

Major Incident Review

- Compromised - Cargo. Traveller and other Border Systems unavailable

	Monday 29 th April, 2019
	Wonddy 23 April, 2019
Priority:	P1
Outage Period	6 hours 47 minutes
Description:	
From 0558hrs on Mo	onday 29th April 2019 users reported being unable to access a range of systems, including * 47E(0)
prompted with 'Canr	. Users were not reach this page'.
A major incident was Restoration Team.	declared and a number of technical teams engaged to investigate, this was managed via a Service
the s. 47E(d) D	dent was identified as a hardware failure, specifically a Line Card on Network Distribution Switch 1 at at at Centre. To restore services, the faulty card was removed and minor patch configurations on restored services and confirmation was received from various business areas including airports.
A restart of JVM's for restarts are needed.	s. 47E(d) were required. This was likely due to current known errors for which regular
	ed from a technical perspective at 1115hrs. Final confirmation of restoration was received from 14hrs, some local reboots of Smartgates were required to trigger connections to the network.
The Property of the Control of the C	monitoring was undertaken to ensure stability of services and there were no issues raised during this as resolved and closed at 1500hrs on Tuesday 30 April 2019.
	pact on active major incident for s. 47E(d) reference s. 47E(d) Actions for this incident needed to outage limited the ongoing investigations.
Business Impact:	
An unscheduled outa	ed in a risk to national security, trade enforcement, migrations system, and border protection. processing times at international airports, and was subject to open source media reporting.
This outage is resulte	ed in a risk to national security, trade enforcement, migrations system, and border protection.
Processing of internation of the outage	itional cargo was halted due to redirecting ABF resources to process passengers manually for the 🗓 🦞
Ongoing activities:	

- During this incident, it was identified that a configuration issue prevented failover to a second switch. A proactive major incident was raised on Wednesday 1 May because of confirmation of a lack of failover/redundancy. An emergency change was successfully completed at 0030hrs on Thursday 2 May to configure the second switch to enable failover.
- A Major Incident Review was completed on Friday 3 May and this has identified a number of points for clarification. and immediate next steps.
- IBM have prepared a risk assessment and recommendation to action the replacement of faulty hardware and complete a test of the failover.
- Failover testing of the redundancy put in place under the above mentioned P2 is being under a P1 Problem record PM4001051. This will be planned and agreed with ABF.

Rele



Identification:

- 0558hrs First call regarding outage of National Intelligence System received at the IT Service Desk
- 0600hrs Service Desk advised Unisys MIM and called through to IBM Service Desk for report of P3.
- 0638hrs s. 22(1)(a)(ii) called s. 22(1)(a)(ii) to advise that Arrivals-Departures/s. 47E(d) were all unavailable. s. 22(1)(a)(ii) then contacted Unisys MIM and advised that a Major Incident should be raised based on the business impact.
- 0706hrs Pageout for P2 was then sent at 07:10hrs (07:06hrs raised) by Unisys MIM.
- 0730hrs Major Incident escalated as a P1.

Prioritisation:

- Major Incident was initially raised as a P2 at 07:09hrs and upgraded to a P1 at 07:30hrs.
- Noting the significant impact to business, a Service Restoration Team was stood-up. In total, 5-checkpoint teleconference dial-ins were conducted throughout the day while Major Incident in-flight.

Investigation and diagnosis

- 0745hrs ICT WIO Technician identified a number of servers that were down. At this point, the issues were isolated to IBM.
- 0832hrs IBM carried out health checks and stage investigation.
- 0841hrs Verified that a Line Card was down on the Network Distribution Switch 1 at the s. 47E(d) and the assumed failover did not occur to Switch 2. Although traffic was moving across to Switch 2, it was not moving out to the WAN.

Resolution activities

IBM performed the following activities in an attempt to failover to Switch 2:

- 0855hrs Shut down the VLANS to Switch 1 so failover to Switch 2 could occur. The VLANS were seen on Switch 2, however, there was no traffic flowing through Switch 2 to the Wide Area Network (WAN).
- 1009hrs Agreed to turn off Switch 1 to force a physical failover to Switch 2 just in case there was some corruption in Switch 1 preventing the failover from occurring. Once switch 1 was turned off, Switch 2 could see the VLANs same as before, however, there was still no WAN network traffic.
- 1105hrs Given the continuing issues with Switch 2 not failing over, Switch 1 was restarted again and services were moved from the failed Line Card to another working line card on Switch 1, which involved physically moving cables from the failed Line Card to a working Line Card on Switch 1. When the relocation of the cables was complete, traffic started to flow on Switch 1. This resolved the issue and allowed traffic to flow over the WAN.
- 1115hrs Majority of airports reported restoration of services, with the remaining resolved by following SOPs and performing system restarts.

Resolution confirmation

All impacted systems and services were coming back on-line around 1115hrs and associated checks and balances being undertaken by business to confirm services restored.

- Traveller & Cargo needed to perform a restart of JVM for s. 47E(d)
- Restart of s. 47E(d) fixed some issues, however, full functionality of this was dependant on an IBM fix that was to be deployed into PROD later that evening.

IT and business stakeholders advised all affected systems were back up and running by 1245hrs and will continue to monitor. All systems appeared to be stable by 1457hrs.

Incident monitoring period

Major Incident was placed into monitoring for a further 24 hours to confirm stability. At 1500hrs the next day, Incident was placed into a resolved state and closed.

Immediate post incident action

- Requested Post Incident Reports from IBM and Unisys.
- Daily Major Incident Summary: 01 May 2019 provided to Senior Executive.

Action items from this review

- IBM to draft a risk assessment as part of their implementation plan in relation to the above-mentioned P3 Incidents
- Unisys MIM to confirm other reports of Incidents called through to the IT Service Desk between 0630-0710hrs;
- Unisys MIM to update consolidated Unisys PIR i.e. what times were the Teleconferences held, and when updates were provided to the broader group;

the

IBM to provide update on when they contacted the Service Desk about Citrix issue;



- IBM, Cargo & Trade, ABF Operations Systems Management, s. 22(1)(a)(ii)
Processing between 1114-1230hrs;

to review Cargo

- ICT SM to have a discussion with ABF Operations Systems Management to understand the greater impact of the issues;
- Change Management to review the time-frame of lodged change post-incident and the change process;
- IBM to advise what existing monitoring system triggered an alert for the line card failure and what methods are in place for IBM to receive alerts when access is unavailable via Citrix.
- IBM to perform failover testing in PROD, once the routing change is deployed there.
- Problem Ticket to be raised to investigate failover of Smartgate Arrivals and Departures in similar scenarios; and
- IBM Problem Management and Network Assurance to assess changes put through for the lower environments, with an idea to move into prod change records required to validate time frames.

