TELECOMMUNICATIONS
(INTERCEPTION AND ACCESS) ACT 1979
Annual Report 2014–15
A C H I E V I N G A J U S T A N D S E C U R E S O C I E T Y |
w w w . a g . g o v . a u
ISBN 978-1-925290-48-6 (Print)
ISBN 978-1-925290-49-3 (Online)
© Commonwealth of Australia 2015
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TELECOMMUNICATIONS
(INTERCEPTION AND ACCESS) ACT 1979
Annual Report 2014–15
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CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
v
Legislative reforms
v
Key judicial decisions
vi
Review of policy developments
vi
Key findings
vii
Access to the content of a communication
viii
Telecommunications data
ix
Format of Annual Report
ix
More information
x
CHAPTER 1—TELECOMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPTION
1
Serious offences
2
Eligibility to issue an interception warrant
4
Applications for and issue of telecommunications interception warrants
4
Effectiveness of telecommunications interception warrants
8
Named person warrants
12
B-Party warrants
16
Duration of warrants
18
Eligible warrants
20
Interception without a warrant
21
Mutual assistance
22
Number of interceptions carried out on behalf of other agencies
22
Telecommunications interception expenditure
23
Emergency service facilities
25
Safeguards, controls and reporting requirements
25
Commonwealth Ombudsman—inspection of telecommunications
interception records 26
Commonwealth Ombudsman’s summary of findings
27
Commonwealth Ombudsman’s findings for individual agency for warrants
expiring between 1 January to 31 December 2014
28
C O N T E N T S | I I I
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CHAPTER 2—STORED COMMUNICATIONS
31
Effectiveness of stored communications warrants
34
Preservation notices
34
Mutual assistance
36
Commonwealth Ombudsman—inspection of stored communications
records expiring between 1 July 2013 and 30 June 2014
36
CHAPTER 3—TELECOMMUNICATIONS DATA
41
Future reporting obligations
42
Existing data—enforcement of a criminal law
42
Existing data—enforcement of a law imposing a pecuniary penalty or
protecting public revenue
45
Prospective data—authorisations
48
Data authorisations to locate missing persons
49
Data authorisations for foreign law enforcement
50
CHAPTER 4—FURTHER INFORMATION 51
APPENDIX A—LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES
52
APPENDIX B—INTERCEPTION AGENCIES UNDER THE TIA ACT
55
APPENDIX C—ABBREVIATIONS 56
APPENDIX D—CATEGORIES OF SERIOUS OFFENCES
58
I V | T E L E C O M M U N I C AT I O N S I N T E R C E P T I O N A N D A C C E S S A C T 1 9 7 9 A n n u a l R e p o r t 2 0 14 –15
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 Act Annual Report 2014–15 sets
out the extent and circumstances in which eligible Commonwealth, State and Territory
government agencies have used the powers available under the
Telecommunications
(Interception and Access) Act 1979 (TIA Act) between 1 July 2014 and 30 June 2015.
The primary function of the TIA Act is to protect the privacy of the communications of
people who use the Australian telecommunications network. Serious and organised
criminals and persons seeking to harm Australia’s national security routinely use
telecommunications service providers and communications technology to plan and to
carry out their activities. Some activities, including child pornography, are predominantly
executed through communications devices such as phones and computers.
The TIA Act provides a legal framework for national security and law enforcement
agencies to access the information held by communications providers that agencies
need to investigate criminal offences and other activities that threaten safety and
security. The access that may be sought under the TIA Act includes access to
telecommunications data, stored communications that already exist or the interception
of communications in real time in prescribed circumstances. Each of the powers
available under the TIA Act is explained below.
The use of warrants to either intercept or access stored communications under the
TIA Act is independently overseen by the Commonwealth Ombudsman and equivalent
state bodies. From 13 October 2015, the number of agencies able to access stored
communications was reduced to only criminal-law enforcement agencies and the
independent oversight role of the Commonwealth Ombudsman was extended to agency
use of telecommunications data under the TIA Act.
Legislative reforms
On 26 March 2015, the
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment
(Data Retention) Act 2015 (Data Retention Act) was passed. The Data Retention Act imposed
a new data retention obligation on carriers to retain specific information for a period
of two years. In addition, the Data Retention Act significantly reduced the number of
agencies that may access stored communications and telecommunications data under
the TIA Act. It also introduces additional record-keeping and reporting obligations relating
to the access to and use of telecommunications data by law enforcement agencies.
The obligations introduced by the Data Retention Act came into effect on 13 October
2015. Accordingly, the 2014-15 annual report does not contain the additional
information that the Data Retention Act requires to be included in future reports.
For example, future reports will include information relating to the offences for which
telecommunications data has been sought and the number of requests for subscriber
E X E C U T I V E S U M M A R Y | V
data and traffic data. Further information about the record keeping obligations
and future annual reporting on the access and use of telecommunications data by
enforcement agencies is contained in Chapter 3.
Key judicial decisions
No significant judicial decisions relevant to the TIA Act occurred during the
reporting period.
Review of policy developments
There were three inquiries or reviews relating to potential policy developments to the
TIA Act during the 2014–15 reporting period:
The Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee Comprehensive Revision of the
TIA Act Report
The Senate for Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee agreed to inquire into
the revision of the TIA Act on 12 December 2013. The Committee was required to
comprehensively review the TIA Act having regard to recommendations made by
the Australian Law Reform Commission and the Parliamentary Joint Committee on
Intelligence and Security (PJCIS) Inquiry into Potential reforms of Australia’s National
Security Legislation in May 2013. The Senate Committee tabled its Report on 24 March
2015 recommending reform of the TIA Act. The Government had not responded to that
inquiry at the end of the reporting period.
The Senate Committee’s inquiry spanned 15 months, during which time, the
Government introduced the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment
(Data Retention) Bill 2014.
The Data Retention Bill
The Data Retention Bill would require Australian telecommunications companies to
keep a limited set of telecommunications data for two years and significantly reduce the
number of agencies that may access telecommunications data under the TIA Act. The
Bill passed the Parliament on 26 March 2015 as the
Telecommunications (Interception
and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Act 2015 (Data Retention Act).
The Government noted that telecommunications data is increasingly important
to Australia’s law enforcement and national security agencies. Access to
telecommunications data is central to virtually every counter-terrorism, organised
crime, counter-espionage and cyber-security investigation, as well as almost
every serious criminal investigation, such as murder, rape and kidnapping by
allowing prescribed agencies to determine how and with whom a person has been
communicating. The Government indicated its intent to standardise the types of
telecommunications data that service providers must retain under the TIA Act and
the period of time that information must be held in order to assist investigations into
particular offences, given telecommunications data has proven to be a critical tool
for law enforcement and national security agencies, providing both intelligence and
evidence when identifying and prosecuting alleged offenders.
V I | T E L E C O M M U N I C AT I O N S I N T E R C E P T I O N A N D A C C E S S A C T 1 9 7 9 A n n u a l R e p o r t 2 0 14 –15
The Data Retention Act also introduced additional record-keeping and reporting
obligations relating to the access to and use of telecommunications data by enforcement
agencies, and ensures that this access is subject to comprehensive oversight by the
Commonwealth Ombudsman’s Office.
The Data Retention Act does not increase or otherwise modify the powers of Australian
agencies in relation to access to the content of communications.
Before the Bill passed Parliament, it was reviewed by the PJCIS and the Parliamentary
Joint Committee on Human Rights (PJCHR).
The PJCIS inquiry into the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment
(Data Retention) Bill 2014
In its Report, the PJCIS concluded that data retention is a ‘necessary, effective and
proportionate response’ to combat serious crime and threats to national security
and recommended that the Bill be passed subject to recommendations designed to
strengthen safeguards and oversight measures. The Committee also recommended
that the department undertake a range of additional reviews on policy issues related
to access to telecommunications data and telecommunications interception. The
Government accepted all of the recommendations in passing the legislation.
The PJCHR review of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment
(Data Retention) Bill 2014
The PJCHR tabled its Report on 18 March 2015. The PJCHR examined the compatibility
of the Government’s Data Retention Bill with human rights. The role of the PJCHR is to
consider whether a proposed Bill’s limitation on the right to privacy will be permissible
under international human rights law where it addresses a legitimate objective, is
rationally connected to that objective and is a proportionate means of achieving that
objective. The PJCHR was of the view that the Attorney-General generally established
that the proposed scheme addresses a pressing and substantial concern which may
be regarded as a legitimate objective under international human rights law. It also
acknowledged the fundamental and legitimate interests of government in ensuring
that there are adequate tools for law enforcement agencies to ensure ‘public safety
and the ability for victims of crime to have recourse to justice’s a result of the PJCHR
recommendations the Government introduced additional accountability and oversight
arrangements to further protect privacy rights.
Key findings
• In 2014–15, issuing authorities issued 3,926 interception warrants, this
is consistent with the 2013–14 period when 4,007 warrants were issued.
Interception warrants are highly privacy intrusive and are only sought when
operationally necessary and where statutory preconditions are met.
• During 2014–15, information obtained under interception warrants was used in:1
– 3,100 arrests
– 4,686 prosecutions
– 1,912 convictions.
1 These figures provide an indication about the effectiveness of interception, rather than the full picture, as, for
example, a conviction can be recorded without admitting intercepted information into evidence.
E X E C U T I V E S U M M A R Y | V I I
• In 2014–15, 83 enforcement agencies made 365,728 authorisations for
the disclosure of historical telecommunications data. Of these, 354,841
authorisations were made to enforce a criminal law. This compares with
334,658 data authorisations made by 77 enforcement agencies in 2013–14, of
which 324,260 authorisations were made to enforce a criminal law (a 9 per cent
increase from 2013–14).
• In 2014–15, 102 B-Party warrants2 were issued, around 15 per cent less than in
2013–14.
• In 2014–15, 1,000 named person warrants were issued. This is consistent with
the 2013-14 reporting period during which 999 named person warrants were
obtained.
• In 2014–15, consistent with the last reporting period, the majority of
named person warrants were for the interception of between two to five
telecommunications services.
• In 2014–15, law enforcement agencies made 377 arrests, conducted 335
prosecutions and obtained 198 convictions based on evidence obtained under
stored communications warrants.3
• During the reporting period the Commonwealth Ombudsman conducted six
inspections of the interception records of the ACC, ACLEI and the AFP (two
inspections for each agency).
• The Ombudsman found that there continued to be a high level of compliance with
the telecommunications interception provisions of the TIA Act and that agencies
were cooperative with inspections and receptive to suggestions for improvement.
Access to the content of a communication
Accessing content, or the substance of a communication—for instance, the message
written in an email, the discussion between two parties to a phone call, the subject
line of an email or a private social media post—without the knowledge of the person
making the communication is highly privacy intrusive. Under the TIA Act, access can
only occur under an interception or stored communications warrant, or in certain
limited circumstances, such as a life-threatening emergency. Accessing a person’s
communications is subject to significant limitations, oversight and reporting obligations
and the annual report is an important part of this accountability framework.
The ability to access a person’s communications is an effective investigative tool
that supports and complements information obtained through other methods. In
some cases, the weight of evidence obtained through either an interception or a
stored communications warrant results in defendants entering guilty pleas, thereby
eliminating the need for the intercepted information to be introduced into evidence.
2 A B-Party warrant is an interception warrant that enables an interception agency to intercept the
communications of a person who is communicating with a person suspected of involvement in a
serious offence.
3 These figures provide an indication about the effectiveness of interception, rather than the full picture,
as, for example, a conviction can be recorded without admitting intercepted information into evidence.
V I I I | T E L E C O M M U N I C AT I O N S I N T E R C E P T I O N A N D A C C E S S A C T 1 9 7 9 A n n u a l R e p o r t 2 0 14 –15
Telecommunications data
A critical tool available under the TIA Act is access to telecommunications data.4
Telecommunications data is often the first source of lead information for further
investigations, helping to eliminate potential suspects and to support applications for
more privacy intrusive investigative tools including search warrants and interception
warrants. For example, an examination of call charge records can show that a potential
person of interest has had no contact with suspects being investigated.
Telecommunications data gives agencies a method for tracing telecommunications
from end-to-end. It can also be used to demonstrate an association between people,
or to prove that two or more people spoke with each other at a critical point in time
(such as before the commission of an alleged offence).
Access to telecommunications data is regulated by Chapter 4 of the TIA Act, which
permits authorities or bodies that are an ‘enforcement agency’ under the TIA Act to
authorise telecommunications carriers to disclose telecommunications data where
that information is reasonably necessary for the enforcement of the criminal law,
a law imposing a pecuniary penalty, or the protection of the public revenue.5
During the reporting period all enforcement agencies could access historical data6
and only criminal law-enforcement agencies could access prospective data to assist in
the investigation of offences punishable by at least 3 years’ imprisonment.7 The Data
Retention Act which was passed by the Parliament in March 2015 reduced the number
of enforcement agencies that may access telecommunications data on an ongoing
basis to 21 specified agencies. There is the ability for the Attorney-General to declare
additional agencies in prescribed circumstances.
Format of Annual Report
This Annual Report is organised into three main chapters:
• Chapter 1—telecommunications interception,
• Chapter 2—stored communications; and
• Chapter 3—telecommunications data.
The TIA Act and associated amendments is availabl
e online at <www.comlaw.gov.au>.
4 Telecommunications data is information about a communication, such as the phone numbers of the people
who called each other, how long they talked to each other, the email address from which a message was sent
and the time the message was sent.
5 All interception agencies are also enforcement agencies as well as authorities or bodies whose functions
include administering a law imposing a pecuniary penalty or administering a law relating to the protection of
the public revenue.
6 Historical data, also known as existing data, is information that is already in existence when an authorisation
for disclosure is received by a telecommunications carrier.
7 Prospective data is telecommunications data that comes into existence during a period of time in which an
authorisation is in force.
E X E C U T I V E S U M M A R Y | I X
More information
Further information about telecommunications, interception and privacy law can be
found at:
• Attorney-General’s Department <www.ag.gov.au/>
• Department of Communic
ations <www.communications.gov.au/>
• Commonwealth Ombudsman <
www.ombudsman.gov.au/>
• Office of the Australian Information Commis
sioner <www.oaic.gov.au/>
• Telecommunications Indus
try Ombudsman <www.tio.com.au/>
• Australian Communications and Media Authority <
www.acma.gov.au/>
X | T E L E C O M M U N I C AT I O N S I N T E R C E P T I O N A N D A C C E S S A C T 1 9 7 9 A n n u a l R e p o r t 2 0 14 –15
CHAPTER 1
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPTION
The primary function of the TIA Act is to protect the privacy of the communications of
people who use the Australian telecommunications network by making it an offence
to intercept communications, subject to limited lawful exceptions. Under the TIA Act,
communications cannot be intercepted while they are passing over the Australian
telecommunications system, except as authorised in the circumstances set out in
the TIA Act.
