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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE CHIEFS OF SERVICE COMMITTEE

COSC AGENDUM 596 OF 22 IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS FROM AFGHANISTAN CAMPAIGN AND ^{\$22}

STUDIES

Sponsoring COSC member: Chief of the Defence Force

SPONSOR'S EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Purpose

1. To seek COSC agreement on the approach to implementation of recommendations from the recent Afghanistan Campaign Study \$22

Key judgments

2. Recommendations and implementation actions \$22 were further refined in consultation with Groups and Services post exposure at the 30 June 2022 COSC. \$33(a)(ii)

Recommendations

- 3. It is recommended that COSC:
- a. Agree the recommendations and implementation actions summarised at Enclosure 1.
- b. s22
- c. **Agree** Joint Doctrine Management Group (JDMG) review the 11 recommendations involving doctrinal changes, allocate review responsibilities to doctrine sponsors and then oversee doctrinal change implementation.
- d. Agree that implementation leads for Campaign Study Recommendations 8.2, 12.1, 17.1 and 21.1 s22

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SENSITIVE: COMMITTEE

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Resource implications

Most recommendations can be implemented within existing resources, however additional 4. resources may be required to address \$22 ICT related recommendations (Campaign Study Recommendation 13.1 s22

Consultation

All Groups, Services and AIRTF have been consulted on this submission with inputs 5. summarised and incorporated into Enclosure 1. Other than items flagged for further COSC discussion there are no outstanding issues or dissenting views.

Contact officer: MAJGEN Andrew Hocking, \$22 Co-lead and author of Afghanistan Campaign Study \$22

Date authorised: 16 Aug 22

PROTECTED SENSITIVE: COMMITTEE

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AGENDUM PAPER

Background

6. In June 2021, MAJGEN Hocking conducted a study into the key organisational-level lessons from the ADF's commitment to the Afghanistan Campaign. s22

The full studies are at Enclosures 2 and 3. A Defence Lessons Learning and Adaption Forum was conducted on 19 May 2022 to enable broad reflection on the findings of the two studies, and to discuss the enterprise level "so what" in a campaigning in competition context.

Recommendations

7. Consolidated recommendations from both studies and proposed implementation leads were exposed to COSC on 2 June 2022. These have been further consulted, agreed and consolidated with further COSC discussion required in relation to 1 recommendation and the general approach to implementing doctrinal changes associated with 11 recommendations.

Recommendation 1: That COSC **agree** the recommendations and implementation actions summarised at Enclosure 1.

s22

Recommendation 3: That COSC **agree** Joint Doctrine Management Group (JDMG) review the 11 recommendations involving doctrinal changes, allocate review responsibilities to doctrine sponsors and then oversee doctrinal change implementation.

Implementation oversight

8. Centralised oversight of the implementation of 90 recommendations is resource intensive. The vast majority of implementation actions either fall within existing Defence processes/projects that already have adequate oversight, or are not considered substantial enough to require enterprise level oversight. 10 implementation actions do not fall within existing Defence processes/projects and are considered substantial enough to warrant COSC implementation oversight.

 Recommendation
 4:
 That COSC agree implementation leads for Campaign Study

 Recommendations
 8.2, 12.1, 17.1 and 21.1 \$22

 report implementation progress to COSC biannually.

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Conclusion

10.Implementation of the recommendations contained in the Afghanistan Campaign Studys22will contribute to broader enterprise transformation efforts that prepare Defencefor future demands.

Enclosures:

- 1. Consolidated recommendations and implementation actions.
- 2. Preparing for the Future: Organisational Lessons from the Afghanistan Campaign
- 3. s22



	AFGHANISTAN CAMPAIGN STUDY Recommendation Summary Focus Area 1: Strategy Making (See study for full description)					
Lesson 1	A more dynamic, competitive and interconnected future operating environment will require strategy-making systems, forums and cultures to be more iterative and have a	1.1 Government consider reviewing Australia's strategy-making and monitoring mechanisms.				
	wider range of whole-of-government and expert inputs.	1.2 Develop a whole-of-government national strategy-making curriculum.				
		1.3 Codify the roles and expected behaviours of those involved in strategy making.				
		1.4 Conduct a review of Defence military strategy-making mechanisms and processes.				
		1.5 Review ADF Command, Control and Communications (C3) paradigms.				
Lesson 2	Defining, reviewing and clearly communicating national and supporting military strategic objectives is essential to enabling a coordinated whole-of-government effort, maintaining public interest and support, and ensuring those in harm's way at the tactical level have a clear and unifying purpose.	2.1 Review Defence's approach to media during operations and campaigns.				
		2.2 Review ADF strategy-making, planning, orders and leadership doctrine.				
Lesson 3	Western aspiration can be a strength but if due consideration is not given to local history, culture, politics and capacity it can lead to overly ambitious and unsustainable	3.1 Enhance ADF professional development in regional history, culture and language.				
	national and military strategic objectives.	3.2 Include specialists, experts and gender advisers in planning and strategy making.				