Name	Title	
s. 22(1)(a)(ii)	Optus	
	ICT Service Management Director	
	IBM	
	ICT Service Management	
	IBM	
	ICT Service Management	
	ICT Service Management	
	ICT Vendor Management	
	Vendor & MOU Management	
	IBM	
	ICT Service Management	
	Vendor & MOU Management	
	ICT Service Management	
	ICT Service Management	
	Unisys	
	Unisys	
	Unisys	
	ICT Service Management	
	IBM	
	Wintel	
	ABF Operations Systems	
	Traveller Systems	
	Traveller Systems	
	Network Operations & Assurance	
	Network Operations & Assurance	
	ABF Operations Systems	
	Cargo & Trade Systems	





For further information in relation to the incident or the PIR corrective actions, please refer to the attached.

1 – PIR (IBM input)

IBM PIR - P1 IM4576792 29th Apr

2 – PIR (Unisys)

Unisys
Consolidated PIR - F Freedom of Information Act under the

	Post Incident	Report		
Incident Summary:				
Brief Incident description:	Multiple Systems Down – Prompt	ting 'Cannot reach this page'		
Incident Number:	s. 47E(d)	External Reference Numbers:	IN1699357	
Priority Level:	Priority 1	PIR Author:	s. 22(1)(a)(ii)	
Actual downtime of Incident:	4 hours 7 minutes	PIR Review & Input provided by: (Org/Name/Section)	IBM Network and Service Delivery manager	
Date/Time of Incident Recorded:	29/04/2019 07:06	Resolving Group:	IBM – Network Services	
Date/Time of Incident Resolution:	29/04/2019 11:13	No. of Users affected:	ТВА	
Environment impacted:	E9 - Production	Related change number if applicable: (please provide number and title)	N/A	
PIR Request Date: (If P2/3/4 Incident)	N/A	Method of Detection:	Staff	
Service / System / Device affected:	s. 47E(d)	Geographic Location:	Australia	
Actual Business impact:	TBA – to be provided by the Department			
Business and System Owner:	TBA			

What steps were performed to restore	7:15 IBM were engaged. IBM technical support (Unix, Web Support) teams investigated.					
services? What specific action was taken to restore services?	t specific action was taken to 7:45 IBM Unix confirmed servers were up but unable to logon directly from Putty. IBM Web S					
	7:49 IBM Unix advised all data network seems down, servers accessible only by admin network shows that physical links are down.	work. VIOS				
	7:57 IBM Network team engaged.					
	08:16 IBM DCMS at s. 47E(d) Data Centre were engaged to inspect core switch.					
	08:32 IBM Network team advised the link to the edge switch to Distribution switch is down	1				
	08:41 IBM DCMS performed physical inspection and confirmed Line Card 9 is down on the Distribution Switch 01.	primary				
	08:54 IBM Network team: An automatic failover of Distribution Switch 01 to Switch 02 sho occurred. As the failover was unsuccessful, the following actions were made to force the tr Switch 02 manually, but was also unsuccessful. - Shutdown the vlans on the Distribution Switch 01 - Shut all access connections to Distribution Switch 01					
	09:50 IBM DCMS team were requested by the Network Team to power off ATE(d) Distribution 1 to force the failover to Switch 02 as there could be some open connections stopping the from occurring. IBM Network team confirmed on Distribution Switch 02 that all vlans were however no routes were being learned on Distribution Switch 02 from the Optus WAN – the no traffic flow.	e failover e active,				
	10:10 IBM Network team arranged hardware call for Distribution Switch 01.					
	10:20 IBM DCMS restarted Distribution Switch 01 and re seated the Line Card, however the 9 was still red.	e Line Card				
	10:49 IBM identified another Line Card in Distribution Switch 01 that could be used.					
	11:05 IBM DCMS repatched the connection (Edge switch to Distribution switch 01) from Li (faulty) to Line Card 8 (functioning). IBM Network team configured the port and enabled it					
	11:13 Service restored. Network logs verify the repatched DS01 was back up at April 29, 11	l: 1 3:27				
	11:14 Mainframe log entry confirms the mainframe communication restored ACO1 2019119 11:14:29.05 T0227565 00000090 \$HASP100 DCDLE2 ON TSOINRDR	82				
Was Root Cause identified during the incident? If so please provide detail.	Root cause was a Hardware Failure on ATE(d) 1 to the Edge Switch. Network traffic should have failed over from ATE(d) the Edge Switch. This failover did not occur successfully because the static route was missi Edge Switch to route traffic to and from Distribution Switch 2.	vi tc h 2 from				
Was the resolution temporary or permanent?	Temporary.	nt of nform				
Has the issue occurred before? Are there any noticeable trends or Patterns?	No.	rtme r of //				
What is the likelihood of this issue re- occurring?	Low.	epa				
		Released by Dunder the Free				

What stakeholders need to be engaged for Root Cause Analysis (include any Business Reps that should be included)?	IBM Network team have identified	d the root cause as above.	
Is Incident related to an existing Problem or Known Error?	No.	Reference Number:	
Service Improvement Activities: Have any service improvement activities been identified. If so please provide detail?	 Vlans and access ports r Once the faulty hardward (functional) to Line Card The static route of Edge 	ard 9 of s. Distribution Switch 0 ard 9 of 47E(d) Distribution Switch 0 are has been replaced, repatch cable 19 (currently down) of s. Distribution Switch should be added for s. Distribution Switch	tribution Switch 01. es back from Line Card 8

	Post Incide	ent Report	
Incident Summary:			
Brief Incident description:	Multiple Systems Down – Pron	mpting 'Cannot reach this page'	
Incident Number:	s. 47E(d)	External Reference Numbers:	IN1699357
Priority Level:	Priority 1	PIR Author:	s. 22(1)(a)(ii) — IBM s. 22(1)(a)(ii) MIM
Actual downtime of Incident:	4 hours 7 minutes	PIR Review & Input provided by: (Org/Name/Section)	IBM Network and Service Delivery manager
Date/Time of Incident Recorded:	29/04/2019 07:06	Resolving Group:	IBM – Network Services
Date/Time of Incident Resolution:	29/04/2019 11:13	No. of Users affected:	ТВА
Environment impacted:	E9 - Production	Related change number if applicable: (please provide number and title)	N/A
PIR Request Date: (If P2/3/4 Incident)	N/A	Method of Detection:	Staff
Service / System / Device affected:	s. 47E(d)	Geographic Location:	Australia
Actual Business impact:	TBA – to be provided by the Department		
Business and System Owner:	ТВА		
Incident Timeline & Resolution:			

