Our reference:
trim:[17/44617]
23 March 2017
Mr Paul Whiley
By email: xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx@xxxxxxxxxxx.xxx.xx
Dear Mr Whiley
Freedom of Information Request ACIC 17-05
I refer to your request for access to documents relating to stolen firearms under the
Freedom of
Information Act 1982 (FOI Act)
.
I, Suzannah Ward, FOI Delegate, am an officer authorised under section 23(1) of the FOI Act to make
decisions in relation to FOI requests.
I am writing to tell you that I believe that the work involved in processing your request in its current
form would substantially and unreasonably divert the resources of this agency from its other
operations due to its size and broad scope. This is called a ‘practical refusal reason’ (section 24AA).
On this basis, I intend to refuse access to the documents you requested. However, before I make a
final decision to do this, you have an opportunity to revise your request. This is called a ‘request
consultation process’ as set out under section 24AB of the FOI Act. You have 14 days to respond to
this notice in one of the ways set out below.
Why I intend to refuse your request
In your request you sought
The records of all stolen firearms nationally for the last 5 years. And how and where they
were stolen from.
I have decided that a practical refusal reason exists because further searches of the Australian
Criminal Intelligence Commission’s information holdings have returned a large number of
documents within scope of your request, most of which comprise information provided by State and
Territory police agencies, which would consequently need to be consulted in relation to the request.
The Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission (ACIC) has multiple electronic document and
information management systems. Each system needs to be searched individually. Searches
undertaken on one of the ACIC’s largest databases, being its Electronic Document Records
Management System, have returned approximately 400 documents which would need to be
reviewed to determine whether they are within scope of your request.
Discovering threats,
supporting law enforcement,
protecting Australia.
As the information the ACIC holds in relation to stolen firearms is primarily sourced from States and
Territories, I anticipate that many documents within scope of the request would likely have been
authored by police agencies in other jurisdictions and/or contain information sourced from police
agencies in other jurisdictions.
The nature of your request in its current form, and the documents within its scope, are therefore
such that I anticipate processing the request would require consultation with all State and Territory
jurisdictions on a large number of documents, and substantial agency resources would have to be
used for:
identifying, locating or collating the documents within ACIC’s information holdings;
deciding whether to grant, refuse or defer access to a document to which the request
relates, or to grant access to an edited copy of such a document (including resources that
would have to be used for examining the document and consulting with State and Territory
police agencies in relation to the request);
making a copy or an edited copy, of the document; and
notifying any interim or final decision on the request.
On this basis, I consider processing your request in its current form would substantially and
unreasonably divert the resources of this agency from its other operations.
Some information relevant to stolen firearms is publicly available on the ACIC website at
https://www.acic.gov.au/publications/intelligence-products/illicit-firearms-australia-report. The
Illicit Firearms in Australia report may be of particular interest to you. I have
attached a copy of that
report to this correspondence.
Request consultation process
You now have an opportunity to revise your request to enable it to proceed.
Revising your request can mean narrowing the scope of the request to make it more manageable or
explaining in more detail the documents you wish to access. For example, by providing more specific
information about exactly what documents you are interested in, our agency will be able to pinpoint
the documents more quickly and avoid using excessive resources to process documents you are not
interested in.
Before the end of the consultation period, you must do one of the following, in writing:
withdraw your request
make a revised request
tell us that you do not wish to revise your request.
The consultation period runs for 14 days and starts on the day after you receive this notice.
During this period, you are welcome to seek assistance from the contact person I have listed below
to revise your request. If you revise your request in a way that adequately addresses the practical
refusal grounds outlined above, we will recommence processing it. Please note that the time taken
to consult you regarding the scope of your request is not taken into account for the purposes of the
30 day time limit for processing your request.
If you do not do one of the three things listed above during the consultation period or you do not
consult the contact person during this period, your request will be taken to have been withdrawn.
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Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission
Contact officer
If you would like to revise your request or have any questions, the contact officer for your request is:
Suzannah Ward
FOI Delegate
Phone: 02 6268 7230
Email: xxxxxxxx.xxxx@xxxx.xxx.xx
Yours sincerely,
Suzannah Ward
FOI Delegate
3
Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission
ILLICIT FIREARMS
IN AUSTRALIA
Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission
Illicit Firearms in Australia
2
Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission
Illicit Firearms in Australia
CONTENTS
CEO FOREWORD .....................................................................................................................4
ILLICIT FIREARMS OVERVIEW ................................................................................................6
DOMESTIC ILLICIT FIREARMS MARKET .................................................................................7
FIREARM DIVERSION ..............................................................................................................8
FIREARM-RELATED DEATHS .................................................................................................12
FIREARM-RELATED OFFENCES .............................................................................................13
INTERNATIONAL ILLICIT FIREARMS MARKET .....................................................................14
EMERGING TRENDS ..............................................................................................................18
OUTLOOK ..............................................................................................................................20
APPENDIX A ...........................................................................................................................22
APPENDIX B ...........................................................................................................................26
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Illicit Firearms in Australia
CEO FOREWORD
Mr Chris Dawson APM
The use and movement of illicit firearms by criminals is a serious national problem. It
impacts every Australian jurisdiction and affects the safety of our community.
Criminals continue to acquire and use firearms to enable their criminal business, whether
it is to protect their interests, intimidate or to commit acts of violence. Technological
advancements have seen individuals and organised crime increasingly able to purchase
illegal firearms and components anonymously facilitated through the use of darknets,
encrypted communications and digital currencies. Illegal virtual marketplaces have made
firearms more widely available and increasingly allow anonymous procurement of firearms
by criminal entities.
The Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission continues to conservatively estimate that
there are more than 260,000 firearms in the illicit firearms market. This estimate is based
on intelligence and information from several sources. Contemporary methods of diversion
include theft, illicit assembly and manufacture, and illegal importation.
Firearms enable organised crime groups to be more lethal in their activities. It only takes
one firearm in the hands of a person with malicious intent to be of great concern to the
community. Illicit firearms put us all at risk. Any efforts, including both local and national
firearm amnesties that reduce the number of and access to illegal or unregistered firearms
in the community are a positive step forward.
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Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission
Illicit Firearms in Australia
Through close engagement and a national focus on illegal firearms in the Australian
community, the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission and our law enforcement
partners continue to target and reduce criminal access to and use of firearms in the
community. Continuing to collect national intelligence on illicit firearms will assist all law
enforcement agencies to better understand the nature and extent of the market, as well as
identify key gaps and vulnerabilities to assist in directing response options.
I would like to thank our law enforcement partners and all Commonwealth, State and
Territory departments who have contributed to this report. Without input from contributing
agencies, it would not be possible to understand the complex firearm environment.
Chris Dawson APM
Chief Executive Officer
Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission
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Illicit Firearms in Australia
ILLICIT FIREARMS OVERVIEW
The illicit movement, trafficking and use of firearms is a serious national threat and a
significant safety concern for the Australian community.
The demand for and supply of illicit firearms in Australia is driven by a range of entities,
from organised crime groups to low-level individual criminals, who continue to seek,
procure and use firearms to protect their interests and commit violent acts.
Since 2010, intelligence has indicated that not only are serious and organised crime groups
seeking access to firearms for criminal purposes, but an increasing number of groups are
trafficking firearms. The illicit firearms market is driven in part by outlaw motorcycle gangs,
Middle Eastern organised crime groups, and other groups engaged in trafficking illicit
commodities such as drugs.
These groups are known to have direct links to the use of illicit firearms but criminal
involvement in the illicit firearm market is not limited to serious and organised crime
groups, gangs or particular criminal acts.
A wide range of criminals acquire and use firearms to conduct their criminal business,
protect their interests, intimidate others and commit acts of violence. No single organised
crime group dominates the sale and supply of firearms in the Australian illicit market.
Firearms enter the illicit market in Australia through a number of historical and
contemporary diversion methods, depending on the firearm type.
Organised crime is exploiting the rapid development of technology and its increasing
availability to users worldwide. Criminals are likely to exploit new and emerging trends to
acquire and traffic illicit firearms.
Organised crime and firearms are inextricably linked, and law enforcement response
strategies must address both illicit firearms supply routes and the criminal activities that
drive firearms use.
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Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission
Illicit Firearms in Australia
DOMESTIC ILLICIT FIREARMS MARKET
Based on available data, the ACIC conservatively estimates there are 260,000 firearms
(250,000 longarms and 10,000 handguns) in the domestic illicit market. This estimate is
based on a range of intelligence sources, including firearm importation figures and seizure
trends over time.
The exact extent of the Australian illicit firearms market cannot be determined as no
historical data is available on its size prior to the implementation of the National Firearms
Agreement (NFA) of 1996. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
estimates the global illicit market contains the equivalent of approximately 10 to 20 per
cent of the number of firearms in the licit market.1 If this ratio is applied to Australia’s illicit
firearm market, it would contain somewhere between 300,000 and 600,000 firearms.
1 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2011,
The Globalisation of Crime, UNODC, viewed 18 May 2015,
<https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/tocta/TOCTA_Report_2010_low_res.pdf>
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Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission
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FIREARM DIVERSION
The ACIC’s National Firearm Trace Program (FTP) was developed to ascertain the history and
diversion methods of seized firearms. The FTP data collected to date reveals that firearm
enthusiasts with no previous criminal involvement can also influence demand, by sourcing
rare or specialised items from the illicit market that are not available through licit avenues.2
Firearms are diverted to the illicit market in various ways and these diversion methods can
generally be categorised as either historical or contemporary (see Figure 1). While it should
be possible to associate all illicit firearms with one of these diversion methods, a substantial
number of firearms are untraceable and cannot be determined with any confidence to have
entered the market by either means.
HISTORICAL DIVERSION METHODS
Diversion methods used in the past are referred to as historical diversion methods. Due to
changes in practice and regulation, the number of firearms diverted by these methods should
not increase; but firearms already diverted through historical methods may remain in the illicit
market for the life of the firearm. Identified historical methods of diversion include:
the grey market3
technical loopholes in legislation and regulation
the reactivation of previously unaccountable deactivated firearms.
THE GREY MARKET
Most grey-market firearms are unlikely to be held for the purpose of committing violent
offences; however, these firearms are unlikely to be reported as stolen if theft occurs
by criminals. Motivated criminals are more likely to be interested in using unregistered
firearms, as they are unlikely to be traceable by law enforcement agencies.
Many members of the community still possess grey-market firearms because they did
not surrender these during the 1996–97 gun buyback. Many firearm owners chose at that
time to maintain possession (albeit illegally) during the implementation of the National
Firearms Agreement.
The ACIC has received reports of thefts where both registered and unregistered firearms
were stolen; to avoid adverse police attention, the victim reported only the theft of the
registered firearms. It was during the recovery of the registered firearms that police
discovered the existence of the unregistered and unreported stolen firearms.
2 More information on the Firearms Trace Program is at
Appendix A.
3 The grey market consists of illegally held longarms which should have been registered or surrendered under the 1996
National Firearms Agreement but were not. There are also a small number of black powder handguns in the grey market,
which at one time were not required to be registered in some jurisdictions.
