PO Box 7820 Canberra BC ACT 2610
7 November 2025
Our references: LEX 78207
LEX 76729
Your reference: MR23/01526
Jason Aghahowa
Assistant Review Advisor
Review and Investigations
Freedom of Information
Office of the Australian Information Commissioner
Only by email: xxxxx@xxxx.xxx.xx
Dear Mr Aghahowa,
Response to notice of Information Commissioner review and request for information
1.
I refer to your Direction issued under section 55(2)(e)(ii) of the
Freedom of Information
Act 1982 (FOI Act), and dated 10 October 2025, directing Services Australia (the
Agency) to make further submissions to support its claims that a practical refusal reason
exists under s24 of the FOI Act, or make submissions that it no longer maintains its
access refusal claims under s 24 of the FOI Act.
2.
In the attached correspondence you stated that the Applicant’s request is not sufficiently
ambiguous for the purposes of s 24AA(1)(b), stating that “[i]
t is clear from the request
the applicant is seeking active and inactive agreements, MoUs, or contracts that ‘result
in the sharing of veteran data, even if identified.’”
3.
You also stated that should the Agency wish to rely upon section 24AA(1)(a)(i), further
information should be provided in respect of;
a)
how it has concluded that there is a minimum of 900 documents captured by the
request in circumstances where the searches evidence does not establish how
many of these documents are likely to be relevant
b)
the accuracy of its processing estimate given that the nature of the documents
captured by the request and the complexity of processing those documents is
unclear in the absence of a sampling exercise. For example, without a sampling
exercise it is not clear:
i.
the number of pages that likely fall within the scope of the applicant’s request
ii.
how many documents consist of duplicates
iii.
how many documents would be exempt in full or released in full and
therefore would be quicker to process, and
iv.
how many documents would require smaller more detailed redactions.
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4.
Given the above request for information, further consultation has been had with internal
Agency business areas in order to clarify our position.
Background
5.
On 31 October 2023, the Applicant made a request under the FOI Act for access to the
following documents;
All active Memorandum of Understanding, Heads of Agreement, Data Sharing
Agreements, and Service Contracts that result in the sharing of veteran data,
even if de-identified. I am looking for similar documents for programs and
agreements that ceased within the last 10 years or are still active.
6.
A comprehensive background was provided to OAIC on 2 October 2025, and as such,
the Agency does not propose to recite that information again.
Summary of agency submissions
7.
The Agency submits that the correct and preferable decision is that a practical refusal
reason exists in relation to the Applicant’s FOI request under section 24AA of the FOI
Act as the Agency has been unable to identify the documents in which the Applicant is
seeking, and therefore the requirement set out in section 15(2)(b) of the FOI Act has not
been satisfied.
8.
However, if the OAIC considers the Applicant’s request is clear enough to process, and
is therefore minded to determine that the request meets the requirement set out in
section 15(2)(b) of the FOI Act, then Agency argues, in the alternative, that a practical
refusal reason would exist as the work involved in processing the Applicant’s request
would substantially and unreasonably divert the resources of the agency from its other
operations under section 24(1)(a)(i) of the FOI Act.
9.
The Agency unsuccessfully attempted to consult with the Applicant twice in the course
of the original decision, in an attempt to clarify the documents in which he is seeking.
The parties have been unable to revise the scope of the request, such that the practical
refusal reasons are resolved.
10. Consultation has not been had with the Applicant in the course of the Information
Commissioner Review given that the Applicant’s last response to the Agency stated that
should a practical refusal reason be relied upon by the Agency, the Applicant wished to
seek review from OAIC. This indicates to the Agency that the Applicant does not wish
to engage directly with the Agency on this issue.