Focus Area	a 2: Campaign Design	Recommendation Summary	s47C, s33(a)(ii)
		(See study for full description)	
Lesson 4	The ADF needs to appropriately balance its education and overall investment across the tactical, operational and strategic levels to	4.1 Review and refine the role of HQJOC and MSC.	
	ensure success in future military commitments.	4.2 More regularly exercise the linkages between the political, strategic and operational levels.	
Lesson 5	Robust campaign design and assessment are essential to successfully achieving national strategic objectives and require appropriate education and overall investment.	5.1 Further weight campaign design within the Defence training and education continuum.	
		5.2 Invest further in HQJOC capacity and capability to conduct campaign design and assessment.	-
Lesson 6			-
Lesson	Force optimisation and force sustainability should be considered carefully and objectively when selecting the military means to achieve strategic ends. Force options and all associated risks should be formally communicated to government for consideration.	6.1 Further codify in ADF doctrine an objective process for considering both immediate and longitudinal risks associated with force assignment and ongoing rotation.	
		6.2 Re-examine and codify how the ADF might better prepare and utilise embeds.	
		6.3 Enhance and build on the ADF's extant and standing structures of Defence attachés, national liaison officers and embeds.	
		6.4 Improve understanding of the application of personnel caps.	
		6.5 Enhance enabling capabilities in standing and deployed force structures.	





Lesson 7	The ADF and other government departments	7.1 Develop whole-of-government	s47C, s33(a)(ii)
	and agencies should be able to deploy capabilities that realise the full potential of	counterinsurgency doctrine.	_
	coordinated whole-of-government effects, which are often necessary to achieve enduring strategic outcomes.	7.2 Foster the skills and cultures of ADF personnel to effectively contribute to whole-of-government strategy, planning and operational execution.	
Focus Area	3: Command and Control (C2)	Recommendation Summary (See study for full description)	
Lesson 8	C2 structures and authorities are essential to promote the exercise of leadership, command accountability, risk management, operational coordination, coalition influence and to ensure alignment of tactical actions with strategic ends.	8.1 Include the requirement for formal C2 risk assessments in planning and strategy doctrine.	
		8.2 Strengthen assurance mechanisms that maintain the integrity of reporting, detect any filtering of information up chains of command, and enable confidence in dispersed C2 environments.	
Lesson 9	Restrictions and caveats calibrated by national risk appetite can affect national reputation, strategic influence and broader alliance objectives, which over time can unintentionally increase risk to mission.	 9.1 Carefully calibrate caveats and restrictions. 9.2 Review and establish more explicit 'coalition C2 models' within a Joint Operating Concept. 	

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Lesson 10	There is significant risk in the practice of mission command having ad hoc/non- standing HQs and task groups within complex national and coalition C2 arrangements without having national formation HQs in the tactical chain of command. This risk should be considered carefully when determining force assignment, task group preparation, C2 design and the application of mission command. The excessive disaggregation of established sub-unit, unit and HQ capability bricks can increase risk in both deployed and non- deployed force elements.	 10.1 Enhance 'mission command' doctrine and understanding. 10.2 Further stress in training, the key role that young officers and non-commissioned officers play in mission command execution. 11.1 Further evolve task-organisation doctrinal concepts to retain their strengths but also acknowledge and mitigate the risks of forming excessively ad hoc, non-habitual HQs and task groups. 11.2 Where formed units are not deployed, incorporate non-deployed personnel into the structures of other non-deployed units. 	s47C, s33(a)(ii)
Lesson 12:	The continuity of deployed personnel, structures and teams is important to achieving alliance objectives, effective command and leadership, and for the wellbeing of personnel during and post deployment. The risks associated with disrupting this continuity should be considered carefully against the benefits.	12.1 Further study the effects of tour length on personnel, family welfare, governance and operational effectiveness.	
Lesson 13	Communications systems and protocols, combined with human connections and trust, are essential for enabling effective C2 in a coalition environment.	 13.1 Evolve the information technology (IT) systems and protocols that enable the rapid sharing of intelligence and information across coalition and regional partners. 13.2 Ensure dedicated and appropriately resourced Force Communications Units remain part of future deployed force structures. 	

