Aeronautical Study of
Hobart
February 2017

Office of Airspace Regulation
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DOCUMENT SPONSOR:  OFFICE OF AIRSPACE REGULATION

TRIM REFERENCE:
D16/485962

FILE REF:

OP15/552

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1.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Airspace Act 2007 (Act)1 provides the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) with the
authority to administer and regulate Australian-administered airspace and obligates CASA to
undertake reviews of existing airspace arrangements.
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the airspace arrangements and classification within
35 nautical miles (NM) radius of Hobart aerodrome. The Government considers the safety of
passenger transport2 (PT) services as the first priority in airspace administration, therefore
CASA must respond quickly to emerging changes in risk levels for passenger transport
operations. Airspace administration should also seek to deliver good safety outcomes to al
aviation participants.
The scope of this study includes the review of the airspace architecture, identification of
issues supported by safety incident reporting and evaluation of the efficiency of the airspace.
A multifaceted approach was used in conducting this review, including quantitative and
qualitative analysis consisting of:
•  Aerodrome traffic data;
•  Airspace design;
•  Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) incident data; and
•  Stakeholder consultation.
In November 2009, the Office of Airspace Regulation (OAR) commissioned an Airspace
Review of Hobart and Cambridge. The issues and findings identified in that review were
considered during the conduct of this study.3
1.1
Operational context
Hobart is a certified aerodrome, operated by Hobart International Airport Pty Ltd. Cambridge
is an uncertified aerodrome and is privately operated. The Hobart and Cambridge aerodrome
runway thresholds are situated within 1 NM of each other.
The aerodromes are located approximately 17 kilometres east of Hobart, in the City of
Clarence. Airservices Australia (Airservices) provides a Class D procedural
(non-surveil ance) tower (TWR) and an approach control service (Class C and D) from
Hobart TWR.
Melbourne Air Traffic Service Centre provides a surveil ance control service in Class A4 and
Class C Control Area (CTA) above 7,000 feet (ft) Above Mean Sea Level (AMSL) and a
procedural (non-surveil ance) control service in Class C and D airspace between 1,500 ft
AMSL and 7,000 ft AMSL outside TWR hours. Melbourne Air Traffic Service Centre also
provides a Directed Traffic Information (DTI) service in Class G airspace. As a certified
aerodrome, aircraft operating in the vicinity of Hobart outside of the hours of air traffic
control (ATC) are required to carry and use a Very High Frequency (VHF) radio.
1.2
Summary of issues and stakeholder comments
The fol owing issues were identified:
•  Hobart and Cambridge aerodromes are in such close proximity that they affect each
other. The aerodromes are located within 1 NM of each other and share a runway
designation (12/30). This close proximity occasional y presents traffic complexities
and therefore needs to be considered when assessing the Hobart Control Zone
(CTR).

1 A ful  list of acronyms and abbreviations used within this report can be found at Annex A.
2 For the purposes of this study, PT services can be defined as activities involving Regular Public Transport (RPT) and all non-
freight-only Charter operations.
3 Airspace Review of Hobart and Cambridge November 2009 https://www.casa.gov.au/files/hobartcambridgereviewpdf
4 Australian airspace structure can be found at Annex B.
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•  Hobart’s TWR provides combined TWR and procedural (non-surveil ance) approach
control services within Class C and D airspace from the surface to 8,500 ft AMSL
during the hours of operation. The Hobart TWR facility provides an airways clearance
delivery and surface movement control function at Hobart and a TWR and approach
function for Hobart and Cambridge.
•  There are a number of traffic crossover points located just outside 35 NM from
Hobart. Inbound traffic from the Australian mainland is directed via the instrument
flight rules (IFR) waypoint CLARK. The basic route structure for Hobart provides
lateral y displaced arrival and departure routes, with crossovers designed to be done
inside the terminal airspace. In recent years it became practice between Hobart TWR
and en route to process Brisbane and Sydney arriving traffic via CLARK when
runway 12 is in use. This mode significantly increases workload and complexity in the
en route Tasmania sector as there are consequential route crossovers between
Melbourne, Sydney and Brisbane bound traffic. However this management mode
significantly simplifies the TWR traffic pattern with no crossovers in the terminal
airspace.
•  Airline stakeholders provided comment on the potential efficiency benefit and
improved predictability if Airservices introduced standard arrival routes (STARs) to
facilitate both visual and instrument arrivals into Hobart;
•  Airservices control ers manage workload by the division of control responsibility into
two sectors: the Tasmania sector and the Huon sector. These sectors usual y operate
in a combined configuration, however with little warning the combined sectors can
present on occasion, unpredictable levels of activity, resulting in rapid increases in
control er workload for short periods. It is these occasions where the sectors maybe
de-combined.
•  Airspace users reported that on occasion they experienced delays in receiving
airways clearances and general inefficiencies in the use of the airspace due to the
reported claims of over servicing of Class D procedures by Hobart TWR.
•  General aviation (GA) stakeholders believed that improvements to airspace access
and efficiency could be achieved by increasing the level of surveil ance available to
ATC for separation in lieu of the existing procedural separation standards.
•  Hobart has one runway which does not have a parallel ful -length taxiway. Aircraft
operating from Hobart therefore require backtracking on the runway. This results in
longer runway occupancy times, increased delays and reduces the efficiency of traffic
flow.
•  Changes made to Hobart airspace in 2012 resulted in the Hobart Class C step being
moved from 30 Distance Measuring Equipment (30 nautical miles as measured using
DME) to 35 DME. This move of an airspace boundary provided an improved descent
profile for jet operators and helped reduce workload for the aircrew.
•  Comments regarding the 30 DME to 35 DME step change were also received from
recreational airspace users. They highlighted that the change presented an
impediment to their ability to climb safely above terrain while remaining clear of
control ed airspace. The Tasmanian Hang Gliding and Paragliding Association have
submitted an airspace change proposal.
•  The stakeholder comments received highlighted that occasional y the TWR frequency
experienced congestion and over transmission occurrences.
1.3
Findings and conclusions
•  An 73% increase in traffic movements occurred at Cambridge between December
2009 and June 2016. Hobart’s total traffic movements saw a decline between
December 2011 and December 2012 of 24.2%. Hobart has recovered with steady
growth in total aircraft movements from December 2012 to June 2016 of 14%.
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Considering the period of December 2009 to June 2016, Hobart has seen an overal
decline of traffic movements of 9.3%.
•  The total annual PT passenger movements for Hobart (2.3 mil ion) has exceeded the
Class C airspace criteria threshold (1 mil ion) in the Australian Airspace Policy
Statement 2015 (AAPS). This requires CASA to complete an aeronautical risk review
– hence this aeronautical study5.
•  Between December 2012 and June 2016, the average growth for PT movements
have averaged at 2%. Based on this growth rate, PT movements would not exceed
the next AAPS airspace criteria threshold (30,000 PT movements) until 2023 – 2024.
•  The annual number of airspace related incidents6 at Hobart has remained low.
Between December 2009 and June 2016 there were seven recorded airspace related
incidents. No injuries were recorded.
•  There is a broad range of aircraft traffic mix and performance at Hobart and
Cambridge aerodromes.
•  Airline scheduling results in peaks between 09:00-13:00 and 15:00-19:00. These are
the periods where congestion and delays are reported to occur.
•  Current IFR traffic departing Hobart using runway 12, results in the Melbourne bound
traffic remaining on the direct route via Launceston. The Sydney and Brisbane bound
traffic are tracked to the fly-by waypoint at KAREN and NUNPA (Flinders Island).
There is no outbound route crossover. Arriving aircraft for runway 12 via the CLARK
waypoint, 31 NM to the northwest of Hobart creates two conflict points with outbound
traffic during the climb phase.
•  Traffic inefficiencies were observed as a result of these conflict points. This appears
to create increased workload and traffic co-ordination for the Melbourne en route and
Hobart TWR control er.
1.4
Recommendations
CASA applies a precautionary approach when conducting aeronautical studies. As a result of
CASA’s analysis of the Hobart airspace, the fol owing recommendations are made:
Recommendation 1:
The existing airspace classification and architecture (apart from the one CTA step lower limit
change, which is already the subject of an airspace change proposal) is appropriate and
should remain unchanged.
Recommendation 2:
CASA should continue to monitor aircraft and passenger movements and incidents at Hobart
over the next 24 months to determine whether the trend for growth continues. An
aeronautical risk review should then be conducted if necessary.
Recommendation 3:
To improve efficiencies and predictability, taking into account PBN requirements Airservices
should continue redesign work for flight routes into and out of Hobart, make improvements to
existing Terminal Instrument Flight Procedures (TIFPs) and introduce STARs into Hobart.


5 AAPS https://infrastructure.gov.au/aviation/aaps/files/Australian_Airspace_Policy_Statement_2015.pdf
6 An airspace related incident is one that occurs whilst an aircraft is airborne.  Airspace related incidents exclude mechanical
issues.
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2.
INTRODUCTION
The Office of Airspace Regulation (OAR) within the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA)
has carriage of the regulation of Australian-administered airspace, in accordance with section
11 of the Airspace Act 2007 (Act). Section 12 of the Act requires CASA to foster both the
efficient use of Australian-administered airspace and equitable access to that airspace for al
users. CASA must also take into account the capacity of Australian-administered airspace to
accommodate changes to its use. In exercising its powers and performing its functions,
CASA must regard the safety of air navigation as the most important consideration7.
Section 3 of the Act states that ‘the object of this Act is to ensure that Australian-
administered airspace is administered and used safely, taking into account the fol owing
matters:
•  protection of the environment;
•  efficient use of that airspace;
•  equitable access to that airspace for al  users of that airspace; and
•  national security.’
2.1
Overview of Australian Airspace
In line with the Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) of International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) Annex 11 and as described in the Australian Airspace Policy
Statement 2015 (AAPS), Australian airspace is classified8 as appropriate in accordance with
ICAO Class A, B, C, D, E, F and G depending on the level of Air Traffic Service (ATS)
required to best manage the traffic safely and effectively. Class B and Class F airspace
classifications, although available, are not currently utilised in Australia. The airspace
classification determines the category of flights permitted, aircraft equipment requirements
and the level of ATS provided. Annex B provides details of the classes of airspace used in
Australia. Within this classification system aerodromes are either control ed (i.e. Class C or
Class D) or non-control ed (Class G).
Pilots of aircraft operating at Certified, Registered, Military and CASA designated
aerodromes are required to carry and use a Very High Frequency (VHF) radio. Aircraft
operating within control ed airspace are also required to carry and use a VHF radio. Further
information about aircraft operations at non-control ed aerodromes can be found on the
CASA website:
http://casa.gov.au/scripts/nc.dl ?WCMS:STANDARD::pc=PC_100058
2.2
Purpose and Scope
The purpose of this aeronautical study is to evaluate the airspace arrangements within
35 nautical miles (NM) of Hobart aerodrome from the surface (SFC) up to Flight
Level (FL) 180 and determine if they are appropriate. This aeronautical study forms part of
the OAR’s program of work to review Australia’s airspace as required by the Act.
The OAR commissioned the Argus Consulting Group to conduct the previous Airspace
Review on the airspace surrounding Hobart and Cambridge in November 2009. This can be
found on the CASA website:
https://www.casa.gov.au/files/hobartcambridgereviewpdf
The scope of this current Aeronautical Study included identification and consultation with
stakeholders to gather the necessary data and information related to airspace issues around
Hobart. This included consultation with regular public transport (RPT) operators, charter
operators, flying training schools, the Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP), Department of

7 Civil Aviation Act 1988, Section 9A – Performance of Functions
8 Australian Airspace Structure can be found at Annex B.
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Defence (Defence), emergency service operators and the aerodrome operators of Hobart
and Cambridge.
The scope of the study included:
•  An evaluation of the airspace architecture to confirm suitability for the ANSP to
provide air traffic services safely and effectively;
•  Ensuring the airspace architecture is appropriate for the range of aeronautical
activities conducted;
•  An evaluation of air routes as applicable to the objectives;
•  Identification of issues supported by safety incident reporting from the ANSP and the
Australian Transport Safety Bureau;
•  An evaluation of the appropriateness of the ICAO SARPs airspace classifications
being applied;
•  An evaluation of airspace efficiency;
•  Restricted and Danger Areas (DAs) and their impact on traffic flow; and
•  Other issues determined by the study team to be applicable to the objectives.
•  The scope of this study did not include aerodrome facilities and infrastructure unless
any weakness or failings in these areas have an effect on the safety of aircraft
operations near Hobart.
2.3
Objective
The objective of this study was to examine the airspace around Hobart to determine the
appropriateness of the current airspace arrangements.  This was accomplished by:
•  Examining through stakeholder consultation and investigation, the appropriateness of
the current airspace design and  classification, equitable access issues, terminal
instrument flight procedure (TIFP) design9 issues, expected changes to the current
traffic levels and mix of aircraft operations within the existing airspace;
•  Analysis of current traffic levels and mix of aircraft operations within the existing
airspace in relation to the level of services provided;
•  Identifying any threats to aircraft operations, focussing as a priority on the safety and
protection of passenger transport (PT)10  services;
•  Reviewing relevant Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP) entries for applicability;
and
•  Ensuring that any identified issues are passed onto the appropriate stakeholder group
for their consideration.
2.4
Study Methodology
A multifaceted approach was used in conducting this study, including quantitative and
qualitative analysis consisting of:
•  Traffic data analysis;
•  Airspace design review;
•  Incident analysis;
•  Stakeholder consultation; and
•  Site visits.