What steps were performed to restore 07:00 - Major Incident Manager (MIM) engaged WIO. services? 07:06 - MIM raised priority 2 incident. What specific action was taken to 07:10 - MIM engaged Optus Technician to investigate. restore services? 07:15 - MIM engaged IBM. 07:15 IBM were engaged. IBM technical support (Unix, Web Support) teams investigated. 07:18 - Optus engaged MIM to advise their SNOC have performed checks and were unable to see any 07:20 – IBM engaged MIM to advise of their reference number s. 47E(d) 07:25 - VBOX on call engaged MIM to regards to the issue. 07:30 - MIM raised incident from a priority 2 to a priority 1 due to the impact to Smartgates and border systems. 07:30 - IBM engaged IBM Web Posting to investigate. 07:30 - MIM contacted WIO who advised a technician was still investigating and to contact Secure Gateway Services (SGS). 07:44 - MIM attempted to contact SGS on call - no answer, left a voicemail. 07:45 - MIM WIO Technician noticed a number of servers down and were working to restore them. 07:45 - IBM Unix team confirmed servers were up but unable to logon directly from Putty. IBM Web Support unable to connect to Smartgate servers. Users unable to access s. 47E(d) 07:49 - IBM Unix team advised all data network seems down, servers accessible only by admin network. VIOS shows that physical links are down. 07:57 IBM Network team engaged. 08:04 - IBM Unix team advised WAN (supported by Optus), AIX Solaris, Intel servers are all affected, not just AIX. However, further investigation was ongoing to confirm. 08:10 - IBM were unable to connect via jumpbox to perform checks which meant a core switch or WAN was down. 08:16 – IBM DCMS at s. 47E(d) Data Centre were engaged to inspect core switch. 08:30 - IBM Unix confirmed they could not ping either of the Airport servers from their Home Affairs 08:31 - IBM Network team managed to log in and check switches: Confirmed Optus link was back up Confirmed Edge switch was back up 08:32 - IBM Network team advised the link to the edge switch to Distribution switch is down. 08:34 - IBM engaged MIM to contact Optus to confirm WAN connectivity and also check the link to 08:35 – MIM engaged Optus on call to confirm WAN connectivity and to check the link to \$. Optus advised the core switch (last hop in to s. 47E(d)) in currently reachable across the WAN. Optus and from s. 47E(d) have performed ping tests from s. 47E(d) Latency from S. DC core switch were stable overnight. 08:41 - IBM DCMS performed physical inspection and confirmed Line Card 9 is down on the primary Distribution Switch 01. 08:42 – MIM scheduled a Service Restoration Team (SRT) meeting at 09:00 with the relevant resolver 08:54 - IBM Network team: An automatic failover of Distribution Switch 01 to Switch 02 should have occurred. As the failover was unsuccessful, the following actions were made to force the traffic to Switch 02 manually, but was also unsuccessful. Aff Shutdown the vlans on the Distribution Switch 01 T Shut all access connections to Distribution Switch 01 отпе UO 09:00 - SRT 1 commenced Optus Technicians notice core switch traffic started to drop at 05:45 from the domain controller. WIO Technicians advised they are unable to see anything from the s. 47E(d) Data Network switch should have failed over but did not, IBM are trying to fail over to network 09:50 – IBM DCMS team were requested by the Network Team to power off 8. Distribution Switch 01 to force the failover to Switch 02 as there could be some open connections stopping the failover from occurring. IBM Network team confirmed on Distribution Switch 02 that all vlans were active. however no routes were being learned on Distribution Switch 02 from the Optus WAN - therefore still no traffic flow. ŏ