Definition
The term ‘interception agency’ is defined in section 5 of the TIA Act. This
is limited to agencies such as the Australian Federal Police and State and
Territory police forces eligible to apply under Part 2–5 of the TIA Act for an
interception warrant.
The TIA Act provides for several types of warrants which enable access to the content of
a communication, including warrants allowing access to real-time content (for example,
a phone call while the parties are talking with each other) and a warrant to access
‘stored communications’ (including emails and text messages), accessed from the
telecommunications carrier after they have been sent).
During the reporting period, interception warrants were available to 17 Commonwealth,
state and territory agencies including:
• ACC, ACLEI and AFP
• State and Territory Police, and
• State anti-corruption agencies.
A full list of the agencies able to obtain an interception warrant is provided in
Appendix B.
C H A P T E R 1 | 1
Serious offences
Interception warrants can only be obtained to investigate serious offences. Serious
offences generally carry a penalty of at least seven years’ imprisonment.
Serious offences for which interception can be obtained under the TIA Act include
murder, kidnapping, serious drug offences, terrorism, offences involving child
pornography, money laundering, and offences involving organised crime.
The information provided in Table 1 illustrates the important role telecommunications
interception plays in investigating serious crimes. Consistent with previous years, in
2014–15 agencies obtained the majority of warrants to assist with investigations into
serious drug offences (1,901 warrants). Loss of life or personal injury offences were
specified in 477 warrants and 420 warrants related to murder investigations. Organised
crime was specified as an offence in 203 warrants. The total number of offences is
typically larger than the total number of warrants issued as warrants can be issued to
investigate more than one serious offence.
Information about the serious offences covered under each category of serious offence
set out in the first column of Table 1 is provided in Appendix D.
2 | T E L E C O M M U N I C AT I O N S I N T E R C E P T I O N A N D A C C E S S A C T 1 9 7 9 A n n u a l R e p o r t 2 0 14 –15
L
4
-
1
-
-
A
286
28
149
10
49
53
477
197
420
203
63
165
121
TOT
1,901
4,127
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
5
-
-
WA
21
19
12
38
15
10
POL
198
318
-
-
-
3
-
-
2
-
3
-
6
-
9
-
-
-
VIC
51
39
61
POL
174
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1
-
-
9
-
-
-
14
-
-
-
24
TAS
POL
-
-
-
2
-
-
4
-
2
3
-
8
5
-
2
-
-
-
SA
62
88
POL
-
-
1
-
-
-
-
-
-
4
1
27
1
-
-
1
-
-
QLD
POL
236
271
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
8
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
PIC
30
10
48
s. 100(1)(f), 100(1)(g), 100(2)(f) and 100(2)(g)
-
-
-
1
-
-
7
-
-
6
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
NT
15
25
54
POL
s—s
-
-
8
-
5
-
-
-
-
-
ant
14
28
34
378
204
172
40
583
66
NSW
POL
1,532
arr
-
-
-
-
-
7
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
CC
12
13
27
56
90
NSW
205
-
-
-
2
-
-
1
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
3
ception w
ICAC
(SA)
er
-
-
-
5
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
5
ICAC
(NSW)
ations int
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
4
14
-
-
18
IBAC
-
-
-
7
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
30
7
-
-
44
CCC
ommunic
(QLD)
ec
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
el
A)
23
23
CCC
(W
-
4
1
40
-
3
-
1
-
16
24
4
-
7
67
-
AFP
148
588
121
1,024
-
-
-
7
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
7
CLEI
es specified in t
A
-
-
-
-
2
-
-
-
-
1
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
enc
ACC
286
289
t
e
s
es agains
enc
ed
es
es
e
ape or
enc
elat
enc
operty
evenue Los
es
tic
enc
o esc
sonal Injury
es and/or
enc
tigations
y Off
es
o Pr
er
es and/or
son
enc
es
egories of serious off
es
son t
eeds
enc
ations Off
oc
es
aph
enc
enc
orruption; off
ganisations
ation of Jus
enc
e Or P
tr
raud and/or R
ornogr
e/Aid/Abet Serious Off
e 1: Cat
ting a per
crime Off
y Laundering
e Smuggling And R
ommunic
egories of off
el Off
C Special Inv
d P
der
orism Off
sis
s Of Lif
ec
al
yber
ganised Off
eopl
Tabl
Cat
AC
Adminis
As
dispose of pr
Bribery or c
ss 131.1, 135.1, 142.1, 142.2, 148.2,
268.112 of the Criminal Code
Cart
Chil
Conspir
C
Kidnapping
Los
Mone
Mur
Or
Criminal Or
P
Serious Damage T
and/or Serious Ar
Serious Drug Off
Trafficking (9.1 Criminal Code)
Serious F
Tel
Terr
Tot
C H A P T E R 1 | 3
Eligibility to issue an interception warrant
An interception warrant may only be issued by an eligible Judge or a nominated
Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) member. Table 2 records that in 2014–15
there were 80 issuing authorities.
An eligible judge is a judge who has consented in writing and been declared by the
Attorney-General to be an eligible judge. In the reporting period, eligible judges
included members of:
• the Federal Court of Australia
• the Family Court of Australia, and
• the Federal Circuit Court.
A nominated AAT member is a Deputy President, senior member or member of the
AAT who has been nominated by the Attorney-General to issue warrants.
Table 2: Availability of Federal Court Judges, Family Court Judges, Federal Circuit Court
Judges and nominated AAT Members to issue telecommunications interception warrants—
s. 103(ab)
Issuing authority
Number eligible
Federal Court judges
14
Family Court judges
4
Federal Circuit Court judges
33
Nominated AAT members
29
Before issuing an interception warrant the authority must take into account:
• the gravity of the conduct of the offence/s being investigated
• how much the interception would be likely to assist with the investigation, and
• the extent to which other methods of investigating the offence are available
to the agency
Applications for and issue of telecommunications
interception warrants
Table 3 sets out information about the number of eligible judges and nominated
AAT members and the agencies to which they issued warrants. In 2014–15, issuing
authorities issued 3,926 interception warrants, a decrease of around 2 per cent from
2013–14, when 4,007 warrants were issued. Interception warrants are highly privacy
intrusive and are only sought when operationally necessary.
4 | T E L E C O M M U N I C AT I O N S I N T E R C E P T I O N A N D A C C E S S A C T 1 9 7 9 A n n u a l R e p o r t 2 0 14 –15
Table 3: Number of telecommunications interception warrants issued by Federal Court
judges, Family Court judges, Federal Circuit Court judges and nominated AAT members—
s. 103(ab)
Issuing authority
Agency
Family Court
Federal Court
Federal Circuit
Nominated AAT
judges
judges
Court judges
members
ACC
-
-
11
278
ACLEI
-
-
3
-
AFP
8
119
56
669
CCC (QLD)
-
-
5
39
CCC (WA)
5
-
-
18
IBAC
-
-
-
18
ICAC (NSW)
-
-
-
5
ICAC (SA)
-
-
-
3
NSW CC
-
-
-
185
NSW Police
-
118
-
1,414
NT Police
21
-
-
33
PIC
-
4
-
44
QLD Police
-
-
178
93
SA Police
-
-
5
80
TAS Police
-
-
-
24
VIC Police
-
-
-
172
WA Police
170
-
-
148
Total
204
241
258
3,223
C H A P T E R 1 | 5
Table 4: Applications for telecommunications interception warrants, telephone interception
warrants, and renewal applications—ss. 100(1)(a)-(c) and 100(2)(a)-(c)
Telephone
Applications for
Renewal
applications for
Agency
Relevant statistics
warrants
applications9
warrants8
13/14
14/15
13/14
14/15
13/14
14/15
Made
253
290
-
-
25
27
ACC
Refused/withdrawn
-
1
-
-
-
-
Issued
253
289
-
-
25
27
Made
25
3
-
-
17
1
ACLEI
Refused/withdrawn
-
-
-
-
-
-
Issued
25
3
-
-
17
1
Made
690
856
-
3
143
243
AFP
Refused/withdrawn
6
4
-
-
-
-
Issued
684
852
-
3
143
243
Made
38
44
-
-
7
13
CCC (QLD)
Refused/withdrawn
-
-
-
-
-
-
Issued
38
44
-
-
7
13
Made
67
25
-
-
23
7
CCC (WA)
Refused/withdrawn
3
2
-
-
-
-
Issued
64
23
-
-
23
7
Made
16
18
-
-
1
6
IBAC
Refused/withdrawn
-
-
-
-
-
-
Issued
16
18
-
-
1
6
Made
21
5
-
-
8
2
ICAC (NSW)
Refused/withdrawn
-
-
-
-
-
-
Issued
21
5
-
-
8
2
Made
6
3
-
-
-
-
ICAC (SA)
Refused/withdrawn
-
-
-
-
-
-
Issued
6
3
-
-
-
-
Made
349
185
-
-
71
68
NSW CC
Refused/withdrawn
-
-
-
-
-
-
Issued
349
185
-
-
71
68
Made
1,519
1,532
57
40
197
252
NSW Police
Refused/withdrawn
5
-
-
-
-
-
Issued
1,514
1,532
57
40
197
252
Made
43
54
-
-
4
9
NT Police
Refused/withdrawn
-
-
-
-
-
-
Issued
43
54
-
-
4
9
Made
35
48
-
-
8
9
PIC
Refused/withdrawn
-
-
-
-
-
-
Issued
35
48
-
-
8
9
Made
308
271
-
-
33
42
QLD Police
Refused/withdrawn
4
-
-
-
-
-
Issued
304
271
-
-
33
42
6 | T E L E C O M M U N I C AT I O N S I N T E R C E P T I O N A N D A C C E S S A C T 1 9 7 9 A n n u a l R e p o r t 2 0 14 –15
Telephone
Applications for
Renewal
applications for
Agency
Relevant statistics
warrants
applications9
warrants8
13/14
14/15
13/14
14/15
13/14
14/15
Made
132
85
3
-
9
3
SA Police
Refused/withdrawn
-
-
-
-
-
-
Issued
132
85
3
-
9
3
Made
35
24
-
1
6
6
TAS Police
Refused/withdrawn
-
-
-
-
-
-
Issued
35
24
-
1
6
6
Made
188
174
15
1
7
9
VIC Police
Refused/withdrawn
-
2
-
-
-
-
Issued
188
172
15
1
7
9
Made
300
318
-
-
44
53
WA Police
Refused/withdrawn
-
-
-
-
-
-
Issued
300
318
-
-
44
53
Made
4,025
3,935
75
45
603
750
Total
Refused/withdrawn
18
9
-
-
-
-
Issued
4,007
3,926
75
45
603
750
The TIA Act provides that in exceptional circumstances, an issuing authority can
issue an interception warrant that authorises entry on to premises to carry out
telecommunications interception. An issuing authority can only issue such a warrant if
satisfied that it would be impracticable or inappropriate to intercept communications
otherwise than by use of equipment installed on those premises. Agencies only use this
type of warrant on rare occasions.
Table 5: Applications for telecommunications interception warrants authorising entry
on premises—ss. 100(1)(d) and 100(2)(d)
Warrants authorising entry on premises
Agency
Relevant statistics
13/14
14/15
Made
-
1
AFP
Refused/withdrawn
-
-
Issued
-
1
Made
1
2
CCC (WA)
Refused/withdrawn
-
-
Issued
1
2
Made
1
3
Total
Refused/withdrawn
-
-
Issued
1
3
8 Telephone applications are part of the total application of warrants.
9 A renewal is a warrant that is issued for an existing warrant that is still in force
C H A P T E R 1 | 7
An issuing authority can place any conditions or restrictions on an interception warrant
they consider necessary. For example, a condition or restriction may limit the ability
for the agency to use or communicate the information obtained under the warrant, or
restrict when interceptions may occur.
Figure 1 provides information about the use of warrants issued with conditions or
restrictions. In 2014–15, 26 interception warrants were issued with a condition or
a restriction.
Figure 1: Telecommunications interception warrants issued with specific conditions or
restrictions—ss. 100(1)(e) and 100(2)(e)
7
6
6
6
5
5
5
4
3
3
2
1
1
0
ACLEI
ACC
AFP
CCC QLD
NSW
QLD
POLICE
POLICE
Effectiveness of telecommunications interception warrants
The information provided in this section should be interpreted with some caution,
particularly in presuming a relationship between the number of arrests, prosecutions
(which include committal proceedings) and convictions in a reporting period. An arrest
recorded in one reporting period may not result in a prosecution until a later reporting
period. Any resulting conviction could be recorded in that or a subsequent reporting
period. Additionally, the number of arrests may not equate to the number of charges
laid as an arrested person may be prosecuted and convicted for a number of offences,
some or all of which may be prosecuted at a later time.
The tables may also understate the effectiveness of interception in so far as, in some
cases, prosecutions may be initiated and convictions recorded, without the need to
give intercepted information in evidence. In particular, agencies continue to report that
telecommunications interception effectively enables investigators to identify persons
involved in and the infrastructure of, organised criminal activities. In some cases,
the weight of evidence obtained through telecommunications interception results in
defendants entering guilty pleas, thereby eliminating the need for the intercepted
information to be admitted into evidence.
8 | T E L E C O M M U N I C AT I O N S I N T E R C E P T I O N A N D A C C E S S A C T 1 9 7 9 A n n u a l R e p o r t 2 0 14 –15
In 2014–15 there were 3,100 arrests, 4,686 prosecutions and 1,912 convictions based on
lawfully intercepted material. Tables 6, 7 and 8 provide this information.
Table 6: Arrests on the basis of lawfully intercepted information—ss. 102(1)(a) and
102(2)(a)10
Arrests
Agency
13/14
14/15
ACC
105
104
ACLEI
10
5
AFP
209
281
CCC (WA)
1
-
CCC (QLD)
10
46
NSW CC
139
102
NSW Police
1,181
1,171
NT Police
47
35
PIC
50
9
QLD Police
437
457
SA Police
121
159
TAS Police
57
31
VIC Police
254
329
WA Police
317
371
Total
2,938
3,100
10 The figures include statistics from agencies that do not have formal arrest powers and require the assistance
of other law-enforcement agencies to execute an arrest. In these circumstances, an arrest figure may have
been recorded in both the agency that obtained the warrant and the arresting agency.
