Defence FOI 204 2021 Statement of Reasons.pdf

Objective Reference: BN23727309
FOI 204/20/21 STATEMENT OF REASONS UNDER THE FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACT
1.
I refer to the application by Mr Joseph Semmens under the Freedom of Information Act
1982 (FOI Act) for access to:
“…“1. The AGSVA “vetting decision risk model” referred to in paragraph 2.13 of the
ANAO’s 2018 report on Mitigating Insider Threats through Personnel Security.

2. The “structured professional judgement instrument” referred to in the same
paragraph.”…”
Personal email addresses, signatures, PMKeyS numbers and mobile telephone
numbers contained in documents that fall within the scope of the FOI request,
duplicates of documents, and documents sent to or from the applicant are excluded
from this request. Defence has only considered final versions of documents.
FOI decision maker
2.
I am the authorised officer pursuant to section 23 of the FOI Act to make a decision on
this FOI request.
Documents identified
3.
I identified two documents as matching the description of the request.
Decision
4.
I have decided to:
a.  partially release one document in accordance with section 22 [access to edited
copies with exempt or irrelevant matter deleted] of the FOI Act, on the grounds
that the deleted material is considered exempt under section 33(a)(i)
[Documents affecting national security] and section 47E(d) [public interest
conditional exemptions-certain operations of agencies] of the FOI Act;
b.  refuse access to one document under section 7(2A) [Certain persons or bodies]
of the FOI Act; and
c.  remove irrelevant material as referred to in the scope of the request in
accordance with section 22(1)(b)(ii) of the FOI Act.
Material taken into account
5.
In making my decision, I had regard to:
a.  the terms of the request;
b.  the content of the identified documents in issue;
c.  relevant provisions in the FOI Act; and
d.  the Guidelines published by the Office of the Australian Information
Commissioner under section 93A of the FOI Act (the Guidelines).

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Reasons for decision
Section 7(2A) – Certain persons and bodies
6.
Subsection 7(2A)(b) of the FOI Act provides that information from an intelligence
agency is exempt from the operation of the Act in relation to particular types of documents.
7.
Subsection 7(2C)(a)(i) of the FOI Act provides that a document that has originated with,
or has been received from, the Department of Defence and that is in respect of: (i) the
collection, reporting or analysis of operational intelligence or is exempt from the operation of
the Act.
8.
In accordance with FOI Guidelines 2.18 the Exemption also extends to a part of a
document that contains an extract from or a summary of an intelligence document.
2.18 All Australian Government agencies are exempt from the operation of the Act in
relation to ‘intelligence agency documents’ and ‘defence intelligence documents’(for
example, a document that originated with or was received from the Department of
Defence and relates to the collection, reporting or analysis of operational intelligence
s 7(2C)… The exemption extends to a part of a document that contains an extract from
or a summary of an intelligence agency document or a defence intelligence document.
The remainder of the document is not exempt on the same basis, and access may have
to be given after deletion of the exempt material under s 22.
9.
I am satisfied that the document exempted under section 7 of the FOI Act is a defence
intelligence document.

Section 33 – Documents affecting national security, defence or international relations
10.  Section 33(a)(i) of the FOI Act provides that a document is exempt from release if its
disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the security of the
Commonwealth. For this exemption to be claimed I must be satisfied that there is a ‘real’ and
‘substantial’ risk of damage occurring. It is insufficient that there merely be a possibility of
such damage.
11.  In regards to the terms ‘could reasonably be expected to’ and ‘damage’ paragraphs 5.16,
5.17 and 5.28 of the Guidelines provide that:
5.16 The test requires the decision maker to assess the likelihood of the
predicted or forecast event, effect or damage occurring after disclosure of a
document.
5.17 The use of the word ‘could’ in this qualification is less stringent than
‘would’, and requires analysis of the reasonable expectation rather than
certainty of an event, effect or damage occurring. It may be a reasonable
expectation that an effect has occurred, be presently occurring, or could occur
in the future.
5.28 ‘Damage’ for the purposes of this exemption is not confined to loss or
damage in monetary terms. The relevant damage may be intangible…but
[should be] determined on the facts of each particular case.
12.  Having reviewed the information in light of the Guidelines, I am satisfied of the real
and substantial risk to national security the release of the exempt information would pose. The
security clearance assessment process is central to the Australian Government’s ability to
secure classified information and safeguard against misuse and unauthorised disclosure.