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oes57 - IBM Network team and/sed there are no routes were being learned on ISSQ from the outside and were currently troubleshooting the issue. 1002 - IBM exclusted with Teistra to define the next course of action 1010 - IBM Network team arranged hardware call for Distribution Switch OI: 1020 - IBM DOMS restarted Distribution Switch OI and rest setted the Line Card, however the Line Card and Sea State of Card Sea State of						
10:20 – IBM DecMs restarted bistribution switch 01 and re seated the Line Card, however the Line Card 9 was still red. 10:26 – IBM DCMS restarted bistribution switch 01 and re seated the Line Card, however the Line Card 9 was still red. 10:26 – IBM Unix confirmed so far AIX server / CBR00011 and application are all good on OS health check. Only external connectivity is an issue. 10:30 – IBM Unix confirmed the switch configuration is fine, however traffic is not routing through. 10:38 – Teistra Leadership engaged Hardware Support and Cisco for assistance. 10:39 – DPI engaged Optus for assistance with 1rdfir flows. 10:49 – IBM Network team advised they were investigating the Line Card still being red after DCMS restart. 10:49 – DPI engaged Optus for assistance with 1rdfir flows. 10:40 – IBM Network team advised they were investigating as they could see no option of the card of the card of the switch 10 price of the country of the card of the card of the country of the card of the country of the card of the card of the card of the country of the card of the car		09:57 – IBM Network team advised there are no routes were being learned on DS02 from the outside				
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health check. Only external connectivity is an issue. 10:30 - IBM Unix confirmed the switch configuration is fine, however traffic is not routing through. 10:33 - IBM were in progress of restarting DSOI switch 10:38 - DEF engaged Optus for assistance. 10:39 - DPF engaged Optus for assistance with traffic flows. 10:40 - IBM identified another Line Card in Distribution Switch 01 that could be used. 11:04 - Optus advised they could see direct connections but were investigating as they could see no routes. 11:05 - IBM DCMS repatched the connection (Edge switch to Distribution switch 01) from Line Card 9 (faulty) to Line Card 9 (functioning). IBM Network team configured the port and enabled it. 11:13 - Service restored. Network logs verify the repatched DSOI was back up at April 29, 11:13:27 11:14 - IBM advised DSOI was back up, however DSO2 was still the primary. 11:17 - IBM dwised DSOI was back up, however DSO2 was still the primary. 11:17 - IBM advised they were seeing a significant amount of data flowing through. 11:19 - IBM advised they were seeing a significant amount of data flowing through. 11:19 - IBM advised they were in the process of reactivating the VLANs on DSOI. 11:27 - IBM advised they were in the process of reactivating the VLANs on DSOI. 11:27 - IBM advised they were in the process of reactivating the VLANs on DSOI. 11:27 - IBM advised they were in the process of reactivating the VLANs on DSOI. 11:28 - IBM advised they were in the process of reactivating the VLANs on DSOI. 11:29 - IBM advised they were in the process of reactivating the VLANs on DSOI. 11:29 - IBM advised they were in the process of reactivating the VLANs on DSOI. 11:29 - IBM advised they were in the process of reactivating the VLANs on DSOI. 11:29 - IBM advised they were in the process of reactivating the VLANs on DSOI. 11:29 - IBM advised they use the process of reactivating the VLANs on DSOI. 11:29 - IBM advised they use the process of reactivating the VLANs on DSOI. 11:29 - IBM advised they use the process of reactivating the V		10 NO				
10:30 – IBM Unix confirmed the switch configuration is fine, however traffic is not routing through. 10:38 – Telstra Leadership engaged Hardware Support and Cisco for assistance. 10:39 – DPE engaged Optus for assistance with traffic flows. 10:40 – IBM Network team advised they were investigating the Line Card still being red after DCMS restart. 10:49 – IBM Methods they could see direct connections but were investigating as they could see no routes. 11:05 – Dpus advised they could see direct connections but were investigating as they could see no routes. 11:05 – IBM DCMS repatched the connection (Edge switch to Distribution switch 01) from Line Card 9 (faulty) to Line Card 8 (functioning), IBM Network team configured the port and enabled it. 11:13 – Service restored. Network logs verify the repatched GSO1 was back up at April 29, 11:13:27 11:14 – Mainframe log entry confirms the mainframe communication restored 11:16 – IBM advised of S01 was back up however DSO2 was still the primary. 11:17 – IBM Unix confirmed they were sable to connect directly to servers. 11:18 – Dpring advised they were seeing as guifficient amount of data flowing through. 11:21 – IBM advised they were seeing as guifficient amount of data flowing through. 11:22 – IBM advised they were in the process of reactivating the VLANs on DS01. 11:27 – DPF notified client. 11:28 – IBM advised they were in the process of reactivating the VLANs on DS01. 11:29 – IBM Confirmed all Cracle Databases had health check had come back all good. 11:33 – IBM advised they were seeing all arrival gates were operating in Melbourne. 11:49 – IBM confirmed all Cracle Databases had health check had come back all good. 11:33 – IBM advised Smartgate Arrivals and Departure, Particular Standard Standar						
10:33 IBM were in progress of restarting DSOI switch 10:38 DEFE engaged Optus for assistance. 10:39 DPE engaged Optus for assistance with traffic flows. 10:40 IBM Methors team advised they were investigating the Line Card still being red after DCMS restart. 10:49 IBM identified another Line Card in Distribution switch 01 that could be used. 11:04 Optus advised they could see direct connections but were investigating as they could see no routes. 11:05 IBM DCMS repatched the connection (Edge switch to Distribution switch 01) from Line Card 9 (faulty) to Line Card 8 (functioning). IBM Network team configured the port and enabled it. 11:13 Service restored. Network logs verify the repatched DSOI was back up at April 29, 11:13:27 11:14 Mainframe log entry confirms the mainframe communication restored 11:16 IBM Unix confirmed they were selde to connect directly to servers. 11:17 IBM Unix confirmed they were selde to connect directly to servers. 11:18 Optus advised they were seeling a significant emount of data flowing through. 11:19 IBM advised of they were not the process of reactivating the VLANs on DSOI. 11:27 DPE notified client (Flower in the process of reactivating the VLANs on DSOI.) 11:27 DPE notified client (Flower in the process of reactivating the VLANs on DSOI.) 11:29 VBOX brought up a gate in Sydney and restarted a GTM (Flower in the process of reactivating the VLANs on DSOI.) 11:39 IBM advised they were mainty and restarted a GTM (Flower in the process of reactivating the VLANs on DSOI.) 11:39 IBM advised they were in the process of reactivating the VLANs on DSOI. 11:39 IBM advised they are the process of reactivating the VLANs on DSOI. 11:39 IBM advised through the process of reactivating the VLANs on DSOI. 11:39 IBM advised smartgate replication is down from what it was but is almost up to date. 11:39 IBM advised Smartgate replication is down from what it was but is almost up to date. 11:39 IBM advised Smartgate replication is down f						
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Has the issue occurred before? Are there any noticeable trends or Patterns?	No.
What is the likelihood of this issue re- occurring?	Low.
What stakeholders need to be engaged for Root Cause Analysis (include any Business Reps that should be included)?	IBM Network team have identified the root cause as above.
Is Incident related to an existing Problem or Known Error?	No. Reference Number:
Service Improvement Activities: Have any service improvement activities been identified. If so please provide detail?	Short Term: - Faulty hardware (Line Card 9 of s. 47E(d) Distribution Switch 01) needs to be replaced. - Vlans and access ports need to be reactivated on s. 47E(d) Distribution Switch 01. - Once the faulty hardware has been replaced, repatch cables back from Line Card 8 (functional) to Line Card 9 (currently down) of s. 47E(d) Distribution Switch 01. - The static route of Edge Switch should be added for s. 47E(d) Distribution Switch 02. - Complete fail over testing of s. 47E(d) Distribution Switch



47E(d)

6 hours 20 minutes

For-Official-Use-Only

Major Incident Review – Thursday, July 25 2019

_	-			
Priority:	P1			

TRIPS/Mainframe - Multiple Services Impacted

Outage Period Description:

On Monday July 15, ABF reported an issue with all Departure SmartGates nationwide due to an 'unexpected movement' error. This resulted in all passengers being referred to the primary line, causing severe delays in passenger processing.

The incident was first reported at 0433hrs and 4 Priority 3 tickets were raised within the next hour. Given the business impact, Unisys Major Incident Major (MIM) escalated the incident to a Priority 2 at 0537hrs. A separate Priority 2 incident was raised at 0550hrs regarding \$\frac{s}{47E(d)}\$ being unavailable, however, both in-flight Priority 2 incidents were closed and managed under a Priority 1 incident once ICT Border Mainframe confirmed that SmartGates, \$\frac{s.47E(d)}{s.47E(d)}\$ were all experiencing performance issues.

The issue has been attributed to an authorised change (C4534173) that caused an ICT Border Mainframe communication device (BROKER) to fail, causing processing to queue at the mainframe. The change was deployed on Monday July 15 at 0001hrs and implementation concluded at 0400hrs.

At 0729hrs, IBM advised that they had successfully restarted BROKER and ICT Border Mainframe confirmed to was now available was working as intended. There was a backlog of 30,400 Expected Movements that needed to be processed and by 1009hrs, technicians advised that the data had been loaded into However, there was still 30,000 jobs that needed to be transferred to to resolve the issue. At 1304hrs, ICT Border Mainframe confirmed that the backlog had been cleared and once the ABF confirmed that all airports were operating as intended, the major incident was resolved at 1317hrs.

Root cause for the BROKER failure is not yet known, however, logs from the BROKER have identified that there was some communication issue between the Adabas processes and/or between the client/server. There is ongoing dialogue between IBM and the vendor, Software AG, who have advised that there is a fix that has been released in June for BROKER issue. Problem Management investigations are continuing.

Post major incident declaration, the incident was handled effectively until it was resolved.

Business impact:

Between 0517-1300hrs, all Departure SmartGates Nationwide were impacted as expected movement data was unavailable. All passengers had to be referred to the primary line for manual processing, causing severe delays in passenger processing.

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Multiple systems, including s. 47E(d), had limited to no functionality due to data not flowing through to the Mainframe, which impacted the ability to process Visa applications and s. 47E(d) between 052 0729hrs.

Key points of note:

The issue was first reported to the IT Service Desk at 0433hrs and a subsequent call was made to Mainframe Operations on-call, however, only 1 attempt was made with no further follow-up or escalation per the on-call escalation list. It was recommended for Unisys to review the initial ticket and due process around contacting. This may have been a missed opportunity to identify a major incident earlier, therefore, potentially reducing the backlog of Expected Movements posteremediation.