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Focus Area	a 4: ADF Culture	Recommendation Summary	
	1	(See study for full description)	_
Lesson 14	The inherent complexity of warfare and its changing character demand an ongoing evolution of ADF culture and practice that retains existing strengths but appropriately acknowledges and mitigates vulnerabilities.	14.1 Review doctrine, education and training to ensure the upsides of military culture are reinforced, while adequately acknowledging and mitigating associated vulnerabilities.	
		14.2 Review doctrine, education and training to identify areas of narrow, prescriptive or binary framings, which do not fully describe more complex realities, or are overly weighted to the tactical context.	
Lesson 15	Australia's egalitarianism is a cultural strength of the ADF, but inherent vulnerabilities need to be appropriately acknowledged, balanced and mitigated.	 15.1 Review ADF leadership doctrine, education and training to ensure the strengths and vulnerabilities of Australian egalitarian culture are appropriately acknowledged and mitigated. 15.2 Evolve and more explicitly articulate the balance of 'collaborative', 'enquiring' and 'respectful challenge' cultures aspired to under One Defence. 	





			s47C, s33(a)(ii)
Lesson 16	Early Service emphasis on tribalism and unit pride can contribute to a sense of belonging and esprit de corps. Through time or if over emphasised, this can also generate individual and organisational overconfidence and a lack of humility. This can detract from behaviours that are required to integrate joint, whole-of-government and coalition effects and can contribute to 'identity fragility' on transition out of service.	16.1 Review recruit and officer training cultures to ensure there is no promotion of ideas that ADF personnel are 'better than others'.	
Lesson 17	Beyond the general trend of ADF tribalism and unit pride exist elite cultures that are vulnerable to 'exceptionalism'. When combined with geographic isolation, excessive compartmentalisation and inappropriate empowerment, this 'exceptionalism' can further exacerbate barriers to cooperation, sharing of	17.1 Reviewing the remit of independent bodies such as the Inspector General of the ADF to ensure they are enabled to routinely examine and pre-emptively scan for emerging risks in unit's vulnerable to exceptionalism.	
	information/learning and generate resistance to appropriate oversight and external checks and balances. This in turn can create institutional risk and deprive the broader force of opportunities for collective improvement and combined effect.	17.2 Review specialist capabilities and objectively determine the need and extent of compartmentalisation and/or bespoke raise, train, sustain approaches.	
		17.3 Better integrate the learning and adaption systems housed in specialist capabilities with the broader ADF lessons enterprise.	
		17.4 Identify opportunities to exercise and expose a wider audience to specialist capabilities (including intelligence capabilities) as part of joint and whole-of-government training and education regimes.	
Lesson 18	The ADF would benefit from a simple, consistent and regularly applied tool for measuring and monitoring organisational culture. Such a tool could contribute to pre- emptively identifying risk or exploiting	18.1 Consolidate existing cultural monitoring tools into a single ADF tool that is able to incorporate information from other databases and personnel reporting systems. 18.2 Shift the ADF's cultural	
	opportunity to optimise individual and team performance.	monitoring regime from a focus on climate, behaviour and governance to a system that provides leaders at all	





Lesson 19	The nature of warfare requires a well understood ethical and cultural basis to guide decisions and actions, and to support an increasingly educated and aware workforce to process their military experiences.	 levels with a more holistic analytical tool, which can be used to optimise individual and team performance or identify and pre-emptively treat areas of emerging risk. 19.1 Refine and further develop evidence-based ethics doctrine. 19.2 Include 'regular and ongoing' LOAC, ethics and cultural training at all levels during deployments. 19.3 Ensure LOAC, ethics and cultural training remain part of any 'ready' certification for contingency forces. 	s47C, s33(a)(ii)
Focus Area Manageme	5: Learning, Adaption and Risk	Recommendation Summary (See study for full description)	-
Lesson 20	The ADF is unbalanced in its application of learning due to the current emphasis on capturing lessons by <i>Service at the tactical</i> level, rather than capturing and implementing lessons along domain, joint, enterprise or interagency lines at <i>all</i> levels.	 20.1 Further develop a Defence Lessons capability that integrates existing learning mechanisms (including those of specialist capabilities) into a single coherent Defence-wide system. 20.2 Formally codify into planning doctrine a requirement to research and raise awareness of previous lessons in the early stages of any planning process. 20.3 Re-institute annual senior leader exercises that review and analyse organisational-level lessons from operations during a campaign. 	





		20.4 Include learning and adaption outcomes in ADF leadership and reporting models to ensure learning, adaption and continuous improvement is incentivised and becomes a core part of leadership at all levels.	s47C, s33(a)(ii)
Lesson 21	The ADF would benefit from tools, education and practices that appropriately support identifying, registering and mitigating the risks (and exploiting the opportunities) that exist between the tactical-event and enterprise levels.	21.1 Identify best practice methodologies for scanning, recording and managing risks/opportunities from the tactical to the enterprise levels.	

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE CHIEFS OF SERVICE COMMITTEE

COSC AGENDUM 595 OF 22 IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS FROM AFGHANISTAN CAMPAIGN^{\$22} STUDIES

Sponsoring COSC member: Chief of the Defence Force

SPONSOR'S EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Purpose

1. To provide COSC an exposure of the allocated Group/Service lead responses to recommendations from the recent Afghanistan Campaign Study ^{\$22}

in preparation for more formal consideration and decision at the 2 August COSC.

