FOI 4145 - Document 1
From:
KEYS, Daniel
Sent:
Monday, 25 May 2020 4:55 PM
To:
s47F
s47F
Subject:
Apple ENF meeting on Wednesday [SEC=OFFICIAL]
Hi guys
On Thursday last week I attended a meeting between the Minister Hunt and the VP of Apple Health. s47F
s47F
who is the lead for the ENF in the US was also in the meeting and objected when I said
that their framework would be of limited use in its current form to the Australian implementation. We
agreed to take it offline so that he can share with us how he believes that it can satisfy our requirements
of supporting public health officials.
How about at the meeting I supply an overview of the process in Australia then one of you guys can talk
about the discussions you’ve had with Apple Australia and the assessment you’ve made of the
framework. Then we can throw over to s47F to talk about why they feel our assessment is incorrect.
At some stage I’d also like both of us to raise getting API access to the upgraded Bluetooth in the
framework. I spoke to my equivalent in the UK and he was saying they have formally requested the
ACT 1982 (CTH)
same.
Sound like a plan? You might also have a role for s47F in there given they’ve done the assessment. Just
let me know so we present a joined up story.
Thanks
HEALTH AND AGED CARE
Daniel Keys
Chief Information Officer and Chief Security Officer
INFORMATION
Information Technology Division | Corporate Operations Group
Australian Government Department of Health
T: (02) 6289
| M:
| E: xxxxxx.xxxx@xxxxxx.xxx.xx
s22
s22
Location: s22
PO Box 9848, Canberra ACT 2601, Australia
Executive Assistant
| (02) 6289
|
@health.gov.au
s22
s22
s22
Executive Officer
| (02) 6289
|
@health.gov.au
s22
s22
s22
FREEDOM OF
THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN RELEASED UNDER
The Department of Health acknowledges the traditional owners of country throughout Australia, and their continuing connection to
land, sea and community. We pay our respects to them and their cultures, and to elders both past and present.
THEBY THE DEPARTMENT OF
Page 1 of 1
FOI 4145 - Document 2
From:
KEYS, Daniel
Sent:
Thursday, 21 May 2020 4:12 PM
To:
s47F
Subject:
Apple framework description [SEC=OFFICIAL]
Thanks for the chat today s47F
Here is a good description of the Exposure Notification Framework FYI.
https://www.macrumors.com/guide/exposure-notification/.
Any help would be greatly appreciated.
Daniel Keys
Chief Information Officer and Chief Security Officer
Information Technology Division | Corporate Operations Group
Australian Government Department of Health
T: (02) 6289
| M:
| E: xxxxxx.xxxx@xxxxxx.xxx.xx
s22
s22
Location:
ACT 1982 (CTH)
s22
PO Box 9848, Canberra ACT 2601, Australia
Executive Assistant
| (02) 6289
|
@health.gov.au
s22
s22 s22
Executive Officer
s22
| (02) 6289
|
@health.gov.au
s22
s22
HEALTH AND AGED CARE
The Department of Health acknowledges the traditional owners of country throughout Australia, and their continuing connection to
land, sea and community. We pay our respects to them and their cultures, and to elders both past and present.
INFORMATION
FREEDOM OF
THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN RELEASED UNDER
THEBY THE DEPARTMENT OF
Page 1 of 1
FOI 4145 - Document 3
From:
KEYS, Daniel
Sent:
Wednesday, 27 May 2020 8:00 AM
To:
s22
Cc:
s22
; s22
; s47F
Subject:
FW: An app 'fear' we need some lines about [SEC=OFFICIAL]
Attachments:
RE: Standard response for Bluetooth hacking Qs [SEC=OFFICIAL]
Morning s22
Is there any chance you can have a chat with s22
in security to pull together some words
on the inherent risks with the use of Bluetooth.
Attached is what s22
had previously supplied however it doesn’t say much.
Key line will be that it is no less secure than connecting to your headphones or watch. But would be
good to find some key statements (which should be available on the internet) about the inherent risks.
Happy for you to loop s22
in if needed too.
ACT 1982 (CTH)
Thanks
Daniel Keys
Chief Information Officer and Chief Security Officer
Information Technology Division | Corporate Operations Group
HEALTH AND AGED CARE
Australian Government Department of Health
T: (02) 6289
| M:
| E: xxxxxx.xxxx@xxxxxx.xxx.xx
s22
s22
Location:
s22
PO Box 9848, Canberra ACT 2601, Australia INFORMATION
Executive Assistant
| (02) 6289
|
@health.gov.au
s22
s22
s22
Executive Officer
| (02) 6289
|
@health.gov.au
s22
s22
s22
The Department of Health acknowledges the traditional owners of country throughout Australia, and their continuing connection to
land, sea and community. We pay our respects to them and their cultures, and to elders both past and present.
From: s47E(d)
FREEDOM OF
Sent: Tuesday, 26 May 2020 5:04 PM
THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN RELEASED UNDER
To: Barrett, Callie ; KEYS, Daniel ; McBride, Paul
Cc: s47E(d)
THE
Subject: RE: An app 'fear' we need some lines about [SEC=OFFICIAL]
BY THE DEPARTMENT OF
Thanks all
I don’t think this really answers the question people have. Most people seem to understand how little
information is in the app itself. They’re not so worried about that being accessed. They are more
Page 1 of 8
FOI 4145 - Document 3
worried about whether using the app (including having Bluetooth running) makes their phone more
vulnerable to hacking generally (ie someone accessing everything else on their phone).