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Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission
Illicit Firearms in Australia
FIGURE 1: DIVERSION METHODS: HOW FIREARMS ENTER THE ILLICIT MARKET
illicit grey market
HISTORICAL
legislative loopholes
WN
illegal imports
illicit assembly
UNKNO
CONTEMPORARY
illegal manufacture
theft
LEGISLATIVE LOOPHOLES
A substantial number of handguns entered the illicit firearms pool through regulatory
loopholes in the legislation around deactivated firearms, some of which still exist4. It is
estimated more than 5,000 handguns have entered the illicit market in this way.
Issues around deactivation are not limited to a single jurisdiction. The ACIC’s FTP has
identified a number of previously deactivated firearms that have been reactivated. The
most significant loophole relating to deactivation was in Queensland’s firearms legislation,
which was subsequently changed in 2000.
4 Legislation in South Australia and Western Australia contained some potential loopholes relating to accountability for
deactivated or inoperable firearms. Legislation addressing the South Australian loophole is currently before the South
Australian Parliament. The Law Reform Commission of Western Australia will consider potential loopholes in that state’s
firearms legislation. Firearms allegedly deactivated while loopholes existed in some jurisdictions
have been identified in several ACIC firearm traces.
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Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission
Illicit Firearms in Australia
CONTEMPORARY DIVERSION METHODS
Contemporary diversion methods are current practices for moving firearms or firearm
components to the domestic illicit firearm market. They include:
theft from licensed individuals and firearm dealers, including suspected staged theft
the domestic manufacture and assembly of firearms
the illegal importation of undeclared firearms and firearm parts, and
failure to record or reconcile the interstate movement of firearms.
THEFT
The ACIC’s FTP has found that theft is the primary contemporary diversion method. Theft
accounts for the diversion of 8.5 per cent of firearms traced in 2015–16. While it is likely
some of these stolen firearms come into the possession of organised crime groups, the total
number is unknown.
Many jurisdictions reported an increase in the percentage of firearms stolen from premises
in regional or isolated locations. Offenders target vulnerable homes in these locations
because theft from such properties may yield multiple firearms.
ILLICIT MANUFACTURE
Firearms such as single-shot pen guns, key ring guns and submachine guns are still believed
to be illicitly manufactured in Australia. Only 1.7 per cent of the illicit firearms traced by the
FTP in 2015–16 were of this type.
The ACIC and other law enforcement agencies have assessed the current threat of 3D
printing of firearms as low. Currently, the technology does not commercially enable the
mass production of printed components that match the reliability and cost-effectiveness
of factory-produced firearms. Since instructions to produce a 3D printed firearm were
published online, the ACIC has identified only three attempts to manufacture such firearms
in Australia. Of those identified, none were functioning when detected by police. During the
same period, the ACIC traced almost 1,000 factory-manufactured handguns, demonstrating
that these firearms are more readily available at this time.
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Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission
Illicit Firearms in Australia
As technology improves and 3D printing becomes more affordable, the threat of this
manufacturing method is likely to increase.
ILLEGAL IMPORTATION
According to Australian border detection figures and the FTP, illegal importation accounts
for
a comparatively small percentage of illicit firearms in the Australia market. Of all
firearms traced by the FTP in 2015–16, only 1 per cent were identified as illegally imported.
It is likely that some illicit firearms imported remain undetected at the border.
FAILURE TO RECONCILE TRANSFERS
Each Australian jurisdiction maintains a separate firearm registry, and dealers and individual
licence holders are required to advise the appropriate registry when they dispose of or
receive a firearm from interstate. The accuracy of jurisdictional and, therefore, national
records is adversely affected if the record of a firearm transfer may not be promptly
reconciled by the receiving jurisdiction. It is possible that a small number of firearms may
continue to be diverted through a failure to reconcile firearm transfers. This observation
is supported by the FTP results, which found this method of diversion accounted for only
1 per cent of all firearms traced in 2015–16. This figure is likely to incorporate firearms that
had been diverted in this manner outside of the reporting period.
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Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission
Illicit Firearms in Australia
FIREARM-RELATED OFFENCES
Crime associated with firearms is reported in a number of ways. The usefulness of these
statistical datasets as a measure of firearm-related crime is limited; differences in collection
methods and definitions, and organisational differences between law enforcement
agencies providing the data, restrict comparison and analysis. Statistics gathered by the ABS
reference weapons and explosives offences which incorporate both firearm and firearm-
related offences as per the Australian and New Zealand Standard Offence Classification.5
An average of 4.3 per cent of all offences (9,406 events) recorded between 2008–09 and
2013–14 were related to the primary use of a prohibited or regulated weapon.6
A percentage of other offences that involved firearms as a secondary offence are not
included in these figures. It is therefore likely that crime reporting in relation to firearms
is underestimated.
Between 2009–10 and 2013–14, an average of 1.7 per cent of completed Australian court
cases related principally to a regulated or prohibited weapons or explosives offence.7 In
2013–14, only 1.3 per cent of convictions involving these offences resulted in custodial
sentences of five to 10 years. In 32 per cent of these cases, the sentence imposed was three
months or less.
