or campaign end state or objective within a given time and geographical area.

operational art

The skilful employment of military forces to attain strategic goals through the design, organisation, sequencing and direction of campaigns and major operations.

Notes:

1. Operational art translates strategic into operational and ultimately tactical actions.
2. It requires a commander to:
 - a. identify the military conditions or end state that constitute the strategic objective;
 - b. decide the operational objectives that must be achieved to reach the desired end state;
 - c. order a sequence of actions that lead to fulfilment of the operational objectives; and
 - d. apply the military resources allocated to sustain the desired sequence of actions.

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operational command

The authority granted to a commander to specify missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to re-assign forces and to retain or delegate operational control, tactical command and/or control as may be deemed necessary.

Note: It does not of itself include responsibility for administration.

operational control (opcon)

The authority delegated to a commander to:

- a. direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time or location;
- b. deploy units concerned and retain or delegate tactical control of those units.

Notes:

1. It does not include authority to allocate separate employment of components of the units concerned.
2. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control.

raise, train and sustain

The generation, preparation, and maintenance of Defence capability by designated capability managers at the level of capability specified in preparedness directives.

Notes:

1. Capability managers raise, train and sustain (RTS) through the exercise of service command (for Service Chiefs) or joint command (for VCDF, CJOPS and CJC).
2. Before and after assigning forces to operations, RTS encompasses service chief requirements to:
 - a. Generate force elements (capability) in accordance with force structure priorities.
 - b. Train and sustain force elements at specified preparedness levels.
 - c. Reconstitute forces returning from operations.
3. Once forces are assigned, RTS encompasses:
 - a. Chief of Joint Operations (CJOPS) requirements to:

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- (1) Generate joint forces capability in accordance with force structure priorities.
 - (2) Sustain joint forces through the provision of appropriately prepared force elements.
 - (3) Provide support to assigned forces.
 - (4) Be the coordination authority for technical control of assigned forces and the arbiter of disputes between operational and technical control priorities.
- b. Service chiefs and capability managers requirements to:
- (1) Sustain forces through the provision of appropriately prepared personnel and equipment.
 - (2) Provide support to assigned forces that is beyond the capability of operational headquarters.
 - (3) Exercise their technical control authority for assigned forces, through CJOPS, as the coordinating authority.
 - (4) Provide technical control advice to CJOPS for assigned forces, including priority notification of any impact on operations.

service command

The enduring authority given by the Chief of the Defence Force to service chiefs to command their services.

Note: Service command does not include authority to conduct operations.

tactical command

The authority delegated to a commander to specify missions and tasks to forces under their command for the accomplishment of the mission specified by higher authority.

tactical control (tacon)

The detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or manoeuvres necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.

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technical control (techcon)

The provision of specialist and technical advice by designated authorities for the management and operation of forces.

Notes:

1. Capability managers exercise technical control and will not normally delegate it. Technical control advice is not included in a delegation of theatre command.
2. Capability managers exercise technical control through advice to the theatre commander for assigned forces.
3. Technical control advice may not be modified but may be rejected in part or in total by a commander in consideration of operational factors and within their span of command.
4. A commander is accountable for the consequences of rejecting the advice.

theatre command

The authority given by the Chief of the Defence Force to a subordinate to command assigned forces to prepare for and conduct operations (campaigns, operations, combined and joint exercises, and other activities as directed).

Note: Theatre command does not include authority to determine single-Service personnel policy or conduct career management.

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Shortened forms of words

1JMU	1st Joint Movement Unit
AAP	Australian Air Publication
ACAUST	Air Commander Australia
ADDP	Australian Defence Doctrine Publication
ADDP-D	Australian Defence Doctrine Publication-Docctrine
ADF	Australian Defence Force
ADFHQ	Australian Defence Force Headquarters
ADFP	Australian Defence Force Publication
ADFWC	Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre
AIF	Australian Imperial Force
C2	command and control
CASG	Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group
CAOC	coalition air operations centre
CC	component commander
CDF	Chief of the Defence Force
CDJFHQ	Commander Deployable Joint Force Headquarters
CDRUSPACOM	Commander United States Pacific Command
CFC	Combined (or Coalition) Force Commander
CJC	Commander Joint Capabilities
CIS	communication and information system
CINCPAC	Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (USA)
civpol	civilian police
CJLOG	Commander Joint Logistics
CJOPS	Chief Joint Operations
CJTF	commander joint task force
CMO	Chief Military Observer
CMS	Chief of Mission Support
COMAST	Commander Australian Theatre
COMAUSC	Commander Australian Contingent
COMAUSFLT	Commander Australian Fleet
comd	commander
conops	concept of operations
COP	common operational picture
COS	chief of staff
COSC	Chiefs of Service Committee
Cth	Commonwealth

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DACC	Defence Assistance to the Civil Community
DC	Defence Committee
DCJOPS	Deputy Chief Joint Operations
DEPSEC	Deputy Secretary
DFACA	Defence Force Aid to the Civil Authority
DFS	Department of Field Support
DGACOPS	Director-General Air Command Operations
DGAIR	Director-General Air
DIRLAUTH	direct liaison authorised
DJFHQ	Deployable Joint Force Headquarters
DMS	Director of Mission Support
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DSRSG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General
FC	force commander
FE	force element
FORCOMD	Commander Forces Command
fullcomd	full command
HOM	head of mission
HOMC	Head of Military Component
HOPC	Head of Police Component
HQ	headquarters
HQ 1 Div	Headquarters 1st Division
HQJOC	Headquarters Joint Operations Command
HQMNF-1	Headquarters Multinational Force Command
INTERFET	International Force for East Timor
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
jcomd	joint command
JFAO	joint force area of operations
JLC	Joint Logistics Command
JOC	Joint Operations Command
JTF	joint task force
LOAC	law of armed conflict
MEAO	Middle East Area of Operations

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MER	Middle East Region
MILAD	Military Advisor
MINDEF	Minister for Defence
MNF	multinational force
MNO	multinational operation
MOU	memorandum of understanding
natcomd	national command
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCC	National Contingent Commander
NSC	National Security Committee of Cabinet
OE	operational environment
OGD	other government departments
OPD	operational preparedness directive
opcomd	operational command
opcon	operational control
opord	operation order
PADFA	Program of Australian Defence Force Activities
PULSE	Profile of Unit Leadership, Satisfaction and Effectiveness
RAAF	Royal Australian Air Force
RAN	Royal Australian Navy
RN	Royal Navy
ROE	rules of engagement
RSO&I	reception, staging, onward movement and integration
SCAC	Secretary and Chief of the Defence Force's Advisory Committee
SCG	Strategic Command Group
SCNS	Secretaries Committee on National Security
scomd	service command
SECDEF	Secretary of Defence
SOCAUST	Special Operations Commander Australia
SOCOMD	Special Operations Command
SP&IG	Strategic Policy and Intelligence Group
SRSR	Special Representative of the Secretary-General

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tacomd	tactical command
tacon	tactical control
TCC	troop-contributing country
TCN	troop-contributing nation
tcomd	theatre command
techcon	technical control
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
UNSG	United Nations Secretary-General
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
USA	United States of America
USG	Under-Secretary-General
VCDF	Vice Chief of the Defence Force
WHS	workplace health and safety

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