In terms of monitoring/tracking, IBM have solutioned an alert situation for the CICS timeout message in $\frac{s}{47E(d)}$ that will be implemented on 31 July 2019. ICT Mainframe Midrange Database will also look into developing a heartbeat between that will exercise BROKER and NAT RPCs to identify workflow.


In regards to preventative measures, ICT Mainframe Midrange Database advised that the system needs be shut down and restarted automatically during every maintenance window for associated changes. An expectation statement confirming the process that is to be followed when implementing changes during a maintenance window will be provided to establish this.

Lastly, a further meeting will be scheduled to clarify the roles and responsibilities across IBM, ICT Mainframe Midrange Database and ICT Border Mainframe.

Communication back to business:

From a business impact perspective, re-validation of the period used for change outage windows may need to be considered to take into account the tolerances for processing of passengers at airports. It was raised that Immigration Systems Management should also be included in these discussions given the potential impacts s.4s.

Post-in	cident action items			
A.1	Review the incident timeline to confirm what actions occurred between 0652-0710hrs and advise.	IBM	Due 26/07/2019 - PENDING	
A.2	Clarify the context of the PIR/MIR processes to ensure that any preceding P3/P4s are documented and made available to MIR attendees.	ICT Service Delivery Management	Due 2/08/2019 - PENDING	70
A.3	Review ticket SD29014535 and due process around contacting: - Was this an opportunity to identify a major incident earlier if Mainframe contact had been made?	Unisys	Due 2/08/2019 - PENDING	
A.4	Investigate putting in an alert situation for the CICS timeout message in \$\frac{s}{47E(d}\$ (this to be included with other problem management tasks due on 8/08).	IBM	Due 8/08/2019 - PENDING	
A.5	Review existing change outage window timings to establish if alternate windows should be considered.	ABF/Visa Processing Teams	Due 29/07/2019 - PENDING	
A.6	Review backlog processing with ICT Border Mainframe, ITCAPM and IBM.	Traveller Systems	Taken on notice	
A.7	Explore the feasibility of flight selector in emergency situations.	Traveller Systems/ABF	Taken on notice	rs 982
A.8	Create a heartbeat between s. 47E(d) that will exercise Broker and NAT RPCs to identify workflow.	ICT Mainframe Midrange Database	Due 9/08/2019 - PENDING	Affai ct 1
A.9	Formulate an expectation statement confirming the process that is to be followed when implementing changes during a maintenance window.	ICT Mainframe Midrange Database	Due 2/08/2019 - PENDING	ome A
A.10	Establish a process that ensures change implementation plans are communicated prior to deployment.	IBM/ICT Mainframe Midrange Database	Due 2/08/2019 - PENDING	t of He
A.11	Organise a meeting between the teams to clarify of roles and responsibilities across IBM, ICT Mainframe Midrange Database & ICT Border Mainframe.	ICT Service Delivery Management	Due 2/08/2019 - PENDING	n of In
MIR In	vitees/Attendees			aps 900
Name	Title			by D
				ad be



Name Title	
s. 22(1)(a)(ii) ICT Convice Delivery Manage	

For further information in relation to the associated incident, please refer to the attached.

1. Unisys PIR



	Post Incident Report					
Incident Summary:						
Brief Incident description:	s. 47E(d) /Mainframe - Multiple Se	ervices Impacted				
Incident Number:	s. 47E(d)	External Reference Numbers:	IN1789042 - IBM			
Priority Level:	Priority 1	PIR Author:	s. 22(1)(a)(ii) - MIM			
Actual downtime of Incident:	6 Hours 20 Minutes	PIR Review & Input provided by: (Org/Name/Section)	s. 22(1)(a)(ii) — Border Mainframe s. 22(1)(a)(ii) - IBM			
Date/Time of Incident Recorded:	Jul 15, 2019 06:56	Resolving Group:	Border Mainframe			
Date/Time of Incident Resolution:	Jul 15, 2019 13:16	No. of Users affected:	Unknown			
Environment impacted:	E9 - Production Related change number if applicable: (please provide number and title) N/A					
PIR Request Date: (If P2/3/4 Incident)	Jul 15, 2019 13:16	Method of Detection:	Reported by Sydney Airport			
Service / System / Device affected:	s. 47E(d)	Geographic Location:	Australia			
Actual Business impact:	Between the hours of 05:17 are impacted, expected movement primary line for manual process. Multiple systems including s. 47 flowing through to the Mainfre	nd 13:00 all Departure SmartGar at data was unavailable and refe ssing, causing severe delays in p had limited to no fur ame, this impacted the ability to etween 05:26 and 07:29.	rring all passengers to the assenger processing.			
Business and System Owner:	s. 22(1)(a)(ii) (business owne	r), ^{s. 22(1)(a)(ii)} (system owner)			

Incident Timeline & Resolution:

What steps were performed to restore 00:01 - Change C4534173 commenced. services? 01:20 - Upgrade complete. Adabas is up without CICS. That will be delayed until after initial What specific action was taken to BVT. restore services? 01:30 - Initial TVT of upgrade was conducted, but this is fairly limited and databases showed no errors. 01:34 - IBM technician investigating DBPL010 problem. 02:30 - IBM technician resolved DBPL010 problem. 02:41 - BVT advised initial testing successful. 03:00 - Databases restarted through normal start up process. 03:20 - Online system made available and further upgrade testing was conducted, without any errors detected. $03:20-\frac{s}{47E(d)}$ batch jobs also started with some being successful but others failing. The Visa Send job is a crucial 5. job and it had a load library error. 03:20 – s. 47E(d) Referrals Visa Load jobs had similar failures. 03:50 - Visa send job issue was resolved. 04:56 – s. on-call was able to rerun Visa Load job successfully. 04:54 - Service Desk (SD) raised P3 incident IM4594672 regarding Sydney receiving the "No Expected Movement" error on Departure Smartgates. 04:57 – SD engaged s. on-call technician to notify of issue. 05:17 – SD engaged MIM to advise of P3 s. 47E(d) 05:20 - SD engaged MIM to advise Melbourne Airport was receiving the same error 05:26 – SD engaged MIM advising users were unable to access 47E(d) and raised P3 incident IM4594673. 05:27 – MIM engaged ^{s.} on-call who advised the link between ^{s. 47E(d)} is not functioning correctly. 05:30 - MIM engaged Border Mainframe to investigate. 05:30 – SD engaged MIM advising users were unable to search in s. 47E(d) the application would freeze – MIM requested they run the s. 47E(d) bat fix and test in Citrix and advise of results. 05:37 - MIM raised P2 incident IM4594674. 05:40 - MIM re-engaged Border Mainframe technician who advised there is a delay in the EMR that would be causing the error message. 05:40 – Border Mainframe technician confirmed state was completely unavailable and this was already being investigated. 05:50 – MIM raised P2 incident IM4584675 regarding s. being unavailable. 06:22 - Border Mainframe identified the issue was caused by a BROKER on the Mainframe had failed causing a halt to s. 47E(d) 06:40 - SD engaged MIM to advise multiple users were unable to search in s. 47E(d application was freezing when attempting to do so. 06:42 - Border Mainframe technician advised an IBM technician was engaged to help investigations. 06:50 - s. support advised IBM to stop & start BROKER. 06:51 - MIM engaged IBM for reference number - IN1789042. TIE 06:52 - IBM logged into OPSMVS on IMPA and attempted stop via OPSMVS. 06:55 – Border Mainframe technician confirmed SmartGate, s. 47E(d) issue were all I related due to the fault with the BROKER. 06:56 - MIM raised P1 incident IM4564683. 06:58 – BROKER is not stopping – IBM checked via SDSF and could not see a Stop issued. IBM called $\frac{s}{47E(d)}$ support asking if IBM could cancel $\frac{s}{47E(d)}$ support confirmed. 06:59 - MIM closed P2 IM4594675 and IM4594674 to consolidate and Manage under P1 IM4564683. edon 07:00 - IBM attempted cancel via SDSF. en 07:05 - BROKER still not coming down. 07:10 - IBM cancelled BROKER using address space. 6 U