9 Refer to Civil Aviation Safety Regulation (CASR) Manual of Standards (MOS) Part 173.
10 For the purposes of this study, PT services can be defined as activities involving Regular Public Transport and all non-freight-
only Charter operations
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Historical aircraft traffic data recorded between December 2009 and June 2016 for Hobart
and Cambridge aerodromes was evaluated. This evaluation provided an indication for the
current and likely future level of air traffic. Analysis of aviation safety incident reports was
conducted to identify potential trends in airspace related incidents.
CASA conducted consultation visits in October and November 2015 while on-site in Hobart
and Cambridge. This resulted in contact with a large number of aircraft operators, service
providers, other organisations and stakeholders (refer to Annex C for a ful list of
stakeholders). CASA reviewed the stakeholder feedback and after further analysis of
relevant data and information, conclusions were reached regarding the issues identified.
These conclusions were used in formulating appropriate recommendations for Hobart’s
airspace.
CASA applies a precautionary approach when conducting aeronautical studies and where
appropriate CASA will make recommendations based on existing and projected data.

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3.
AERODROMES
3.1
Hobart International Airport
Hobart is a certified aerodrome operated by Hobart International Airport Pty Ltd. The
aerodrome has an elevation of 13 feet (ft) Above Mean Sea Level (AMSL) and is situated to
the east of high terrain reaching 1,300 ft AMSL. Hobart has one runway designated as 12/30
which is 2,251 metres long and 45 metres wide. Refer to Figure 1 below. The aerodrome has
two taxiways entering onto the runway that are located central y. Backtracking is required
after landing and to access the ful length for departures.

Figure 1: Hobart Aerodrome layout, DAP (3 March 2016).

Hobart is the main gateway for southern Tasmania. Hobart aerodrome has seen strong
growth in passenger numbers since privatisation in 1998, growing from 856,000 to 2.3 mil ion
passengers per year in 2016. As a result, a large proportion of Hobart traffic is scheduled PT
operations.
3.2
Cambridge aerodrome
Cambridge is an uncertified aerodrome that is privately owned and operated. Initial y opened
in the 1920s, Cambridge was used as Hobart’s primary aerodrome until 1956.
Cambridge aerodrome has an elevation of 67 ft AMSL and is situated less than 2 kilometres
from Hobart’s runway 12 threshold. The aerodrome has three runways: 12/30 which is
approximately 965 metres long, 14/32 which is approximately 760 metres long and; 09/27
which is approximately 830 metres long. Cambridge is not available to aircraft above
5,700 kg. Refer to Figure 2. Cambridge runway 12/30 is the preferred runway for both Hobart
TWR and the primary operator at Cambridge.
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Figure 2: Hobart and Cambridge Airports (Source: Google Earth).

3.3
Instrument approaches
Hobart aerodrome’s published instrument flight procedures include instrument landing
system (ILS) for runway 12, VHF Omni-Directional Radio Range (VOR) runway 12/30 and
DME or Global Navigation Satel ite System (GNSS) arrival instrument procedures for runway
12/30. Hobart aerodrome has been included in the initial candidate aerodrome list in the draft
Australia’s Policy Approach to Baro-VNAV. The Baro-VNAV approaches to Hobart are
expected to be validated by December 2016. There are no published TIFPs for Cambridge
aerodrome. Stakeholders reported no issues with the TIFPs.
3.4
Aeronautical information
A review of the published aeronautical information indicated adequate detail for operations at
Hobart and Cambridge. Publications reviewed included, but were not limited to:
•  Civil Aviation Act 1988;
•  Airspace Act 2007;
•  Airspace Regulations 2007
•  Civil Aviation Regulations 1988;
•  Australian Airspace Policy Statement 2015;
•  AIP documents including Departure and Approach Procedures (DAP), En Route
Supplement Australia (ERSA), Designated Airspace Handbook (DAH), MAP and
relevant charts for Hobart; and
•  Tasmanian Regional Airspace and Procedures Advisory Committee (RAPAC)
minutes.
Stakeholders reported no known errors or omissions.

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4.
AIRSPACE
4.1
Airspace Structure
Hobart airspace (centred on the aerodrome reference point (ARP)), consists of Class A, C, D
and G airspace. The airspace within 35 NM of Hobart starts with a Class D Control Zone
(CTR) operating from surface (SFC) to 1,500 ft AMSL, then Class D and Class C steps.
Refer to the DAH11. The CTR shape reflects a truncated circle with arcs of 8 NM from the
ARP to the north west and 9 NM from the ARP to the south east. Above the CTR are a
number of Class D steps with increasing lower limit intervals of 1,500 ft AMSL, 2,500 ft AMSL
then to 3,500 ft AMSL (with an upper limit of 4,500 ft AMSL) during the TWRs hours of
operation. (Refer to Figure 3).

Figure 3: Hobart Airspace. 3 Dimensional View.
Overlaying Hobart Class D airspace is Class C airspace commencing at a lower limit of
4,500 ft AMSL and an upper limit of FL180 which extends out to 35 NM. Overlaying these
two airspace volumes is Class A airspace with a lower limit of FL180.
Located within Hobart’s control ed airspace volumes are Restricted Area (RA) R379 (SFC-
NOTAM12) and Danger Area (DA) D378 (SFC to 1,700 ft AMSL). R379 and D378 cover the
Buckland Military Training Area. These service a military non-flying smal  arms range.
To the west of the Hobart control ed airspace volumes, there is predominantly Class G
airspace from SFC to the lower limit of Class E which ranges from FL180 to FL245.
Contained within this airspace is D316 (SFC to 5,000 ft AMSL). This is used for civil flying
training activities. To the east of the Hobart control ed airspace volumes, there is
predominantly Class G airspace from SFC to the lower limit of Class E of FL180.
To the north of Hobart are numerous Class C and D Control Area (CTA) steps with various
lower limits. CTA extends to the south east to 36 DME with a lower limit of  4,500 ft AMSL.

11 Designated Airspace Handbook, Effective 26 May 2016; http://www.airservicesaustralia.com/aip/current/dah/dah.pdf
12 Notice to Airmen.
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Figure 4: Hobart Aeronautical Study area 35 NM.  Visual Terminal Chart (VTC). (26 May 2016).

4.2
Restricted and Danger areas
The declaration of a RA creates airspace of defined dimensions within which the flight of
aircraft is restricted in accordance with specified conditions. Clearances to fly through an
active RA are general y only withheld when activities hazardous to the aircraft are taking
place, or when military activities require absolute priority. RAs are mainly declared over
areas where military operations occur.
R379 is the only promulgated RA within Hobart’s vicinity. (Refer to Figure 4 above). Two
additional RAs were disestablished on 26 May 2016. Defence is the control ing authority for
R379, which is activated by NOTAM (SFC – NOTAM). R379 has a flight planning conditional
status of RA2. This requires pilots not to flight plan through the RA unless on a route
specified in ERSA or under agreement with Defence.  However, a clearance from air traffic
control (ATC) or the control ing authority is not assured. Other tracking may be offered
through the RA on a tactical basis. There were no issues raised by stakeholders with regard
to R379.
The declaration of a DA defines airspace of defined dimensions within which activities
dangerous to the flight of aircraft may exist at specific times. Approval for flight through a DA
is not required, however, pilots are expected to maintain a high level of vigilance when
transiting DAs.
D316 is established for flying training (SFC – 5,000 ft AMSL) and D378 (SFC to 1,700 ft
AMSL) is declared over the military training area replacing the old R379A. There were no
issues raised by stakeholders with regard to either DA.

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4.3
Airspace management and air traffic services
Hobart’s TWR is operated daily between 0600 – 2230 hours (local time). The TWR provides
combined TWR and procedural (non-surveil ance) approach control services within Class C
and D airspace from SFC to 8,500 ft AMSL during the hours of operation. Refer to Figure 5
below.
Air traffic services in the Hobart TWR facility include an airways clearance delivery and
surface movement control function through Hobart Ground on 121.7 Megahertz (MHz), and a
TWR and approach function on 118.1 MHz.

Figure 5: Hobart airspace during TWR hours.

During periods of TWR de-activation, Melbourne Centre operates Hobart’s Class C and D
airspace above 1,500 ft AMSL on 125.55 MHz. Melbourne Centre provides a procedural
(non-surveil ance) approach control service between 1,500 ft and 7,000 ft AMSL. Airspace
below 1,500 ft AMSL reverts to Class G and Hobart operates under Common Traffic
Advisory Frequency procedures on 118.1 MHz (Refer to Figure 6 below).
Melbourne Centre provides a surveil ance en route service in all airspace classes above
7,000 ft AMSL, 24 hours a day. However, below 8,500 ft AMSL a procedural service is
provided within the Class D and C airspace by Hobart TWR during hours of operation.
Aircraft separation within the CTR in proximity to Hobart and Cambridge is predominantly
conducted visual y by ATC within Hobart TWR. VFR procedures/routes have recently been
implemented (see Section 6.2). The use of the Tower Situational Awareness Display (TSAD)
assists ATC’s situational awareness. As such, the costs and complexities of introducing
additional electronic surveil ance (see Section 4.4) need to be balanced against any possible
increase in safety or efficiency of the airspace surrounding Hobart and Cambridge.
Observations and comments received from airspace users indicated that VHF radio facilities
provided adequate coverage to Melbourne Centre and Hobart TWR.
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Figure 6: Hobart airspace outside of TWR hours.