Submissions
Section 24 of the FOI Act – Power to refuse request – the documents are not reasonably able
to be identified
11. Section 24 of the FOI Act provides:
(1) If an agency or Minister is satisfied, when dealing with a request for a document,
that a practical refusal reason exists in relation to the request (see section 24AA),
the agency or Minister:
a) must undertake a request consultation process (see section 24AB); and
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b) if, after the request consultation process, the agency or Minister is satisfied
that the practical refusal reason still exists—the agency or Minister may
refuse to give access to the document in accordance with the request.
12. Section 24AA of the FOI Act provides:
(1) For the purposes of section 24, a practical refusal reason exists in relation to a
request for a document if either (or both) of the following applies:
a) the work involved in processing the request:
i.
in the case of an agency—would substantially and unreasonably divert
the resources of the agency from its other operations; or
ii.
in the case of a Minister—would substantially and unreasonably
interfere with the performance of the Minister’s functions;
b) the request does not satisfy the requirement in paragraph 15(2)(b)
(identification of documents).
(2) Subject to subsection (3), but without limiting the matters to which the agency or
Minister may have regard, in deciding whether a practical refusal reason exists,
the agency or Minister must have regard to the resources that would have to be
used for the following;
a)
identifying, locating or collating the documents within the filing system of
the agency, or the office of the Minister;
b)
deciding whether to grant, refuse or defer access to a document to which
the request relates, or to grant access to an edited copy of such a
document, including resources that would have to be used for:
i.
examining the document; or
ii.
consulting with any person or body in relation to the request;
c)
making a copy, or an edited copy, of the document;
d)
notifying any interim or final decision on the request.
13. Paragraph 3.194 of the FOI Guidelin
es1 provides:
One formal requirement of an FOI request is that the request must provide ‘such
information as is reasonably necessary to enable a responsible officer of the
agency, or the Minister to identify’ the document that is requested (s 15(2)(b)).
This differs from other formal requirements, in that a failure to comply with this
requirement is classified by the FOI Act as a ‘practical refusal reason’ for which a
request consultation process is required.
1 Guidelines issued by the Information Commissioner pursuant to section 93A of the FOI Act (the FOI
Guidelines).
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Request consultation process
14. We understand that the Information Commissioner is satisfied that appropriate
consultation measures have been undertaken in accordance with section 24AB of the
FOI Act.
Documents cannot be identified
15. The Agency contends that the Applicant’s request does not contain sufficient information
that would allow an officer of the Agency to reasonably identify documents that may fall
within the scope of the request, and therefore section 24AA(1)(b) is applicable to this
request.
16. We however also note that OAIC has a different opinion on this issue, stating that “[i]
t is
clear from the request the applicant is seeking active and inactive agreements, MoUs,
or contracts that ‘result in the sharing of veteran data, even if identified.”
17. The Agency accepts that active or inactive Memorandum of Understanding, Heads of
Agreement, Data Sharing Agreements, and Service Contracts used within the last 10
years could be considered easily identifiable, albeit, voluminous. However, the issue
arises when the Agency attempts to narrow down these Memorandum of Understanding,
Heads of Agreement, Data Sharing Agreements, and Service Contracts that share
“veteran data”.
Veteran and veteran data
18. The term veteran is not settled terminology and there is no definition of “veteran” within
any portfolio legislation relevant to the Agency. This is principally because the Agency
is not responsible for establishing eligibility for benefits, payments and pensions payable
specifically to veterans. This responsibility sits with the Department of Veterans’ Affairs
(DVA). While the Agency administers most Commonwealth payments, the
administration of payments specific to veterans is done by DVA.
19. The term veteran is defined at section 5(C)(1) of the
Veterans' Entitlements Act 1986
as;
veteran means:
(a) a person (including a deceased person):
(i)
who is, because of section 7, taken to have rendered eligible war
service; or
(ii) in respect of whom a pension is, or pensions are, payable under
subsection 13(6); and
(b) in Parts III and VIIC also includes a person who is:
(i) a Commonwealth veteran; or
(ii) an allied veteran; or
(iv) an allied mariner.