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eleased U 07:12 – BROKER restarted and now back up processing. At this point other $^{s.}_{47E(d)}$ batch jobs which were stalled commenced running again.

07:14 – IBM contacted MIM advised that the ATE(d) connections are showing down in Sydney but all other Airports seem to be up and running and shouldn't be having issues. IBM technician advised this would need to be investigated by the application team (Border Mainframe)

07:25 – MIM engaged BOC to validate widespread impact given IBM's update. BOC advised all Airports are still having issues.

07:29 – Border Mainframe technician advised they had successfully restarted BROKER. After restarting BROKER, s. 47E(d) was available was working as intended. Border Mainframe advised there was a backlog of 30,400 Expected Movements to be processed.

08:13 – Border Mainframe technician advised backlog had dropped to 27,500 Expected Movements.

 $09:00 - \frac{s}{47E(d)}$ backlog of expected movements was cleared but airport departure gates were still affected because the records also need to be loaded into $\frac{s}{47E(d)}$

09:07 – Border Mainframe technician advised the backlog of Expected movements had been loaded in to s. 47E(d)

09:28 – MIM engaged Sydney Control Room to test Smartgates given the data was believed to have cleared. Sydney Airport staff advised the issue is still ongoing.

09:30 – All parties had attended DORM, it was revealed that change C4534173 impacted BROKER communications.

09:58 – MIM engaged Melbourne Airport Control Room to test Smartgates given the data was believed to have cleared. Sydney Airport staff advised the issue is still ongoing.

09:59 – MIM re-engaged Border Mainframe technician to advise the error message was still being received.

10:09 – Border Mainframe technician advised that the data had been loaded into $\frac{s}{47E(d)}$ but at this current time there was still 30,000 jobs that needed to be transferred to $\frac{s}{47E(d)}$ to resolve this issue.

10:59 - Backlog at approximately 23,000

11:39 - Backlog at approximately 15,000

12:24 – Backlog at approximately 8,000

12:46 - Backlog at approximately 5,500

13:04 – Border Mainframe confirm that backlog has cleared.

13:05 – MIM engaged ABF – Advised will contact ABOC and instruct to contact Airports to test

13:12 – ABF confirmed all Airports operating as per intended.

13:17 - MIM resolved P1 incident IM4594683.

Was Root Cause identified during the incident? If so please provide detail.	A number of batch jobs were failing due to the load library configuration. There was no business impact due to this issue. The errors were detected and fixed during the midnight to 4:00am change window. The ADABAS upgrade required a new load library (vendor supplied software)			
	modules) to be included for batch jobs. IBM updated the standard procedure/script to include the new load library. Some batch jobs, even though they referenced the standard procedure did not pick up the new load library and were looking for the previous version.			
	2. Lack of connectivity between key systems, S. 47E(d) The software component called PROKER was malfunctioning and this was			
	The software component called BROKER was malfunctioning and this was the root cause of the issues. The SAGRPCP task was not connected to the BROKER.			
	Note: The IBM draft root caus			
	 This issue resulted in significant business impact causing departure SmartGates to refer all passengers to the primary line. BROKER provides connectivity between the key systems s. 47E(d) It is a 3rd party software product provided by Software AG, who also provide and support the ADABAS software. BROKER appeared to be up and active following the change. Details are referenced in the console snapshot in IBM's report. IBM have obtained the error log from BROKER. The error log was sent to Cyber Security on the 16th of July, approved on the 17th of July and released to Software AG for their analysis. 			
Was the resolution temporary or permanent?	Permanent			
Has the issue occurred before? Are there any noticeable trends or Patterns?	No			
What is the likelihood of this issue re- occurring?	Unlikely			
What stakeholders need to be engaged for Root Cause Analysis (include any Business Reps that should be included)?	IBM ADABAS DBAs Traveller systems			
Is Incident related to an existing Problem or Known Error?	Yes	Reference Number:	PM4001075	
Service Improvement Activities: Have any service improvement activities been identified. If so please provide detail?	 Include reminders in there are problems s During BVT ensure al Complete and signof Review monitoring o Review back out plant Next St. ATE(d) 	A CONTRACTOR OF THE PARTY OF TH	and other affected parties if an be relayed to stakeholders. Ing as intended.	
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Post Incident Report			
Incident Summary:			
Brief Incident description:	TRIPS/Mainframe - Multiple Services Impacted		
Incident Number:	s. 47E(d)	External Reference Numbers:	IN1789042 - IBM
Priority Level:	Priority 1	PIR Author:	s. 22(1)(a)(ii) - MIM
Actual downtime of Incident:	6 Hours 20 Minutes	PIR Review & Input provided by: (Org/Name/Section)	s. 22(1)(a)(ii) – Border Mainframe s. 22(1)(a)(ii) - IBM
Date/Time of Incident Recorded:	Jul 15, 2019 06:56	Resolving Group:	Border Mainframe
Date/Time of Incident Resolution:	Jul 15, 2019 13:16	No. of Users affected:	Unknown
Environment impacted:	E9 - Production	Related change number if applicable: (please provide number and title)	N/A
PIR Request Date: (If P2/3/4 Incident)	Jul 15, 2019 13:16	Method of Detection:	Reported by Sydney Airport
Service / System / Device affected:	s. 47E(d)	Geographic Location:	Australia
Actual Business impact:	TRIPS data stopped flowing causing the following impacts: Between the hours of 05:17 and 13:00 all Departure SmartGates Nationwide were impacted, expected movement data was unavailable and referring all passengers to the primary line for manual processing, causing severe delays in passenger processing. Multiple systems including s. 47E(d) had limited to no functionality due to data not flowing through to the Mainframe, this impacted the ability to process Visa applications and passenger risk assessments between 05:26 and 07:29.		
Business and System Owner:	s. 22(1)(a)(ii) (business owne	r), ^{s. 22(1)(a)(ii)} (system owner	-)