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Disclosure of the information would undermine the effectiveness of the security vetting
process and could increase the risk of misuse of sensitive information.
13.  While some of the information may be considered harmless in isolation, when taken in
conjunction with other documented information a mosaic is created that may reveal damaging
information about the Commonwealth’s security clearance processes.
14.  In relation to the mosaic effect, paragraph 5.39 of the Guidelines state that:
When evaluating the potential harmful effects of disclosing documents that
affect Australia’s national security, defence or international relations, decision
makers may take into account not only the contents of the document but also
the intelligence technique known as the ‘mosaic theory’.  This theory holds
that individually harmless pieces of information, when combined with other
pieces, can generate a composite – mosaic– that can damage Australia’s
national security, defence or international relations.
15.  If the Commonwealth’s security clearance processes are revealed, the integrity and
efficacy of these processes may be compromised, providing scope for clearance applicants to
tailor information to the known rigors of the vetting process. This may provide an inaccurate
picture of individual applicants, who may then be assessed as suitable to access nationally
classified information. This could increase the risk to the Commonwealth of unsuitable
persons gaining access to classified or sensitive government information or resources.
16.  Considering the above, I am satisfied that the identified material is exempt under
section 33(a)(i) of the FOI Act as release could have an adverse effect on the security of the
Commonwealth.
Section 47E – Certain operations of agencies
17.
Section 47E(d) of the FOI Act states:

A document is conditionally exempt if its disclosure under this Act would, or could

reasonably be expected to, do any of the following:
…(d) have substantial adverse effect on the proper and efficient conduct of the
operations of an agency.
18.
Upon examination of the documents I identified information for which a claim under
section 47E(d) of the FOI Act is warranted. I considered that the material could reasonably be
expected to have a substantial adverse effect on the proper and efficient conduct of the
operations of Defence.
19.
I note that use of the word ‘could’ in this provision also requires no more than a
degree of reasonableness to be applied in deciding whether disclosure would cause the
consequences specified.
20.  Having reviewed the information, with respect to the guidelines, I am satisfied that the
release of the information could have an adverse effect on the effectiveness of the assessments
Defence uses to determine a clearance subject’s suitability to access classified resources.
21.  Defence relies on frank and honest answers from applicants related to the security
clearance process. Material, which if publicly released, could provide an understanding of the
factors assessed, sources used, and information considered by Defence to be of significance,
may allow clearance subjects to provide artificial answers to demonstrate superficial
behaviours. This may provide an inaccurate picture concerning individual applicants, who
may then be assessed as suitable to access classified or sensitive resources, with a resultant
increase risk to the Commonwealth.

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22.
Further, identification of database fields and formats, even empty fields, would
provide information on Defence’s approach to protective security assessment that would
reduce the effectiveness of mitigations.
23.
I am satisfied that the expected effect of disclosing to the applicant material identified
exempt under section 47E(d) could adversely affect the proper and efficient conduct of the
operations of Defence. I have decided that the specified material identified in the document is
conditionally exempt pursuant to subsection 47E(d) of the FOI Act. My public interest
considerations are set out below.

Public interest considerations – Section 47E
24.
I have found that the identified document is conditionally exempt under section
47E(d) of the FOI Act. Section 11A (5) provides that, if a document is conditionally exempt,
it must be disclosed ‘unless (in the circumstances) access to the document at that time would,
on balance, be contrary to the public interest’.
25.
I considered the factors favouring disclosure set out in section 11B(3) of the FOI Act.
The relevant factors being that disclosure may promote some of the objects of the FOI Act, as
information held by the Government is a national resource. However, disclosure of this
information would not increase public participation in the Defence process (section 3(2)(a) of
the FOI Act), nor would it increase scrutiny or discussion of Defence activities (section
3(2)(b) of the FOI Act).
26.
Paragraph 6.22 of the Guidelines specifies a non-exhaustive list of public interest
factors against disclosure. The factors I find particularly relevant to this request are that
release of this information could reasonably be expected to prejudice:
a.  the protection of an individual’s right to privacy;
b.  the interests of an individual or a group of individuals;
c.  an agency’s ability to obtain confidential information; or
d.  an agency’s ability to obtain similar information in the future.
27.
The security clearance process is an intrusive process designed to determine an
individual’s suitability to access classified material. Failure to maintain the integrity of this
process would have serious adverse effects on national security. For this reason it is
imperative that information which may compromise the security clearance process is not
released to the public. Any information that will reveal the specific information gathered by
AGSVA about an individual for vetting purposes will therefore be withheld. Information
about certain operations of Defence, if released, could affect the integrity and efficacy of the
Department of Defence’s internal processes and procedures regarding security investigations.
28.
While the applicant may be interested in the information withheld it would not inform
public debate on any matter of public performance in any meaningful way. The deleted
material would not allow the applicant any further access to their own personal information.
29.
Accordingly, I considered that the public interest factors against disclosure outweigh
the factors for disclosure of the identified material. Therefore I decided it would be contrary
to the public interest to release the specific information and consider it exempt under sections
47E(d) and 47F of the FOI Act.
30.
None of the factors listed in section 11B(4) [Irrelevant Factors] were taken into
account when making my decision.

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Further Information
31.  Some of the documents matching the scope of this request contained a dissemination
limiting marker (DLM). Where documents have been approved for public release, the DLM
has been struck through.

steven.williams9 Digitally signed by
steven.williams9

Date: 2020.12.01 12:22:57 +11'00'
Steven Williams
Accredited Decision Maker
Associate Secretary Group