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20. The
Australian Veterans’ Recognition (Putting Veterans and Their Families First) Act
2019 defines a veteran as at section 4 as;
veteran means a person who has served, or is serving, as a member of the
Permanent Forces or as a member of the Reserves.
21. The Agency does not, and has no need, to hold information in respect of who might have
rendered eligible war like service, those whom a pension is, or pensions are, payable
under section 13(6) of the
Veterans' Entitlements Act 1986, or those who have served,
or is serving, as a member of the Permanent Forces, or as a member of the Reserves.
It must also be noted that the definition of a veteran may also include a person, whether
living or deceased.
22. Therefore, the Agency argues that it is unable to readily determine or differentiate those
customers who are classified as, or identify as a veteran per the
Veterans' Entitlements
Act 1986 and
Australian Veterans’ Recognition (Putting Veterans and Their Families
First) Act 2019, for the purposes of determining whether their information is included in
an active or inactive data sharing agreement used by the Agency.
23. Furthermore, as the Agency is unable to determine those customers who identify as a
veteran, we are also unable to determine whether the sharing of the data in question
was for the purpose of sharing “veteran data” exclusively, or for another data sharing
purpose, for which a person who identifies as a veteran, may have had their data shared.
24. For clarity, and on a broad interpretation of “veterans’ data”, we believe this data is not
mutually exclusive to agreements between DVA and the Agency. While a customer
could be classified as, or identify as a veteran, their data could have been shared in
conjunction with our routine business-as-usual Medicare, Centrelink, Child Support and
administrative service offers, for reasons that are irrelevant to their veteran status.
Alternatively, their information may be provided to support other Federal entities to meet
their administrative responsibilities, again, for purposes irrelevant to their status as a
veteran, for example the lodgement and payment of taxation and the exit and arrival to
Australia.
Documents, programs and agreements
25. The Applicant has also stated in his request that he is “looking for similar documents or
programs and agreements that ceased within the last 10 years or are still active”. The
Agency is unable to determine what would constitute “similar programs and
agreements”. The issue arises when attempting to determine what two documents are
being compared to determine similarity, and what elements of a program or agreement
makes it similar to another. In any event, the term “similar programs and agreements”
is not an unambiguous searchable term or sufficiently clearly definitive or descriptive.
26. OAIC have nevertheless indicated that the Applicant “…
is seeking active and inactive
agreements, MoUs, or contracts that ‘result in the sharing of veteran data, even if
identified”.
27. As noted above, regardless of OAIC’s interpretation, the Agency contends that as it does
not hold information in respect of customers who identify as a veteran as per the
Veterans' Entitlements Act 1986 and/ or the
Australian Veterans’ Recognition (Putting
Veterans and Their Families First) Act 2019, and therefore cannot readily determine
which active or inactive Memorandum of Understanding, Head of Agreement, Data
Sharing Agreement, and Service Contract, used by the Agency since 2013 would fall
within the scope of the Applicant’s request.
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28. Based on the fact that the Agency’s systems do not either require customers to identify
that they are a veteran, or readily identify customers as being a veteran, all active and
inactive active Memorandum of Understanding, Heads of Agreement, Data Sharing
Agreements, and Service Contracts used by the Agency since 2013 (10 years prior to
the Applicant’s request for information) are potentially outside the scope of the request.
29. As the Applicant has been unwilling to provide clarification on the documents in which
he has sought access to, and given that the Agency is not able to identify customers
who identify as a veteran, the Agency submits the Applicant’s request does not satisfy
the requirement in section 15(2)(b) of the FOI Act (identification of documents) and, as
such, it is reasonably open to the Agency to refuse the Applicant’s request in
accordance with s 24(1) of the FOI Act.
Section 24 of the FOI Act – Power to refuse request – processing of the documents would
substantially and unreasonably divert the resources of the Agency
30. In the first instance, the Agency submits that the correct and preferable decision is that
a practical refusal reason exists in relation to the Applicant’s FOI request under section
24AA(1)(b) of the FOI Act as the requirement set out in section 15(2)(b) of the FOI Act
has not been satisfied.