C H A P T E R 1 | 9
L
3
-
-
2
-
A
17
22
25
41
163
140
72
362
32
51
330
15
14
280
TOT
3,117
4,686
-
-
-
5
-
-
-
-
-
8
-
5
4
-
-
-
WA
POL
11
12
211
524
780
-
-
3
1
-
-
7
-
1
-
4
5
-
-
-
VIC
POL
13
106
19
13
322
494
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
SA
1
8
5
7
POL
11
11
116
159
-
-
-
-
-
1
-
-
-
-
2
2
1
-
-
-
-
-
QLD
POL
200
17
223
-
-
-
1
-
-
8
-
-
-
1
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
8
PIC
18
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
NT
1
1
1
5
POL
12
20
-
-
1
-
-
6
-
-
-
NSW
POL
12
20
27
11
33
95
40
241
15
240
1,530
2,271
e
-
-
2
-
-
-
-
-
-
5
2
-
2
-
-
-
-
NSW
CC
14
41
197
263
videnc
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
4
-
-
-
-
4
CCC
(QLD)
en in e
A)
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1
-
-
-
1
CCC
(W
-
as giv
-
-
-
-
1
2
-
-
3
-
6
-
-
AFP
13
84
21
209
62
14
32
447
ormation w
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
3
-
-
-
-
3
CLEI
A
ed inf
3
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
3
ACC
cept
er
y int
eeds
oc
son
s 131.1, 135.1,
t s
ganisations
e
s
afficking
os
es agains
enc
ed
es
es
e
ape or dispose of pr
enc
elat
enc
es
tic
enc
operty and/or serious ar
evenue l
o esc
es and/or tr
es
enc
tigations
y off
es
sonal injury
es and/or criminal or
o pr
enc
es
enc
es
osecutions in which lawfull
son t
aph
enc
enc
ations off
orruption; off
es
enc
Pr
ation of Jus
e or per
aud and/or r
tr
enc
e/aid/abet serious off
e 7:
ting a per
crime off
y laundering
e smuggling and r
ommunic
egories of off
el off
C special inv
d pornogr
der
orism off
sis
s of lif
ec
al
yber
ganised off
eopl
Tabl
Cat
AC
Adminis
As
Bribery or c
142.1, 142.2, 148.2, 268.112 of the Criminal Code
Cart
Chil
Conspir
C
Kidnapping
Los
Mone
Mur
Or
P
Serious damage t
Serious drug off
Serious fr
Tel
Terr
Other serious off
Tot
1 0 | T E L E C O M M U N I C AT I O N S I N T E R C E P T I O N A N D A C C E S S A C T 1 9 7 9 A n n u a l R e p o r t 2 0 14 –15
L
3
-
6
-
4
-
4
-
2
A
16
18
14
76
47
37
251
10
72
91
TOT
1,261
1,912
-
-
-
2
-
-
-
-
-
4
4
7
-
2
1
-
-
-
WA
POL
169
347
536
-
-
-
1
-
-
2
-
6
1
-
2
3
-
-
-
VIC
POL
50
15
11
204
295
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1
-
3
-
-
-
9
-
-
-
-
SA
POL
13
-
-
-
-
-
1
-
-
-
-
2
2
1
-
-
-
-
-
QLD
POL
197
17
220
-
-
-
-
-
-
1
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
9
PIC
10
-
-
6
3
-
17
1
-
8
21
5
14
53
-
5
22
-
-
69
NSW
POL
318
542
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
7
-
-
1
-
-
-
-
CC
25
86
e
NSW
119
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
4
-
-
-
-
4
videnc
CCC
(QLD)
A)
en in e
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
CCC (W
as giv
-
-
-
8
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
2
4
-
-
2
AFP
14
92
29
13
164
-
-
-
2
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
4
-
-
-
-
6
CLEI
ormation w
A
ed inf
3
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
3
ACC
cept
er
y int
eeds
oc
son
s 131.1, 135.1,
t s
ganisations
e
s
afficking
os
es agains
enc
ed
es
es
e
ape or dispose of pr
enc
elat
enc
es
tic
enc
operty and/or serious ar
evenue l
o esc
es and/or tr
es
enc
tigations
y off
es
sonal injury
es and/or criminal or
o pr
enc
es
es
son t
enc
aph
enc
enc
ations off
orruption; off
es
enc
Convictions in which lawfull
ation of Jus
e or per
aud and/or r
tr
enc
e/aid/abet serious off
e 8:
ting a per
crime off
y laundering
e smuggling and r
ommunic
egories of off
el off
C special inv
d pornogr
der
orism off
sis
s of lif
ec
al
yber
ganised off
eopl
Tabl
Cat
AC
Adminis
As
Bribery or c
142.1, 142.2, 148.2, 268.112 of the Criminal Code
Cart
Chil
Conspir
C
Kidnapping
Los
Mone
Mur
Or
P
Serious damage t
Serious drug off
Serious fr
Tel
Terr
Other serious off
Tot
C H A P T E R 1 | 1 1
Named person warrants
A named person warrant can authorise the interception of multiple telecommunications
services (such as a landline or mobile service), or in certain circumstances,
telecommunications devices (such as a mobile handset). Before issuing a named person
warrant an issuing authority must take into account:
• how much the privacy of any person would be likely to be interfered with
• the gravity of the offence
• whether the interception will assist in the investigation, and
• the extent to which methods other than using a named person warrant are
available to the agency.
The following tables and figures show that in 2014–15, 1,000 named person warrants
were issued, this is comparable to the 2013–14 reporting period in which 999 named
person warrants were issued.
Table 9: Original applications for named person warrants, telephone applications for named
person warrants, and renewal applications—ss. 100(1)(ea) and 100(2)(ea)
Telephone
Renewal
Applications for
applications for
applications for
named person
Agency
Relevant statistics
named person
named person
warrants
warrants
warrants
13/14
14/15
13/14
14/15
13/14
14/15
Made
168
185
-
-
22
23
ACC
Refused/withdrawn
-
-
-
-
-
-
Issued
168
185
-
-
22
23
Made
4
-
-
-
1
-
ACLEI
Refused/withdrawn
-
-
-
-
-
-
Issued
4
-
-
-
1
-
Made
318
335
-
1
106
110
AFP
Refused/withdrawn
3
2
-
-
-
-
Issued
315
333
-
1
106
110
Made
13
26
-
-
6
11
CCC (QLD)
Refused/withdrawn
-
-
-
-
-
-
Issued
13
26
-
-
6
11
Made
2
2
-
-
1
-
CCC (WA)
Refused/withdrawn
-
-
-
-
-
-
Issued
2
2
-
-
1
-
Made
8
2
-
-
1
1
IBAC
Refused/withdrawn
-
-
-
-
-
-
Issued
8
2
-
-
1
1
Made
145
91
-
-
32
47
NSW CC
Refused/withdrawn
-
-
-
-
-
-
Issued
145
91
-
-
32
47
1 2 | T E L E C O M M U N I C AT I O N S I N T E R C E P T I O N A N D A C C E S S A C T 1 9 7 9 A n n u a l R e p o r t 2 0 14 –15
Telephone
Renewal
Applications for
applications for
applications for
named person
Agency
Relevant statistics
named person
named person
warrants
warrants
warrants
13/14
14/15
13/14
14/15
13/14
14/15
Made
105
144
-
2
25
39
NSW Police
Refused/withdrawn
-
-
-
-
-
-
Issued
105
144
-
2
25
39
Made
3
-
-
-
-
-
NT Police
Refused/withdrawn
-
-
-
-
-
-
Issued
3
-
-
-
-
-
Made
42
46
-
-
6
6
QLD Police
Refused/withdrawn
1
-
-
-
-
-
Issued
41
46
-
-
6
6
Made
25
3
-
-
-
-
SA Police
Refused/withdrawn
-
-
-
-
-
-
Issued
25
3
-
-
-
-
Made
9
5
-
-
4
1
TAS Police
Refused/withdrawn
-
-
-
-
-
-
Issued
9
5
-
-
4
1
Made
44
44
1
-
1
3
VIC Police
Refused/withdrawn
-
-
-
-
-
-
Issued
44
44
1
-
1
3
Made
117
119
-
-
26
32
WA Police
Refused/withdrawn
-
-
-
-
-
-
Issued
117
119
-
-
26
32
Made
1,003
1,002
1
3
231
273
Total
Refused/withdrawn
4
2
-
-
-
-
Issued
999
1,000
1
3
231
273
Under the TIA Act, issuing authorities can issue a warrant with conditions and
restrictions about interceptions under the warrant. In 2014–15, 7 named person
warrants were issued with a condition or restriction.
C H A P T E R 1 | 1 3
Figure 2: Named person warrants issued with conditions or restrictions—ss. 100(1)(ea)
and 100(2)(ea)
3
2
2
2
2
1
1
0
ACC
AFP
CCC QLD
QLD
POLICE
Consistent with the last reporting period, in 2014–15 the majority of named person
warrants were for the interception of between two to five telecommunications services.
Table 10: Number of services intercepted under named person warrants—ss. 100(1)(eb)
and 100(2)(eb)
Relevant statistics
Agency
1 service only
2 –5 services
6–10 services
10+ services
13/14
14/15
13/14
14/15
13/14
14/15
13/14
14/15
ACC
47
50
106
123
12
18
-
8
ACLEI
2
-
2
-
-
-
-
-
AFP
44
104
195
205
23
21
2
1
CCC (QLD)
5
7
6
15
2
3
-
-
CCC (WA)
-
-
1
1
-
-
1
1
IBAC
-
-
6
1
2
1
-
-
NSW CC
51
36
82
47
8
6
1
1
NSW Police
29
33
59
95
11
10
-
-
NT Police
-
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
QLD Police
8
10
27
32
6
4
-
-
SA Police
4
-
18
3
2
-
-
-
TAS Police
-
-
7
4
2
2
-
-
VIC Police
8
10
32
28
4
2
-
1
WA Police
33
33
74
78
10
8
-
-
Total
231
283
616
632
83
75
5
12
1 4 | T E L E C O M M U N I C AT I O N S I N T E R C E P T I O N A N D A C C E S S A C T 1 9 7 9 A n n u a l R e p o r t 2 0 14 –15
Subsections 100(1)(ec)(i)-(iii) require the report to include the following information in
relation to named person warrants the total number of:
(i) services intercepted under service based named person warrants
(ii) services intercepted under device based named person warrants, and
(iii) telecommunications devices intercepted under device based named
person warrants.
Figure 3 and Table 11 outline the number of services intercepted under the different
types of named person warrants and should be read in conjunction with Table 9 which
provides the total number of named person warrants issued.
Figure 3: Total number of services intercepted under service-based named person
warrants—ss. 100(1)(ec) and 100(2)(ec)
798
800
700
600
498
500
400
376
300
227
200
132
103
113
100
58
20
12
10
0
P
e
e
e
ACC
NSW CC
IBAC
CCC QLD
CCC WA
AF
NSW Polic
WA Police
VIC Police
SA Polic
QLD Polic
Under the TIA Act, agencies can apply for a named person warrant in relation to
telecommunications devices, where a device or devices of interest can be identified.
Table 11 shows, consistent with previous years, that in 2014–15 device-based named
person warrants were used by only a small number of agencies.
C H A P T E R 1 | 1 5
Table 11: Total number of services and devices intercepted under device-based named
person warrants—ss. 100(1)(ec) and 100(2)(ec)
Agency
Services
Devices
ACC
79
63
AFP11
-
72
NSW CC
-
1
NSW Police
6
5
VIC Police
9
3
WA Police
6
-
Total
100
144
B-Party warrants
Definition
A ‘B-Party warrant’ is a warrant that enables an interception agency to intercept
the communications of a person who is communicating with a person suspected
of involvement in a serious offence.
An issuing authority can issue a B-Party warrant, but only if there are no other
practicable methods of identifying the telecommunications services of the person
involved in the offences, or if interception of communications from that person’s
telecommunications services would not otherwise be possible.
Table 12 shows that in 2014–15, 102 B-Party warrants were issued, around 26 per cent
less than in 2013–14.
11 The number of services intercepted under device based warrants is unavailable for the AFP during the
reporting period and will be updated in the next Annual Report.
1 6 | T E L E C O M M U N I C AT I O N S I N T E R C E P T I O N A N D A C C E S S A C T 1 9 7 9 A n n u a l R e p o r t 2 0 14 –15
Table 12: Applications for B-Party warrants, telephone applications for B-Party warrants,
and renewal applications—ss. 100(1)(ed) and 100(1)(ed)
Telephone
Renewal
Applications for
applications for
applications for
Agency
Relevant statistics
B-Party warrants
B-Party warrants
B-Party warrants
13/14
14/15
13/14
14/15
13/14
14/15
Made
-
4
-
-
-
1
ACC
Refused/withdrawn
-
-
-
-
-
-
Issued
-
4
-
-
-
1
Made
11
-
-
-
10
-
ACLEI
Refused/withdrawn
-
-
-
-
-
-
Issued
11
-
-
-
10
-
Made
62
50
-
-
18
32
AFP
Refused/withdrawn
-
-
-
-
-
-
Issued
62
50
-
-
18
32
Made
6
7
-
-
1
-
NSW CC
Refused/withdrawn
-
-
-
-
-
-
Issued
6
7
-
-
1
-
Made
57
41
8
9
-
-
NSW Police
Refused/withdrawn
-
-
-
-
-
-
Issued
57
41
8
9
-
-
Made
3
-
-
-
1
-
SA Police
Refused/withdrawn
-
-
-
-
-
-
Issued
3
-
-
-
1
-
Made
139
102
8
9
30
33
Total
Refused/withdrawn
-
-
-
-
-
-
Issued
139
102
8
9
30
33
Table 13: B-Party warrants issued with conditions or restrictions—ss. 100(1)(ed) and
100(2)(ed)
Applications for B-Party warrants
Agency
13/14
14/15
ACLEI
11
-
AFP
-
2
NSW Police
2
1
Total
13
3
C H A P T E R 1 | 1 7
Duration of warrants
Under the TIA Act, a telecommunications interception warrant, other than a B-Party
warrant, can be in force for up to 90 days. Under section 57, the chief executive of an
agency may revoke a warrant at any time and must revoke a warrant if they are satisfied
that the conditions for issuing the warrant no longer exist. Table 14 sets out the average
length of time for which interception warrants—including renewals, but not including
B-Party warrants—were issued and the average length of time they were in force.
Table 14: Duration of original and renewal telecommunications interception warrants—
ss. 101(1)(a)-(d) and 101(2)(a)-(d)
Duration of renewal of
Duration of original telecommunications
telecommunications interception
interception warrants
warrants
Agency
Average period
Average period
Average period
Average period
specified in
warrants in force
specified in
warrants in force
warrants (days)
(days)
warrants (days)
(days)
ACC
89
51
86
70
ACLEI
90
82
90
50
AFP
84
61
82
70
CCC (QLD)
82
68
84
67
CCC (WA)
69
37
71
71
IBAC
90
89
90
90
ICAC (NSW)
90
89
90
40
ICAC (SA)
88
88
-
-
NSW CC
82
70
89
79
NSW Police
61
46
65
55
NT Police
90
53
90
50
PIC
82
70
90
88
QLD Police
74
56
68
60
SA Police
76
50
56
32
TAS Police
74
47
84
84
VIC Police
74
54
53
32
WA Police
89
55
87
66
Average
81
63
80
63
1 8 | T E L E C O M M U N I C AT I O N S I N T E R C E P T I O N A N D A C C E S S A C T 1 9 7 9 A n n u a l R e p o r t 2 0 14 –15
Under the TIA Act, a B-Party warrant can be in force for up to 45 days. The following
table sets out the average length of time for which B-Party warrants and renewals of
those warrants were issued and the average length of time they were in force.