Incident Timeline & Resolution:

What steps were performed to restore 00:01 - Change C4534173 commenced. services? 01:20 - Upgrade complete. Adabas is up without CICS. That will be delayed until after initial What specific action was taken to BVT. restore services? 01:30 - Initial TVT of upgrade was conducted, but this is fairly limited and databases showed no errors. 01:34 - IBM technician investigating DBPL010 problem. 02:30 - IBM technician resolved DBPL010 problem. 02:41 - BVT advised initial testing successful. 03:00 - Databases restarted through normal start up process. 03:20 - Online system made available and further upgrade testing was conducted, without any errors detected. $03:20-\frac{s}{47E(d)}$ batch jobs also started with some being successful but others failing. The Visa Send job is a crucial s. job and it had a load library error. 03:20 - s. and Referrals Visa Load jobs had similar failures. 03:50 - Visa send job issue was resolved. 04:56 – s. on-call was able to rerun Visa Load job successfully. 04:54 – Service Desk (SD) raised P3 incident s. 47E(d) regarding Sydney receiving the "No Expected Movement" error on Departure Smartgates. 04:57 – SD engaged s. on-call technician to notify of issue. 05:17 – SD engaged MIM to advise of P3 s. 47E(d) 05:20 - SD engaged MIM to advise Melbourne Airport was receiving the same error 05:26 – SD engaged MIM advising users were unable to access 47E(d) and raised P3 incident 05:27 – MIM engaged s. on-call who advised the link between s. 47E(d) is not functioning correctly. 05:30 - MIM engaged Border Mainframe to investigate. 05:30 – SD engaged MIM advising users were unable to search in and the application would freeze – MIM requested they run the s. 47E(d) bat fix and test in Citrix and advise of results. 05:37 - MIM raised P2 incident IM4594674. 05:40 - MIM re-engaged Border Mainframe technician who advised there is a delay in the EMR that would be causing the error message. 05:40 – Border Mainframe technician confirmed state was completely unavailable and this was already being investigated. 05:50 – MIM raised P2 incident s. 47E(d) regarding s. being unavailable. 06:22 - Border Mainframe identified the issue was caused by a BROKER on the Mainframe had failed causing a halt to s. data. 06:40 – SD engaged MIM to advise multiple users were unable to search in \$. and the application was freezing when attempting to do so. 06:42 - Border Mainframe technician advised an IBM technician was engaged to help investigations. 06:51 – MIM engaged IBM for reference number - s. 47E(d) 06:55 - Border Mainframe technician confirmed SmartGate, related due to the fault with the BROKER. 06:56 - MIM raised P1 incident s. 47E(d) 06:59 - MIM closed P2 s. 47E(d) to consolidate and Manage under P1 07:12 – BROKER restarted after many difficulties in restarting. At this point other batch jobs which were stalled commenced running again. 07:14 – IBM contacted MIM advised that the street connections are showing down in Sydney but all other Airports seem to be up and running and shouldn't be having issues. IBM technician advised this would need to be investigated by the application team (Border Mainframe) 07:25 - MIM engaged BOC to validate widespread impact given IBM's update. BOC advised all Airports are still having issues

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07:29 - Border Mainframe technician advised they had successfully restarted BROKER. After restarting BROKER, S. was available and S. was working as intended. Border Mainframe advised there was a backlog of 30,400 Expected Movements to be processed. 08:13 - Border Mainframe technician advised backlog had dropped to 27,500 Expected Movements. $09:00 - \frac{s}{47E(d)}$ backlog of expected movements was cleared but airport departure gates were still affected because the records also need to be loaded into 47E(d) 09:07 - Border Mainframe technician advised the backlog of Expected movements had been loaded in to s. 47E(d) 09:28 - MIM engaged Sydney Control Room to test Smartgates given the data was believed to have cleared. Sydney Airport staff advised the issue is still ongoing. 09:30 - All parties had attended DORM, it was revealed that change C4534173 impacted BROKER communications. 09:58 - MIM engaged Melbourne Airport Control Room to test Smartgates given the data was believed to have cleared. Sydney Airport staff advised the issue is still ongoing. 09:59 - MIM re-engaged Border Mainframe technician to advise the error message was still being received. 10:09 – Border Mainframe technician advised that the data had been loaded into state but at this current time there was still 30,000 jobs that needed to be transferred to 47E(d) to resolve this issue. 10:59 - Backlog at approximately 23,000 11:39 - Backlog at approximately 15,000 12:24 - Backlog at approximately 8,000 12:46 - Backlog at approximately 5,500 13:04 – Border Mainframe confirm that backlog has cleared. 13:05 - MIM engaged ABF - Advised will contact ABOC and instruct to contact Airports to test. 13:12 – ABF confirmed all Airports operating as per intended. 13:17 - MIM resolved P1 incident s. 47E(d) Was Root Cause identified during the 1. A number of batch jobs were failing due to the load library configuration. incident? If so please provide detail. There was no business impact due to this issue. The errors were detected and fixed during the midnight to 4:00am change window. The ADABAS upgrade required a new load library (vendor supplied software modules) to be included for batch jobs. IBM updated the standard procedure/script to include the new load library. Some batch jobs, even though they referenced the standard procedure did not pick up the new load library and were looking for the previous version. Lack of connectivity between key systems, s. 47E(d) 2. The software component called BROKER was malfunctioning and this was the root cause of the issues. The SAGRPCP task was not connected to the BROKER. Note: The IBM draft root cause analysis is attached. This issue resulted in significant business impact causing departure SmartGates to refer all passengers to the primary line. BROKER provides connectivity between the key systems s. 47E(d) . It is a 3rd party software product provided by Software AG, who also provide and support the ADABAS software. BROKER appeared to be up and active following the change. Details are referenced in the console snapshot in IBM's report. IBM have obtained the error log from BROKER. The error log was sent to Cyber Security on the 16th of July, approved on the 17th of July and released to Software AG for their analysis. U the eleased

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Was the resolution temporary or permanent?	Permanent		
Has the issue occurred before? Are there any noticeable trends or Patterns?	No		
What is the likelihood of this issue re- occurring?	Unlikely		
What stakeholders need to be engaged for Root Cause Analysis (include any Business Reps that should be included)?	IBM ADABAS DBAs Traveller systems		
Is Incident related to an existing Problem or Known Error?	Yes	Reference Number:	PM4001075
Service Improvement Activities: Have any service improvement activities been identified. If so please provide detail?	 Refine checklist of s. post upgrade to include checks in BROKER for any errors. Include reminders in the checklist to contact the MIM and other affected parties if there are problems so that appropriate information can be relayed to stakeholders. During BVT ensure all associated systems are operating as intended. Complete and signoff on BVT. Review monitoring of s. and dependant systems. Review back out plan and impact of s. changes. Next s. outage window is the 19th August, It is expected that all monitoring recommendations are implemented prior to this date. 		