31. Should OAIC determine that the Applicant’s request is clear enough to process, and
therefore meets the requirement set out in section 15(1)(b) of the FOI Act, the Agency
argues that a practical refusal reason would still exist as the work involved in processing
the Applicant’s request would substantially and unreasonably divert the resources of the
agency from its other operations under section 24(1)(a)(i) of the FOI Act.
32. The Agency submits that section 15(2)(b) of the FOI Act leaves the responsible officer
to make a judgment of a broad discretionary kind, as to whether the information given
was ‘reasonably necessary…to identify’ the documents sought. As noted in
Cunliffe v
Darkinjung Local Aboriginal Land Council (GD) [2010] NSWADTAP 77, the emphasis
on ‘identification’ informs the approach to be taken to what is ultimately a discretionary
evaluation
.2
33. As stated above, as the Agency’s systems do not readily identify customers as being a
veteran, all active and inactive active Memorandum of Understanding, Heads of
Agreement, Data Sharing Agreements, and Service Contracts used by the Agency since
2013 (10 years prior to the Applicant’s request for information) are potentially outside
the scope of the request. However, in the circumstances that OAIC believes that this is
an irrelevant factor, then all active and inactive active Memorandum of Understanding,
Heads of Agreement, Data Sharing Agreements, and Service Contracts used by the
Agency since 2013 (10 years prior to the Applicant’s request for information) are
potentially within the scope of the request.
34. We believe, should OAIC take this approach, that such proposition would be based on
the assumption that it is very likely, but not definitively known, that at least one customer,
who is classified as veteran under the relevant legislation, has had their data shared
under an active or inactive Memorandum of Understanding, Head of Agreement, Data
Sharing Agreement, and Service Contract since 2013.
35. While the Agency could consider progressing the Applicant’s request based on the
above assumption, the Agency strongly argues that in doing so, it would be giving the
2
Cunliffe v Darkinjung Local Aboriginal Land Council (GD) [2010] NSWADTAP 77, at 29.
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Applicant access to irrelevant information, as the Agency cannot be certain that a
customer, who identifies as a veteran, actually had their data shared under any of the
Memorandum of Understanding, Head of Agreement, Data Sharing Agreement, and
Service Contract used by the Agency since 2013.
36. In any event, should OAIC request that the Agency process and provide the Applicant
with all Memorandum of Understanding, Head of Agreement, Data Sharing Agreement,
and Service Contracts since 2013 on the assumption that at least one customer who
identifies as veteran has had their data shared under that agreement, we argue that
processing this request would substantially and unreasonably divert the resources of the
agency from its other operations under section 24(1)(a)(i) of the FOI Act.
37. Further, this approach could open the Commonwealth to committing a notifiable privacy
breach under the
Privacy Act 1988 (the Privacy Act). A notifiable privacy breach occurs
when:
•
there is unauthorised access to or unauthorised disclosure of personal
information, or a loss of personal information, that an organisation holds
•
it is likely to result in serious harm to one or more individuals, and
•
the organisation or agency hasn’t been able to prevent the likely risk of
serious harm with remedial action.
38. While unlikely, it is possible that veteran data disclosed under an Agency data sharing
agreement, may capture a small enough group of individuals, that it would be possible
to identify them through the release of an Agency Memorandum of Understanding,
Head of Agreement, Data Sharing Agreement, and/or Service Contracts where
veterans or veteran data may be specifically targeted.
Substantial diversion of agency resources
39. The Agency’s Networks and Partnerships Team within the Partnerships and Assurance
Branch, who oversees the Agency’s agreements register have identified that since 2013
the Agency has utilised 2,060 bilateral agreements, which includes Memorandums of
Understanding, Heads of Agreement, Data Sharing Agreements, and/ or Service
Contracts. It has been determined that this would comprise of approximately 11,370
pages (
Attachment 2).