4.4
Surveillance
Electronic surveil ance can play an important role in delivering ATS. Surveil ance provides
ATC with the ability to establish the location of aircraft and has a direct influence in applying
separation distances between aircraft (i.e. separation standards). In areas without reliable
surveil ance, ATC is reliant on pilots to verbal y report their position, therefore aircraft have to
be separated by relatively large distances to account for uncertainty in the estimated position
of the aircraft (i.e. procedural separation)13. The difference in cost between the two methods
is significant. As such, instal ation of surveil ance capability considers a number of
parameters including safety benefits and efficiency benefits, as wel  as traffic volume and
complexity.
The Tasmanian surveil ance network includes a combination of radar coverage that extends
from Melbourne, Automatic Dependent Surveil ance - Broadcast (ADS-B) and Wide Area
Multilateration (WAM). Aircraft in the en route phase of flight can be detected using multiple
inputs: from Melbourne radar and from the ground-based units located across Tasmania that
comprises the Tasmanian Wide Area Multilateration (TASWAM) system which incorporates
ADS-B. The TASWAM surveil ance system consists of 14 remote ground units, with four of
these units located within the immediate vicinity of Hobart aerodrome which also includes the
ground unit located on Mount Rumney.
The TASWAM system receives aircraft transponder transmissions including mode A/C,
mode S and ADS-B signals. A central processing unit in Melbourne receives these
messages and calculates the position of each aircraft. After the information is received, it is
then displayed on the en route control er’s workstation as wel  as in Hobart TWR through the
TSAD. This provides accurate position information which assists Melbourne Centre
control ers to provide surveil ance separation services and Hobart Tower control ers with
situational awareness via TSAD in the provision of effective procedural services.
The use of ADS-B enhances the TASWAM surveillance capability. Under the terms of the
ADS-B mandate, al  instrument flight rules (IFR) aircraft wil  be ADS-B equipped by February
2017.  The ADS-B mandate is not applicable for VFR aircraft, however the majority of VFR
aircraft operating at Hobart and Cambridge are equipped with mode A/C or mode S
transponders and TASWAM receives aircraft transponder transmissions.
TASWAM uses non-duplicated data links between the WAM units and the track processor
located in the Melbourne Air Traffic Service Centre, posing as single point of failure. The

13 ICAO, Guidance Material on Comparison of Surveillance Technologies, Edition 1.0 – September 2007.
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design of the system is such that where a number of ground stations fail at the same time,
the multi-lateration display information is not useable. Whilst TASWAM and communications
infrastructure is suitable for applying the larger surveil ance separation standards applicable
in the en route environment, Airservices have highlighted that additional ground stations and
supporting infrastructure would be necessary to meet the requirements for application of the
smal er surveil ance separation standards applicable in the approach or terminal area. In
November 2012, Airservices approached CASA seeking approval by way of a safety case to
extend the use of TASWAM surveil ance from 8,500 ft AMSL to 7,000 ft AMSL in order  to
extend the application of en route surveil ance standards to this altitude. This was
subsequently approved.
The cost of instal ing and commissioning ground based surveil ance equipment (i.e. radar) to
serve Hobart is considerable, with costs in the order of $10 - $12 mil ion to instal , with
ongoing costs of $140,000 per annum. The equipment cost of implementing increased WAM
surveil ance is less than radar, due to lower overal  equipment costs and the current
availability of some of the necessary WAM surveil ance infrastructure, however it is stil
considerable.
In broad terms, there are two options to enhance surveil ance services at Hobart:
1.  Introduce a surveil ance approach control service from the Hobart Tower.
2.  Introduce a surveil ance approach control service from a remote location e.g. Melbourne
Centre.
Both options have a significant cost associated with them, which would need to be borne by
the aviation industry. A number of systems must be upgraded or instal ed before an
approach control service can be provided to the surface at Hobart. These enhancements
include:
•  Instal ation of a Radar Data Processing and Display system. The data feed may need
to be enhanced.
•  Instal ation of an additional The Australian Advanced Air Traffic System (TAAATS)
console or a Radar Data Processing and Display system (if the service is provided
from Melbourne Centre).
•  Additional WAM ground stations.
•  Additional communication links between the WAM ground stations and the central
processing unit to provide redundancy and ensure a continuous link is maintained.
•  Instal ation of a radio feed to Melbourne Centre or the relevant remote location (if the
service is not provided from the Hobart TWR).
•  Additional ATC staff may be required.
•  Current and any additional ATC staff would require additional training to achieve
surveil ance approach control status.
The Federal Government requires CASA to “consider the economic and cost impact on
individuals, businesses and the community in the development and finalisation of new or
amended regulatory changes.”14
In terms of safety, the incident analysis identified an average of one loss of separation
assurance incident per year, since 2011. Refer to Section 8.2 for incident analysis. The
number of incidents is very low. Of the five loss of separation assurance incidents that have
occurred since 2011, none were the result of incorrect airspace classification. None of the
loss of separation assurance incidents would have been mitigated or avoided by additional
surveil ance.

14 Statement of Expectations for the Board of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority for the period 16 April 2015 to 30 June 2017.
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In terms of efficiency, this aeronautical study has been informed that Cambridge aircraft
operators occasional y experience delays and holding while they wait for airways clearances.
Concerns in relation to delays at Hobart that would be reduced by surveil ance have not been
raised by industry stakeholders.
The traffic levels at Hobart have increased since 2012, however they are stil  below the traffic
levels of 2010 and 2011. The traffic levels at Cambridge have doubled since 2011. The traffic
mix at each aerodrome is different, however, the number of incidents have remained low
compared to aerodromes with similar movements and traffic mix.
It is recognised that electronic surveil ance is likely to increase the airspace efficiency. A risk
based approach is employed by Airservices to determine levels of air traffic service provision
national y, and this is dependent on the volume and complexity of air traffic in a particular
airspace. Airservices wil  continue to employ the surveil ance coverage available in the area
to manage operational risk.  Airservices is evaluating the use of ADS-B below 7,000 ft AMSL
with the current ADS-B coverage. Airservices is seeing an increase in surveil ance
effectiveness as IFR aircraft equip to meet the ADS-B mandate and as VFR aircraft
voluntarily equip with ADS-B.
The introduction of a surveil ance approach service to Hobart would not mitigate the loss of
separation assurance incidents which have occurred. The introduction of a surveil ance
approach service would result in significant additional costs to the aviation industry to
achieve a minimal efficiency benefit. The financial burden of introducing a surveil ance
approach service at Hobart would be greater than the benefit of reducing the occasional
delays experienced. The introduction of a surveil ance approach service at Hobart is not
required nor recommended at this time.
4.5
Environment
The airspace within 35 NM of Hobart was reviewed to examine if there are current aircraft
environmental issues associated with:
•  Noise;15
•  Gaseous emissions;
•  Interactions with birds and wildlife; and
•  Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (EPBC Act) items.
No environmental issues were identified. Should an airspace change proposal be lodged as
an outcome of this review that results in changes in aircraft traffic patterns, the above
environmental issues wil  require assessment of the potential impacts.

Noise
The AIP ERSA does not require any noise abatement procedures for the aerodromes.

Gaseous emissions
Aircraft fuel use and associated gaseous emissions are unlikely to be influenced by the
current airspace architecture.
Bird and wildlife aircraft interactions and EPBC issues
A review of relevant data sets indicate that aircraft operations in the Hobart airspace have
not had a significant adverse impact on protected parks, ecosystems and wildlife pursuant to
the EPBC Act.


15 Refer to Airservices, Hobart, Cambridge and Launceston Airports, Aircraft Noise Information Report, Quarter 4 2015 (October
to December, http://www.airservicesaustralia.com/wp-content/uploAds/Q4_2015_Hobart_Cambridge_Launceston_ANIR.pdf
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5.
AIRSPACE USERS AND AERONAUTICAL INFORMATION
5.1
Airspace Users
The aeronautical study of Hobart identified and consulted with a number of operators
providing domestic passenger transport (PT) services, charter, flying training, aeromedical
services and sports related aviation activities. These organisations operate regularly into and
out of Hobart and Cambridge. The PT operators operating within this airspace include:
•  Virgin Australia operate direct services to Melbourne, Sydney and Brisbane;
•  Qantas Airlines and Cobham Aviation. Services provided by these companies are
predominantly provided using B717 aircraft, which operate under a ‘wet lease’
agreement for QantasLink. Direct services are operated to Melbourne and Sydney;
•  Jetstar operate direct services to Melbourne, Sydney and Brisbane;
•  Tiger Airways operate direct services to Melbourne; and
•  Hobart Airport is the operational base for the Australian Antarctic Program. Direct
charter services are provided to Wilkins aerodrome each summer.
Some GA flights operate from Hobart aerodrome however, the majority of flights operate
from Cambridge. The GA organisations operating from these aerodromes include:
•  Par-Avion Airlines and Flight Training;
•  Rotor-Lift Aviation;
•  Westpac Rescue Helicopter Service;
•  Heli Adventures Tasmania; and
•  Royal Flying Doctor Service (South Eastern Section).
Other airspace users that were identified were members from the recreational aviation sector
in particular the Tasmanian Hang Gliding and Paragliding Association (THPA) and RAPAC
(Tasmanian Region).

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6.
CONSULTATION
Stakeholders were contacted and invited to provide comment or input to issues relating to
Hobart’s airspace. A list of stakeholders invited to contribute to this review can be found in
Annex C.
CASA consulted with representatives of Hobart and Cambridge aerodromes, aircraft
operators as wel  as PT operators, Defence and ATC staff from Airservices, specifical y
Melbourne Centre and Hobart TWR.
6.1
CASA
CASA officers including Aviation Safety Advisors, Aerodrome Inspectors and CNS/ATM
inspectors were contacted for their input to this aeronautical study. Their responses are
included within the study.
6.2
Airservices
The OAR visited Airservices’ air traffic service centre in Melbourne where aircraft operations
in the Hobart area were observed. Traffic volumes and behaviours were discussed with ATC
staff.
The traffic co-ordination between the ATC staff in the combined en route configuration
sectors of Tasmania and Huon and Hobart TWR were observed. During discussions with
staff, they raised some issues regarding air traffic route crossover points. They identified a
number of traffic crossover points fal ing just outside 35 NM of Hobart. The issue is that most
inbound traffic is directed by waypoint CLARK. This quite often results in inbound and
outbound traffic crossing each other’s tracks. Crossing tracks in most cases are unavoidable,
however, if located in close proximity to the aerodrome, which can add to the workload and
inefficiencies in air traffic management. Airservices added that currently, traffic processing off
published routes is negotiated tactical y between tower and the en route sector, with both
units having responsibility to manage their own workload appropriately. Airservices plans to
implement a route structure that minimises crossovers through the use of segregated flight
paths to reduce complexity.
Consultation with ATC staff highlighted that there would be benefit from the introduction of
Feeder Fixes and standard arrival routes (STARs) as a way of improving efficiency and
predictability to aircraft arrivals and reducing effects of control er and pilot workload.
Airservices briefed CASA on the work currently in progress to redesign routes, making
improvements to the routing structure into and out of Hobart along with the introduction of
STARs. It is Airservices intention that route structures for Hobart wil  provide lateral y
displaced arrival and departure routes with crossovers minimised as far as practicable.This
work takes into account Performance Based Navigation (PBN) requirements and is
anticipated to be completed in the second half of 2016.
Airservices have also been proactive in responding to VFR airspace user concerns regarding
access to Hobart airspace. VFR pilots were seeking predictability to airways clearances for
Cambridge departures and arrivals. As a result, amendments have been made to both ERSA
FAC Hobart and ERSA FAC Hobart/Cambridge introducing six VFR flight procedures/routes
describing inbound and outbound procedures16, (Refer to Figure 7).
Airservices and CASA are currently reviewing the Class D step design to the northwest of
Hobart (between 25 DME and 35 DME). This has been as a result of comments received
from the THPA regarding access to airspace (Refer Figure 8). The THPA are consulting with
CASA and Airservices to progress an airspace change proposal that wil  support improved
airspace access for the gliders launching from the sites around Jericho and Lemont.
It is important to note that any airspace changes wil  consider the containment of Hobart’s
TIFPs and fol ow the standard airspace change process.

16 Airservices, AIP EARSA, FAC Hobart, Flight Procedures 26 May 2016.
http://www.airservicesaustralia.com/aip/current/ersa/FAC_YMHB_26-May-2016.pdf
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         Figure 7: Hobart airspace, Visual Terminal Chart (VTC), VFR Routes. (26 May 2016).