Key judgments

2. In support of the broader Defence Transformation Strategy, recommendations from both studies identify opportunities to continue to transform the ADF in areas of strategy making, campaign design, command and control, culture, learning, risk management, intelligence, interagency planning/ operations and preparedness.

3. A consolidation of Group/Service lead responses, intended implementation actions and reasoning for partial or non-support are at Enclosure 1. s47C, s33(a)(ii)

4. Further analysis, consultation and consolidation of Group/Service responses is required in order to prepare a paper that enables focused discussion and decisions at the 2 August COSC.

Recommendations

- 5. It is recommended that COSC:
- a. Note the allocated Group/Service lead responses to the recommendations from the recent Afghanistan Campaign Study ^{\$22} (Enclosure 1).

Resource implications

6. If necessary, resource implications will be outlined in the 2 August COSC submission. It is expected that there may be resource implications around some IT related recommendations but that most recommendations can be implemented within extant resources.

2

Consultation

7. This COSC provides the first exposure for Groups and Services to review the allocated lead's position on respective recommendations. Further analysis and consultation will be conducted in order to prepare a paper that enables focused discussion and decisions at the 2 August COSC. Consultation comments will be provided as an annex to the 2 August COSC Agendum paper with dissenting views highlighted.

Contact officer: MAJGEN Andrew Hocking, S22 Co-lead and author of Afghanistan Campaign Study S22 Date authorised: 17 Jun 22

PROTECTED SENSITIVE: COMMITTEE

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AGENDUM PAPER

Background

8. In June 2021, MAJGEN Hocking conducted a study into the key organisational-level lessons from the ADF's commitment to the Afghanistan Campaign. s22

9. Considering the recommendations **\$22** is important to help prepare the ADF for future challenges and is an integral part of Defence's Transformation Strategy. To achieve this, a Defence Lessons Learning and Adaption Forum was conducted on 19 May. This forum enabled broad reflection on the findings to determine the enterprise level "so what" in a campaigning in competition context. It is likely that there will be further Defence forums of this nature **\$22**

10. Detailed consideration and decision on respective recommendations will be achieved through exposure and noting at the 30 Jun COSC with the aim to decide on recommendations at the 2 August COSC.

Recommendation 1: That COSC note the Group/Service lead res	ponses to recommendations from
the recent Afghanistan Campaign Study ^{\$22}	(Enclosure 1).

Risks and mitigation

11. Risks and mitigations associated with the implementation of recommendations or any decision to not implement recommendations will be outlined in the 2 August COSC submission. This will include risks and mitigations associated with any overseeing implementation.

Conclusion

12. Through consideration of the recommendations contained in the Afghanistan Campaign s22 , opportunity exist to continue to transform the ADF in preparation for future demands.

Enclosure:

1. Consolidated Group/Service lead's consideration of the recommendations from the recent Afghanistan Campaign Study^{\$22}


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Lesson 1	A more dynamic, competitive and interconnected future operating environment will require strategy-making systems, forums and cultures to be more iterative and have a wider range of whole-of-government and expert inputs.	1.1 Government consider reviewing Australia's strategy-making and monitoring mechanisms. 1.1 Government and monitoring mechanisms. 1.2 Develop a whole-of-government national strategy-making curriculum.	


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Lesson 2	Defining, reviewing and clearly communicating national and supporting military strategic objectives is essential to enabling a coordinated whole-of-government effort, maintaining public interest and support, and ensuring those in harm's way at the tactical level have a clear and unifying purpose.	2.1 Review Defence's approach to media during operations and campaigns.	s47C, s33(a)(ii)
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		e47	′C, s33(a)(ii)
		547	0, 555(a)(II)
		2.2 Review ADF strategy-making, planning, orders and leadership doctrine.	
Lesson 3	Western aspiration can be a strength but if due consideration is not given to local history, culture,	3.1 Enhance ADF professional development in regional history, culture and language.	
	politics and capacity it can lead to overly ambitious and unsustainable national and military strategic objectives.	regional history, culture and language.	

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		3.2 Include specialists, experts and gender advisers in planning and strategy making.)(ii)
Focus Are	The ADF needs to appropriately balance its education and overall investment across the tactical, operational and strategic levels to ensure success in future military commitments.	Recommendations 4.1 Review and refine the role of HQJOC and MSC.	
		4.2 More regularly exercise the linkages between the political, strategic and operational levels.	
Lesson 5	Robust campaign design and assessment are essential to successfully achieving national strategic objectives and require appropriate education and overall investment.	5.1 Further weight campaign design within the Defence training and education continuum.	


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		5.2 Invest further in HQJOC capacity and capability to conduct campaign design and assessment.	s47C, s33(a)(ii)
Lesson 6	Force optimisation and force sustainability should be considered carefully and objectively when selecting the military means to achieve strategic ends. Force options and all associated risks should be formally communicated to government for consideration.	6.1 Further codify in ADF doctrine an objective process for considering both immediate and longitudinal risks associated with force assignment and ongoing rotation.	