40. This figure has been comprised of approximately 990 documents (estimated to be
around 4,980 pages) in respect of current and active agreements with partner
departments and agencies, and approximately 1,070 documents (estimated to be 6,390
pages) in respect of historic bilateral agreements held with departments and agencies
over the last 10 years (
Attachment 1).
41. Given that these documents have been identified by way of the Agency’s agreements
register, a list of all bilateral agreements used by the Agency, none are considered to be
duplicates.
42. It must be noted that the Agency’s Partnerships and Assurance Branch only have
access to the agreements register, and not the specific documents identified within that
register. In order to obtain copies of the 2,060 documents possibly within scope of the
Applicant’s request, the FOI Legal team would need to consult with up to 25 individual
business areas who manage and hold each specific agreement.
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43. This consultation process with the Agency’s internal business areas will also include
obtaining their views on sensitivities and concerns with the potential release of the
documents, given that they are the subject matter experts. We estimate that obtaining,
collating and seeking the internal business areas views on the potential release of the
documents possibly within scope of the Applicant request, will take
37.5 hours. This is
based on an estimate of 1.5 hours per consultation. This does not include the
consultation of any third-party stakeholders or Commonwealth entities that may be a
party to bilateral agreements.
44. In
United Firefighters Union of Australia Aviation Branch and Airservices Australia [2020]
AICmr 4 (20 January 2020), the IC noted at [39] that:
In previous IC review decisions, it has generally been accepted that between 30
seconds to 5 minutes per page is a reasonable estimate of the time required for
an agency to both assess and edit (redact) documents, except where the
documents contain a substantial amount of sensitive information. Generally,
where it has been accepted that an estimate at the higher end of that range is
reasonable, the documents at issue have been complex or sensitive.
45. Therefore, based on a per page estimate in the middle of the estimate suggested in
United Firefighters Union of Australia Aviation Branch and Airservices Australia [2020]
AICmr 4, the Agency submits at 2 minutes per page, consistent with the previous
estimates provided, it would take the Agency approximately
379 hours or the equivalent
of a full-time Agency employee working for almost 51 full days to simply review, assess
and redact the 2,060 documents (approximately 11,370) possibly within scope of the
Applicant’s request.
46. It is not known how many documents will be exempt in full, or released in full, until
consultation is had with the external document owners. The Networks and Partnerships
Team have estimated that there are possibly up to 15 external organisations, and 20
Commonwealth agencies that would need to be consulted with prior to making a
decision on whether to release the documents within scope or not. We conservatively
estimate that each consultation with an external stakeholder will require 1 hour, totalling
35 hours.
47. In summary, the Agency submits that based on its calculations identified above, and
noted below, processing the Applicant’s request based on the assumptions noted above,
would entail a
substantial diversion of the Agency’s resources. The
total processing
time is estimated to be
458.5 hours. This can be characterised as a full time Agency
employee working for more than 61 days, or over 12 weeks to process this one request.
Total number of documents within scope 2,060 documents
11,370 pages
Locating and collating the documents 1.5 hour per consultation = 37.5 hours
(noting that 25 business areas will need to
be consulted)
Consulting with 35 external Agencies
1 hour per consultation = 35 hours
Examining (review, assess and redact)
2 minutes per page = 379 hours
Preparation of Decision
7 hours
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Total estimated processing time.
458.5 hours
48. In the decision of
Farrell; Chief Executive Officer, Services Australia and (Freedom of
information) [2020] AATA 2390
, the Tribunal accepted that a processing timeframe of
61.25 hours was substantial for the purposes of assessment under section 24 of the
FOI Act (see [51] – [52]).
49. Therefore, based on all 2,060 documents falling within the scope of the Applicant’s
request, the Agency submits that, based on a very conservative estimate, the Applicant’s
would entail a
substantial diversion of the Agency’s resources.