Persons incarcerated for regulated or prohibited weapons or explosives offences were most
likely to be Australian (79.2 per cent), male (96.6 per cent), and aged 20–34 years (63.2 per
cent), with a custodial sentence of between one and 10 years (79.1 per cent). The available
statistics do not indicate the number or nature of offences that involved the use of a firearm
where that use was not the principal offence reported.8
5 Australian Bureau of Statistics 2011,
Division 11 of the ANZSOC 2011, viewed 12 August 2016,
<http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/Latestproducts/8BDAA300B501E67CCA2578A200140D63?opendocument>
6 Australian Bureau of Statistics 2015,
Recorded crime: Offenders 2013–14, cat. no. 4519.0, viewed 17 February, 2016,
<http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/DetailsPage/4519.02013-14?OpenDocument>
7 Australian Bureau of Statistics 2015,
Criminal Courts, Australia 2013–14, cat. no. 4513.0, viewed 17 February 2016,
<http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/mf/4513.0>
8 Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2015
Prisoners in Australia 2015, cat. no. 4517.0, viewed 17 February 2016, <http://www.
abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/mf/4517.0>
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Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission
Illicit Firearms in Australia
FIREARM-RELATED DEATHS
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) information9 indicates 0.15 per cent (n=229) of all
deaths registered in Australia during 2014 (n=153,580) were attributed to the use of
firearms; the majority of which were attributed to self-harm using a firearm (n=178).10
This represents a small proportion of registered deaths overall, with the long-term average
remaining at that level since 2006 (See Figure 2).
FIGURE 2: FIREARM-RELATED DEATHS, 2005–2014
Australia continues to rank low in international comparisons of per capita deaths by
firearms. In 2012, the reported firearm-related death rate in Canada was 2.08 deaths per
100,000 people11, while in Australia it was 1.02 per 100,000 people.12 Australia’s relatively
low rate of deaths involving firearms is in part due to its regulated firearms market. More
information relating to Australia’s legal firearms market can be found in
Appendix B.
9 Australian Bureau of Statistics 2015,
Causes of Death, Australia 2014, ABS, viewed 12 August 2016, <http://www.abs.gov.
au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/mf/3303.0>
10 For this assessment, use of a firearm includes those deaths registered as occurring through assault using a firearm,
accidental death caused by a firearm and intentional self-harm using a firearm.
11 Statistics Canada 2015,
Deaths and mortality rate, by selected grouped causes, age group and sex 2012, viewed 12 August
2016, <http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/cansim/a26?lang=eng&retrLang=eng&id=1020551&pattern=&csid=>
12 GunPolicy.org 2016,
Calculated Rates: Australia (Total Gun Deaths), viewed 15 August 2016,
<http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/citation/quotes/6472>
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Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission
Illicit Firearms in Australia
INTERNATIONAL ILLICIT FIREARMS
MARKET
Law enforcement agencies are well aware that organised crime groups are capable of
exploiting supply-chain vulnerabilities and targeting known stockpiles of firearms.
In 2015, Europol reported that firearms originating from conflicts in Syria, Libya and Mali
were entering the European black market. These countries were expected to become the
main source of illicit firearms in Europe.13 Criminal entities may seek to import these illicit
firearms into Australia, but it is highly unlikely the number of firearms entering Australia
from these sources will reach the levels observed in Europe.
During 2014, law enforcement agencies in the United States (US) intercepted large caches
of weapons and related items being smuggled to China, Russia, Mexico, the Philippines,
Somalia, Turkmenistan and Yemen.14 Closer to Australia, the Philippines has a large
legitimate firearm industry15. The Philippines is also known to produce large quantities of
illicit firearms and, in some instances, corrupt police have been found to be involved in the
trade of seized firearms on the black market.16
Australian border agencies have not identified significant numbers of firearms entering
Australia from conflict countries or the Philippines at this time.
INTERNATIONAL VULNERABILITIES
Loopholes in both local and international firearms legislation—particularly in relation to
ownership of and trade in firearms parts—continue to allow the movement of assembled
firearms into the black market. Firearm parts and accessories are sourced from countries
where they are legally available and shipped to individuals and groups for assembly in
countries where these parts and firearm types are prohibited.17
Throughout Europe, loopholes in deactivation regulations have resulted in illegal firearm
traders reactivating firearms for diversion to the illicit market. Parts from multiple firearms
of different origin are combined to produce a single, fully functioning firearm.18
Limited oversight of private firearm sales in the US enables individuals to procure firearms
for illegal overseas export into countries such as Australia with relative anonymity, especially
where transactions are made using emerging technologies and business practices, such as
the Darknet and freight-forwarding services.
13 Europol 2015,
Exploring Tomorrow’s Organised Crime 2015, Europol, viewed 18 May 2015,
<https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/exploring-tomorrow%E2%80%99s-organised-crime>
14 National Security Council,
Transnational Organised Crime: A Growing Threat to National and International Security, the
White House, viewed 21 May 2015, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nsc/transnational-crime/threat>
15 Aquino, N 2014, ‘Farmers copying guns make Philippines deadlier than US’, Bloomberg, viewed 15 July 2015, <http://www.
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-11-13/farmers-copying-guns-at-home-make-philippines-deadlier-than-u-s->
16 SBS 2015, ‘Philippines police crack down on gun use after children die’, available at: <http://www.sbs.com.au/news/
article/2014/08/19/philippines-police-crack-down-gun-use-after-children-die.>
17 Europol 2014, ‘Scan threat: Notice on Internet-based trade in firearms (parts and conversion kits)’, Threat Notice 014-
2014, 2 February 2014
18 Europol 2012, ‘SCAN Early Warning Brief: The Kalashnikov: its illegal sourcing, trade and use in Europe’, Notice 101-2012,
24 August 2012
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Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission
Illicit Firearms in Australia
ILLICIT FIREARMS AT THE AUSTRALIAN BORDER
The majority of undeclared firearm imports detected at the Australian border are attributed
to opportunistic individual importers not previously linked to organised criminal activity.