Table 15: Duration of original and renewal B-Party warrants—ss. 101(1)(da) and 101(2)(da)
Duration of original telecommunications
Duration of renewal of
B-Party warrants
telecommunications B-Party warrants
Agency
Average period
Average period
Average period
Average period
specified in
warrants in force
specified in
warrants in force
warrants (days)
(days)
warrants (days)
(days)
ACC
45
45
45
-
AFP
42
40
45
43
NSW CC
35
35
-
-
NSW Police
31
13
-
-
Average
38
33
45
43
A final renewal means a telecommunications interception warrant that is the last
renewal of an original warrant. A final renewal is recorded as the number of days
after the issue of the original warrant that the last renewal of the warrant ceases to
be in force.
The categories of final renewals are:
• 90 day final renewal—a last renewal that ceases to be in force more than 90 days
but not more than 150 days after the date of issue of the original warrant
• 150 day final renewal—a last renewal that ceases to be in force more than
150 days but not more than 180 days after the date of issue of the original
warrant, and
• 180 day final renewal—a last renewal that ceases to be in force more than
180 days after the date of issue of the original warrant.
Table 16 provides information on the number of final renewals used by agencies.
C H A P T E R 1 | 1 9
Table 16: Number of final renewals—ss. 101(1)(e) and 101(2)(e)
90 days
150 days
180 days
Agency
13/14
14/15
13/14
14/15
13/14
14/15
ACC
9
8
9
8
1
6
ACLEI
-
-
1
-
3
-
AFP
64
35
2
51
23
68
CCC (QLD)
-
2
-
8
2
-
CCC (WA)
6
1
1
6
2
-
IBAC
-
-
-
4
-
1
ICAC (NSW)
1
2
2
-
2
-
NSW CC
12
3
27
18
15
20
NSW Police
79
110
48
8
34
30
NT Police
-
-
1
3
-
2
PIC
4
3
-
-
3
-
QLD Police
14
13
4
12
3
4
SA Police
6
3
-
-
1
-
TAS Police
5
-
-
-
-
-
VIC Police
2
-
-
-
-
-
WA Police
-
11
30
23
1
12
Total
202
191
125
141
90
143
Eligible warrants
Definition
An ‘eligible warrant’ is a warrant that was in force during the reporting period—
not necessarily a warrant that was issued during the reporting period—where
a prosecution was instituted or was likely to be instituted on the basis of
information obtained by interceptions under the warrant.
Table 17 indicates what percentage of each agency’s total warrants in force during the
reporting period were eligible warrants.
Table 17 sets out the number of eligible warrants issued to agencies during the
reporting period and the percentage of warrants issued to agencies that were
eligible warrants.
2 0 | T E L E C O M M U N I C AT I O N S I N T E R C E P T I O N A N D A C C E S S A C T 1 9 7 9 A n n u a l R e p o r t 2 0 14 –15
Table 17: Percentage of eligible warrants—ss. 102(3) and 102(4)
Total number of
Number of eligible
Agency
%
warrants
warrants
ACC
332
141
42
ACLEI
6
4
67
AFP
1,206
849
70
CCC (QLD)
55
35
64
CCC (WA)
34
19
56
IBAC
20
12
60
ICAC (NSW)
5
5
100
ICAC (SA)
3
2
67
NSW CC
251
234
93
NSW Police
1,529
1,176
77
NT Police
54
25
46
PIC
13
11
85
QLD Police
309
296
96
SA Police
85
60
71
TAS Police
26
20
77
VIC Police
205
142
69
WA Police
365
162
44
Total
4,498
3,193
71
Interception without a warrant
Under the TIA Act, agencies can undertake interception without a warrant in limited
circumstances, for example, where there is a serious threat to life or the possibility of
serious injury. Table 18a reports on interceptions under subsection 7(5) of the TIA Act,
which relates to situations where the person to whom the communication is directed
consents to the interception. Table 18b reports on subsection 7(4) of the TIA Act, which
relates to situations where an officer of the agency undertaking the interception is a
party to the communication.
C H A P T E R 1 | 2 1
Table 18a: Interception without a warrant—s. 102A
Consent where person likely to receive communication from person who has:
Committed an act that
Threatened to
Threatened to take,
Threatened to kill
has or may result in
cause serious
endanger, or create
Agency
or seriously injure
loss of life or serious
damage to
serious threat to own
another
personal injury
property
life/safety
13/14
14/15
13/14
14/15
13/14
14/15
13/14
14/15
AFP
-
-
5
-
-
-
-
-
Total
-
-
5
-
-
-
-
-
Table 18b: Interception without a warrant—s. 102A
Agency is a party to the communication and has reasonable grounds for believing person
likely to receive communication from person who has:
Committed an act that
Threatened to
Threatened to take,
Threatened to kill
Agency
has or may result in
cause serious
endanger, or create
or seriously injure
loss of life or serious
damage to
serious threat to own
another
personal injury
property
life/safety
13/14
14/15
13/14
14/15
13/14
14/15
13/14
14/15
AFP
-
11
5
-
-
-
-
-
NSW Police
-
2
-
-
-
-
1
2
Total
-
13
5
-
-
-
1
2
Mutual assistance
Section 102B of the TIA Act requires that the annual report include information about
the number of occasions on which lawfully intercepted information or interception
warrant information was provided to a foreign country under subsection 68(1) or section
68A of the TIA Act in connection with an authorisation made under subsection 13A(1)
of the
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1987. One authorisation issued under
section 13A included telecommunications interception material.
Number of interceptions carried out on behalf of other agencies
The TIA Act supports the ability of interception agencies to cooperate and to work
collaboratively by enabling one interception agency to carry out interception on behalf of
other agencies. Typically this occurs when a larger agency assists a smaller agency to
intercept to reduce the costs of the smaller agency.
2 2 | T E L E C O M M U N I C AT I O N S I N T E R C E P T I O N A N D A C C E S S A C T 1 9 7 9 A n n u a l R e p o r t 2 0 14 –15
Table 19: Number of interceptions carried out on behalf of other agencies—s. 103(ac)
Interception carried out by:
Interception carried out on behalf of:
Number of interceptions:
ACC
CCC (QLD)
109
ACLEI
2
AFP
ACC
2
CCC (WA)
WA POLICE
6
VIC Police
TAS POLICE
24
IBAC
ICAC (SA)
3
Total
146
Telecommunications interception expenditure
Table 20 below provides information about the total expenditure (including expenditure
of a capital nature) by interception agencies on telecommunications interception
warrants and the average expenditure (total warrant expenditure divided by the
number of warrants issued) per warrant. The average cost per warrant is significantly
affected by capital expenditure (which can vary significantly, for instance, due to a
capital upgrade program) and the number of warrants issued, meaning that smaller
interception agencies typically have higher average costs as they apply for fewer
warrants. Care should be taken in comparing costs associated with average expenditure
as interception agencies employ different interception models which may result in some
instances costs associated with interception being delineated, and for other agencies,
those same costs being included in their average expenditure.
Table 20: Total expenditure incurred by each agency in connection with the execution of
telecommunications interception warrants and average expenditure per telecommunications
interception warrant—ss. 103(a) and 103(aa)
Police
Total expenditure ($)
Average expenditure ($)
ACC
8,257,735
28,573
ACLEI
111,193
37,064
AFP
16,685,145
19,583
CCC (QLD)
1,939,070
44,069
CCC (WA)
1,189,101
51,700
IBAC
1,677,907
93,217
ICAC (NSW)
85,308
17,062
ICAC (SA)
119,978
39,993
NSW CC
2,851,845
15,415
NSW Police
6,154,535
4,017
NT Police
995,254
18,431
C H A P T E R 1 | 2 3
Police
Total expenditure ($)
Average expenditure ($)
PIC
1,344,327
28,006
QLD Police
4,654,842
17,176
SA Police
2,974,939
34,999
TAS Police
557,000
23,208
VIC Police
7,791,994
45,302
WA Police
3,972,509
12,492
Table 21 provides a breakdown of the total recurrent costs of interception over the
reporting period. As agencies do not necessarily treat or record particular items of
expenditure in the same way, caution should be exercised in comparing costs incurred
by individual agencies.
Table 21: Recurrent costs of interceptions per agency
Administrative
Capital
Interception
Agency
Salaries
Total ($)
support
expenditure
costs
ACC
6,170,150
88,595
636,116
1,362,874
8,257,735
ACLEI
100,089
5,099
-
6,005
111,193
AFP
8,221,757
220,701
5,583,084
2,659,603
16,685,145
CCC (QLD)
1,300,261
159,843
38,212
440,754
1,939,070
CCC (WA)
835,928
4,136
266,664
82,373
1,189,101
IBAC
1,470,728
52,563
-
154,616
1,677,907
ICAC (NSW)
50,928
-
-
34,380
85,308
ICAC (SA)
38,160
-
-
81,818
119,978
NSW CC
2,048,341
-
4,803
798,701
2,851,845
NSW Police
4,680,702
283,625
20,000
1,170,208
6,154,535
NT Police
794,098
-
120,809
80,347
995,254
PIC
1,127,312
-
-
217,015
1,344,327
QLD Police
3,258,736
490,147
85,540
820,419
4,654,842
SA Police
2,177,266
291,691
304,420
201,562
2,974,939
TAS Police
400,000
50,000
60,000
47,000
557,000
VIC Police
4,876,309
266,065
1,528,000
1,121,620
7,791,994
WA Police
3,318,407
490,635
-
163,467
3,972,509
2 4 | T E L E C O M M U N I C AT I O N S I N T E R C E P T I O N A N D A C C E S S A C T 1 9 7 9 A n n u a l R e p o r t 2 0 14 –15
Emergency service facilities
Table 22 sets out the number of places that have been declared under the TIA Act to
be emergency service facilities. Under the TIA Act, listening to or recording calls to
and from a facility declared by the Minister to be an emergency service facility is not
interception. This exemption ensures that emergency services can assist emergency
callers and respond to critical situations as quickly as possible, without the need to first
obtain a caller’s consent to recording of the call.
Table 22: Emergency service facility declarations
Emergency
State/territory
Police
Fire brigade
Ambulance
services
Despatching
authority
Australian Capital Territory
5
-
-
-
3
New South Wales
8
95
6
-
6
Northern Territory
2
-
1
1
4
Queensland
21
12
6
-
13
South Australia
1
2
1
-
3
Tasmania
1
2
1
-
2
Victoria
6
1
10
3
5
Western Australia
1
2
1
-
6
Total
45
114
26
4
42
Safeguards, controls and reporting requirements
The TIA Act contains a number of safeguards, controls and reporting requirements
in relation to interception, access to stored communications and disclosure of
telecommunications data including:
• the heads of interception agencies provide the Secretary of the
Attorney-General’s Department (AGD) with a copy of each telecommunications
interception warrant
• interception agencies report to the Attorney-General, within three months of a
warrant ceasing to be in force, detailing the use made of information obtained by
the interception
• the Secretary of the AGD maintains a General Register detailing the particulars
of all telecommunications interception warrants. The Secretary of the AGD
must provide the General Register to the Attorney-General for inspection
every three months
• the Secretary of the AGD maintains a Special Register recording the details of
telecommunications interception warrants that do not lead to a prosecution
within three months of the warrant expiring. The Special Register is also given to
the Attorney-General to inspect.
C H A P T E R 1 | 2 5
Law enforcement agencies’ use of interception powers under the TIA Act is independently
overseen by the Commonwealth Ombudsman and equivalent state bodies.
At least twice a year the Commonwealth Ombudsman must inspect the records kept
by the ACC, ACLEI and the AFP relating to interceptions and the use, dissemination
and destruction of intercepted information. The inspections are retrospective and
on the basis of a full year, and for this reason, the Ombudsman inspected relevant
telecommunications interception warrants that expired between 1 January and
31 December 2014.
The Commonwealth Ombudsman is required under the TIA Act to report to the
Attorney-General about these inspections, including information about any deficiencies
identified and remedial action. State and Territory legislation imposes similar
requirements on State and Territory interception agencies regarding their use of
interception powers.
While the Commonwealth Ombudsman is responsible for inspecting the records of
the ACC, ACLEI and the AFP in relation to interception, the relevant state or territory
Ombudsman generally undertakes this function for State and Territory agencies.
The reports of the inspections of the declared state and territory agencies are given to
the responsible state or territory Minister who provides a copy to the Commonwealth
Attorney-General.
The Commonwealth Ombudsman also conducts regular inspections of records in
relation to access by enforcement agencies (including both Commonwealth and state
agencies) to stored communications and reports to the Attorney-General on the results
of those inspections.
Commonwealth Ombudsman—inspection of
telecommunications interception records
During the reporting period the Commonwealth Ombudsman conducted six inspections of
the interception records of the ACC, ACLEI and the AFP (two inspections for each agency).
During its review of warrants that expired in the period 1 January to 31 December 2014,
the Ombudsman noted that there continues to be a high level of compliance with the
TIA Act, where agencies displayed a good understanding of the TIA Act’s requirements.
The Ombudsman particularly noted the cooperative and responsive approach towards
inspection findings.
Overall, the Ombudsman did not identify any systemic issues or significant problems,
with all agencies found to be compliant with the majority of the Ombudsman’s
inspection criteria. The Ombudsman’s inspection criteria (see Figures 4 and 5) are:
1. Were restricted records properly destroyed (s 79)?
2. Were the requisite documents kept in connection with the issue of warrants (s 80)?
3. Were warrant applications properly made and warrants in the correct form
(ss 39(1) and 49)?
4. Were the requisite records kept in connection with interceptions (s 81)?
5. Were interceptions conducted in accordance with the warrants (s 7) and was any
unlawfully intercepted information properly dealt with (s 63)?
2 6 | T E L E C O M M U N I C AT I O N S I N T E R C E P T I O N A N D A C C E S S A C T 1 9 7 9 A n n u a l R e p o r t 2 0 14 –15
Commonwealth Ombudsman’s summary of findings
Table 23a: Summary of findings from the two inspections conducted at each agency during the
period 1 January to 30 June 2014
Criteria
ACC
ACLEI
AFP
Not assessed—the ACC
Compliant for physical
Not assessed
Were restricted records
advised there were no
restricted records, not
as no records
properly destroyed (s 79)?
destructions conducted
compliant for electronic
destroyed.
in the inspection period.
restricted records.
Compliant with
Were the requisite documents
Compliant with the
an exception
kept in connection with the
Compliant.
exception of one instance
relating to four
issue of warrants (s 80)?
(self-disclosed).
warrants.