50. Based on an extremely conservative estimate founded on the approach taken in
United
Firefighters Union of Australia Aviation Branch and Airservices Australia [2020] AICmr
4, the Agency argues that the necessary element identified under section 24AA(1)(a)(i)
– would the processing of the request substantial direct from the resources of the Agency
from its other operations, has already been satisfied.
51. The Agency further submits that sampling is unnecessary in this case, given the above
estimates provided and that the processing of the request substantial direct from the
resources of the Agency from its other operations, has already been satisfied
Unreasonable diversion of agency resources
52. As the Agency has demonstrated that processing this request would substantially divert
the resources of the Agency from its other operations, the second limb of section
24AA(1)(a) needs to be considered, in that, would the processing of this request
unreasonably direct the resources of the Agency from its other operations.
53. Paragraph 3.205 discusses what a decision maker should consider when determining
whether a diversion of Agency resources would be
unreasonable
The evident purpose of this practical refusal ground is to ensure that the capacity
of agencies and ministers to discharge their usual functions is not undermined by
processing FOI requests that are unreasonably large or complex… Similarly,
although a broadly worded request is more likely to constitute an unreasonable
diversion of resources than a request that is narrowly focused, the fact that a large
number of documents are within the scope of a request may not be determinative
if the documents can be easily identified, collated and assessed.
54. Pursuant to section 24AA(2) of the FOI Act and paragraph 3.201 of the FOI Guidelines,
the following factors indicate the Applicant’s request represents an unreasonable
diversion of the Agency’s resources:
•
The request would cause significant resources within the Agency to be diverted
from their business-as-usual work, to search for, and retrieve documents within
the scope of the request. As identified above, processing this request will disrupt
up to 25 internal business areas. This does not include time required by an FOI
officer to collate, externally consult, and then process the request.
•
The expertise of the staff from 25 business areas to provide comment and
justifications in respect of any sensitivities with the documents within the scope of
the Applicant request.
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•
The estimated hours required to process the request, equates to an individual staff
member working full-time, in excess of 51 days in order to review, assess and
redact the request documents. This excludes the time needed to both internally
and externally consult. An additional 7 hours will then be needed to prepare a
decision for release to the Applicant, explaining that while documents have been
provided, they are based on an assumption, and the Agency cannot guarantee
that such documents definitely fall within the scope of the Applicant’s request.
•
Processing the Applicant’s request would divert resources from processing other
FOI requests, noting the Agency has receives over 500 FOI requests per month.
•
The Applicant has been provided the opportunity, and assistance, to revise his
request; however, he refused to do so. The Agency has been as assistive as
possible throughout this process.
Public interest considerations
55. Should OAIC request that the Agency process the Applicant’s request on the
assumption that it is very likely, but not definitively known, that at least one customer,
who is classified as veteran under the relevant legislation, has had their data shared
under an active or inactive Memorandum of Understanding, Head of Agreement, Data
Sharing Agreement, and Service Contract since 2013, and therefore all agreements are
within scope of the Applicant’s request, the Agency submits there is no significant public
interest in the release of the documents
.
56. While the sharing of data arrangements within, and outside, the Agency is arguably of
significant public interest, the Agency would argue that in this case, and if requested to
proceed on an assumption, the public interest benefit would be significantly lessened.
This is due to the fact that there would be no way of definitely knowing whether a veteran
has had their data shared under a specific agreement or not.
57. Further, as provided at paragraphs 37 and 38, the processing of this request and any
subsequent release of information may result in a notifiable data breach under the
Privacy Act which would mitigate any public interest in processing the request.
Cooperation by the Applicant
58. In
Urquhart; Chief Executive Officer, Services Australia and [2021] AATA 1407, the
Tribunal found that where an Applicant ‘did not appear to be particularly flexible in further
limiting his request’, this was a ‘relevant factor’ for the Tribunal in finding the diversion
was unreasonabl
e3.