During the site visit to Hobart TWR, the proximity of Hobart and Cambridge runways was
noted. It was also observed that both aerodromes share the same runway designation. This
was a result of a runway re-designation change for Cambridge that occurred on 17 June
2014, from runway 13/31 to runway 12/30. Cambridge operators and Hobart TWR supported
this change.
ATC have developed radio procedures and phraseologies for pilot use that will assist in
distinguishing the relevant aerodrome runway that is in use (e.g. “Runway 12 Hobart”,
“Runway 12 Cambridge”). ATC have concluded that this procedure mitigates confusion on
runway use.
Hobart TWR identified that traffic efficiency was occasional y affected by the lack of a ful -
length taxiway. Aircraft operating from Hobart therefore require backtracking on the runway.
This results in longer runway occupancy times, increases delays and reduces the efficiency
of traffic flow.
No airspace issues or concerns were raised by air traffic control ers about aircraft operations
into Hobart. The surveil ance coverage supporting traffic in the en route phase and situational
awareness of traffic within 35 NM of Hobart was observed to be effective.
6.3
Aerodrome operators
The Hobart and Cambridge aerodromes have both indicated strong growth in recent years.
Hobart International Airport Pty Ltd has included in their recent Airport Master Plan17
expansion plans to further increase the number of passengers into Hobart while delivering
strategic infrastructure. Capital investment expansion plans to Hobart aerodrome have seen

17 2015 Hobart International Airport Master Plan
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funding assistance of $38 mil ion offered from the Australian Government to improve
operations of the airport and will include:
•  A runway extension of 500 metres that will increase aircraft access to and from other
locations within Australia and Asia along with expanded freight opportunities. The
runway extension wil  also provide direct benefit to further developing Antarctic
aviation programs by enabling larger aircraft to be used and heavier payloads to be
delivered; and
•  A further $25 mil ion wil  be invested in the redevelopment of the passenger terminal
that will meet expected passenger demands through to 2023.
Hobart is the main aviation gateway for southern Tasmania. The aerodrome supports four
main PT operators in Qantas and QantasLink, Jetstar, Virgin Australia and Tiger Airways. Al
PT operations are conducted under the IFR and are scheduled to arrive and depart during
TWR hours. Al  PT operations are ADS-B equipped. The aerodrome also serves the Royal
Flying Doctor Service with just over 350 movements per year.
The review of recent movement data between December 2014 and June 2016 has seen total
aircraft movements (VFR and IFR) increase from 25,191 to 26,249.18 According to the 2015
Hobart International Master Plan, PT services were forecast to be 16,000 movements for the
2015 financial year. The Master Plan forecasts PT aircraft movements to double by financial
year 2035.
Comment was received from Hobart Airport relating to the runway designation at Cambridge
aerodrome. The issue outlined a safety concern held as a result of the runway designation
change promulgated by Cambridge in June 2014 via NOTAM. The NOTAM described a
change of Cambridge runway from 13/31 to 12/30. This change resulted in runways at
Hobart and Cambridge having identical runway designation number of 12/30.
Due to the close proximity of Cambridge to Hobart (approx. 1 NM), this has caused some
confusion for staff operating on the airfield at Hobart. Specifical y, the awareness of which of
the runways 12/30 the pilot or ATC are referring to. ATC and pilots have implemented a risk
mitigation to suffix the radio cal  to include the name of the aerodrome, (e.g. 'runway 12/30
Cambridge' and ‘runway 12/30 Hobart’). However, on occasion this suffix can be missed
during communications, causing confusion among those operating in the vicinity of the two
airports. Hobart Airport submitted that there should be consideration for runway designations
to be reviewed.
[CASA Comment: Feedback from Industry states that the new radiotelephony procedures
work wel  and should be retained.]
Cambridge operates a varied traffic mix, which includes multi and single-engine aircraft. It is
important to note that as Cambridge aerodrome is limited to aircraft not above 5,700 kg. It is
utilised by aircraft predominantly in the GA and sports aviation category. Runway lights are
instal ed at Cambridge on runway 12/30 and runway 14 so operations can take place both
during night and daytime hours.
Cambridge aerodrome supports a mixture of flight training and charter operations. These
include fixed-wing and helicopter operations. Par-Avion Airlines operate a scheduled PT
service from Cambridge to King Island and Burnie/Wynyard. The review of recent movement
data over 12 months ending June 2016 saw the total PT movements for Cambridge to be
2,401. PT operations represents 10.2% of total movements at Cambridge during this period.
Due to the nature of Cambridge as a flight-training aerodrome, passenger numbers have not
been the focus of the aerodrome operator. However, aircraft movements have seen a
substantial increase. Between December 2012 and June 2016 Airservices movement data
showed aircraft movements increasing from 14,208 to 23,587, an increase of 66%. This was

18 Airservices Data Validation Report Aircraft Total Movements for Hobart 12 months ending December 2015.(Report Run Date:
15 April, 2016 11:02:04 AM
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in response to increases in flying training activity. Representatives from Cambridge indicated
that they are actively seeking further growth in their flying training through the Asian market.
6.4
Airspace users
Tasmania’s RAPAC and various other organisations were engaged for comment.
Airspace users from the flying training and charter sector raised the specific issue of the use
of surveil ance. Stakeholders were concerned why surveillance was not being used to
provide a surveil ance separation standard level of service at levels below 7,000 ft AMSL.
Airspace users explained that occasional y delays and holding are experienced while they
wait for airways clearances through Hobart’s CTR and CTA. This mainly affects aircraft
departing and arriving from Cambridge aerodrome. These delays in accessing airspace were
raised as inefficient and a cost issue for Cambridge airspace users.
It had been suggested by some airspace users that the introduction of VFR corridors might
provide improvements to efficiency and access to airspace. As a result, Airservices have
designed and published VFR corridors in the VTC and ERSA effective from 26 May 2016. It
is expected that these corridors will assist ATC to provide improvements to airspace access
and efficiency while providing predictability for pilots within Hobart’s CTA and CTR.
Other comments received include that users perceived that Hobart TWR seem to “over
service”. Comments suggested that ATC provided more than a Class D service in Hobart’s
CTA and CTR. They also commented that the levels and type of service were not consistent
across al  the ATC officers operating Hobart TWR. It was recognised by stakeholders that
recent staff turnover might have an impact on this.
Airspace users identified that the flying community would benefit greatly if improved
engagement and col aboration between al  stakeholders was to occur. Currently there are no
formal or informal airspace user groups other than RAPAC.
The THPA was concerned about access to airspace issues. Before 2011 the THPA and the
Soaring Club of Tasmania (SCT) had access to Class G airspace from SFC to 8,500 ft AMSL
from 30 DME Hobart (Refer to Figure 8).
Figure 8: Hobart airspace, VTC, THPA and SCT activity. (18 Nov 2010).
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Within the 17 November 2011 Aeronautical Information Regulation and Control (AIRAC)
cycle, the 30 DME arc was extended to 35 DME. This change was promulgated based on
enhancements to, and containment of,  TIFP designs and aircraft profile adjustments. By
extending this arc, the Class C airspace with a Lower Level (LL) of 4,500 ft AMSL was
extended and positioned above the launch sites used by the THPA and SCT. The THPA has
sought to improve this situation.
After preliminary analysis of the glideslope of the ILS for RWY 12 Hobart, the potential exists
to increase the Class C LL between 30 DME and 35 DME from 4,500 ft AMSL to 6,500 ft
AMSL. (Refer to Figure 9).
Figure 9: Hobart airspace model looking North-West of Hobart approach under ILS to Runway 12.
The THPA and SCT have submitted an application for a proposed airspace change.
Consultation is currently underway at the time of writing this report and submission of the
application for airspace change is expected to CASA within the second half of 2016.
6.5
Defence
Defence were contacted for their comment regarding any issues concerning the airspace
surrounding Hobart. Defence advised that they had no issues with the current airspace
design.
6.6
Emergency services
Emergency service providers were contacted for comment regarding the airspace
surrounding Hobart. Comments received included some areas that fel  outside the scope of
this study. However, these issues have been included where they may present contributory
factors to airspace efficiency and safety.
•  Airport infrastructure:
o  Hobart does not have a ful  length taxiway. This is perceived as the biggest
causes of taxi and airborne delays in the Hobart area.
o  Hobart has only a single runway. This raises a safety issue as a result of the
varied meteorological factors that can impact on Hobart, including changes in
surface wind direction, and mechanical turbulence events that occur below
10,000 ft AMSL.
o  Taxi delays due to limited parking bays. This can force aircraft to occupy
taxiways while aircraft vacate parking bays. Examples of limited parking were
provided when taxiway H is unavailable each time a RAAF C17 aircraft parks
at Hobart.
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•  ATC  and air traffic services:
o  Airline scheduling was raised as an issue from emergency service
stakeholders. They have found that arrivals and departures were clustered
together and a more even spread of their arrivals and departures could help
smooth out peak periods. These clusters of increased traffic volumes along
with operations at Cambridge occasional y resulted in radio congestion and
over transmission occurrences.
o  The idea of radar surveil ance was suggested for Hobart TWR. It was
suggested that radar surveil ance replace the existing TASWAM surveil ance.
The expectation of this is that a surveil ance separation standard would be
introduced at lower levels. The surveil ance separation standard could then
be applied to VFR and IFR traffic operating within the Hobart CTR resulting in
a reduction of holding delays and improving efficiency and access to
airspace. [CASA comment: The cost of radar surveil ance would be greater
than the resultant benefit. Refer to Section 4.4].
o  Enhancements should be considered to existing published IFR routes and
TIFPs. Suggestions were made to consider additional fixes (waypoints) in
addition to CLARK that might help reduce excess vectoring and track miles
for aircraft to join the Hobart runway 12 ILS.
7.
AVIATION TRAFFIC DATA
7.1
Airspace Research Application (ARA)
Airservices ARA database was developed to enhance their situational awareness of traffic at
aerodromes throughout Australia and identify locations of interest that may trigger further
research. CASA obtains ARA data from Airservices to assist in the analysis of col ision risk at
aerodromes that are under review.
ARA data consists of aircraft movements, passenger numbers and aircraft incidents from
sources such as Avdata Australia, Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB), Airservices’
Corporate Integrated Reporting and Risk Information System, submitted flight plans and
location specific intel igence reports.
The fol owing ARA reports were sourced from Airservices:
•
Trigger criteria summary report: – records total aircraft movements, air transport
movements  and passenger numbers at all aerodromes in Australia over a 12 month
period. An aerodrome is flagged if, for the 12 month period:
o  total passenger numbers exceed 350,000;
o  total aircraft movements exceed 80,000; or
o  total air transport movements exceed 15,000. Air Transport Movements are
aircraft with a maximum take-off weight greater than 2,000 kilograms. For the
purposes of this Aeronautical Study, they are considered to be the same as PT
movements.
•
Aircraft types by port: – This report identifies aircraft by type arriving and departing
from the port during a selected period19. The data is used to estimate the proportion
of aircraft types that are utilising an aerodrome. This report is also used to identify
VFR and IFR traffic by analysing the aircraft seating capacity and the number of
movements per aircraft type. General y, al  rotary winged aircraft are considered
VFR traffic as wel  as aircraft that have three or less seating capacity.
•
Data validation reports: – This report is used to validate the trigger report; identify
the number of training circuits flown per annum and add VFR traffic.

19 This data is extracted from the aircraft register database (maintained by CASA) using the aircraft call sign only, therefore
there may be some inaccuracies
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7.2
Airservices movement data
Two types of Airservices aircraft and passenger movement data reports covering the period
December 2009 to June 2016 for Hobart and Cambridge were reviewed. The Summary of
these movement trends (Figures 10 to 13) show total aircraft movements, air transport
movements, other than PT movements and passengers.

Figure 10: Airservices summary reports – Annual aircraft and passenger movements (2009 to June
2016).