Please update the classification of the document if information provided in the background is above FOUO

MEDIA ENQUIRY

Subject: Sydney Airport Delays

Deadline: ASAP

s. 47F(1)

Enquiry Received (Time & Date): 8:27am 15 July 2019

Media Officer: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) Media Ph: 02 6264 2244

QUESTION / ISSUE

I understand there's significant delays at Sydney airport (and possibly nationwide) with security and e-gates systems down.

Can I receive a statement and more information on what these delays ASAP?

RESPONSE UNCLASSIFIED

- A number of Australian Border Force (ABF) and Department of Home Affairs IT systems impacted by an earlier outage have now been restored.
- The Department is continuing work to bring all systems back online, ensure the integrity of the systems and resolve any ongoing issues.
- Additional ABF staff have been deployed to process passengers at international airports and to minimise delays in cargo processing where possible.
- While the addition of staff has seen reduced delays at some airports, passengers are still encouraged to arrive at airports early to allow additional time for processing.
- Cargo processing is continuing, though some delays can be expected as staff work through the backlog.
- We appreciate the patience of passengers and businesses impacted by these outages.

BACKGROUND (not for public release)

The information below is classified and should not be publicly released without the authority of the Australian Border Force.

A short, <u>unclassified</u> brief providing background/context to the incident/issue/event which may not be clear from the rest of the document; the background must detail actions taken by agency/departments/other stakeholders in the information environment, propaganda by adversaries/interest groups and highlight sensitive considerations.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The background may point to further correspondence on a higher classification system if required.

CLEARANCE:

Drafted by	Title	Time/Date drafted
		Time DD Month 2019

Cleared by	Title	Time/Date cleared
Full Name	Position	Time DD Month 2019
		Time DD Month 2019
s. 22(1)(a)(ii)	Director, ABF Media	Time DD Month 2019
Tony Smith	CoS to Commissioner	

From: **ABF Media** To: Cc:

Subject: RESPONSE: Airport systems [SEC=UNCLASSIFIED]

Monday, 29 April 2019 3:04:11 PM Date:

UNCLASSIFIED

Good afternoon s. 47F(1)

Please see below an updated statement. Please attribute to an Australian Border Force spokesperson.

A number of Australian Border Force (ABF) and Department of Home Affairs IT systems impacted by an earlier outage have now been restored.

The Department is continuing work to bring all systems back online, ensure the integrity of the systems and resolve any ongoing issues.

Additional ABF staff have been deployed to process passengers at international airports and to minimise delays in cargo processing where possible.

While the addition of staff has seen reduced delays at some airports, passengers are still encouraged to arrive at airports early to allow additional time for processing. Cargo processing is continuing, though some delays can be expected as staff work through the backlog.

We appreciate the patience of passengers and businesses impacted by these outages.

Thank you,

Australian Border Force

Media & Communications Media line: 02 6264 2211 E: xxxxx@xxx.xxx.xx

UNCLASSIFIED



s. 47F(1)

From: **ABF Media** To: Cc:

Subject: RESPONSE: UPDATED: Media enquiry: verifying cause and attribution of Monday ABF / Smartgate outage

[SEC=UNCLASSIFIED]

Date: Tuesday, 30 April 2019 4:53:48 PM

image001.png Attachments:

UNCLASSIFIED

Good afternoon,

Please attribute the following to a spokesperson from the Australian Border Force (ABF).

All IT systems are now back online and the Department and ABF are continuing to test and monitor systems to prevent further issues.

Passenger processing is occurring as normal. The ABF has also deployed additional resources to ensure cargo is cleared in a timely manner.

The outage of IT systems yesterday was not directly related to Smartgates, but was linked to a back end network issue that impacted a number of systems, including those used to process passengers and cargo.

Regards

Media Operations Australian Border Force Media line: 02 6264 2211

E: **x**@ **x**xx

UNCLASSIFIED

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 From:
 ABF Media

 To:
 s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

S. 22(1)(a)(ii) ; ABF Media

Subject: RE: FOR INPUT/CLEARANCE: SECURITY DELAYS - AIRPORT [DLM=For-Official-Use-Only]

Date: Monday, 15 July 2019 9:28:37 AM

Attachments: 190715 EN Sydney Airport Delays Various.docx

For-Official-Use-Only

Hi all,

Please see the below for lines we used while the previous incident was ongoing:

- A number of Australian Border Force (ABF) and Department of Home Affairs IT systems impacted by an earlier outage have now been restored.
- The Department is continuing work to bring all systems back online, ensure the integrity of the systems and resolve any ongoing issues.
- Additional ABF staff have been deployed to process passengers at international airports and to minimise delays in cargo processing where possible.
- While the addition of staff has seen reduced delays at some airports, passengers are still encouraged to arrive at airports early to allow additional time for processing.
- Cargo processing is continuing, though some delays can be expected as staff work through the backlog.
- We appreciate the patience of passengers and businesses impacted by these outages.

Grateful if you can advise if you are happy with the above and they are more relevant to this particular issue?

Kind regards,

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

Public Affairs Officer, Media Operations

Media & Engagement Branch | Executive Coordination

Department of Home Affairs

Media line: 02 6264 2244 P: s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

For-Official-Use-Only

From: ABF Media <xxxxx@xxx.xxx.xx> **Sent:** Monday, 15 July 2019 9:20 AM To: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @homeaffairs.gov.au> . 22(1)(a)(ii) **Cc:** Media Operations <xxxxx@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx; @homeaffairs.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @homeaffairs.gov.au>; ABF Media <xxxxx@xxx.xxx.xx>; @homeaffairs.gov.au> **Subject:** FOR INPUT/CLEARANCE: SECURITY DELAYS - AIRPORT [DLM=For-Official-Use-Only]

For-Official-Use-Only

Hi ^{s. 22(1)}

We have received multiple enquiries about alleged delays at Sydney Airport due to smart gate outages.

Grateful if you can provide any available information on this topic and advise if we are able to reuse the same lines as last time we had a delay?

- All IT systems are now back online and the Department and ABF are continuing to test and monitor systems to prevent further issues.
- Passenger processing is occurring as normal. The ABF has also vaness deployed additional resources to ensure cargo is cleared in a timely manner.
- The outage of IT systems yesterday was not directly related to Smartgates, but was linked to a back end network issue that impacted a number of systems, including those used to process passengers and cargo.

Kind regards,

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

Public Affairs Officer, Media Operations Media & Engagement Branch | Executive Coordination

Department of Home Affairs

Media line: 02 6264 2244 P: s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

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