Were warrants properly
Compliant with the
applied for and in the correct
Compliant.
Compliant.
exception of one instance.
form (ss 39(1) and 49)?
Were requisite records kept in
Compliant with the
connection with interceptions
Compliant.
Compliant.
exception of two instances
(s 81)?
in relation to s 81(1)(e).
Were interceptions conducted
Nothing to indicate
in accordance with the
Nothing
otherwise except in
warrants (s 7) and was
to indicate
Compliant.
two instances. Unable
any unlawfully intercepted
otherwise, except to determine in eight
information properly dealt
in one instance.
instances.
with (s 63)?
Table 23b: Summary of findings from the two inspections conducted at each agency during
the period 1 July to 31 December 2014
Criteria
ACC
ACLEI
AFP
Not compliant for physical
Not assessed
Were restricted records
Not assessed as no
restricted records, no
as no records
properly destroyed (s 79)?
records destroyed.
electronic restricted
destroyed.
records assessed.
Were the requisite documents
kept in connection with the
Compliant.
Compliant.
Compliant.
issue of warrants (s 80)?
Were warrants properly
Compliant except in
applied for and in the correct
Compliant.
Compliant.
two instances.
form (ss 39(1) and 49)?
Were requisite records kept in
connection with interceptions
Compliant.
Compliant.
Compliant.
(s 81)?
C H A P T E R 1 | 2 7
Criteria
ACC
ACLEI
AFP
Were interceptions conducted
Nothing to indicate
in accordance with the
Nothing
Nothing to indicate
otherwise except in
warrants (s 7) and was
to indicate
otherwise.
11 instances, unable
any unlawfully intercepted
otherwise.
to determine in two
information properly dealt
instances.
with (s 63)?
Commonwealth Ombudsman’s findings for individual agency for
warrants expiring between 1 January to 31 December 2014
ACC
No formal recommendations were made as a result of either of the two inspections
of the ACC, nor were any deficiencies identified that impacted the integrity of the
telecommunications interception regime. The Ombudsman noted the ACC had
implemented effective monitoring and quarantining procedures for its interception
of telecommunications.
ACLEI
No formal recommendations were made as a result of either of the two inspections
of ACLEI. The Ombudsman noted that ACLEI did not provide proper notification of the
services intercepted under four named person warrants and separately continued
interceptions in matters where revocations had been issued to the Department, prior to
notifying the carriers to disconnect the interception. ACLEI has updated its procedures
to ensure that these errors do not occur in the future.
AFP
The Ombudsman made one formal recommendation for the AFP to update its
procedures and processes to ensure compliance with section 79 of the TIA Act of which
the AFP was responsive to the issue. The AFP accepted the recommendation and took
appropriate remedial action.
The Ombudsman noted that subsection 7(4) of the TIA Act had been breached by the
AFP when conducting emergency interceptions. To mitigate the effects of this, the AFP
advised that it had implemented restrictive practices to quarantine any unauthorised
information. The Ombudsman did not consider that these instances reflected significant
problems with the AFP’s processes and for ensuring interceptions were lawful.
The Ombudsman was unable to determine whether some intercepted lines obtained
under 9 warrants were lawfully intercepted. As a result, the AFP investigated these
issues and quarantined information obtained under one warrant and set in place new
procedures. The Ombudsman noted the AFP’s responsiveness to this issue.
Further information about the Commonwealth Ombudsman’s telecommunications
interception inspection criteria is outlined in Figure 4 and 5 below.
2 8 | T E L E C O M M U N I C AT I O N S I N T E R C E P T I O N A N D A C C E S S A C T 1 9 7 9 A n n u a l R e p o r t 2 0 14 –15
Figure 4: Commonwealth Ombudsman’s Telecommunications Interception Inspection Criteria
e
e
stricted
pt
efused or
ased to
re
ke
pt
came to be
ce
e
ke
.
pt (s 81(1)(a)).
cised by the
rd
rd
e
ar
er of the
levant
ke
er
eption under
co
co
ex
rd
re
rc
arrant details,
re
re
elates to
co
ommunication)
re
in a
withdrawn, r
ce
re
pt (s 81(1)(f))
must also be indicated)
eption and the name of
pt that r
stricted
stricted
ke
ce
rc
re
re
ke
stricted
e
lecommunications
ceptions (W
om or to which or other person re
Te
r ar
pt (ss 81(1)(c)(iii) and (iv)).
epted under the warrants ar
rds, use and c
possession (s 81(1)(d)(i)).
ce
ke
rc
’s
co
e
r a part 2–5 warrant is
re
fo
.
mmunication of LII by an offic
ept (s 81(1)(g)).
ption ar
casion when the
casion when the
isions of the
co
e k
ce
ov
pt (s 81(1)(d)(iii)).
onnection with inter
pt (s 81(1)(d)(ii)).
ke
pt (s 81(1)(a))
e
ormation (LII)
ke
ceived or supplied the
ke
e
e
re
eption pr
pt in c
rc
ke
rds epted inf
or named person warrants the servi
co rc
mmunications have been inte .
re
co
s possession ar
possession ar
elation to the agency ar
y inte
that particulars of each other agency fr
that particulars of each use made by the agency of LII ar
that particulars of each
that particulars of when LII was given in eviden
that each telephone application
ept (s 81(1)(c)(i)).
’s
e that particulars of the day and time at which each inte
e that particulars of the duration of each inte
e that particulars of each named person warrant including each servic
that each warrant issued to the agency is
that particulars of each oc
that particulars of each oc
ce
ce
ce
ce
ce
e that statements as to whether applications we
e that the particulars of all warrants whose authority is e k
ce
ce
ce
.
om which
s 81 Other lawfull
ept (ss 81(1)(c)(ii)) and 81(2)).
rds that have at any time been in the agency
Eviden
Eviden
Eviden
Eviden eeding in r
ommunications inte
1 Eviden
Evidenc
Evidenc
Evidenc
e k
Evidenc
6 Evidenc
pt (s 81(1)(c)(v))
Eviden co
Eviden
Eviden
om or to whom the agency
oc
3.
3.2 issued on the application ar
3.3 agency ar
3.4 the warrant began (f ar
3.5 the person who carried out each inter
3. to or fr ke
3.7 re
3.8 in the agency
3.9 be in the agency’
3.10 fr (s 81(1)(d)(iv)).
3.11 (s 81(1)(e))
3.12 agency to a person or body other than such an offi
3.13 pr
e
e
r
ce
ements of the telec
quir
tary of AGD)
re
s
re
ceive information
) (s 80(d)).
re
nnection with
voking warrants ar
co
re
ertificate issued under
.
pt in
ke
) (s 80(e))
py of each c
opy of each notification under
(
authorisation to
co
the issue of warrant
pt
ke
eeping and destruction
(
evidentiary certificates
k
that all warrants issued to the agency ar
that all instruments
that a
e that a c ept (notifications to the Sec
pt
that each authorisation by the chief offi
rd
ce
ce
ce ke
ce
co
s 80 Documents
re
Eviden
Evidenc
Eviden
Eviden
Eviden
2.1 kept (s 80(a)).
2.2 s 59A(2) is k (s 80(b)).
2.3 kept (s 80(c)).
2.4 s 61(4) is
2.5 under s 66 (2) is
obtained under warrants
e with the
y
or a
omplianc
ed f
stricted the
c
s’
er was
re re
stricted equir
stricted
re
subsequentl
yed
stricted
re
re
ro
re
s
yed
yed befo
rd
ro to be rly
ro
co
ke
re
not li
not dest
obtained (s 79(2)).
to assess agencie
e that the chief offic
that the dest
re
ce re
re
eption and Access) Act 1979
s 79 Destruction of
rc
oyed forthwith (s 79(1)).
Evidenc
rds we
rds we
rds we
co
Eviden co
co
Objective: (Inte
1.1 satisfied that the dest re permitted purpose and we destr
1.2 re Attorney-General had inspected the warrants under which the re
C H A P T E R 1 | 2 9
Figure 5: Other matters reportable under s.85
emises
r that
fo
.
y during
essary
pted
e with
ce
ovide that entry
es nec
anc .
arrants state entry
easonable
rd
.
y inter
s 48 Issue of warrant for entry on pr
W
mmunications
4.7 is authorised to be made at any time of the day or night, or onl specified hours; warrants may pr may be made without permission first being sought, or demand first being made, and authorise measur and r purpose (s 48(5)).
co
dealt with (s 63)
authorised by a
ly
ommunications
re
strictions (s 7)
re
ed c
oper
ptions we
ce
ssed stor
nditions or
ce authorised by a tele eption warrant (s 108(2))
Inter
co
Ac re rc
Evidence that any unlawfull ormation was pr
e of warrants
.
5.1 warrant and conducted in acco any
5.2 we inte
5.3 inf
rc
rrants state a date
s under s 80 and 81
s 54 Entry into fo
Wa
4.6 of issue (and time of issue) (s 49(1))
e check
s
omplianc
.
orm
rm and
e (s 49(7)).
nc
tensions of
esult of c
Fo
ect f
fe
rr
onditions and/or
e of up to 45
ex
ct r
rc
s 49
rrant application
rrants set out
or
ntent of warrant
co
fo
re
co
Wa
If applicable, warrants
strictions (s 49(2))
Wa
No applications
4.1 made to a person authorised under ss 6D or 6DA and warrant in the (ss 39(1) and 49(1)).
4.2 specify c re
4.3 B party warrants specifying the period to be in days, other warrants up to 90 days (s 49(3)).
4.4 short particulars of each serious of
4.5 made f warrants (s 49(4)).
ed as a di
e
.
d
ke
onnection
nditions and/or
orm (ss 39(1) and
lawful
rrant application
co
rrants state a date
evo
re y dealt with.
Wa
ect f
If applicable, warrants
Wa
ept in c
rr
strictions (s 49(2))
eptions)
operl
4.1 made to a person authorised under ss 6D or 6DA and warrant in the co 49(1)).
4.2 specify re
4.6 of issue (and time of issue) (s 49(1)).
rc
mmunications
d or was r
co
e to ensu
re
pi
pted
ex
ce
eportable under s 85 and able to be check
pt
with the issue of warrants
voking
es in plac ormation is pr
that all warrants issued to the agency ar
that
ke
elating to inte
ept
re
e that all
e
d to
s 80 Documents k
ce
ce
re
edur
oc epted inf
etary of AGD)
adhe
Eviden
Eviden
e the warrant
opy of each
Evidenc
rc
or
strictions (r re
2.1 kept (s 80(a)).
2.2 a c notification under s 59A(2) is k (notifications to the Secr (s 80(b)).
2.3 instruments warrants ar (s 80(c)).
re
Other matters r
nnected to the inter
co
y began after the warrant was issued
eased bef
(s)
ce e
s
pt
rd
ke
ptions onl
ptions c
nditions and/or
eptions and that inte
co
e
ce
ce
co
authorised by the warrant
rc
re
re
eptions
inter
inter
any specified on warrants we
subscriber details we
the agency has policies and pr inte
.
onnection with rc
that particulars
Check that:
•
•
•
•
•
ce
eption under the
e that particulars
eption ar
inte
rc
rc
s 81 Other kept in c
ception and the name of
Eviden
Evidenc
3.4 of the day and time at which each inte warrant began (for named person warrants the servi must also be indicated) ar ept (ss 81(1)(c)(ii)) and 81(2)).k
3.5 of the duration of each inter the person who carried out each inte (s 81(1)(c)(iii))
3 0 | T E L E C O M M U N I C AT I O N S I N T E R C E P T I O N A N D A C C E S S A C T 1 9 7 9 A n n u a l R e p o r t 2 0 14 –15
CHAPTER 2
STORED COMMUNICATIONS
Authorities and bodies that are ‘enforcement agencies’ under the TIA Act can apply to
an independent issuing authority for a stored communications warrant to investigate a
‘serious contravention’ of the law.
Definition
An ‘enforcement agency’ is broadly defined to include all interception agencies as
well as a body whose functions include administering a law imposing a pecuniary
penalty or administering a law relating to the protection of the public revenue.
Stored communications include communications such as email, SMS or voice
messages stored on a carrier’s network.
Definition
A ‘serious contravention’ includes:
• serious offences (offences for which a telecommunications interception
warrant can be obtained)
• offences punishable by imprisonment for a period of at least three years
• offences punishable by a fine of least 180 penalty units (currently $30,600) for
individuals or 900 penalty units (currently $153,000) for non- individuals such
as corporations.
C H A P T E R 2 | 3 1
Table 24: Applications and telephone applications for stored communications warrants—ss.
162(1)(a)-(b) and 162(2)(a)-(b)
Telephone applications for
Applications for stored
stored communications
Agency
Relevant statistics
communications warrants
warrants
13/14
14/15
13/14
14/15
Made
4
4
-
-
ACC
Refused/withdrawn
-
-
-
-
Issued
4
4
-
-
Made
-
4
-
-
ACCC
Refused/withdrawn
-
-
-
-
Issued
-
4
-
-
Made
39
94
-
-
AFP
Refused/withdrawn
-
-
-
-
Issued
39
94
-
-
Made
3
-
-
-
ASIC
Refused/withdrawn
-
-
-
-
Issued
3
-
-
-
Made
1
-
-
-
CCC (QLD)
Refused/withdrawn
-
-
-
-
Issued
1
-
-
-
Made
1
-
-
-
CCC (WA)
Refused/withdrawn
-
-
-
-
Issued
1
-
-
-
Made
12
10
-
-
CUSTOMS
Refused/withdrawn
-
-
-
-
Issued
12
10
-
-
Made
3
-
-
-
ICAC (NSW)
Refused/withdrawn
-
-
-
-
Issued
3
-
-
-
Made
8
3
-
-
NSW CC
Refused/withdrawn
-
-
-
-
Issued
8
3
-
-
Made
233
290
1
-
NSW Police
Refused/withdrawn
-
-
-
-
Issued
233
290
1
-
Made
5
16
-
-
NT Police
Refused/withdrawn
-
-
-
-
Issued
5
16
-
-
Made
4
7
-
-
PIC
Refused/withdrawn
-
-
-
-
Issued
4
7
-
-
3 2 | T E L E C O M M U N I C AT I O N S I N T E R C E P T I O N A N D A C C E S S A C T 1 9 7 9 A n n u a l R e p o r t 2 0 14 –15
Telephone applications for
Applications for stored
stored communications
Agency
Relevant statistics
communications warrants
warrants
13/14
14/15
13/14
14/15
Made
107
123
-
-
QLD Police
Refused/withdrawn
1
-
-
-
Issued
106
123
-
-
Made
21
38
-
-
SA Police
Refused/withdrawn
-
-
-
-
Issued
21
38
-
-
Made
52
30
-
-
TAS Police
Refused/withdrawn
-
1
-
-
Issued
52
29
-
-
Made
47
40
-
-
VIC Police
Refused/withdrawn
-
-
-
-
Issued
47
40
-
-
Made
32
38
-
-
WA Police
Refused/withdrawn
-
-
-
-
Issued
32
38
-
-
Made
572
697
1
-
Total
Refused/withdrawn
1
1
-
-
Issued
571
696
1
-
Table 25: Stored communications subject to conditions or restrictions – sections 162(2)(d)
Agency
Application for warrants
14/15
NSW Police
290
QLD Police
3
SA Police
38
TAS Police
1
VIC Police
1
Total
333
C H A P T E R 2 | 3 3
Effectiveness of stored communications warrants
In 2014–15 law enforcement agencies made 377 arrests, conducted 335
proceedings and obtained 198 convictions based on evidence obtained under stored
communications warrants.