The desire for handguns of advanced design may drive an increase in illegal imports of such
handguns in the future.
UNDECLARED FIREARM-RELATED IMPORTS
An imported firearm is considered an undeclared detection19 if it is identified by the
Department of Immigration and Border Protection (DIBP) as prohibited or restricted and
it has not been declared in accordance with legal import requirements. Not all undeclared
detections are seized; seizure only occurs when firearms detained by DIBP fail to meet
import requirements. Many firearms are released after the importer has been given the
opportunity to meet import requirements, such as obtaining the relevant permits.
In 2015–16, DIBP detected 1,751 conventional firearms, firearm parts and accessories and
magazines. While the overall totals have remained consistent over the last three years,
there was an increase in detections of firearm parts and accessories and a reduction in
detections of magazines during the 2015–16 period.
FIGURE 3: UNDECLARED DETECTIONS OF CONVENTIONAL FIREARMS, FIREARM
PARTS, ACCESSORIES AND MAGAZINES BY TYPE, 2011–12 TO 2015–16
1,600
1,400
1,200
1,000
800
NUMBER
600
400
200
0
2011–12
2012–13
2013–14
2014–15
2015–16
WHOLE FIREARMS
PARTS AND ACCESSORIES MAGAZINES
19 For the purpose of this report an undeclared firearm includes undeclared parts, accessories or components where the
importation of the same is controlled by legislation or regulations.
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Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission
Illicit Firearms in Australia
Law enforcement has no way of accurately assessing the extent to which firearms and
firearm parts are illegally imported into Australia.20 Despite attempts by the ACIC to collect
information regarding illegal firearm-related imports over the assessment period, no
significant illicit firearms imports were identified at the border. However, in August 2016,
a multi-agency operation resulted in two men being charged with firearm offences and a
cache of firearms and firearm parts being seized in Australia and the US.21 The majority of
firearms and firearm parts seized (six fully automatic assault rifles and 96 semiautomatic
handgun frames) were intercepted in the US while being prepared for export to Australia.
FIGURE 4: FIREARMS AND PARTS SEIZED IN AUGUST 2016 DURING JOINT
INTERNATIONAL OPERATION TARGETING ILLEGAL FIREARMS
20 Evidence provided to the Senate inquiry in the ability of law enforcement to combat gun-related violence in the
community by NSW Government Justice Cluster (including NSW Police Force) indicated that illegal firearms were a driving
factor in gun crime in NSW. Victoria Police evidence to the same Senate committee indicated they did not believe illegally
imported firearms were a significant factor.
21 AFP 2016, ‘Media Release: Joint international operation sees two men charged with firearm offences’, available at:
<https://www.afp.gov.au/news-media/media-releases/media-release-joint-international-operation-sees-two-men-
charged-firearm>
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Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission
Illicit Firearms in Australia
While undeclared firearms and parts may not necessarily be imported for illicit use,
criminals find importation by mail attractive because it offers fast delivery, tracking and a
reduced risk of scrutiny due to the high volume of mail entering Australia. Australia Post’s
recently introduced parcel lockers also offer a level of anonymity for postal imports. The
majority of firearms, firearm parts and accessories and magazines detected by DIBP in the
past five years were found in international mail.
FIGURE 5: UNDECLARED CONVENTIONAL FIREARMS, FIREARM PARTS, ACCESSORIES
AND MAGAZINES DETECTED AT THE AUSTRALIAN BORDER BY METHOD OF
IMPORTATION, 2011–12 TO 2015–16
3,000
2,500
2,000
1,500
NUMBER
1,000
500
0
2011–12
2012–13
2013–14
2014–15
2015–16
INTERNATIONAL MAIL
PASSENGER
AIR
SEA
SMALL CRAFT
The importation of firearms by individuals and collectors via the international postal system
is likely to continue for opportunistic reasons. Technological advances in procurement
methods may lead to an increase in illegal firearm importation, especially where the desired
firearm or part cannot be sourced from the domestic market.
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Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission
Illicit Firearms in Australia
EMERGING TRENDS
The combination of globalisation and technological development is having a profound effect
on the business models of organised crime in Australia. New trends in methods of acquiring
and moving illicit firearms continue to evolve.
The rapid development of technology and its increasing availability worldwide is
significantly increasing the reach of organised crime. The internet provides criminals with a
global virtual marketplace where illicit goods can be procured anonymously.
ADDITIVE MANUFACTURING: 3D PRINTING
3D printing (also known as additive manufacturing) involves depositing layers of material to
build an object. 3D printing was developed in the early 1980s and by the end of that decade
had been adopted by a number of manufacturing industries.22
3D printing became a concern for law enforcement when instructions for assembling
a firearm from 3D plastic components were published online in May 2013. One police
agency in Australia has created and tested a 3D single-shot pistol and, while it was found to
effectively shoot a single round, it was also found to be unreliable and potentially dangerous
to the user.
3D printing technology is improving rapidly, with new materials in use and commercially
available. However, at this time the capabilities of 3D-printed firearms are limited and, in the
short term, this production method is unlikely to be a significant source of illicit firearms.
ONLINE MARKETPLACES
Encrypted websites are used as virtual marketplaces to trade in various illicit commodities,
including firearms. Such sites are concealed within hidden networks collectively known as
the Darknet. Encryption and routing technologies, and the use of virtual currencies on the
Darknet, allow users to obscure their identity and their location.
Globally, law enforcement agencies have succeeded in dismantling a number of Darknet
sites including Silk Road and the Armory, which specialised in the trade of firearms, firearm
components and other illicit commodities. However, because the Darknet is difficult to
monitor, it is not known how deeply embedded organised crime is in this market.
