This is an HTML version of an attachment to the Freedom of Information request 'What are all our .gov.au domains?'.

From:
C Drake
To:
FOI Requests
Subject:
Freedom of Information request - What are all our .gov.au domains?
Date:
Sunday, 13 November 2022 8:20:45 AM
Dear Department of Finance,
Please provide the comprehensive list of all .gov.au domain names that can be accessed by Australian taxpayers on the internet.
This is not a vexatious request, and I am happy to cancel my prior requests to your department when you chose to grant this one.
I'm aware (from your earlier refusals) that you supply this data to third parties under confidentiality agreements (who in turn supply it to other third
parities, and make it available in the DNS and WHOIS systems (at least) for public searching).  While I do not believe it's possible for confidentially
rules you chose to impose on those third parties to apply to your FoI-Act duty to make information available to the public, that is nevertheless the
excuse you chose previously to deny my access to this information.
Accordingly, I request this list of all .gov.au domains from any available source you have (including, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, the records from the
website you operate "https://www.domainname.gov.au/", any reports you may have on gov.au domains, any third parties who do (or have in the past,
like Afilias did) indicated that they are "happy" to supply a list, or any other source).
I'm happy to enter into confidentiality agreements, or any other arrangement if needed, to make it easier to release this list to me.  I have written
government policy in the past, and I am available for security clearance at least to NV1 if required.
I remind you of your duty under the FoI act to negotiate with me to help make it easier to release this information: if you can think of any way at all to
get me this information, please take that route.
This request is made through the public "Right to Know" ( www.righttoknow.org.au ) website, which is an online journalist organisation dedicated to
publication of FoI requests for the public interest.
I am seeking access to this data for the following purposes:-
1. Public interest disclosure: reporting to the public on the scope and competence of our government's public release and management of Australian
internet services and data
2. Senate inquiry: This list and my analysis of it will form part of a senate inquiry submission, and updates to my prior submissions. This list was
formerly easily available and published online, and my analysis of it formed part of the following submissions:-
Senate Inquiry into the Digital delivery of government services (
https://chrisdrake.com/for_gai/Digital_delivery_of_Government_services_Inquiry_Submission_2017.pdf )
Senate Inquiry into the 2016 Census ( https://chrisdrake.com/for_gai/Census_Senate_Inquiry-Chris_Drake_Submission.pdf
https://chrisdrake.com/for_gai/Cyber-Security-Strategy-2016-with_notes_by_Chris_Drake.pdf )
The 2020 Cyber-Security Strategy ( https://chrisdrake.com/for_gai/Cyber-Security-Strategy-2020-Chris_Drake_Submission.pdf and notes:
https://chrisdrake.com/for_gai/Cyber-Security-Strategy-2020-discussion-paper_with_notes_by_Chris_Drake.pdf and call for views:
https://chrisdrake.com/for_gai/Response%20to%20A%20call%20for%20views%20on%20Australias%202020%20Cyber%20Security%20Strategy.pdf
)
The Digital Economy Strategy Consultation (
https://chrisdrake.com/for_gai/Digital_Economy_Strategy_Consultation-Chris_Drake_Submission.pdf )
The Future of Work Senate Inquiry ( https://chrisdrake.com/for_gai/Future_of_Work_Inquiry_Submission_2017.pdf )
Senate Inquiry into the Medicare Breach ( https://chrisdrake.com/for_gai/Medicare_Breach_Inquiry_Submission_2017.pdf )
The Online Safety act ( https://chrisdrake.com/for_gai/Response%20to%20Consultation%20on%20a%20new%20Online%20Safety%20Act.pdf )
The Review of national arrangements for the protection and management of identity information (
https://chrisdrake.com/for_gai/Review_of_national_arrangements_for_the_protection_and_management_of_identity_information_Submission_2018.pdf
)
The Critical Infrastructure Bill 2020 ( https://chrisdrake.com/for_gai/Security%20of%20critical%20infrastructure%20-
%20Chris%20Drake%20Comments.pdf )
I fully intend to make available to the public every possible government embarrassment I can uncover with respect to the operation of all our gov.au
domains.  Accordingly I draw your attention to the FoI act purpose:-
1. The public interest test: the scrutiny of government
2. public participation in government decision-making (refer to my submissions above)
3. factors an agency or minister MUST NOT TAKE into account: embarrassment to or loss of confidence in the government, confusion or unnecessary
debate.
If you intend to raise any refusal excuse relating to "security", I will NOT accept any assertions that are made anonymously, or by anyone without a
current and verifiable accreditation (i.e. CISSP, CISA, Security+, CEH, CISM, GSEC, SSCP, CASP, GCIH, OSCP) in an appropriate field with
evidence that they were not under duress.
Yours faithfully,
C Drake

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