The Hobart data displayed in Figure 10 above indicates the fol owing:
•  Total aircraft movements experienced a 24% decline between December 2011 and
December 2012;
•  Total aircraft movements experienced a 14% increase between December 2012 and
June 2016;
•  Since December 2011, passenger movements have seen continuous steady growth
averaging 24%. Passenger movements as of June 2016 were 2.3 mil ion passengers.
This exceeds the Airspace Criteria Threshold by 1.3 mil ion passengers;20
•  The decline in movements over the 2012 calendar year did not influence the
passenger movement count, which continued its upward trend. This can be explained
by the introduction of aircraft variants with increased seating capacity; and
•  A sharp decline of 62% in aircraft not engaged in PT activities was experienced over
the 2012 calendar year. After 2012, Other Than Air Transport movements remained
constant averaging 4,973 movements.


20 Australian Airspace Policy Statement 2015. Process for Changing the Classification of a Volume of Airspace at an
Aerodrome. Airspace Criteria Thresholds.
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The Cambridge data displayed in Figure 11 below indicates the fol owing:
•  A substantial increase in total aircraft movements of 113% occurred between
December 2011 to June 2016. Of interest is the Cambridge movement increase from
December 2011 to December 2012 of 28%. The corresponding movement decline for
this same period for Hobart was 24%.
•  Figures col ected for June 2016 indicate a decline of 6.7% in total aircraft movements
from June2016 to June 2016.
•  That the main type of traffic influencing the total movements is aircraft activities
engaged in activities other than air transport.
•  Over al  passenger movements for Cambridge are very low compared to passenger
numbers at Hobart. An air transport service is operating from Cambridge to three
destinations within Tasmania (See Section 6.3). Annual air transport movement
numbers have remained relatively constant.

              Figure 11: Airservices summary reports – Annual aircraft and passenger movements
(December 2009 to June 2016)

Data was also col ected from Airservices Data Validation Reports (December 2009 to June
2016). The data col ected for Hobart in Figure 12 below indicates the fol owing:
•  A 66% reduction in circuit operations at Hobart between December 2011 and
December 2012;
•  A 47% reduction in total VFR operations at Hobart between December 2011 and
December 2012. These reductions also added influence on the Total Movements
decline over this same period; and
•  The Hobart traffic mix has seen an overal  decline in VFR activity replaced with a
steady growth in IFR operations.

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               Figure 12: Airservices data validation reports – Hobart annual aircraft IFR, VFR and circuit
movements (December 2009 to June 2016).

Airservices’ data validation reports (December 2009 to June 2016) for Cambridge in Figure
13 below indicates the fol owing:
•  A 40% increase in circuit operations at Cambridge between December 2011 and
December 2012. Circuit traffic continued to increase at Cambridge from December
2013 to June 2016 by 831%;
•  A 66% increase in total VFR operations at Cambridge between December 2012 and
December 2013; and
•  Traffic mix has seen the continued growth of VFR activities with total IFR movements
remaining constant.

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Figure 13: Airservices data validation reports – Cambridge annual aircraft IFR, VFR and circuit
movements (December 2009 to June 2016).
7.3
Hobart and Cambridge Traffic Mix Review – Aircraft types by port
Data was also col ected from the Airservices’ Aircraft types by port report. This recorded an
approximate traffic mix for Hobart and Cambridge. The data is broken down into three
categories below, and the traffic mix shown as a percentage of the total aircraft
movements:21
Hobart:
•  Indicative aircraft seating capacity:
o  Less than 10 seats: 23.2%
o  10 to 30 seats: 3%
o  30 to 70 seats: 0.05%
o  Over 70 seats: 73.7%
•  Aircraft description:
o  Helicopter: 14%
o  Piston engine aeroplane: 3.4%
o  Turbofan aeroplane: 74.4%
o  Turboprop aeroplane: 8.2%
•  CASA aircraft register average aircraft type designator maximum take-off weight:22
o  Up to 2,000 kg: 7.5%
o  2,001 to 5,000 kg: 11.5%
o  5,001 to 7,000 kg: 5.1%
o  7,001 to 14,000 kg: 2.1%
o  14,001 to 29,000 kg:0.1%
o  Over 29,000 kg:73.7%


21 Traffic mix based on Airservices Aircraft Types by Port December 2015 report. All ICAO type designators were identified,.
22 Average aircraft maximum take-off weights are used to indicate aircraft size. Actual aircraft take-off weight varies between
individual aircraft and is influenced by local conditions, operational requirements and payload.
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Cambridge:
•  Indicative aircraft seating capacity:
o  Less than 10 seats: 99.6%
o  10 to 30 seats: 0.4%
o  30 to 70 seats: 0%
o  Over 70 seats: 0%
•  Aircraft description
o  Helicopter: 11.7%
o  Piston engine aeroplane: 88.1%
o  Turbofan aeroplane: 0%
o  Turboprop aeroplane: 0.2%
•  CASA aircraft register average aircraft type designator maximum take-off weight:
o  Up to 2,000 kg: 76.9%
o  2,001 to 5,000 kg: 22.6%
o  5,001 to 7,000 kg: 0.5%
o  7,001 to 14,000 kg: 0%
o  14,001 to 29,000 kg: 0%
o  Over 29,000 kg: 0%

The conclusions drawn from the traffic mix review of Hobart and Cambridge over the 12
months to June 2016 are:
•  The two aerodromes support aircraft in two distinct groups. For Hobart, 73.7% of
traffic movements are aircraft with a maximum take-off weight of 29,000 kg and over,
while 76.9% of Cambridge’s movements are aircraft with a maximum take-off weight
of 2,000 kg and below.
•  Most of the aircraft operating into Hobart are turbine aircraft while most of the aircraft
operating into Cambridge are piston engine aircraft.
•  Approximately 67% of the total aircraft movements into Hobart were Airbus A321,
A320 and Boeing B737, B717 aircraft types; and
•  For movements at Cambridge 63% of the total aircraft movements were by Cessna
C172 and C206 aircraft types.
It is clear from the review of the Airservices movement data and aircraft types by port that the
main drivers of movement growth have been in the flying training sector operating from
Cambridge. The use of larger turbine aircraft servicing Hobart supports the continued growth
trends in passenger numbers.
7.4
Future traffic estimates
Within the 2015 Hobart Airport Master Plan, future traffic and expected growth targets were
discussed. Passenger aircraft services were forecast to be 16,000 movements for the 2015
financial year. The Draft Master Plan has forecast PT aircraft movements to double from its
current level of 21,133 by financial year 2035. This would require an increase of an additional
1,000 PT movements each year based on existing movements. Recent trends from 2013,
2014 and 2015 have seen the yearly total for PT movements increase by an average of over
500 PT movements each year. This fal s significantly below the forecast growth described
within the Hobart Airport Master Plan.
Traffic forecasting is complex and has many influences outside aviation including aerodrome
infrastructure. However, based on the future estimates described within the Hobart Airport
Master Plan, passenger air transport movements at Hobart would exceed the AAPS criteria
threshold for annual PT aircraft in eight years (2024). This would result in Hobart exceeding
the AAPS threshold criteria for both the total annual passenger count and the air transport
movements for Class C airspace. An aeronautical study should be scheduled in the OAR’s
work program when PT movements approach the AAPS trigger criteria threshold.
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In the most recent sample of traffic data taken for Hobart and Cambridge from December
2009 to June 2016 the data Indicated overall an average decline in total movements. Total
aircraft movements for Cambridge saw a decline of 6.7%  and Hobart saw a 2% decline of
total aircraft movements. However, the average fair paying passenger for Cambridge saw an
increase from for the year ending December 2015 of 462 passengers to 1,632 passengers
for the year ending June 2016.
7.5
AAPS airspace criteria thresholds
The AAPS states that, ‘When annual traffic levels at an aerodrome meet a threshold of any
one of the criteria CASA should complete an aeronautical risk review in consultation with the
public, industry and other government agencies.’
‘While the criteria provide a good indicator of likely airspace classification, CASA wil  be able
to consider public, industry and agency comments, forecast future traffic levels and any
significant risk mitigators already in place or planned at the location, before finalising an
airspace determination.’
Hobart exceeds the AAPS passenger criteria for Class C airspace shown in Table 1.
From December 2009 to June 2016 total PT movements for Hobart have seen an average
growth of 1.9%. As of June 2016 PT movements for Hobart are 20,358 (Depicted as Air
Transport Movements in Figure 10. For the same period total PT movements for Cambridge
saw an average growth of 11.3%. Cambridge movements total ed 2,401 for June 2016
(Depicted as Air Transport Movements in Figure 11). These figures are well below the AAPS
PT aircraft movement criteria for Class C airspace.
AAPS Criteria Thresholds
Class B
Class C
Class D
Service provided
ATC23
ATC
ATC
Total annual aircraft movements
750,000
400,000
80,000
Total annual PT aircraft
250,000
30,000
15,000
movements
Total annual PT passengers
25 mil ion
1 mil ion
350,000
Table 1: Airspace criteria thresholds (AAPS 2015).
Further assessment of the total annual aircraft movements was conducted for the period
ending June 2016. The total sum of annual aircraft movements for Hobart was 26,249. This
figure fal s below the AAPS aircraft movement criteria for Class C airspace.
The only criteria that exceeds the AAPS thresholds is the count of total annual PT
passengers for Hobart at 2.3 mil ion passengers.
Due to the close proximity of Cambridge to Hobart, it is appropriate that consideration be
given to the traffic operations at Cambridge. As at June 2016, total annual aircraft
movements for Cambridge were 23,587 (Refer to Figure 11).  This figure is below the AAPS
total annual aircraft movement threshold which is 80,000 for movements other than PT
aircraft movements.
Cambridge is predominantly a GA aerodrome, with 63% of the total aircraft movements
made by Cessna C172 and C206 aircraft types. However, considering the traffic as a
combined quantity, the total aircraft movement figure for Cambridge and Hobart is
approximately 49,836.
Considering the total annual aircraft movements, total annual passenger transport aircraft
movements, total annual passengers, stakeholder consultation (section 6), future traffic
estimates and aviation safety incident reports (Refer to Section 8) CASA considers Hobart’s
Class D (CTR and CTA) and overlying Class C CTA to be appropriate at this time.

23 Air Traffic Control
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8.
INCIDENT AND ACCIDENT DATA
8.1
Aviation Safety Incident Reports (ASIRs) description
All incidents and accidents involving Australian registered aircraft, or foreign aircraft in
Australian airspace must be reported to the ATSB. The ATSB receives incident information
via pilot reports, Airservices’ Corporate Integrated Reporting and Risk Information System
(CIRRIS) reports and the Australian Defence Forces’ Aviation Safety Occurrence Reports
(ASORs).
The ATSB maintains its own database, the Safety Investigation Information Management
System (SIIMS), in which al  reported occurrences are logged, assessed, classified and
recorded. The information contained within SIIMS is dynamic and subject to change based
on additional and/or updated data. Each individual report is known as an Aviation Safety
Incident Report (ASIR) and for identification purposes is al ocated its own serial number.
CASA receives de-identified ASIR data for the purpose of improving safety. The airspace
related incidents within 35 NM of Hobart from 2009 to 2015 were reviewed.
8.2
Hobart airspace incidents
Table 2 shows total airspace related incidents within 35 NM of Hobart and total combined
aerodrome movements for Hobart and Cambridge from 2009 to 2015.
Type of incident
Number of airspace attributed incidents