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		s47C, s33(a)(ii)	
Lesson 7	The ADF and other government departments and agencies should be able to deploy capabilities that realise the full potential of coordinated whole-of- government effects, which are often necessary to achieve enduring strategic outcomes.	7.1 Develop whole-of-government counterinsurgency doctrine.	
		effectively contribute to whole-of-government strategy,	



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		planning and operational execution.	s47C, s33(a)(ii)
Focus Are	ea 3: Command and Control (C2)	Recommendations	
Lesson 8	C2 structures and authorities are essential to promote the exercise of leadership, command accountability, risk management, operational coordination, coalition influence and to ensure alignment of tactical actions with strategic ends.	8.1 Include the requirement for formal C2 risk assessments in planning and strategy doctrine.	

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		s47C, s33(a)(ii) 8.2 Strengthen assurance mechanisms that maintain the integrity of reporting, detect any filtering of information up chains of command, and enable confidence in dispersed C2 environments.
Lesson 9	Restrictions and caveats calibrated by national risk appetite can affect national reputation, strategic influence and broader alliance objectives, which over time can unintentionally increase risk to mission.	9.1 Carefully calibrate caveats and restrictions.


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			s47C, s33(a)(ii)
		9.2 Review and establish more explicit 'coalition C2	
		models' within a Joint Operating Concept.	
Lesson 10	There is significant risk in the practice of mission command having ad hoc/non-standing HQs and task	10.1 Enhance 'mission command' doctrine and understanding.	
	groups within complex national and coalition C2 arrangements without having national formation HQs in		
	the tactical chain of command. This risk should be considered carefully when determining force		
	assignment, task group preparation, C2 design and the application of mission command.		
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		s47C, s33(a)(ii)
Lesson 11	The excessive disaggregation of established sub-unit, unit and HQ capability bricks can increase risk in both deployed and non-deployed force elements.	11.1 Further evolve task-organisation doctrinal concepts to retain their strengths but also acknowledge and mitigate the risks of forming excessively ad hoc, non-habitual HQs and task groups.

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			s33(a)(ii)
		11.2 Where formed units are not deployed,	
		incorporate non-deployed personnel into the structures of other non-deployed units.	
		structures of other non-deployed units.	
Lesson	The continuity of deployed personnel, structures and	12.1 Further study the effects of tour length on	
12:	teams is important to achieving alliance objectives,	personnel, family welfare, governance and operational	
	effective command and leadership, and for the	effectiveness.	
	wellbeing of personnel during and post deployment.		
	The risks associated with disrupting this continuity should be considered carefully against the benefits.		
	should be considered carefully against the benefits.		
Lesson 13	Communications systems and protocols, combined with	13.1 Evolve the information technology (IT) systems	
15	human connections and trust, are essential for enabling effective C2 in a coalition environment.	and protocols that enable the rapid sharing of intelligence and information across coalition and	
		regional partners.	

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		13.2 Ensure dedicated and appropriately resourced Force Communications Units remain part of future deployed force structures.	s47C, s33(a)(ii)
Focus An Lesson 14	The inherent complexity of warfare and its changing character demand an ongoing evolution of ADF culture and practice that retains existing strengths but appropriately acknowledges and mitigates vulnerabilities.	Recommendations 14.1 Review doctrine, education and training to ensure the upsides of military culture are reinforced, while adequately acknowledging and mitigating associated vulnerabilities.	


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×			s47C, s33(a)(ii)
		14.2 Review doctrine, education and training to identify areas of narrow, prescriptive or binary	
		framings, which do not fully describe more complex realities, or are overly weighted to the tactical context.	
Lesson	Australia's egalitarianism is a cultural strength of the	15.1 Review ADF leadership doctrine, education and	
15	ADF, but inherent vulnerabilities need to be appropriately acknowledged, balanced and mitigated.	training to ensure the strengths and vulnerabilities of Australian egalitarian culture are appropriately acknowledged and mitigated.	

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		s47C, s33(a)(ii)	
Lesson 16	Early Service emphasis on tribalism and unit pride can contribute to a sense of belonging and esprit de corps. Through time or if over emphasised, this can also generate individual and organisational overconfidence and a lack of humility. This can detract from behaviours that are required to integrate joint, whole-of-government and coalition effects and can contribute to 'identity fragility' on transition out of service.	16.1 Review recruit and officer training cultures to ensure there is no promotion of ideas that ADF personnel are 'better than others'.	