Table 26: Number of arrests, proceedings and convictions made on the basis of lawfully
accessed information—s. 163(a)-(b)
Arrests
Proceedings
Convictions
Agency
13/14
14/15
13/14
14/15
13/14
14/15
ACC
15
5
8
-
-
-
AFP
23
46
19
34
1
15
CCC (QLD)
-
3
-
-
-
-
CCC (WA)
-
-
2
-
2
-
Customs
4
-
1
-
1
-
NSW Police
51
179
138
221
121
107
NT Police
2
8
-
-
-
-
PIC
-
8
-
-
-
-
QLD Police
23
69
-
68
-
68
SA Police
-
17
-
3
-
2
TAS Police
1
4
1
-
1
1
VIC Police
21
28
3
7
16
1
WA Police
13
10
4
2
2
4
Total
153
377
176
335
144
198
Care should be taken in interpreting Table 26 as an arrest recorded in one reporting
period may not result in a prosecution (if any) until a later reporting period. Any
resulting conviction may be recorded in that or an even later reporting period.
Preservation notices
Under Part 3-1A of Chapter 3 of the TIA Act, certain agencies can give a preservation
notice to a carrier requiring the carrier to preserve all stored communications held
that relate to the person or telecommunications service specified in the notice. The
carrier is required to keep the stored communications while the notice is in force, which
allows a period of time for enforcement agencies to obtain a warrant to access them.
The purpose of the preservation notice is to prevent the communications from being
destroyed before an agency can obtain a warrant to access the information.
3 4 | T E L E C O M M U N I C AT I O N S I N T E R C E P T I O N A N D A C C E S S A C T 1 9 7 9 A n n u a l R e p o r t 2 0 14 –15
The TIA Act provides for two types of preservation notices:
•
domestic preservation notices—which cover stored communications that might
relate either to a contravention of certain Australian laws or to security
•
foreign preservation notices—which cover stored communications that might
relate to a contravention of certain foreign laws. Only the AFP can give a foreign
preservation notice to a carrier. The AFP can only issue a notice if a foreign
country has requested the preservation of stored communications that relate to
the contravention of certain foreign laws.
Domestic preservation notices must be revoked if the stored communications relating
to the person or telecommunications service specified in the notice are no longer
under investigation.
Foreign preservation notices must be revoked if 180 days has elapsed since the
carrier was given the notice and the foreign country has not made a request to the
Attorney-General for access to those communications in that time period, or if the
Attorney-General refuses the request to access the communications.
In 2014–15, 1,716 domestic preservation notices and 592 domestic preservation
revocation notices were issued (see Table 27).
Table 27: Domestic preservation notices—s. 161A(1)
Domestic preservation
Domestic preservation notice
Agency
notice issued
revocations issued
ACC
15
-
ACCC
4
-
ACLEI
9
9
AFP
287
60
CCC (QLD)
43
13
CUSTOMS
7
-
ICAC (NSW)
2
-
NSW CC
8
4
NSW Police
351
43
NT Police
189
140
PIC
25
3
QLD Police
390
194
SA Police
82
33
TAS Police
106
41
VIC Police
74
22
WA Police
124
30
Total
1,716
592
C H A P T E R 2 | 3 5
Under section 161A(2) of the TIA Act the AFP is required to report on foreign
preservation notices. In 2014–15, the AFP reported that three foreign preservation
notices and no foreign preservation notice revocation notices were issued.
Mutual assistance
Section 162(1)(c) requires the report to outline the number of stored communications
warrants obtained to assist in mutual assistance applications. No stored
communications warrants were obtained in these circumstances.
Section 163A of the TIA Act provides that the annual report must provide information
regarding the number of occasions in which lawfully accessed information or stored
communications warrant information was provided to a foreign country under the
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1987 (the Mutual Assistance Act). In 2014-15
there were no occasions on which this information was provided to a foreign country
under the Mutual Assistance Act.
Commonwealth Ombudsman—inspection of stored
communications records expiring between 1 July 2013 and
30 June 2014
During the reporting period the Commonwealth Ombudsman inspected the
preservation notices and stored communications access records of 20 enforcement
agencies. The inspections are retrospective and on the basis of a full year, and for this
reason, the Ombudsman inspected enforcement agencies’ preservation notices and
stored communication warrants that expired between 1 July 2013 to 30 June 2014.
During this inspection period the Ombudsman noted that agencies have generally
displayed a positive attitude towards compliance and meeting their requirements under
Chapter 3 of the TIA Act. It was noted that agencies were generally responsive to the
inspection findings and receptive to any suggestions for improvement, continuing to
update relevant policies and procedures to help staff to comply with the TIA Act.
The Ombudsman’s inspection criteria are:
1. Were destructions properly conducted and reported on (ss 150 and 151(e))?
2. Were records properly kept (ss 150A and 151)?
3. Were preservation notices properly given (ss 107H(2), 107H(3) and 107M, 107N,
and 107S)?
4. Were preservation notices properly revoked (ss 107L and 107M, 107R and 107S)?
5. Were warrants properly applied for (ss 113, 5E, 6B, 116(1)(d), 116(1)(da), 6DB,
118, and 119(5))?
6. Were warrants properly revoked (where applicable) (ss 122 and 123)?
7. Was the authority of warrants lawfully exercised and were accessed stored
communications received by authorised officers in the first instance (ss 127(1)
and (2), and 135(2))?
3 6 | T E L E C O M M U N I C AT I O N S I N T E R C E P T I O N A N D A C C E S S A C T 1 9 7 9 A n n u a l R e p o r t 2 0 14 –15
8. Were conditions and restrictions on warrants adhered to (s 117)?
9. Does the agency have procedures in place to ensure that it is only dealing with
lawfully accessed stored communications (ss 108, 117 and 119) and were any
unlawfully accessed stored communications properly dealt with (s133)?
The Ombudsman also met with agencies to discuss policies and procedures and
highlighted any gaps in agency processes that may pose potential compliance risks.
Overall
Most agencies were assessed as compliant and where issues of non-compliance were
identified, the agency in question undertook to implement appropriate remedial action
or seek further legal advice.
Record keeping compliance
The Ombudsman concluded that all agencies who gave preservation notices were
compliant with record-keeping requirements under section 150 and 150A of the TIA Act
except one. The agency accepted this finding and was able to identify the reasons why
this occurred and advised of additional remedial action to prevent reoccurrences.
Additionally, in the previous reporting period, the Ombudsman made a recommendation
to another agency to improve its record-keeping procedures to ensure compliance with
section 150 of the TIA Act. The agency did not appear to have a reliable system in place
for keeping track of how many warrants with which it had been issued to enable it to
accurately report on warrant numbers. During the current reporting period, the agency
advised it had not taken any measures to improve its processes and procedures relating
to record-keeping compliance. The Ombudsman advised it will continue to closely
monitor this agency’s compliance during its next inspection.
Preservation notices
The Ombudsman identified a number of instances of non-compliance where
preservation notices were not given and revoked in accordance with the TIA Act. In
particular, the Ombudsman made a number of suggestions to agencies that they
improve their processes which were generally accepted. In some instances, agencies
are seeking further clarification from the Attorney-General’s Department regarding the
operation of the legislation.
Properly handling unlawfully accessed stored communications
The Ombudsman advised that it was satisfied that agencies have appropriate screening
procedures in place, in line with recommendations from previous reporting years.
However, the Ombudsman identified several instances where unlawfully accessed
stored communications were not appropriately handled. In response to the findings,
the relevant agencies subsequently quarantined that unlawfully accessed information.
C H A P T E R 2 | 3 7
Destructions
The Ombudsman identified that most agencies were compliant with the provisions
relating to the destruction of stored communications. Any agencies identified as
non-compliant have advised the Ombudsman of remedial action.
Applying for warrants
Several agencies applied for warrants in relation to a victim of a serious contravention
who was able, but chose not to, consent to their stored communications being accessed
by law enforcement against the intention of paragraph 116(1)(da) of the TIA Act. The
Attorney-General’s Department has provided advice regarding the operation of the
legislation in relation to victims.
3 8 | T E L E C O M M U N I C AT I O N S I N T E R C E P T I O N A N D A C C E S S A C T 1 9 7 9 A n n u a l R e p o r t 2 0 14 –15
Figure 6: Commonwealth Ombudsman Stored Communications Access Inspection Criteria
d
ed
re
ormed as a
mmunicated
adhe
ntravention
co
re
ssing stor
co
dealt with the
t 1979
ce
made by the
ly
Ac
re
ed
uld be perf
ecuted by carriers
or ac
oper
TIA
co
ntent (s 118).
r which the intended
ex
with ss 122 and 123.
co
fo
ly
om carriers is
ce
the
ommunications warrant
ect
an
rr
rd
ecuted by carrier (s 117).
ed c
ex
co
ved in the serious
co
1
not valid
re
s under ss 150 and 151
ommunications we
strictions on warrants we
ovisions of
d in ac
re
mmunications fr
ke
ed c
co
vo
mmunications became stor
ed
re
co
rm and with the
of the warrant applicable f
made to an eligible issuing authority (ss 110(1)
re
warrants we
ssed stor
the warrant was
re oviders (s 119), the agency pr
esult of check
fo
ce
re
r the warrant or to whom a s 135(2) authorisation
ed re
fa
fo
ce
fo
nditions and
ect
co
e pr
ect r
rr
ssed stor
s under ss 150 and 15
ommunications pr
eportable under s 153(3) and which dir
co
of application/warrant invol
ce
that the authority of the stor
that ac
that stor
that, whe
ce
e that
ed c
ce
ce
ce
ce
fa
cised by persons authorised to do so (s 127).
er
e that ac
that warrants we
er who applied
ex
ssed information (s 133).
.
ce
sult of check
e.
Eviden
Eviden
Evidenc
cipient was the person on the warrant (s 117).
Eviden mmunications be
Eviden
ce
rrants in the
rrant applications we
rc
re
6.1 was
6.2 person on the warrant or by another person and re
6.3 co
6.4 to (s 117).
7.1 and internet servic ac
fo
ct
Other matters r
Wa
Contraventions on the
Person on
Wa
Evidenc
Eviden
re
3.1
3.2 communications (ss 118, 5E).
3.3 (ss 116(1)(d) and (da) and 6B).
3.4 and 6DB)
4.1 to the offic is in
5.1
ements of the stor
quir
re
ormed as a di
re
es ed
.
s
edur
s
ssed
rd
oc
rd
ertifying
ce
co
uld be perf
obtains ssed stor
co
re
co
ly ce
re
y ac
pt
d to
strictions specified re
ac
ss
ept (s 151(b))
ke
re
ly
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e
mmunications we
adhe
that it on
opy of each
co
.
eeping and destruction
ive lawfull
re
re
k
ce
ed
pt (s 135(2) authority)
ormation and er has caused in
rd
eping ac
ept (s 151(a)).
re ke
co
Ke
e that each warrant issued to
that each instrument of
ertificate issued by c
ept (s 151(c)).
that particulars of the
:
re
ce
e that a c
with s 150 ar
e to ensu
er to
nditions and/or
.
ce
ce .
ssed stor
co
s 151
an
mmunications
Evidenc
Eviden
ers of the agency under
rd
acce authorised by warrants
any on warrants we
the agency has policies and pr in plac and deals with lawful co
vocation of warrants is k
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•
C H A P T E R 2 | 3 9
Figure 7: Commonwealth Ombudsman Preservation Notice Inspection Criteria
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4 0 | T E L E C O M M U N I C AT I O N S I N T E R C E P T I O N A N D A C C E S S A C T 1 9 7 9 A n n u a l R e p o r t 2 0 14 –15
CHAPTER 3
TELECOMMUNICATIONS DATA
Access to telecommunications data is regulated by Chapter 4 of the TIA Act which
permits enforcement agencies to authorise telecommunications carriers to disclose
telecommunications data where that information is reasonably necessary for the
enforcement of the criminal law, a law imposing a pecuniary penalty, or the protection
of the public revenue.
Definition
An ‘enforcement agency’ is broadly defined to include all interception agencies as
well as a body whose functions include administering a law imposing a pecuniary
penalty or administering a law relating to the protection of the public revenue.
In 2014–15, 83 enforcement agencies made historical data authorisations.
Access to telecommunications data is a critical tool for investigating criminal offences
and other activities that threaten community safety and security.
Definition
‘Telecommunications data’ is information about a communication—such as the
phone numbers of the people who called each other, how long they talked to
each other, the email address from which a message was sent and the time the
message was sent.
Data is often the first source of lead information for further investigations, helping to
eliminate potential suspects and to support applications for more privacy intrusive
investigative tools including search warrants and interception warrants.
Under the TIA Act, all enforcement agencies can access historical data and criminal law
enforcement agencies can also access prospective data. Disclosure of telecommunications
data must be approved by an authorised senior officer of the relevant enforcement agency.
Definition
‘Historical data’, also known as ‘existing data’, is information that is
already in existence when an authorisation for disclosure is received by a
telecommunications carrier.
‘Prospective data’ is telecommunications data that comes into existence during a
period of time in which an authorisation is in force.
C H A P T E R 3 | 4 1
Only agencies recognised under the Act as being a ‘criminal law enforcement agency’
can authorise the disclosure of prospective data. During the reporting period, a
‘criminal law enforcement agency’ meant all interception agencies and Customs.
A criminal law-enforcement agency can only authorise the disclosure of prospective
data when disclosure is considered to be reasonably necessary for the investigation
of an offence punishable by imprisonment for at least three years. A prospective data
authorisation comes into force once the relevant telecommunications service provider
receives the request and is effective for 45 days or less.
Future reporting obligations
From 13 October 2015, enforcement agencies will be required to keep statistics on the
types of offences for which data authorisations are made and the types of data being
sought, i.e subscriber data or traffic data to assist in investigations. These reporting
figures will be included in the next and future annual reports.
Existing data—enforcement of a criminal law
Tables 28, 29, 30 and 31 provide information on agency use of historical data
authorisations to enforce the criminal law. In 2014–15, enforcement agencies made
354,841 data authorisations to enforce the criminal law.