2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
Failure to comply with ATS
instructions or procedures
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
Loss of Separation
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
Assurance
ANSP Operational Error
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
Total Airspace Related
0
0
1
1
1
3
1
Incidents
Total aircraft movements

for Hobart and Cambridge
(Figures 11 and 12).
42,538
43,899
41,402
37,181
39,638
49,545
52,077
Table 2: Airspace attributed incidents 2009 to 2015 (ATSB and Airservices data).
Table 2 compares the total aircraft movements with total airspace related incidents. It shows
that in 2014, three incidents were recorded. This also correlates with an increase in total
aircraft movements for the same period in 2014.
Between 2011 and 2015, five loss of separation assurance incidents occurred.  An analysis
of the incidents showed:
•  One of the incidents occurred in Class G (uncontrol ed) airspace and therefore not
under the control of ATC.  As the incident occurred outside control ed airspace,
additional surveil ance would not have prevented the incident.
•  One incident occurred at 9,000 ft AMSL, which is within the surveil ance coverage
and under the jurisdiction of Melbourne Centre.  Surveillance to a lower level would
not have prevented the incident.
•  One incident occurred at 7,000 ft AMSL, which is within the surveil ance coverage.
Surveillance to a lower level would not have prevented the incident.
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•  Two incidents occurred within the Hobart Class D CTR.  Extracts from the ATSB
ASIR for the two incidents stated:
o  Incident 1 (April 2015): The Cessna 172 on approach to runway 14 at
Cambridge was advised by the control er to maintain visual separation with
the Boeing 737 on approach to runway 12 at Hobart. The control er did pass
traffic information on the  Cessna 172 to the crew of the Boeing 737 resulting
in a loss of separation. The Boeing 737 subsequently received a Traffic Alert
and Col ision Avoidance System (TCAS) Resolution Advisory on the
Cessna 172 and conducted a missed approach;
o  Incident 2 (March 2013): The Cessna 172 did not adhere to an ATC
sequencing instruction to fol ow the preceding Cessna 172. The second
Cessna 172 inadvertently fol owed a different aircraft in the circuit resulting in
the two Cessna 172s coming into close proximity. The crew of the first
Cessna 172 took avoiding action to ensure separation.
The two incidents which occurred within the Hobart Class D CTR were not the result of a lack
of surveil ance.  Additional surveil ance would not have prevented either incident.
The results of the analysis of incidents at Hobart compared to other locations with similar
movements, reveal that the number of loss of separation assurance incidents for the
airspace around Hobart are very low.
8.3
ATSB investigations
The ATSB prioritises its investigations based on societal risk. The investigation priorities on
when to investigate any incident or occurrence are outlined on the ATSB website.24 Between
01 December 2009 and 01 June 2016, the ATSB conducted four occurrence investigations
into incidents that occurred at Hobart.25 Of these investigations, none of the incidents were
airspace related.
8.4
Incident summary
The traffic levels at Hobart and Cambridge have increased. However, the numbers of
incidents have remained low compared to aerodromes with similar movements and traffic
mix.
Airspace related incidents for Hobart and Cambridge comprised 2.2% of the total incidents
recorded. Animal/Bird strikes recorded at 31% represents the main incident occurrence type
recorded.
Based on Hobart and Cambridge’s combined movements compared to those aerodromes at
other locations, the number of incidents is considered to be low. Stakeholder comment did
not identify any airspace incidents to be an issue.
9.
AIRSPACE REFORM
As required by the AAPS, this review takes into account the Government’s requirement that
CASA wil  continue the review of Australia’s airspace and move towards closer alignment
with the ICAO system and ensure that appropriate levels of airspace classification and air
traffic services are implemented to protect aerodromes served by passenger transport
services.
Paragraph 8 of the AAPS states: ‘The administration of Australian-administered airspace:
•  shal  be in the best interests of Australia;

24 ATSB: Terminology, investigation procedures, and deciding whether to investigate.
http://www.atsb.gov.au/about_atsb/investigation-procedures.aspx
25 ATSB Aviation safety investigations & reports webpage advanced search: Hobart, 01/12/2009 to 01/12/2015
http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/safety-investigation-
reports.aspx?mode=Aviation&location=Hobart&ods=11/10/2009&ode=01/06/2016&initialTab=2
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•  shal  consider the current and future needs of the Australian aviation industry;
•  shal  adopt proven international best practice airspace systems adapted to benefit
Australia’s aviation environment; and
•  shal  take advantage of advances in technology wherever practicable.’
It is noted that some other Class D towered aerodromes at other regional parts of Australia
have adopted Class E airspace below 8,500 ft AMSL where surveil ance coverage is
available. Locations with comparable movements include:
•  Mackay aerodrome (33,044 total aircraft movements); and
•  Rockhampton aerodrome (28,747 aircraft movements).
In the case of Hobart, the TWR provides a combined TWR and approach control services
within Class C and D airspace from 8,500 ft AMSL and below during the TWR hours of
operation. The Hobart airspace also differs significantly from other Class D towered
aerodromes with the combined activity of Cambridge. Based on observations of the traffic
management services currently being provided and the future growth needs of this airspace
over the next eight years, it is concluded that the existing airspace architecture is
appropriate.
10.  SUMMARY OF ISSUES
The fol owing issues were identified:
•  Hobart and Cambridge aerodromes are in such close proximity that they affect each
other. The aerodromes are located within 1 NM of each other and share a runway
designation (12/30). This close proximity occasional y presents traffic complexities
and therefore needs to be considered when assessing the Hobart CTR.
•  Hobart’s TWR provides combined TWR and procedural (non-surveil ance) approach
control services within Class C and D airspace from the surface to 8,500 ft AMSL
during the hours of operation. The Hobart TWR facility provides an airways clearance
delivery and surface movement control function at Hobart and a TWR and approach
function for Hobart and Cambridge.
•  There are a number of traffic crossover points located just outside 35 NM from
Hobart. Inbound traffic from the Australian mainland is directed via the IFR waypoint
CLARK. The basic route structure for Hobart provides lateral y displaced arrival and
departure routes, with crossovers designed to be done inside the terminal airspace. In
recent years it became practice between Hobart TWR and en route to process
Brisbane and Sydney arriving traffic via CLARK when runway 12 is in use. This mode
significantly increases workload and complexity in the en route Tasmania sector as
there are consequential route crossovers between Melbourne, Sydney and Brisbane
bound traffic. However this management mode significantly simplifies the TWR traffic
pattern with no crossovers in the terminal airspace.
•  Airline stakeholders provided comment on the potential efficiency benefit and
improved predictability if Airservices introduced STARs to facilitate both visual and
instrument arrivals into Hobart;
•  Airservices control ers manage workload by the division of control responsibility into
two sectors: the Tasmania sector and the Huon sector. These sectors usual y operate
in a combined configuration, however with little warning the combined sectors can
present on occasion, unpredictable levels of activity, resulting in rapid increases in
control er workload for short periods. It is these occasions where the sectors maybe
de-combined.
•  Airspace users reported that on occasion they experienced delays in receiving
airways clearances and general inefficiencies in the use of the airspace due to the
reported claims of over servicing of Class D procedures by Hobart TWR.
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•  GA stakeholders believed that improvements to airspace access and efficiency could
be achieved by increasing the level of surveil ance available to ATC for separation in
lieu of the existing procedural separation standards.
•  Hobart has one runway which does not have a paral el ful -length taxiway. Aircraft
operating from Hobart therefore require backtracking on the runway. This results in
longer runway occupancy times, increased delays and reduces the efficiency of traffic
flow.
•  Changes made to Hobart airspace in 2012 resulted in the Hobart Class C step being
moved from 30 DME to 35 DME. This move of an airspace boundary provided an
improved descent profile for jet operators and helped reduce workload for the aircrew.
•  Comments regarding the 30 DME to 35 DME step change were also received from
recreational airspace users. They highlighted that the change presented an
impediment to their ability to climb safely above terrain while remaining clear of
control ed airspace. The Tasmanian Hang Gliding and Paragliding Association have
submitted an airspace change proposal.
•  The stakeholder comments received highlighted that occasional y the TWR frequency
experienced congestion and over transmission occurrences
11.  FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
•  An 73% increase in traffic movements occurred at Cambridge between December
2009 and June 2016. Hobart’s total traffic movements saw a decline between
December 2011 and December 2012 of 24.2%. Hobart has recovered with steady
growth in total aircraft movements from December 2012 to June 2016 of 14%.
Considering the period of December 2009 to June 2016, Hobart has seen an overal
decline of traffic movements of 9.3%.
•  The total annual PT passenger movements for Hobart (2.3 mil ion) has exceeded the
Class C airspace criteria threshold (1 mil ion) in the Australian Airspace Policy
Statement 2015 (AAPS). This requires CASA to complete an aeronautical risk review
– hence this aeronautical study26.
•  Between December 2012 and June 2016, the average growth for PT movements
have averaged at 2%. Based on this growth rate, PT movements would not exceed
the next AAPS airspace criteria threshold (30,000 PT movements) until 2023 – 2024.
•  The annual number of airspace related incidents27 at Hobart has remained low.
Between December 2009 and June 2016 there were seven recorded airspace related
incidents. No injuries were recorded.
•  There is a broad range of aircraft traffic mix and performance at Hobart and
Cambridge aerodromes.
•  Airline scheduling results in peaks between 09:00-13:00 and 15:00-19:00. These are
the periods where congestion and delays are reported to occur.
•  Current IFR traffic departing Hobart using runway 12, results in the Melbourne bound
traffic remaining on the direct route via Launceston. The Sydney and Brisbane bound
traffic are tracked to the fly-by waypoint at KAREN and NUNPA (Flinders Island).
There is no outbound route crossover. Arriving aircraft for runway 12 via the CLARK
waypoint, 31 NM to the northwest of Hobart creates two conflict points with outbound
traffic during the climb phase.

26 AAPS https://infrastructure.gov.au/aviation/aaps/files/Australian_Airspace_Policy_Statement_2015.pdf
27 An airspace related incident is one that occurs whilst an aircraft is airborne.  Airspace related incidents exclude mechanical
issues.
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•  Traffic inefficiencies were observed as a result of these conflict points. This appears
to create increased workload and traffic co-ordination for the Melbourne en route and
Hobart TWR control er.
12.
RECOMMENDATIONS
CASA applies a precautionary approach when conducting aeronautical studies and therefore
the fol owing recommendations are made:
Recommendation 1:
The existing airspace classification and architecture (apart from the one CTA step lower limit
change, which is already the subject of an airspace change proposal) is appropriate and
should remain unchanged.
Recommendation 2:
CASA should continue to monitor aircraft and passenger movements and incidents at Hobart
over the next 24 months to determine whether the trend for growth continues. An
aeronautical risk review should then be conducted if necessary.
Recommendation 3:
To improve efficiencies and predictability, taking into account PBN requirements Airservices
should continue redesign work for flight routes into and out of Hobart, make improvements to
existing TIFPs and introduce STARs into Hobart.

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13.
REFERENCES
•
Airspace Act, 2007 http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2007A00038
•
Airspace Regulations
http://www.comlae.gov.au/ComLaw/Legislation/Act1.nsf/0/CBB21AA2AFCE9CA7CA
2573970008AB2F/$file/0382007.pdf
•
Australian Airspace Policy Statement 2015.
•
Aeronautical Information Publication – effective 26 May 2016.
•
Hobart Departure and Approach Procedures – effective 26 May 2016.
•
Designated Airspace Handbook – effective 26 May 2016.
•
En Route Supplement Australia – effective 26 May 2016.
•
Hobart Visual Terminal Chart – effective 26 May 2016.
•
Hobart Visual Terminal Chart – effective 18 November 2010.
•
Hobart Visual Navigation Chart – effective 26 May 2016.
•
En Route Chart Low (L1) – effective 26 May 2016.
•
Terminal Area Chart (TAC3) Hobart – effective 26 May 2016.
•
Hobart Airport website, arrival and departures.
•
2015 Hobart Airport Preliminary Draft Master Plan.
•
Hobart Airport Master Plan – effective 18 December 2015
•
Airservices  2014  Hobart,  Cambridge  and  Launceston  Airports  Aircraft  Noise
Information
Report
Q4
http://www.airservicesaustralia.com/wp-
content/uploads/Q4_2015_Hobart_Cambridge_Launceston_ANIR.pdf
•
Airservices  Airspace  Research  Application  Trigger  Criteria  Summary  Reports
December 2009 to June 2016.
•
ATSB Aviation safety investigations & reports webpage advanced search: Hobart,
01/12/2009 to 01/12/2015.
•
ATSB: Terminology, investigation procedures, and deciding whether to investigate.
http://www.atsb.gov.au/about_atsb/investigation-procedures.aspx
•
Civil Aviation Safety Regulation (CASR) Manual of Standards (MOS) Part 173.
•
ICAO: Guidance Material on Comparison of Surveil ance Technologies.