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×		s47C, s33(a)(ii)
Lesson 17	Beyond the general trend of ADF tribalism and unit pride exist elite cultures that are vulnerable to 'exceptionalism'. When combined with geographic isolation, excessive compartmentalisation and inappropriate empowerment, this 'exceptionalism' can further exacerbate barriers to cooperation, sharing of information/learning and generate resistance to appropriate oversight and external checks and balances. This in turn can create institutional risk and deprive the broader force of opportunities for collective improvement and combined effect.	17.1 Reviewing the remit of independent bodies such as the Inspector General of the ADF to ensure they are enabled to routinely examine and pre-emptively scan for emerging risks in unit's vulnerable to exceptionalism.

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		s47C, s33(a)(ii)
	17.3 Better integrate the learning and adaption systems housed in specialist capabilities with the broader ADF lessons enterprise.	

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Lesson	The ADF would benefit from a simple, consistent and	17.4 Identify opportunities to exercise and expose a wider audience to specialist capabilities (including intelligence capabilities) as part of joint and whole-of-government training and education regimes.	17C, s33(a)(ii)
Lesson 18	regularly applied tool for measuring and monitoring organisational culture. Such a tool could contribute to pre-emptively identifying risk or exploiting opportunity to optimise individual and team performance.	a single ADF tool that is able to incorporate information from other databases and personnel reporting systems.	
		18.2 Shift the ADF's cultural monitoring regime from a focus on climate, behaviour and governance to a system that provides leaders at all levels with a more holistic analytical tool, which can be used to optimise individual and team performance or identify and pre-emptively treat areas of emerging risk.	
Lesson 19	The nature of warfare requires a well understood ethical and cultural basis to guide decisions and actions, and to support an increasingly educated and aware workforce to process their military experiences.	19.1 Refine and further develop evidence-based ethics doctrine.	


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		19.2 Include 'regular and ongoing' LOAC, ethics and cultural training at all levels during deployments. 19.3 Ensure LOAC, ethics and cultural training remain part of any 'ready' certification for contingency forces.	s47C, s33(a)(ii)
Focus Are	ea 5: Learning, Adaption and Risk Management	Recommendations	
Lesson 20	The ADF is unbalanced in its application of learning due to the current emphasis on capturing lessons by <i>Service at the tactical</i> level, rather than capturing and implementing lessons along domain, joint, enterprise or interagency lines at <i>all</i> levels.	20.1 Further develop a Defence Lessons capability that integrates existing learning mechanisms (including those of specialist capabilities) into a single coherent Defence-wide system.	


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
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		20.4 Include learning and adaption outcomes in ADF leadership and reporting models to ensure learning, adaption and continuous improvement is incentivised and becomes a core part of leadership at all levels.	47C, s33(a)(ii)
Lesson 21	The ADF would benefit from tools, education and practices that appropriately support identifying, registering and mitigating the risks (and exploiting the opportunities) that exist between the tactical-event and enterprise levels.	21.1 Identify best practice methodologies for scanning, recording and managing risks/opportunities from the tactical to the enterprise levels.	

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ANNEX A TO COSC AGENDUM 625 OF 22 17 JUN 22

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- OFFICIAL SENSITIVE. COMMITTEE

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE CHIEFS OF SERVICE COMMITTEE

COSC AGENDUM 457 OF 2021 – PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE: KEY ORGANISATIONAL LESSONS FROM THE AFGHANISTAN CAMPAIGN

Sponsoring COSC member: Chief of the Defence Force

SPONSOR'S EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Purpose

1. To brief COSC on the outcomes of an independent study commissioned by the Chief of the Defence Force into organisational-level lessons from the Afghanistan Campaign.

Key judgments

2. The study highlights that the Afghanistan Campaign was protracted in duration, framed by high and evolving aspirations at the political level, characterised by complex coalition considerations at the strategic level, and executed in an environment with deep historical and cultural dynamics at the tactical level. It finds that these complexities drew out remarkable qualities of leadership, determination, adaptability, courage and compassion at every level. It also finds that the Afghanistan Campaign drove significant evolution of ADF capability in areas including intelligence fusion, rapid capability acquisition, force protection, detainee management, personnel support and overall combat mindset. It finds that Australia's future strategic environment and the evolving nature of warfare will be increasingly characterised by grey-zone activity, a convergence of cross domain effects, and the need for soft and hard power integration. To best prepare for this future, the study identifies key organisational lessons in areas of strategy making, campaign design, command and control, risk management, learning systems and aspects of ADF culture.

Recommendations

- 3. It is recommended that COSC:
- a. **note** the outcomes of the study.
- b. **offer** any feedback for consideration prior to publication.

Resource implications

4. There are no additional resource implications. Following any COSC inputs and final editorial adjustments, the study will be published at the UNCLASSIFIED level as part of Australian Defence College - *Vanguard Occasional Paper Series*. This is expected to occur prior to mid December 2021.