Many illicit commodity shipments are detected at the Australian border as a direct result
of intelligence-led interventions across a number of law enforcement agencies. Increased
international cooperation has resulted in enhanced intelligence collection, sharing and
detection (see case study).
22 Hickey, S 2014 ‘Chuck Hull: the father of 3D printing who shaped technology’,
The Guardian, 22 June 2014, viewed 16
January 2015, <http://_www.theguardian.com/business/2014/jun/22/chuck-hull-father-3d-printing-shaped-technology>
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Illicit Firearms in Australia
CASE STUDY
FOUR CHARGED DURING OPERATION
TARGETING ONLINE FIREARM SALESi
A six-month joint operation by United States
(US) Homeland Security Investigations
(HSI), the Australian Federal Police and the
Department of Immigration and Border
Protection led to the execution of 15 search
warrants in February and March 2015.
Working with Australian authorities, HSI
identified a number of Australians who
were attempting to purchase firearms.
Four firearms, as well as ammunition, illicit
drugs and computer equipment, were
seized in the execution of the warrants,
and two clandestine laboratories were also
uncovered. Internationally, the operation
seized more firearms, illicit drugs and
virtual currency, and led to the arrest of
the US-based supplier.
i
Australian Federal Police 2015, ‘Four Australians charged in international illegal firearm sting’, media release, 14 May
2015, viewed 20 May 2015, <http://www.afp.gov.au/media-centre/news/afp/2015/may/four-australians-charged-in-
international-illegal-firearm-sting>
19
Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission
Illicit Firearms in Australia
OUTLOOK
DOMESTIC MARKET
The full nature and extent of the illicit firearm market in Australia is complex and difficult
to assess. Firearms are an enduring commodity, and a well-maintained firearm can be used
for more than 100 years. Firearms already in the illicit market, and those that enter the
market through contemporary diversion methods, will remain a threat unless continuous,
coordinated and targeted efforts are made by law enforcement to locate them.
The grey market will continue to be a significant source of firearms for criminals. While most
jurisdictions support the removal of these firearms from the community through amnesties,
some members of the community still believe surrendering their illicit firearms to police
may have adverse personal consequences. Grey-market firearms are targeted by criminals
because they are difficult for law enforcement to trace to the last known legal owner. A
national program encouraging the registration and/or surrender of unregistered firearms
could significantly reduce the number of firearms available to the illicit market.
FIREARMS TRAFFICKING
International illicit firearms trafficking is a challenge to Australian and international law
enforcement, border control and regulatory authorities. Inconsistencies in the legislation
relating to the ownership, possession and sale of firearms and their components make it
difficult to detect and, subsequently, prosecute those who trade in illicit firearms.
The illegal movement of firearms internationally is compounded by the high degree of
anonymity the online environment offers firearm vendors and purchasers. Proliferation
of Darknet marketplaces is expected to drive the continued export of firearms from
jurisdictions where domestic firearm controls are weaker.
As law enforcement agencies detect methods of trafficking firearms, criminals rapidly adapt
and modify their practices. Law enforcement agencies must continue to identify ways to
disrupt these practices in order to prevent these illegal firearms entering the community.
DATA INTEGRITY
The overall management of firearm registrations and licencing regimes is the responsibility of
states and territories in Australia. The holding of firearm-related data in disparate jurisdictional
information systems is a significant barrier to developing a national picture of the licit and
illicit firearm markets and the individuals and crime groups associated with them.
Details of firearm offences and those involved in them are often contained within individual
incident reports in jurisdictional databases or reported to state and territory crime
hotlines. While these are addressed in a variety of ways, the information is not collected
in a consistent manner and the ability to interrogate this data to produce a national view
is limited. Inconsistencies in the classification of firearms offences have hindered the
standardisation of firearm incidents reported across jurisdictions. These inconsistencies
have also prevented the cross-referencing of firearm registration and licensing records with
firearm incident and offence data.
20
Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission
Illicit Firearms in Australia
To obtain an accurate picture of the number of firearms in the Australian illicit firearms
market, Australian law enforcement must:
ensure the data and records captured are accurate, accessible and consistent. The
development and implementation of the Australian Firearms Information Network
(AFIN) will allow agencies to track firearms over their lifetime, from import or
manufacture, registration and transfer to destruction or legal export. This capacity is
critical to understanding both the licit and illicit firearm markets. The implementation
of the AFIN may provide an opportunity to enhance the sharing of information and
intelligence nationally.
Underpinning the AFIN is the National Firearm Identification Database (NFID), an online
tool that enables law enforcement agencies to standardise terminology and descriptor
sets for firearms registered within Australia. The NFID will strengthen law enforcement’s
ability to minimise the diversion of firearms through using the disparate identification
methods used by state and territory firearm registries. NFID uses internationally
accepted methods of firearm identification and will greatly enhance the quality of
firearm data within Australia over time.
consistently record and report data. The illicit market is, by its very nature, concealed
and consequently extremely difficult to accurately measure. Inconsistent and limited
data collection has so far prevented an evidence-based assessment of the market.
The ACIC was formed on 1 July 2016 through a merger of the former Australian Crime
Commission and CrimTrac. The ACIC has an enhanced ability to understand and respond
to the evolving nature of crime affecting Australia by better connecting a diverse range of
criminal data systems at the Commonwealth, state and territory levels.