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ANNEX A – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
Acronym / abbreviation
Explanation
AAPS
Australian Airspace Policy Statement 2015
Act
Airspace Act 2007

ADS-B
Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast system
AIP
Aeronautical Information Publication
Airservices
Airservices Australia
AMSL
Above Mean Sea Level
AOPA
Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association
ARA
Airspace Research Application
ASA
Aviation Safety Advisor
ASIR
Aviation Safety Incident Report (recorded by ATSB)
ATC
Air Traffic Control
ATI
Air Transport Inspector
ATS
Air Traffic Service
ATSB
Australian Transport Safety Bureau
CAR
Civil Aviation Regulation 1988
CASA
Civil Aviation Safety Authority
CASR
Civil Aviation Safety Regulation 1998
CIRRIS
Corporate Integrated Reporting and Risk Information System
CTR
Control Zone
CTA
Control Area
DA
Danger Area
DAH
Designated Airspace Handbook
DAP
Departure and Approach Procedures
Defence
Department of Defence
DME
Distance Measuring Equipment
DTI
Directed Traffic Information
EPBC Act
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999
ERSA
En Route Supplement Australia
FIS
Flight Information Service
FL
Flight Level
FOI
Flying Operations Inspector
FPL
Flight Plan
ft
feet
GA
General Aviation
GNSS
Global Navigation Satel ite System (navigation aid)
GPS
Global Positioning System (navigation aid)
hrs
hours
IAS
Indicated Air Speed
ICAO
International Civil Aviation Organization
IFR
Instrument Flight Rules
IMC
Instrument Meteorological Conditions
ILS
Instrument Landing System (navigation aid)
kg
kilograms
km(s)
kilometre(s)
kt(s)
knot(s)
LL
Lower level
MHz
MegaHertz
MOS
Manual of Standards

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Acronym / abbreviation
Explanation
MTOW
Maximum Take Off Weight
NavAid
Navigation Aid
NM
nautical miles
NOTAM
Notice to Airmen
OAR
Office of Airspace Regulation
PBN
Performance Based Navigation

PT
passenger transport
RA
Restricted Area
RAPAC
Regional Airspace and Procedures Advisory Committee
RFDS
Royal Flying Doctor Service
RPT
Regular Public Transport

SFC
Surface
SIIMS
Safety Investigation Information Management System
STARs
Standard Arrival Routes
SVFR
Special Visual Flight Rules
TCAS
Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System
TIFPs
Terminal Instrument Flight Procedures
TWR
Tower
VFR
Visual Flight Rules
VHF
Very High Frequency
VIS
Visibility
VMC
Visual Meteorological Conditions
VNC
Visual Navigation Chart
VOR
VHF Omni-Directional Radio Range
VTC
Visual Terminal Chart
WAM
Wide Area Multilateration




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ANNEX B – AUSTRALIAN AIRSPACE STRUCTURE
Class
Description
Summary of Services/Procedures/Rules
All airspace above Flight
Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) only. All aircraft require a clearance from Air Traffic Control (ATC) and are separated by ATC.
A
Level (FL) 180 (east coast)
Continuous two-way radio and transponder required. No speed limitation.
or FL 245
B
Not currently used in Australia.
In control CTRs of defined

All aircraft require a clearance from ATC to enter airspace. All aircraft require continuous two-way radio and transponder.
dimensions and control

IFR separated from IFR, VFR and Special VFR (SVFR) by ATC with no speed limitation for IFR operations.
C
area steps generally

VFR receives traffic information on other VFR but are not separated from each other by ATC. SVFR are separated from
SVFR when visibility (VIS) is less than Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC).
associated with controlled

VFR and SVFR speed limited to 250 knots (kt) Indicated Air Speed (IAS) below 10,000 feet (ft) Above Mean Sea Level
aerodromes
(AMSL)*.

All aircraft require a clearance from ATC to enter airspace. For VFR flights this may be in an abbreviated form. As in
Towered locations such as
Class C airspace all aircraft are separated on takeoff and landing. Al  aircraft require continuous two-way radio and are
Hobart, Bankstown,
D
speed limited to 200 kt IAS at or below 2,500 ft within 4 NM of the primary Class D aerodrome and 250 kt IAS in the
Jandakot, Archerfield,
remaining Class D airspace.
Parafield and Alice Springs.

IFR are separated from IFR, SVFR, and are provided with traffic information on all VFR.

VFR receives traffic on all other aircraft but are not separated by ATC.

SVFR are separated from SVFR when VIS is less than VMC.

All aircraft require continuous two-way radio and transponder. All aircraft are speed limited to 250 kt IAS below 10,000 ft
Controlled airspace not
AMSL*,
E
covered in classifications

IFR require a clearance from ATC to enter airspace and are separated from IFR by ATC, and provided with traffic
information as far as practicable on VFR.
above

VFR do not require a clearance from ATC to enter airspace and are provided with a Flight Information Service (FIS). On
request and ATC workload permitting, a Surveillance Information Service (SIS) is available within surveil ance coverage.
F
Not currently used in Australia.

Clearance from ATC to enter airspace not required. All aircraft are speed limited to 250 kt IAS below 10,000 ft AMSL*.
G
Non-controlled

IFR require continuous two-way radio and receive a FIS, including traffic information on other IFR.

VFR receive a FIS. On request and ATC workload permitting, a SIS is available within surveillance coverage. VHF radio
required above 5,000 ft AMSL and at aerodromes where carriage and use of radio is required.
* Not applicable to military aircraft.
**If traffic conditions permit, ATC may approve a pilot's request to exceed the 200 kt speed limit to a maximum limit of 250 kt unless the pilot informs ATC a higher minimum
speed is required.
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ANNEX C – STAKEHOLDERS
Position
Organisation
AOPA Office
Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA)
ATC Line Manager
Airservices Australia
ATC Sector Control ers
Airservices Australia
Hobart TWR Manager
Airservices Australia
Business Readiness Manager
Airservices Australia
Initiatives Delivery
Airservices Australia
Aerodrome Inspector (AI)
CASA, Air Navigation, Airspace and Aerodrome Branch
Air Transport Inspector (ATI)
CASA, Operations Division
Flying Operations Inspector (FOI)
CASA, Operations Division
Aviation Safety Advisor (ASA)
CASA, Safety Analysis & Education Division
Defence Liaison Manager
Department of Defence
Operations Coordinator
Hobart Airport
Managing Director
Par-Avion (Airlines of Tasmania)
Chief Flight Instructor
Par-Avion Flight Training
Head of Safety & Compliance
Qantas Airways
Secretariat
Regional Airspace and Procedures Advisory Committee
General Manager
Rotor-Lift Aviation
Instructor
Rotor-Lift Aviation
Pilot RFDS South Eastern Section
Royal Flying Doctor Service
Senior Safety Officer
Tasmanian Hang Gliding and Paragliding Association
Head of Training and Checking
Tiger Airways
Regional Flight Operations Manager
Virgin Australia

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ANNEX D – DEFINITIONS AND EXPLANATION OF TERMS
Restricted  Area:   The  declaration  of  a  Restricted  Area  (RA)  creates  airspace  of
defined dimensions within which the flight of aircraft is restricted in accordance with
specified  conditions.   Clearances  to  fly  through  an  active  RA  are  generally  only
withheld  when  activities  hazardous  to  the  aircraft  are  taking  place,  or  when  military
activities require absolute priority.  RAs are mainly declared over areas where military
operations  occur.  However,  RAs  have  also  been  declared  to  cater  for
communications and space tracking operations or to control access to emergency or
disaster  areas.    RAs  are  general y  promulgated  at  specified  times  and  dates.    For
example, a temporary RA may be declared for special events where there may be a
public safety issue – such as the Avalon Air Show or the Commonwealth Games.
Danger Area: The declaration of a Danger Area (DA) defines airspace within which
activities dangerous to the flight of aircraft may exist at specified times. Approval for
flight through a DA outside control ed airspace is not required.  However, pilots are
expected to maintain a high level of vigilance when transiting DAs.  DAs are primarily
established to alert aircraft on the following:

Flying training areas where student pilots are learning to fly and / or gather
in large numbers;

Gliding  areas  where  communications  with  airborne  gliders  might  be
difficult;

Blasting on the ground at mine sites;

Parachute operations;

Gas discharge plumes; and

Smal  arms fire from rifle ranges.

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ANNEX E – STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION/FEEDBACK REGISTER
Stakeholder /
No.
Reference
Comment
CASA response
Action
Response
Commentator
The report noted there was a reduction in
Noted.
June 2016 movement
The study did consider
movements in Hobart, however this was

data added to report.
the movements of both
due to the bankruptcy of light charter

aerodromes together.
aircraft operator based at Hobart. The
Hobart’s overall
number of passengers into the airport has
movements
grown, as have the number of IFR jet
experienced a decline
movements. There is an overal growth in
between December
traffic across both airports during this
2011 and December
period. The report doesn’t make this
2012. Movements
distinction directly and due to the nature of
continued increase to
the two airports they should be considered
26,000. The data does
as one entity
support that in that
time period, the traffic
mix changed and other
aircraft types were
introduced into Hobart.
These larger aircraft
1
Flying school and
Local Operator
charter
support the
incremental growth in
movements but it also
demonstrated the clear
growth in passengers.
Cambridge Airport does have lights, and is
Noted.
Details regarding

used for night operations, including flying

runway lighting at
training.
Cambridge have been
amended.
The report doesn’t comment as to the cost
Noted. Airservices
Airservices provided

to fix the TASWAM system, as was told to
was invited to
the following response:
Industry, would be providing surveillance
respond with
Because each WAM is
coverage to Hobart/Launceston. There are
further detail.
designed to meet
numerous RAPAC meeting comments

certain objectives in a
made that industry were told (as a
particular airspace
consequence of the ministerial directive)
environment, with
constraints of
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Response
Commentator
geography, site
determination and the
availability of
communications, a
detailed analysis
would need to be
undertaken before any
accurate cost estimate
could be provided.
There are also
ongoing staffing costs
to provide the service,
including the provision
of an additional
console.

To determine levels of
air traffic service
provision national y, a
risk based approach is
employed, and this is
dependent on the
volume and complexity
of air traffic in a
particular airspace.
Based on the current
complexity of air traffic
Airservices wil
continue to employ the
surveil ance coverage
available in the area to
manage operational
risk, and there is
currently no intent to
provide a surveil ance
approach service H24
at Hobart.
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Commentator
Comment was also made in reference to
Noted. Airservices

Airservices provided
the Ministers Direction with regards to
was invited to

the following response:
surveil ance. Claims have been made that
respond with

Airservices have ignored this directive and
further detail.
Airservices considers
gone for a solution which did not meet the

the surveil ance to be
design requirements of what the minister at
adequate for the
the time directed.
current volume of
traffic, as
demonstrated in this
report. Airservices is
evaluating the use of
ADS-B below 7,000 ft
AMSL with the current
ADS-B coverage.
Airservices is seeing
an increase in
surveil ance
effectiveness as IFR
aircraft equip to meet
the ADS-B mandate
and as VFR aircraft
voluntarily equip with
ADS-B.

Page 23 (Section
Cambridge Airport does have lights, and is
Noted.
Report amended.

6.3)
used for night operations, including flying

training.
Page 5 and page
Stakeholder  comment  highlighted  an  error  Noted.
Report amended.
Comments were
36
regarding  the  reports  reference  to  the
considered and
Industry
number  of  traffic  crossover  points  located
verified. Report has
2
Stakeholders
just outside 35 NM from Hobart. The report
been updated.
indicated  that  the  use  of  waypoint  CLARK

acted  as  a  single  feeder  waypoint  forcing

traffic  crossovers  that  occurs  within  CTA.