Table 28: Number of authorisations made by a Law Enforcement Agency for access to existing
information or documents in the enforcement of a criminal law—s. 186(1)(a)
Authorisations
Agency
13/14
14/15
ACC
5,447
7,429
ACLEI
2,244
5,908
AFP
21,358
27,462
CCC (QLD)
10,896
12,451
CCC (WA)
1,804
1,333
IBAC
321
424
ICAC (NSW)
933
532
ICAC (SA)
16
734
NSW CC
3,294
3,023
NSW Police
111,889
114,111
NT Police
10,182
3,391
PIC
1,475
1,296
QLD Police
35,663
40,710
4 2 | T E L E C O M M U N I C AT I O N S I N T E R C E P T I O N A N D A C C E S S A C T 1 9 7 9 A n n u a l R e p o r t 2 0 14 –15
Authorisations
Agency
13/14
14/15
SA Police
8,504
11,668
TAS Police
9,921
8,152
VIC Police
63,325
66,663
WA Police
27,315
36,310
Total
314,587
341,597
Table 29: Number of authorisations made by a Commonwealth Enforcement Agency
for access to existing information or documents in the enforcement of a criminal law—
s. 186(1)(a)
Authorisations
Agency
13/14
14/15
ACCC
10
133
ASIC
1,771
1,691
ATO
277
206
Australian Financial Security Authority
128
76
Australian Fisheries Management Authority
3
-
Civil Aviation Safety Authority
-
11
Clean Energy Regulator
-
2
Customs
6,196
9,749
Dept. of Agriculture
84
58
Dept. of Defence (IGD, ADFIS)
25
21
Dept. of Health
38
58
Dept. of Immigration And Border Protection
107
102
Dept. of Social Services
1
-
Dept. of The Environment
13
21
Total
8,653
12,128
C H A P T E R 3 | 4 3
Table 30: Number of authorisations made by a state or territory enforcement agency
for access to existing information or documents in the enforcement of a criminal law—
s. 186(1)(a)
Authorisations
Agency
13/14
14/15
Consumer and Business Services (SA)
-
111
Corrective Services NSW
52
52
Dept. of Commerce (WA)
78
97
Dept. of Economic Development, Jobs, Transport and Resources (VIC)
-
226
Dept. of Environment Regulation (WA)
-
18
Dept. of Environment, Land, Water and Planning (VIC) (formerly the
347
27
Dept. of Fisheries (VIC))
Dept. of Justice (Corrections Victoria)
389
276
Environment Protection Authority (NSW)
5
51
Legal Services Board (VIC)
-
3
Office of Environment & Heritage (NSW)
47
46
Roads and Maritime Services NSW
-
5
RSPCA Queensland
-
14
RSPCA TAS
-
2
RSPCA Victoria
64
133
The Hills Shire Council
1
-
Transport Accident Commission (VIC)
8
8
Workcover NSW
4
6
Worksafe Victoria
25
41
Total
1,020
1,116
Table 31: Total number of authorisations made for access to existing information or
documents in the enforcement of a criminal law—section 186(1)(a)
Authorisations
Agency
13/14
14/15
No. of authorisations made by a Law Enforcement Agency
314,587
341,597
No. of authorisations made by a Commonwealth Agency
8,653
12,128
No. of authorisations made by a State or Territory Agency
1,020
1,116
Total
324,260
354,841
4 4 | T E L E C O M M U N I C AT I O N S I N T E R C E P T I O N A N D A C C E S S A C T 1 9 7 9 A n n u a l R e p o r t 2 0 14 –15
Existing data—enforcement of a law imposing a pecuniary
penalty or protecting public revenue
Tables 32, 33, 34 and 35 provide information on agency use of historical data
authorisations in the enforcement of a law that imposes a pecuniary penalty or
protects the public revenue.
Table 32: Number of authorisations made by a law enforcement agency for access to existing
information or documents in the enforcement of a law imposing a pecuniary penalty or the
protection of the public revenue—s. 186(1)(b)
Authorisations
Agency
13/14
14/15
AFP
36
43
CCC (QLD)
11
3
NSW Police
5,324
3,570
NT Police
4
-
QLD Police
239
400
SA Police
2
2
TAS Police
764
536
Total
6,380
4,554
Table 33: Number of authorisations made by a Commonwealth Enforcement Agency
for access to existing information or documents in the enforcement of a law imposing a
pecuniary penalty or the protection of the public revenue—s. 186(1)(b)
Authorisations
Agency
13/14
14/15
ACCC
31
132
ASIC
110
160
ATO
66
43
Australia Post
810
625
Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency
23
22
Clean Energy Regulator
1
-
Customs
156
261
Department of Industry and Science (National Measurement Institute)
1
1
Dept. of Defence (IGD, ADFIS)
94
71
Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Trade
227
145
C H A P T E R 3 | 4 5
Authorisations
Agency
13/14
14/15
Dept. of Human Services
339
269
Dept. of Prime Minister & Cabinet (Formerly the Dept. of Families,
-
1
Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs)
Dept. of Social Services
1
6
Fair Work Building & Construction
7
8
Total
1,866
1,744
Table 34: Number of authorisations made by a state or territory enforcement agency for
access to existing information or documents in the enforcement of a law imposing a
pecuniary penalty or the protection of the public revenue—s. 186(1)(b)
Authorisations
Agency
13/14
14/15
ACT Revenue Office
3
3
Bankstown City Council
7
13
City of Darebin
1
-
Consumer Affairs Victoria
120
132
Consumer and Business Services (SA)
153
21
Dept of Environment and Heritage Protection (QLD)
32
28
Dept. of Agriculture and Fisheries (QLD)
25
41
Dept. of Commerce (WA)
87
115
Dept. of Economic Development, Jobs, Transport and Resources (VIC)
-
1
Dept. of Fisheries (WA)
113
98
Dept. of Justice (Sheriffs Office of Victoria)
16
3
Dept. of Mines and Petroleum (WA)
2
1
Dept. of Parks And Wildlife (WA)
6
42
Dept. of Primary Industries (NSW)
226
148
Harness Racing New South Wales
7
15
Harness Racing Victoria
3
2
Health Care Complaints Commission (NSW)
20
63
Ipswich City Council
21
3
Juvenile Justice NSW
-
2
Knox City Council
5
15
4 6 | T E L E C O M M U N I C AT I O N S I N T E R C E P T I O N A N D A C C E S S A C T 1 9 7 9 A n n u a l R e p o r t 2 0 14 –15
Authorisations
Agency
13/14
14/15
Legal Services Board (VIC)
9
-
Office of Fair Trading (NSW)
758
675
Office of Fair Trading (QLD)
252
361
Office of Liquor and Gaming Regulation (QLD)
3
2
Office of State Revenue (NSW)
127
34
Office of State Revenue (QLD)
1
1
Office of The Racing Integrity Commissioner (VIC)
10
48
Primary Industries & Regions (SA)
-
238
Racing and Wagering Western Australia
18
7
Racing NSW
16
33
Racing Queensland
4
5
Revenue SA
17
10
RSPCA Queensland
19
-
State Revenue Office Victoria
53
32
Taxi Services Commission (VIC)
-
5
Worksafe Victoria
17
-
Wyndham City Council
1
-
Total
2,152
2,197
Table 35: Total number of authorisations made for access to existing information or
documents in the enforcement of a law imposing a pecuniary penalty or protecting
public revenue—s. 186(1)(b)
Authorisations
Agency
13/14
14/15
No. of authorisations made by a Law Enforcement Agency
6,380
4,554
No. of authorisations made by a Commonwealth Agency
1,866
1,744
No. of authorisations made by a State or Territory Agency
2,152
2,197
Total
10,398
8,495
C H A P T E R 3 | 4 7
Prospective data—authorisations
Tables 36 and 37 set out information about the use of prospective data authorisations
during the reporting year. The number of authorisations made by a criminal law-
enforcement agency for access to specified information or documents that come
into existence during the period for which an authorisation is in force is continued in
Table 36.
Table 36: Prospective data authorisations—s. 186(1)(c)
Number of
Days specified
Actual days in
Authorisations
Agency
authorisations
in force
force
discounted
made
ACC
1,552
46,250
29,033
51
ACLEI
20
546
278
4
AFP
1,624
62,144
39,291
136
CCC (QLD)
339
9,915
7,855
8
CCC (WA)
59
2,554
1,040
14
Customs
157
216
206
1
IBAC
165
7,125
5,848
13
ICAC (NSW)
18
514
359
1
ICAC (SA)
4
165
138
-
NSW CC
809
31,748
24,439
107
NSW Police
630
22,059
11,846
61
NT Police
448
19,485
13,235
90
PIC
111
4,637
3,325
15
QLD Police
5,240
226,403
182,222
596
SA Police
372
14,465
9,236
23
TAS Police
161
7,245
4,998
10
VIC Police
4,797
98,226
43,859
53
WA Police
923
41,535
29,500
96
Total
17,429
595,232
406,708
1,279
The table also outlines the number of days the authorisations were to be in force
and how many days they were actually in force as well as providing the number of
authorisations still in force at the end of the reporting period.
Table 37 provides information about the average number of days the authorisations
were specified to be in force and the average actual number of days they remained
in force.
4 8 | T E L E C O M M U N I C AT I O N S I N T E R C E P T I O N A N D A C C E S S A C T 1 9 7 9 A n n u a l R e p o r t 2 0 14 –15
Table 37: Average specified and actual time in force of prospective data authorisations
Average period specified
Average period actual
Agency
13/14
14/15
13/14
14/15
ACC
28
30
19
19
ACLEI
8
27
21
17
AFP
32
38
25
26
CCC (QLD)
18
29
18
23
CCC (WA)
34
43
25
23
Customs
1
1
1
1
IBAC
45
43
37
38
ICAC (NSW)
45
29
35
21
ICAC (SA)
-
41
-
35
NSW CC
36
39
29
35
NSW Police
38
35
25
21
NT Police
45
43
45
37
PIC
40
42
36
35
OPI
44
-
44
-
QLD Police
42
43
37
39
SA Police
42
39
32
26
TAS Police
45
45
30
33
VIC Police
15
20
9
9
WA Police
45
45
36
36
Average
33
35
28
29
Data authorisations to locate missing persons
Under section 178A of the TIA Act, the AFP and state police forces can authorise the
disclosure of telecommunications data to help find a missing person.
C H A P T E R 3 | 4 9
Table 38: The number of authorisations made for access to existing information or documents
for the location of missing persons—s. 178A
Authorisations
Agency
13/14
14/15
AFP
55
112
NSW Police
1,097
1,377
NT Police
36
8
SA Police
33
50
TAS Police
155
201
VIC Police
-
5
QLD Police
652
639
Total
2,028
2,392
Data authorisations for foreign law enforcement
The TIA Act also requires the AFP to report on data authorisations made in relation to
foreign law enforcement. In 2014–15, the AFP made 36 data authorisations for access to
telecommunications data for the enforcement of the criminal law of a foreign country.
Following these requests, the AFP made 11 disclosures to foreign law enforcement
agencies. Information was disclosed to the following countries: the Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia, France, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Czech Republic,
Switzerland, Vietnam, the United States of America, Thailand and Mexico.