21
Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission
Illicit Firearms in Australia
APPENDIX A: FIREARMS TRACING AND
BALLISTIC IDENTIFICATION
FIREARMS TRACE PROGRAM
The ACIC’s National FTP was established in 2004 to assist Australian law enforcement
agencies ascertain the history of seized firearms and, where possible, determine how
they were diverted to the illicit market. The ongoing collection by the ACIC of firearm
importation data with historical and contemporary firearms dealer records, underpins the
FTP’s capacity to identify the point at which a firearm moved to the illicit market.
The ACIC’s firearms trace data provides a high-quality sample of the illicit firearm market
and is currently the only source of information available from which to develop a national
picture of trends in the diversion of firearms from the licit to the illicit market. Referral of
seized firearms to the ACIC for tracing is voluntary; some jurisdictions regularly forward
firearms trace requests to the ACIC, while others submit requests on an ad hoc basis and
only in relation to specific firearm types or incidents.
ANALYSIS OF FIREARMS TRACE DATA
Between 2004 and 30 June 2016 the ACIC received 6,874 requests for domestic firearms
traces. The most significant diversion methods identified during this period were the grey
market (3,022 firearms or 44 per cent); unknown methods of diverting untraceable firearms
(2,158 or 31.4 per cent); and theft (630 firearms or 9.2 per cent).
Of the total number of trace requests received by the ACIC, 4,308 (62.7 percent) were for
longarms22 and 2,519 (36.7 per cent) for handguns. The remaining requests related to 47
firearms that could not be categorised using the information provided.
With the exception of the ‘other’ category, analysis of the most common methods of
diversion in 2015–16 did not identify any significant changes from the 2012 assessment
and the FTP overall. The increase in the ‘other’ category from 3.3 per cent in 2012 to 21.5
per cent in 2015–16 can be attributed to firearms seized from a dealer who was operating
without a licence.
22 Longarms includes all category A, B, C and D firearms as defined under the National Firearms Agreement.
22
Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission
Illicit Firearms in Australia
FIGURE 6: COMPARISON OF DIVERSION METHODS OF FIREARMS TRACED
BY THE ACIC, 2004 TO JUNE 2016
50%
45%
40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
GREY
UNKNOWN
THEFT
OTHER
DEACTIVATION
DOMESTIC
INTERSTATE
SUSPECTED LOST/ MISSING
ILLEGAL
MARKET
/LEGISLATIVE MANUFACTURE DIVERSION
STAGED
IMPORT
LOOPHOLE
THEFT
TOTAL FTP
NIFA 2012
2015–16
Since the implementation of the FTP, an average of 31.4 per cent of firearms23 referred to
the ACIC for tracing were unable to be traced due to factors such as defaced serial numbers
or the firearm not being registered either within Australia or overseas. A proportion of this
percentage relates to firearms where trace analysis is not yet finalised, pending further
information from industry or overseas agencies.
Where traces were finalised, the primary method of diversion varied depending on whether
the firearm was a longarm (category A, B, C or D) or a handgun (category H).
LONGARMS
Where a diversion method could be identified, between 2004 and 30 June 2016 most
longarms were diverted through:
the grey market (79.2 per cent)
theft (9.2 per cent)
other (6.4 per cent; see Figure 7).
23 The percentage of untraceable firearms was most significant in respect of handguns (63.6 per cent untraceable), and less
so for longarms (11.8 per cent).
23
Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission
Illicit Firearms in Australia
FIGURE 7: METHOD OF DIVERSION OF LONGARMS WHERE TRACE WAS COMPLETED,
2004 TO 30 JUNE 2016
GREY MARKET (79.2%)
THEFT (9.2%)
OTHER (6.4%)
DEACTIVATION/LEGISLATIVE LOOPHOLE (0.2%)
DOMESTIC MANUFACTURE (0.8%)
INTERSTATE DIVERSION (0.9%)
SUSPECTED STAGED THEFT (1.5%)
LOST/MISSING (1.2%)
ILLEGAL IMPORT (0.6%)
HANDGUNS
Where a diversion method could be identified, between 2004 and 30 June 2016 most
handguns were diverted through:
theft (30.9 per cent)
deactivation/legislative loopholes (18.5 per cent)
other (16.2 per cent; see Figure 8).
FIGURE 8: METHOD OF DIVERSION OF HANDGUNS WHERE TRACE WAS COMPLETED,
2004 TO 30 JUNE 2016
GREY MARKET (1.5%)
THEFT (30.8%)
OTHER (16.2%)
DEACTIVATION/LEGISLATIVE LOOPHOLE (18.5%)
DOMESTIC MANUFACTURE (13.7%)
INTERSTATE DIVERSION (6.4%)
SUSPECTED STAGED THEFT (3.15%)
LOST/MISSING (2.6%)
ILLEGAL IMPORT (7.1%)
24
Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission
Illicit Firearms in Australia
2004–2016 FTP TRACE REQUESTS: CRIMINAL ASSOCIATIONS
AND OFFENCES
Not all trace requests received by the ACIC included information on the offender or the
offences that led to the firearm’s seizure. However, analysis of trace requests received
between 2004 and 2016 indicates that 36.8 per cent of the firearms referred for tracing
were linked to or seized from individuals associated with high-risk criminal groups.24
Handguns are readily concealed, provide a perceived level of status and are the preferred
type of firearms for protecting criminal interests and committing acts of violence. Members
of organised crime groups are likely to obscure a handgun’s identifying marks and ballistic
signature to prevent it being traced and thereby linking them to previously committed
serious offences such as homicide.
THE AUSTRALIAN BALLISTICS INFORMATION NETWORK (ABIN)
On 21 May 2014 the Australian Government launched the Australian Ballistics Information
Network (ABIN), a national system for digitally matching fired projectiles and cartridge
cases. The ABIN allows the digital signature of police images of projectiles to be matched
with those of other images, both nationally and internationally.