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Consultation

5. Within an established ethics framework, the study has been informed by a broad literature review and reflective inputs from approximately 150 current and ex-serving ADF personnel, academics and national security leaders. Early drafts of the paper have also been circulated to the Secretary, CDF, VCDF, Service Chiefs, CJOPS, CDI, FAS IP, FAS Gov and Reform, other select members of the Defence Senior Leadership Group, academics and national security leaders. Feedback from this consultation has been incorporated where appropriate.

Contact officer: s47E(d) **Date authorised**: 01 Oct 21

ADC to MAJGEN Andrew Hocking



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AGENDUM PAPER

Background

1. On 22 Jun 21, the CDF issued a directive to MAJGEN Andrew Hocking to lead an independent study to identify, consolidate and report on ADF organisational-level lessons from operations in Afghanistan between 2001 to 2021 (see annex A).

Objectives of the study

- 2. The objectives of the study were to:
- a. Prepare the ADF for future operational demands, by identifying core organisational learnings from the Afghanistan experience.
- b. Stimulate focused, rapid, and ongoing learning at a range of levels during the course of the study, where appropriate.
- c. Reinforce best practice for lessons learned within the ADF.
- d. Ensure confidence in Defence's culture and practice of learning. Cut and paste 4a-4d from the Directive.
- e. Reinforce trust and confidence with government, non-government, and international partners; and most importantly with the Australian community we serve.

Outcomes of the study

3. The outcomes of the study are contained in the draft paper at enclosure 1. An Executive Summary of the key organisational-level lessons is on pages 3-5 of the draft paper.

Recommendation 1: That COSC **note** the outcomes of the study.

Recommendation 2: That COSC offer feedback for consideration prior to publication.

Opportunities/risks and mitigations

4. Increasing public interest in the Afghanistan evacuation operation and overall campaign may generate a degree of media and political interest. This presents an opportunity for the study to drive broader discussion and learning. It also presents an opportunity to demonstrate the importance of open, objective and thoughtful reflection. The associated risks are mitigated by fact that the study is focused on ADF learning and has avoided any detailed discussion of matters relating to government policy.

5. Risks associated with compromising ongoing war crimes investigations have been mitigated through early consultation with IGADF and the provision of independent legal advice. This ensured inputs were not sought from people where this risk was apparent.





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6. Opportunity also exists for the recommendations of the study to be further discussed by COSC post publication, with a view to determining any follow on action.

Conclusion

7. It is hoped that the findings of this study stimulate further debate, and inform ongoing organisational-level learning that best prepares the ADF for future challenges.

Annex A:

A. CDF Directive 07-2021 – Preparing for the Future: Lessons from the Afghanistan Campaign.

Enclosure:

1. DRAFT for COSC – Preparing for the Future - 1 Oct 21



ANNEX A TO COSC AGENDUM 457 OF 21 12 OCT 21

CDF Directive 07-2021 – Preparing for the Future: Lessons from the Afghanistan Campaign



ENCLOSURE 1 TO COSC AGENDUM 457 OF 21 12 OCT 21

DRAFT for COSC - Preparing for the Future - 1 Oct 21



Defence FOI 517/23/24 Item 3, Document 3 EC21-002242 See distribution



DIRECTIVE 07/2021 BY THE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE FORCE

TO ^{s22} MAJOR GENERAL A.J. HOCKING, CSC

PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE: KEY ORGANISATIONAL LESSONS FROM THE AFGHANISTAN CAMPAIGN

REFERENCES

- A. Afghanistan Inquiry Reform Plan, Version 1.0, 26 May 2021.
- B. <u>Lead the Way: Defence Transformation Strategy</u>
- C. <u>Human and Animal Research Manual</u>, October 2020

BACKGROUND

1. The Australian Defence Force (ADF) has been involved in the Afghanistan Campaign since 2001. There are numerous complete and ongoing bodies of work that document the campaign history and lessons at a range of levels.

2. Establishing a factual baseline, and consolidating organisational-level lessons within a whole of campaign context, will contribute to the ongoing development of the ADF as a lethal, capable, and dynamic military warfighting capability. It will ensure that the ADF is prepared for future operational demands.

PURPOSE

3. You are appointed to independently identify, consolidate, and report to the Chiefs of Service Committee (COSC) on ADF organisational-level lessons from operations in Afghanistan between 2001 to 2021.