5 0 | T E L E C O M M U N I C AT I O N S I N T E R C E P T I O N A N D A C C E S S A C T 1 9 7 9 A n n u a l R e p o r t 2 0 14 –15
CHAPTER 4
FURTHER INFORMATION
For further information about the
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979
please contact the Attorney-General’s Department:
Electronic Surveillance Policy Branch
Attorney-General’s Department
3-5 National Circuit
BARTON ACT 2600
(02) 6141 2900
More information about telecommunications interception and access and
telecommunications data access can be found at <www.ag.gov.au/NationalSecurity/
TelecommunicationsSurveillance/Pages/default.aspx.>
Previous copies of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979
Annual Report can be acces
sed online at <www.ag.gov.au/NationalSecurity/
TelecommunicationsSurveillance/Pages/Annualreports.aspx.>
C H A P T E R 4 | 5 1
link to page 15 link to page 15 link to page 16 link to page 16 link to page 16 link to page 17 link to page 17 link to page 17 link to page 18 link to page 18 link to page 18 link to page 19 link to page 19 link to page 21 link to page 21 link to page 22 link to page 22 link to page 23 link to page 24 link to page 24 link to page 24 link to page 26 link to page 26 link to page 28 link to page 28 link to page 29 link to page 29 link to page 29 link to page 29 link to page 30 link to page 30 link to page 31 link to page 31
APPENDIX A
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES
Tables
Table 1: Categories of serious offences specified in telecommunications
interception warrants—ss. 100(1)(f), 100(1)(g), 100(2)(f) and 100(2)(g)
3
Table 2: Availability of Federal Court Judges, Family Court Judges, Federal Circuit
Court Judges and nominated AAT Members to issue telecommunications
interception warrants—s. 103(ab)
4
Table 3: Number of telecommunications interception warrants issued by Federal
Court judges, Family Court judges, Federal Circuit Court judges and
nominated AAT members—s. 103(ab)
5
Table 4: Applications for telecommunications interception warrants, telephone
interception warrants, and renewal applications—ss. 100(1)(a)-(c) and
100(2)(a)-(c) 6
Table 5: Applications for telecommunications interception warrants authorising
entry on premises—ss. 100(1)(d) and 100(2)(d)
7
Table 6: Arrests on the basis of lawfully intercepted information—ss. 102(1)(a)
and 102(2)(a)
9
Table 7: Prosecutions in which lawfully intercepted information was given
in evidence
10
Table 8: Convictions in which lawfully intercepted information was given in evidence 11
Table 9: Original applications for named person warrants, telephone applications
for named person warrants, and renewal applications—ss. 100(1)(ea)
and 100(2)(ea) 12
Table 10: Number of services intercepted under named person warrants—
ss. 100(1)(eb) and 100(2)(eb)
14
Table 11: Total number of services and devices intercepted under device-based
named person warrants—ss. 100(1)(ec) and 100(2)(ec)
16
Table 12: Applications for B-Party warrants, telephone applications for B-Party
warrants, and renewal applications—ss. 100(1)(ed) and 100(1)(ed)
17
Table 13: B-Party warrants issued with conditions or restrictions—ss. 100(1)(ed)
and 100(2)(ed)
17
Table 14: Duration of original and renewal telecommunications interception
warrants—ss. 101(1)(a)-(d) and 101(2)(a)-(d)
18
Table 15: Duration of original and renewal B-Party warrants—ss. 101(1)(da)
and 101(2)(da)
19
5 2 | T E L E C O M M U N I C AT I O N S I N T E R C E P T I O N A N D A C C E S S A C T 1 9 7 9 A n n u a l R e p o r t 2 0 14 –15
link to page 32 link to page 33 link to page 34 link to page 34 link to page 35 link to page 35 link to page 35 link to page 35 link to page 35 link to page 36 link to page 37 link to page 39 link to page 39 link to page 39 link to page 39 link to page 44 link to page 44 link to page 45 link to page 45 link to page 46 link to page 46 link to page 47 link to page 54 link to page 54 link to page 54 link to page 55 link to page 55 link to page 55 link to page 56 link to page 56 link to page 56 link to page 56 link to page 56 link to page 57 link to page 57 link to page 57 link to page 57 link to page 57 link to page 57 link to page 57 link to page 58 link to page 58 link to page 58 link to page 58
Table 16: Number of final renewals—ss. 101(1)(e) and 101(2)(e)
20
Table 17: Percentage of eligible warrants—ss. 102(3) and 102(4)
21
Table 18a: Interception without a warrant—s. 102A
22
Table 18b: Interception without a warrant—s. 102A
22
Table 19: Number of interceptions carried out on behalf of other agencies—
s. 103(ac)
23
Table 20: Total expenditure incurred by each agency in connection with the execution
of telecommunications interception warrants and average expenditure per
telecommunications interception warrant—ss. 103(a) and 103(aa)
23
Table 21: Recurrent costs of interceptions per agency
24
Table 22: Emergency service facility declarations
25
Table 23a: Summary of findings from the two inspections conducted at each agency
during the period 1 January to 30 June 2014
27
Table 23b: Summary of findings from the two inspections conducted at each agency
during the period 1 July to 31 December 2014
27
Table 24: Applications and telephone applications for stored communications
warrants—ss. 162(1)(a)-(b) and 162(2)(a)-(b)
32
Table 25: Stored communications subject to conditions or restrictions—
sections 162(2)(d)
33
Table 26: Number of arrests, proceedings and convictions made on the basis of
lawfully accessed information—s. 163(a)-(b)
34
Table 27: Domestic preservation notices—s. 161A(1)
35
Table 28: Number of authorisations made by a Law Enforcement Agency for
access to existing information or documents in the enforcement of a
criminal law—s. 186(1)(a)
42
Table 29: Number of authorisations made by a Commonwealth Enforcement
Agency for access to existing information or documents in the
enforcement of a criminal law—s. 186(1)(a)
43
Table 30: Number of authorisations made by a state or territory enforcement
agency for access to existing information or documents in the
enforcement of a criminal law—s. 186(1)(a)
44
Table 31: Total number of authorisations made for access to existing information
or documents in the enforcement of a criminal law—section 186(1)(a)
44
Table 32: Number of authorisations made by a law enforcement agency for access to
existing information or documents in the enforcement of a law imposing a
pecuniary penalty or the protection of the public revenue—s. 186(1)(b)
45
Table 33: Number of authorisations made by a Commonwealth Enforcement Agency
for access to existing information or documents in the enforcement of a law
imposing a pecuniary penalty or the protection of the public revenue—
s. 186(1)(b)
45
Table 34: Number of authorisations made by a state or territory enforcement agency
for access to existing information or documents in the enforcement of a law
imposing a pecuniary penalty or the protection of the public revenue—
s. 186(1)(b)
46
A P P E N D I X A | 5 3
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Table 35: Total number of authorisations made for access to existing information or
documents in the enforcement of a law imposing a pecuniary penalty or
protecting public revenue—s. 186(1)(b)
47
Table 36: Prospective data authorisations—s. 186(1)(c)
48
Table 37: Average specified and actual time in force of prospective data
authorisations 49
Table 38: The number of authorisations made for access to existing information or
documents for the location of missing persons—s. 178A
50
Figures
Figure 1: Telecommunications interception warrants issued with specific conditions
or restrictions—ss. 100(1)(e) and 100(2)(e)
8
Figure 2: Named person warrants issued with conditions or restrictions—
ss. 100(1)(ea) and 100(2)(ea)
14
Figure 3: Total number of services intercepted under service-based named person
warrants—ss. 100(1)(ec) and 100(2)(ec)
15
Figure 4: Commonwealth Ombudsman’s Telecommunications Interception
Inspection Criteria
29
Figure 5: Other matters reportable under s.85
30
Figure 6: Commonwealth Ombudsman Stored Communications Access
Inspection Criteria
39
Figure 7: Commonwealth Ombudsman Preservation Notice Inspection Criteria
40
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APPENDIX B
INTERCEPTION AGENCIES UNDER THE TIA ACT
Commonwealth agency or state eligible authority
Date of s.34 declaration
Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity
Not applicable
Australian Crime Commission
Not applicable
Australian Federal Police
Not applicable
Corruption and Crime Commission (Western Australia)
26 March 2004
Crime and Corruption Commission (Queensland)
7 July 2009
Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission (Victoria)
18 December 2012
(came into force 10 February 2013)
Independent Commission Against Corruption (New South Wales)
6 June 1990
New South Wales Crime Commission
30 January 1989
New South Wales Police Force
30 January 1989
Northern Territory Police
25 October 2006
Police Integrity Commission
14 July 1998
(New South Wales)
Queensland Police Service
8 July 2009
Independent Commissioner Against Corruption (South Australia)
17 June 2013
(came into force 1 September 2013)
South Australia Police
10 July 1991
Tasmania Police
5 February 2005
Victoria Police
28 October 1988
Western Australia Police
15 July 1997
A P P E N D I X B | 5 5
APPENDIX C
ABBREVIATIONS
Acronym
Agency/Organisation
AAT
Administrative Appeals Tribunal
ACC
Australian Crime Commission
ACCC
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission
ACLEI
Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity
AFP
Australian Federal Police
AGD
Attorney-General’s Department
ASIC
Australian Securities and Investments Commission
ATO
Australian Taxation Office
CAC
Communications Access Co-ordinator
CCC (WA)
Corruption and Crime Commission (Western Australia)
CCC (QLD)
Crime and Corruption Commission (Queensland)
Customs
Australian Customs and Border Protection Service
DIBP
Department of Immigration and Border Protection
Defence (IGD, ADFIS)
Inspector-General Defence, Australian Defence Force
Investigative Service
IBAC (Vic)
Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission (Victoria)
NSW CC
New South Wales Crime Commission
ICAC (NSW)
Independent Commission Against Corruption (New South Wales)
NSW Police
New South Wales Police Force
NT Police
Northern Territory Police
OPI
Office of Police Integrity (Victoria)
PIC
Police Integrity Commission (New South Wales)
PIM
Public Interest Monitor
PJCIS
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security
QLD Police
Queensland Police Service
ICAC (SA)
Independent Commissioner Against Corruption (South Australia)
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Acronym
Agency/Organisation
SA Police
South Australia Police
TAS Police
Tasmania Police
Telecommunications Act
Telecommunications Act 1997
TIA Act
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979
VIC Police
Victoria Police
WA Police
Western Australia Police
A P P E N D I X C | 5 7
APPENDIX D
CATEGORIES OF SERIOUS OFFENCES
Serious offence category
Offences covered
ACC special investigation
TIA Act, s5D(1)(f): ACC special investigation
Administration of justice
TIA Act, s5D(8)(b): offences against ss35, 36, 36A, 37, 39, 41, 42,
43, 46 or 47 of the Crimes Act 1914
Assist escape punishment/dispose
TIA Act, s5D(7): assisting a person to escape punishment or to
of proceeds
dispose of the proceeds of a serious offence
Bribery or corruption; offences against
TIA Act, s5D(2)(vii), bribery or corruption; TIA Act, s5D(8)(a):
ss131.1, 135.1, 142.1, 142.2, 148.2,
offences against ss131.1, 135.1, 142.1, 142.2, 148.2 or 268.112
268.112 of the Criminal Code
of the Criminal Code Act 1995
Cartel offences
TIA Act, s5D(5B): cartel offences
Child pornography offences
TIA Act, s5D(3B): child pornography offences
Conspire / aid / abet serious offence
TIA Act, s5D(6): conspiring to commit or aiding or abetting the
commission of a serious offence
Cybercrime offences
TIA Act, s5D(5): cybercrime offences
Kidnapping
TIA Act, s5D(1)(b): kidnapping
Loss of life or personal injury
TIA Act, s5D(2)(b)(i) and (ii): serious personal injury, loss of life
Money laundering
TIA Act, s5D(4): money laundering
Murder
TIA Act, s5D(1)(a): murder
Organised offences and/or
TIA Act, s5D(3): offences involving planning and organisation;
criminal organisations
s5D(8A) and (9), criminal organisations
People smuggling and related
TIA Act, s5D(3A): people smuggling, slavery, sexual servitude,
deceptive recruiting, trafficking in persons
Serious damage to property
TIA Act, s5D(2)(b)(iii) and (iiia): serious damage to
and/or serious arson
property, arson
Serious drug offences
TIA Act, s5D(5A); s5D(2)(b)(iv): serious drug offences, drug
and/or trafficking
trafficking; TIA Act, s5D(1)(c): import or export border
controlled drugs
Serious fraud and/or revenue loss
TIA Act, s5D(2)(v) and (vi): serious fraud, serious revenue loss
Telecommunications offences
TIA Act, s5D(5)(a): telecommunications offence
Terrorism offences
TIA Act, s5D(1)(d), 5D(1)(e): terrorism offences
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3247
Document Outline
- CONTENTS
- EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- CHAPTER 1: TELECOMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPTION
- CHAPTER 2: STORED COMMUNICATIONS
- CHAPTER 3: TELECOMMUNICATIONS DATA
- CHAPTER 4: FURTHER INFORMATION
- APPENDIX A: LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES
- APPENDIX B: INTERCEPTION AGENCIES UNDER THE TIA ACT
- APPENDIX C: ABBREVIATIONS
- APPENDIX D: CATEGORIES OF SERIOUS OFFENCES
- Table 1: Categories of serious offences specified in telecommunications interception warrants—ss. 100(1)(f), 100(1)(g), 100(2)(f) and 100(2)(g)
- Table 2: Availability of Federal Court Judges, Family Court Judges, Federal Circuit Court Judges and nominated AAT Members to issue telecommunications interception warrants—s. 103(ab)
- Table 3: Number of telecommunications interception warrants issued by Federal Court judges, Family Court judges, Federal Circuit Court judges and nominated AAT members—s. 103(ab)
- Table 4: Applications for telecommunications interception warrants, telephone interception warrants, and renewal applications—ss. 100(1)(a)-(c) and 100(2)(a)-(c)
- Table 5: Applications for telecommunications interception warrants authorising entry on premises—ss. 100(1)(d) and 100(2)(d)
- Table 6: Arrests on the basis of lawfully intercepted information—ss. 102(1)(a) and 102(2)(a)
- Table 7: Prosecutions in which lawfully intercepted information was given in evidence
- Table 8: Convictions in which lawfully intercepted information was given in evidence
- Table 9: Original applications for named person warrants, telephone applications for named person warrants, and renewal applications—ss. 100(1)(ea) and 100(2)(ea)
- Table 10: Number of services intercepted under named person warrants—ss. 100(1)(eb) and 100(2)(eb)
- Table 11: Total number of services and devices intercepted under device-based named person warrants—ss. 100(1)(ec) and 100(2)(ec)
- Table 12: Applications for B-Party warrants, telephone applications for B-Party warrants, and renewal applications—ss. 100(1)(ed) and 100(1)(ed)
- Table 13: B-Party warrants issued with conditions or restrictions—ss. 100(1)(ed) and 100(2)(ed)
- Table 14: Duration of original and renewal telecommunications interception warrants—ss. 101(1)(a)-(d) and 101(2)(a)-(d)
- Table 15: Duration of original and renewal B-Party warrants—ss. 101(1)(da) and 101(2)(da)
- Table 16: Number of final renewals—ss. 101(1)(e) and 101(2)(e)
- Table 17: Percentage of eligible warrants—ss. 102(3) and 102(4)
- Table 18a: Interception without a warrant—s. 102A
- Table 18b: Interception without a warrant—s. 102A
- Table 19: Number of interceptions carried out on behalf of other agencies—s. 103(ac)
- Table 20: Total expenditure incurred by each agency in connection with the execution of telecommunications interception warrants and average expenditure per telecommunications interception warrant—ss. 103(a) and 103(aa)
- Table 21: Recurrent costs of interceptions per agency
- Table 22: Emergency service facility declarations
- Table 23a: Summary of findings from the two inspections conducted at each agency during the period 1 January to 30 June 2014
- Table 23b: Summary of findings from the two inspections conducted at each agency during the period 1 July to 31 December 2014
- Table 24: Applications and telephone applications for stored communications warrants—ss. 162(1)(a)-(b) and 162(2)(a)-(b)
- Table 25: Stored communications subject to conditions or restrictions – sections 162(2)(d)
- Table 26: Number of arrests, proceedings and convictions made on the basis of lawfully accessed information—s. 163(a)-(b)
- Table 27: Domestic preservation notices—s. 161A(1)
- Table 28: Number of authorisations made by a Law Enforcement Agency for access to existing information or documents in the enforcement of a criminal law—s. 186(1)(a)
- Table 29: Number of authorisations made by a Commonwealth Enforcement Agency for access to existing information or documents in the enforcement of a criminal law—s. 186(1)(a)
- Table 30: Number of authorisations made by a state or territory enforcement agency for access to existing information or documents in the enforcement of a criminal law—s. 186(1)(a)
- Table 31: Total number of authorisations made for access to existing information or documents in the enforcement of a criminal law—section 186(1)(a)
- Table 32: Number of authorisations made by a law enforcement agency for access to existing information or documents in the enforcement of a law imposing a pecuniary penalty or the protection of the public revenue—s. 186(1)(b)
- Table 33: Number of authorisations made by a Commonwealth Enforcement Agency for access to existing information or documents in the enforcement of a law imposing a pecuniary penalty or the protection of the public revenue—s. 186(1)(b)
- Table 34: Number of authorisations made by a state or territory enforcement agency for access to existing information or documents in the enforcement of a law imposing a pecuniary penalty or the protection of the public revenue—s. 186(1)(b)
- Table 35: Total number of authorisations made for access to existing information or documents in the enforcement of a law imposing a pecuniary penalty or protecting public revenue—s. 186(1)(b)
- Table 36: Prospective data authorisations—s. 186(1)(c)
- Table 37: Average specified and actual time in force of prospective data authorisations
- Table 38: The number of authorisations made for access to existing information or documents for the location of missing persons—s. 178A
- Figure 1: Telecommunications interception warrants issued with specific conditions or restrictions—ss. 100(1)(e) and 100(2)(e)
- Figure 2: Named person warrants issued with conditions or restrictions—ss. 100(1)(ea) and 100(2)(ea)
- Figure 3: Total number of services intercepted under service-based named person warrants—ss. 100(1)(ec) and 100(2)(ec)
- Figure 4: Commonwealth Ombudsman’s Telecommunications Interception Inspection Criteria
- Figure 5: Other matters reportable under s.85
- Figure 6: Commonwealth Ombudsman Stored Communications Access Inspection Criteria
- Figure 7: Commonwealth Ombudsman Preservation Notice Inspection Criteria