59. In
'RW' and Services Australia (Freedom of information) [2020] AICmr 12 (13 April 2020)
(see [82]), the Information Commissioner affirmed the Agency’s finding that a practical
refusal reason existed in circumstances where:
the applicant has taken limited steps to reduce the scope such that a practical
refusal reason ceased to exist. In circumstances where the request is substantial,
these considerations go to the issue of the unreasonableness of the processing
burden on Services Australia.
60. If the Applicant were to revise the scope of his request, to potently limit the agreements
between the Agency and one other organisation or Agency, and within a limited
3
Urquhart at [65]-[66]
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timeframe, it is likely his FOI request will be processed in the usual way and consistent
the purpose of the FOI Act
61. However, the Agency submits that the Applicant has taken limited steps to meaningfully
consult with the Agency about the scope of this FOI request to the extent that the
practical refusal reason ceases to exist.
62. The Applicant’s correspondence in the original decision highlights the difficulties the
Agency is facing in eliciting a meaningful response on which the Agency could
reasonably rely to progress the current FOI request. The Agency has chosen not to
engage further with the Applicant during the course of the Information Commissioner
review so as not to enflame the Applicant further given that the last response received
from the Applicant indicated that they only wished to engage with OAIC.
63. The Agency submits that in light of the above, the Applicant has not been genuinely
open to revising the scope of this request, and does not appear open to further
meaningful engagement to refine the scope of his FOI request such that the practical
refusal reason is removed.
64. In summary, we submit:
•
The Agency does not readily hold information in respect of customers who
identify as veterans as defined by the
Veterans' Entitlements Act 1986 and
Australian Veterans’ Recognition (Putting Veterans and Their Families First) Act 2019, for the purposes of determining whether their information is included in an
active or inactive data sharing agreement used by the Agency;
•
Regardless of OAIC’s interpretation, the Agency argues that it cannot readily
determine which active or inactive Memorandum of Understanding, Head of
Agreement, Data Sharing Agreement, and/ or Service Contract, used by the
Agency since 2013 would fall within the scope of the Applicant’s request.
•
Should a broad view of the Applicant’s request be taken, and it be assumed that
it is very likely, but not definitively known, that at least one customer, who is
classified as veteran under the relevant legislation, has had their data shared
under an active or inactive Memorandum of Understanding, Head of Agreement,
Data Sharing Agreement, and Service Contract since 2013, the processing of
this request would substantially and unreasonably divert Agency resources as
described above, or encompass documents not within the scope of the
Applicant’s request as the Agency is unable to clearly identified customers who
identify as a veteran as per the relevant legislation.
•
That the correct and preferable decision is for OAIC to affirm the Agency’s
decision that is that a practical refusal reason exists in relation to the Applicant’s
FOI request under section 24AA of the FOI Act as the Agency has been unable
to identify the documents in which the Applicant is seeking, and therefore the
requirement set out in section 15(2)(b) of the FOI Act has not been satisfied;
•
Further, and or in the alternative, should OAIC determine that the Applicant’s
request is clear enough to process, and therefore meets the requirement set out
in section 15(2)(b) of the FOI Act, the Agency submits a practical refusal reason
would exist as the work involved in processing the Applicant’s request would
substantially and unreasonably divert the resources of the agency from its other
operations under section 24(1)(a)(i) of the FOI Act.
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•
Lastly, the Agency contends that processing the request may lead to a notifiable
data breach under the Privacy Act where the scope of the request relates to
information that leads to the identification of person who may identify as or be
classified as a veteran.
Further comments
65. The Agency does not consent to
Attachment 1 and 2 being provided to the Applicant.
66. Should you have any enquiries concerning this matter, please contact me via email at
xxx.xxxxx.xxxx@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.xxx.xx.
Yours sincerely
Sonya
FOI Practitioner
Freedom of Information Legal Team
Legal Services Division
Services Australia
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