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RESPONSIBILITIES AND GUIDANCE

- 4. The **objectives** of this study are to:
- a. Prepare the ADF for future operational demands, by identifying core organisational learnings from the Afghanistan experience.
- b. Stimulate focused, rapid, and ongoing learning at a range of levels during the course of the study, where appropriate.
- c. Reinforce best practice for lessons learned within the ADF.
- d. Ensure confidence in Defence's culture and practice of learning.
- e. In accordance with Reference A, reinforce trust and confidence with government, nongovernment, and international partners; and most importantly with the Australian community we serve.
- 5. The **deliverables** of this study are to:
- a. Through a literature review, and targeted engagement with current or former leaders and other relevant personnel, consolidate, prioritise, and report relevant aspects of the campaign history and organisational-level lessons.
- b. Facilitate and stimulate organisational-level reflection and learning with Defence audiences, in relation to ADF operations in Afghanistan.
- c. Triage lessons learned from ADF operations in Afghanistan, and determine optimal mechanisms for driving ongoing organisational training, education and improvement.
- d. Evolve and model an organisational-level learning approach that might inform the development of an Enterprise Lessons Learned Framework, in accordance with Reference B.
- 6. As **additional guidance**, this study is to:
- a. Gain ethics approval from the Defence People Research Low Risk Ethics Panel, in accordance with HUMRESMAN (Reference C).
- b. Write in plain, non-attributable, and constructive language that is informed by the past but focuses on preparing for the future of the ADF and Defence.
- c. To maximise ongoing utility, seek to write and report at the lowest classification possible.
- d. Avoid duplication with other ongoing work within Defence, through partnering with other stakeholders, leveraging existing work, and participating as an observer on Afghanistan Inquiry Reform Stream work where appropriate.
- e. Avoid any approach that exacerbates inquiry stress or fatigue on stakeholders, and ensure appropriate welfare support is available to those engaged directly in discussions.



- f. Where appropriate, lessons should reference the structures, systems and directions or guidance (doctrine, policy, processes, etc) that direct, govern, guide and enable the way the ADF conducts operations and Defence works to achieve its mission.
- g. This study is solely of and regarding the performance of the ADF.

REPORTING

7. Whilst your work will be intellectually independent from other ongoing work on these matters within Defence, you are to provide me verbal progress updates on a monthly basis.

8. Your final document should be briefed to the COSC in November 2021 or at another date agreed by me, in a final draft-for-publication format.

ADMINISTRATION

9. You will be administered by Army Headquarters for any Service related matters.

10. A letter of of support from me will be provided to you, to assist in leveraging personnel resources and expertise within or external to Defence. You should inform me if you require additional resources.

IMPLEMENTATION

11. This Directive is effective immediately and will remain extant until December 2021.

12. This Directive is sponsored by the Chief of Staff to the CDF. This Directive is to be reviewed by 1 November 2021 or if arrangements significantly change.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

13. You are to acknowledge receipt of this Directive by signing and returning Annex A within 14 days of issue.

s22

Angus J Campbell General Chief of the Defence Force

2,2 June 2021





Annex: A. Acknowledgement of CDF Directive 07/2021


Distribution

MAJGEN Hocking

For information:

ASSOC SEC VCDF CN CA CAF CJOPS CJC CDI DEPSEC DP DEPSEC SP&I COMD FORCOMD COMD ADC H-AITF SOCAUST

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ANNEX A TO JOINT DIRECTIVE 07/2021 JUN 21

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF JOINT DIRECTIVE

I acknowledge receipt of CDF Directive 07/2021 and will comply with the instructions detailed within.

A.J. Hocking Major General

June 21

Annex is to be submitted the Executive Support Unit (s47E(d)

OFFICIAL



CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE FORCE

EC21-002242

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LETTER OF SUPPORT – 'PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE: KEY ORGANISATIONAL LESSONS FROM THE AFGHANISTAN CAMPAIGN'

The ADF has been involved in the Afghanistan Campaign since 2001. There are numerous complete and ongoing bodies of work that document the campaign history and lessons at a range of levels. Establishing a factual baseline, and consolidating organisational-level lessons within a whole of campaign context, will contribute to the ongoing development of the ADF as a lethal, capable, and dynamic military warfighting capability. It will ensure that the ADF is prepared for future operational demands.

I have recently asked Major General Hocking to independently identify, consolidate and report on our organisational lessons from the Australian Defence Force's operations in Afghanistan. His specific deliverables include to:

- Through a literature review, and targeted engagement with current or former leaders and other relevant personnel, consolidate, prioritise, and report relevant aspects of the campaign history and organisational-level lessons.
- Facilitate and stimulate organisational-level reflection and learning with Defence audiences, in relation to ADF operations in Afghanistan.
- Triage lessons learned from ADF operations in Afghanistan, and determine optimal mechanisms for driving ongoing organisational training, education and improvement.
- Evolve and model an organisational-level learning approach that might inform the development of an Enterprise Lessons Learned Framework as part of the Defence Transformation Strategy.

To avoid duplication, I have asked him to engage and partner with other stakeholders, and where sensible both leverage and inform existing or ongoing work. It is with this in mind that I write to encourage and seek your support for his important work. I am confident that through a collaborative approach we can collectively contribute to the ongoing development of the Australian Defence Force as a lethal, capable and dynamic military warfighting instrument of national policy.

Yours sincerely

s22 Angus Mampbell, AO, DSC General Chief of the Defence Force

2 June 2021

s47E(d) PO Box 7900 CANBERRA BC ACT 2610