Firearms can leave unique microscopic markings on the surface of fired projectiles. Ballistics
experts examine and compare these markings, thus linking ballistic evidence to crime
scenes and components of recovered firearms. This information is a source of intelligence
that may assist in linking firearms with suspects and crimes.
The ABIN is supported by the ACIC and commenced operation in July 2014. The New South
Wales Police Force has been using a similar system since 1999.
With all jurisdictions across Australia contributing, the number of ballistic matches
continues to increase. During 2015–16, there were 89 confirmed matches of various ballistic
data, comprising five national incidents between New South Wales, Queensland and South
Australia’s borders, and 84 local incidents within New South Wales, Victoria, Northern
Territory, Queensland, South Australia and Tasmania.25
24 In this dataset, a high-risk criminal group identifier was applied based on whether associated individuals were involved
with groups engaged in high-risk crime activities (such as firearms or drug trafficking).
25 ACIC statistical data provided 5 September 2016.
25
Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission
Illicit Firearms in Australia
APPENDIX B: THE LEGAL FIREARM
MARKET IN AUSTRALIA
Australia’s firearms policy environment is multifaceted and tiered, and is structured around
state, territory and Commonwealth authorities. Firearms must be registered and individuals
licensed to use them. Broadly, the Commonwealth Government regulates the import and
export of firearms, ammunition and firearm parts, while state and territory governments
regulate their ownership, possession and sale.
LEGAL IMPORTATION OF FIREARMS
Over 640,000 firearms were surrendered and removed from the community during the
1996 gun buyback. According to Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) data, more than 1.16
million firearms have been imported since the buyback commenced (see Figure 9). Many
licenced firearm owners used compensation obtained during the 1996 buyback to purchase
new legal replacement firearms and this would account for the high number of imports
during this period. The totals do not include over 1.05 million spring-, air- or gas-operated
firearms that were also imported in this period.
FIGURE 9: TOTAL LICIT FIREARM IMPORTS INTO AUSTRALIA BY FIREARM TYPE,
1996–2015
140,000
120,000
100,000
80,000
NUMBER 60,000
40,000
20,000
0
1996–97
1997–98
1998–99
1999–00
2000–01
2001–02
2002–03
2003–04
2004–05
2005–06
2006–07
2007–08
2008–09
2009–10
2010–11
2011–12
2012–13
2013–14
2014–15
OTHER
HANDGUNS
LONGARMS
Source: ABS
26
Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission
Illicit Firearms in Australia
A significant number of the items surrendered during the 1996–97 gun buyback were
centre-fire semiautomatic firearms. While the number of longarms imported since 1996
exceeds the number of firearms surrendered during the buyback, these legally imported
longarms now form part of the legal market. They are not the same kind of semiautomatic
firearms legislated against in the 1996 National Firearm Agreement.
The number of longarms legally imported in 2013–14 was the highest on record since the
1996 buyback. Imports decreased in 2014–15, but were still the second highest reported
since the 1996 buyback. The increase in legal firearm imports is likely to continue.
Demand for legally imported firearms will also be influenced by increasing numbers of new
licenced participants in shooting sports. This new generation of sports shooters generally
has limited or no family history of participation in the sport and limited access to family-
owned or second-hand firearms. This consequently leads to increased demand for new
imported firearms.
Sports shooting in Australia has been a generational activity within the family environment;
as new members take up the sport, it can be expected that the culture of firearm ownership
will continue to grow.
FIREARM REGISTRATION AND LICENSING
The Commonwealth Senate inquiry report into the ability of Australian law enforcement
authorities to eliminate gun-related violence in the community was released in 2015.26
It identified vulnerabilities and inconsistencies in both firearms registration and licensing
across the country which affect the development of a national understanding of the legal
firearms market in Australia. More recently, the joint Commonwealth–New South Wales
review of the Martin Place siege highlighted the longevity of firearms and the difficulty of
identifying and regulating grey-market firearms in Australia.27
The ACIC, in collaboration with other Commonwealth, state and territory regulatory
agencies, has found there are more than 2.89 million legally registered firearms in Australia.
This is an increase of approximately 9.3 per cent since December 2011, when the number
of registered firearms in Australia was approximately 2.75 million—a ratio of approximately
123 registered firearms per 1,000 people in 2011. In 2016 this ratio rose slightly to 125
registered firearms per 1,000 people.
Licensing data provided by state and territory regulatory agencies also indicate the number
of firearm licences (which may not be representative of the number of individual licensees)
increased from approximately 734,000 in 2011 to approximately 816,000 in 2016, an
increase of 11.2 per cent. Using ABS population data, this equates to 34 licences per 1,000
people in 2016, a marginal increase from 33 licences per 1,000 people in 2011.
26 Parliament of Australia 2015, ‘Ability of Australian law enforcement authorities to eliminate gun-related violence in the
community’, <http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Legal_and_Constitutional_Affairs/
Illicit_firearms/Report>, 9 April 2015
27 Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet 2015, ‘Martin Place Siege – Joint Commonwealth New South Wales Review,
<https://www.dpmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/publications/170215_Martin_Place_Siege_Review_1.pdf>, 27 February 2015
27
WHERE TO GO FOR MORE INFORMATION
Everyone can play a role in responding to organised criminal activity in
Australia by reporting suspicious activity to your local police or
calling Crime Stoppers on 1800 333 000.
For more information visit www.acic.gov.au
© Commonwealth of Australia 2016