Stakeholder comments suggests the basic
route structure for Hobart provides laterally
displaced arrival and departure routes, with
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crossovers designed to be done inside the
terminal  airspace.  Further  comments  went
on  to  suggest  that  given  the  increased
availability  of  surveillance  coverage  in
recent  years  it  became  practice  between
TWR
and
En
Route  to
process
Brisbane/Sydney arriving traffic via CLARK
when  RWY  12  is  in  use.  This  mode
significantly  increases  workload  and
complexity  in the En Route TAS sector as
there  are  consequential  route  crossovers
between
Melbourne/Sydney/Brisbane
bound  traffic.  However  this  management
mode  significantly  simplifies  the  TWR
traffic  pattern  with  no  crossovers  in  the
terminal airspace.

Page 6 and page
Comment received from stakeholders
Noted
Recommendation
Comment has been
37
highlighted the reports comment that
added
clarified with

“Current IFR traffic departing Hobart using
Airservices.
runway 12, results in the Melbourne bound
Comments have been
traffic remaining on the direct route. The
amended within the
Sydney and Brisbane bound traffic are
report.
tracked to the fly-by waypoint at CLARK.

The CLARK waypoint is approximately 31

NM to the northwest of Hobart. This
creates two conflict points with outbound
traffic during the climb phase.” Feedback
from stakeholder suggested this was
incorrect. Melbourne bound traffic off RWY
12 routes via Launceston. Sydney and
Brisbane bound traffic off RWY 12 routes
via waypoint KAREN and NUNPA (Flinders
Island). The is no route crossover.
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Page 5 and page
Stakeholder comment  was provided
Noted
Report wil  be
Comment has been
36
regarding the following reported issue.
amended to reflect this  clarified with
“Airservices control ers manage workload

Airservices.
by the division of control responsibility into
Comments have been
two sectors: the Tasmania sector and the
amended within the
Huon sector. These sectors can be
report.
combined, however with little warning the

combined sectors can present on
occasion, unpredictable levels of activity
resulting in rapid increases in controller
workload for short periods.”
Comments suggested it would be more
accurate if the report reflected the
fol owing;

“The TAS and HUO sectors are virtually
always operated combined although it is
possible for them to be de-combined.
Airservices does not currently resource
these sectors to be operated de-combined
for more than half an hour, nor are the
controllers familiar or confident with
operating the sectors de-combined.
Workload on the combined sectors can,
however, increase rapidly although usual y
it is possible to predict these peaks in the
short term with reasonable reliability.”
Chapter 7 Page
A stakeholder raised the observation that
Traffic data
No further action.
CASA considered
26-30
the Aeronautical Study of Hobart did not
col ected is

seasonal influences in
consider the annual distribution of traffic
annualised but is
conjunction with other
volumes in respect to seasonal influences.
also considered in
qualitative and
It was suggested by the stakeholder that
conjunction with
quantitative data. No
this influence my inflate traffic density at
the Airspace
further action.
certain times of the year and as a result
Criteria thresholds

increase risk.
(AAPS 2015) and
Incident and
Accident data.
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Commentator

Section 4.4
Stakeholder comment received claimed
Noted.
CASA sought to have
Airservices is
Surveil ance,
that the study misunderstood the nature of
the surveil ance
evaluating the use of
Page 16-18
the Tasmanian surveillance system
component reviewed
ADS-B below 7,000 ft
architecture. In particular the ADS-B
by Airservices. Study
AMSL with current
coverage is, in fact, both excel ent and
has addressed this
ADS-B coverage.
highly redundant. The IFR ADS-B mandate
appropriately.
There are currently no
from 2017 wil  ensure that al  IFR aircraft
plans to increase the
are within reliable surveil ance coverage at
multilateration/SSR
all times when within the Hobart terminal
coverage in the Hobart
airspace.
area.

Airservices is seeing
an increase in
surveil ance
effectiveness as IFR
aircraft equip to meet
ADS-B mandate and
as VFR aircraft
voluntarily equip with
ADS-B.
Recommendation
Stakeholder comment received relating to
Noted. CASA

Refer to the answer to
3
recommendation 3: To improve efficiencies  referred to
‘Question 1’ in the list
and predictability, taking into account PBN
Airservices.
of questions from
requirements Airservices should continue
CASA to Airservices
redesign work for flight routes into and out
below.
of Hobart, make improvements to existing
Terminal Instrument Flight Procedures
(TIFPs) and introduce STARs into Hobart.
Stakeholder commented that there are
some significant problems with the
introduction of RNP1 SIDs and STARs into
a non-surveillance environment such as
Hobart. It was added that these problems
would be rectified if and work wel  in a wel
surveil ed environment.

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1. In terms of air route design, can
Noted.
Report amended.
Airservices
Airservices confirm that the basic route
response: Yes, it is
structure for Hobart provides a laterally
Airservices intention
displaced arrival and departure routes with
that route structures
crossovers designed to be done inside or
for Hobart wil provide
outside the terminal airspace?
laterally displaced
arrival and departure
routes with crossovers
minimised as far as
practicable.

2. Can Airservices confirm that Hobart

Airservices
TWR and Melbourne En Route agree to
response: Currently,
The fol owing
process only Brisbane/Sydney arriving
traffic processing off
general questions traffic via CLARK when RWY 12 is in use?
published routes is
were raised from
negotiated tactical y
other industry
between tower and
CASA
stakeholders.
enroute. Airservices
3
Questions to

plans to implement a
Airservices
These questions
route structure that
were presented to
minimises crossovers
Airservices
through the use of
seeking further
segregated flight paths
detail.
to reduce complexity.
The most appropriate
point will be
determined via
modelling.
3. Can Airservices confirm that by

Airservices
operating in this mode of using waypoint
response: Currently,
CLARK significantly increase the workload
traffic processing off
and complexity in the En Route TAS sector
published routes is
as a result of route crossovers between
negotiated tactical y
Melbourne/Sydney/Brisbane-bound traffic
between tower and
and the inbound traffic from
enroute, with both
Sydney/Brisbane?
units having
responsibility to
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manage their own
workload
appropriately.
Airservices plans to
implement a route
structure that
minimises crossovers
through the use of
segregated flight paths
to reduce complexity.

4. If crossovers are to occur where would

Airservices
Airservices control ers prefer the
response:
crossover, within the En Route airspace or
Independent model ing
within the terminal airspace of Hobart?
will help to identify the
conflict pairs and wil
inform decision making
on the appropriate
positions for any
required crossovers

5. Can Airservices confirm that Departures

Airservices
for Melbourne off Hobart RWY 12 are
response: These are
routed via Launceston? And Sydney and
the current published
Brisbane bound traffic departing Hobart
routes. Future routes
RWY 12 are routed via waypoint  KAREN
are to be developed
and NUNPA (Flinders Island)?
that will standardise
traffic processing for
all departures.

6. With the route redesign work currently

Airservices
underway for Hobart, wil  Airservices
response: Airservices
consider the crossover points being
confirms that this will
separated using PBN track spacing
be considered with
requirements for aircraft to reach or leave
respect to ICAO
levels prior to the crossing tracks area of
SID/STAR
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Response
Commentator
conflict by design? (This may reduce ATC
phraseology.
and pilot transmissions to establish and

release requirements while addressing
potential frequency congestion).

7. Does Airservices operate the TAS and

Airservices
HUO sectors as combined sectors in al
response: Current
occasions?
staffing is based on
TAS and HUO sectors
operating in a
combined
configuration for
normal daily
operations.
Notwithstanding,
Airservices recently
reconfigured HUO to
be split during busy
summer months.

8. Are there any occasions where these

Airservices
sectors might be de-combined? Why might
response: See
this occur?
previous response.

9. What would be required for Melbourne

Airservices
Centre to provide surveillance approach
response: A risk
services at Hobart H24 to the surface?
based approach is

employed to determine
levels of air traffic
service provision
national y, and this is
dependent on the
volume and complexity
of air traffic in a
particular airspace.
Airservices wil
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continue to employ the
surveil ance coverage
available in the area to
manage operational
risk, and there is
currently no intent to
provide a surveil ance
approach service H24
at Hobart.

10. What is the approximate cost in

Airservices
providing this type of service?
response:

Surveillance:
Radar: As previously
provided, the cost of
installing and
commissioning ground
based radar
surveil ance equipment
to serve Hobart is
considerable, with
costs in the order of
$10 - $12 mil ion to
install, with ongoing
costs of $140,000 per
annum.

WAM:
Because each WAM is
designed to meet
certain objectives in a
particular airspace
environment, with
constraints of
geography, site
determination and the
availability of
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communications, a
detailed analysis
would need to be
undertaken before any
accurate cost estimate
could be provided.

Console and staff:
Procedural approach
services are provided
to both Hobart and
Launceston outside of
tower hours. Any
change to operations
in Hobart would
require an assessment
of the like-type
services provided in
Launceston.
It is anticipated that
the additional
resources required are
one discrete Eurocat
console, and ten
controllers.

Note:
•  These figures are
based on the need
to man the new
console 0600-2200
local (in addition to
current night-time
requirements)
which would
require a minimum
of four controllers
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per day (two
morning shifts and
two afternoon
shifts).
•  Daytime approach
services could not
be combined with
any other types of
service (i.e.
enroute control
over Tasmania).
•  If surveillance
approach services
were provided at
both Hobart and
Launceston, it is
assumed that
these services
would be run
concurrently on the
same console.
•  Existing staffing
within the affected
group are not
sufficient to cover
the additional
console therefore
the new console is
considered stand-
alone.
•  Annual leave
requirements for
the additional staff
have been factored
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in.
•  There would be no
staff savings in
either Hobart or
Launceston towers.
In addition to the
above:
•  a more in-depth
assessment would
need to be
completed on the
resources required
to transition to the
new mode of
operations which
would include
items such as
procedures
development,
training and
supervision.
•  A safety
assessment on the
appropriateness of
running two
surveil ance
approach services
simultaneously with
day-time traffic
levels would need
to be completed.
•  Should the two
approach services
need to be de-
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combined for short
periods, it is
expected that this
could be achieved
via the use of
existing
infrastructure, (with
the inclusion of the
additional console)
however should the
two services be
required to operate
independently on a
permanent basis, a
separate review
would be required.
However, to determine
levels of air traffic
service provision
national y, a risk based
approach is employed,
and this is dependent
on the volume and
complexity of air traffic
in a particular
airspace. Based on the
current complexity of
air traffic Airservices
will continue to employ
the surveil ance
coverage available in
the area to manage
operational risk, and
there is currently no
intent to provide a
surveil ance approach
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Commentator
service H24 at Hobart.

11. What are the technical limitations on

Airservices
TASWAM surveil ance that prevents it
response: Broadly,
being used to the surface?
the issue is with the
RU geometry.
Additional RUs may
help, but the
communication
network design (and
reliability) does not
support the standards
required for
surveil ance terminal
area operations (for
the multilateration
component). This is
not a level of air traffic
service delivery
intended in Tasmania
based on the current
volume and complexity
of traffic flows.

12. How long would it take to solve any

Airservices
technical limitations of the existing
Response: It is
TASWAM system so it may provide
estimated that it wil
effective surveillance to the surface?
take approximately 12
months and there are
no plans to do so.
13. The use of electronic surveillance at

Airservices provided
lower levels would enhance the efficiency
the following response:
of the airspace. What plans does

Airservices have to increase the
Airservices is
effectiveness of the electronic surveil ance
evaluating the use of
in the vicinity of Hobart?
ADS-B below 7,000 ft
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AMSL with the current
ADS-B coverage.
Airservices is seeing
an increase in
surveil ance
effectiveness as IFR
aircraft equip to meet
the ADS-B mandate
and as VFR aircraft
voluntarily equip with
ADS-B.

Aeronautical Study of Hobart – February 2017
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