R
Rachel Balmanno
First Assistant Secretary
People, Communication and Parliamentary Division
Corporate Operations Group
Australian Government Department of Health
T: 02 6289 s22 | E: xxxxxx.xxxxxxxx@xxxxxx.xxx.xx
Location: s22
PO Box 9848, Canberra ACT 2601, Australia
The Department of Health acknowledges the traditional owners of country throughout Australia, and their
continuing connection to land, sea and community. We pay our respects to them and their cultures, and
to elders both past and present.
From: Barrett, Callie <xxxxxx.xxxxxxx@xxxxxx.xxx.xx>
ACT 1982 (CTH)
Sent: Monday, 25 May 2020 9:31 PM
To: KEYS, Daniel <xxxxxx.xxxx@xxxxxx.xxx.xx>; BALMANNO, Rachel
<xxxxxx.xxxxxxxx@xxxxxx.xxx.xx>; McBride, Paul <xxxx.xxxxxxx@xxxxxx.xxx.xx>
Cc: s47E(d)
Subject: RE: An app 'fear' we need some lines about [SEC=OFFICIAL]
HEALTH AND AGED CARE
Hi,
Release 4 (planned for today) aimed to address some of the bluetooth hacking issue. So once we have
INFORMATION
confirmation it went ahead, we could craft something involving this information:
Bluetooth privacy fixes
Device name - On an Android device, the "Bluetooth Device Name" (the usercustomisable
name that is visible when you pair your device) is permanently visible.
This fix will remove the ability for a malicious actor to silently use Bluetooth logging to
capture a device name for all devices in range.
Modified COVIDSafe device - An attacker could potentially use a modified device
running the COVIDSafe app to access the temporary identifier of a user through the
FREEDOM OF
Bluetooth pairing exchange. This pairing will compromise a device's anonymity and
THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN RELEASED UNDER
may enable further surveillance of a user’s device. This fix will remove this
vulnerability.
THE
BY THE DEPARTMENT OF
Some thoughts below about the text as is:
Need a title: ‘Can I be hacked through the COVIDSafe app?’ or ‘How secure is the COVIDSafe app?’
The COVIDSafe app security design has been informed by sound cyber security principles that ensure that
your information remains safe. The COVIDSafe National Data Store which holds user registration
information is housed in a data centre that has been certified to the PROTECTED level, ensuring the
Page 2 of 8
ACT 1982 (CTH)
HEALTH AND AGED CARE
INFORMATION
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FOI 4145 - Document 3
Thanks,
Callie Barrett
Innovation Lead, Digital Innovation,
www.health.gov.au Covid-19 Response
Making Flexibility Work - if you receive an email from me outside of normal business hours, I'm sending it at a
time that suits me. I'm not expecting you to read or reply until normal business hours.
People, Communication & Parliamentary Division |Corporate Operations Group
Australian Government Department of Health
T:
| E: xxxxxx.xxxxxxx@xxxxxx.xxx.xx
s22
Location: s22
PO Box 9848, Canberra ACT 2601, Australia
The Department of Health acknowledges the traditional owners of country throughout Australia, and their continuing
connection to land, sea and community. We pay our respects to them and their cultures, and to elders both past and present.
From: KEYS, Daniel <xxxxxx.xxxx@xxxxxx.xxx.xx>
Sent: Monday, 25 May 2020 1:19 PM
ACT 1982 (CTH)
To: BALMANNO, Rachel <xxxxxx.xxxxxxxx@xxxxxx.xxx.xx>; McBride, Paul
<xxxx.xxxxxxx@xxxxxx.xxx.xx>; Barrett, Callie <xxxxxx.xxxxxxx@xxxxxx.xxx.xx>
Cc: s47E(d)
@health.gov.au>
Subject: RE: An app 'fear' we need some lines about [SEC=OFFICIAL]
Hi Rach
HEALTH AND AGED CARE
s22
INFORMATION
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The part in yellow could be taken out because they are a bit off topic but I’ll leave that for you to decide.
THE
Tim Roy (AS) and s22
are from the ASD media team if you need to confirm anything
BY THE DEPARTMENT OF
but I’m happy to be the conduit if you like.
Thanks
Daniel Keys
Chief Information Officer and Chief Security Officer
Page 4 of 8
FOI 4145 - Document 3
Information Technology Division | Corporate Operations Group
Australian Government Department of Health
T: (02) 6289
| M:
| E: xxxxxx.xxxx@xxxxxx.xxx.xx
s22
s22
Location:
s22
PO Box 9848, Canberra ACT 2601, Australia
Executive Assistant
| (02) 6289
|
@health.gov.au
s22
s22
s22
Executive Officer
| (02) 6289
|
@health.gov.au
s22
s22
s22
The Department of Health acknowledges the traditional owners of country throughout Australia, and their continuing connection to
land, sea and community. We pay our respects to them and their cultures, and to elders both past and present.
From: BALMANNO, Rachel <xxxxxx.xxxxxxxx@xxxxxx.xxx.xx>
Sent: Saturday, 23 May 2020 1:00 PM
To: KEYS, Daniel <xxxxxx.xxxx@xxxxxx.xxx.xx>; McBride, Paul <xxxx.xxxxxxx@xxxxxx.xxx.xx>; Barrett,
Callie <xxxxxx.xxxxxxx@xxxxxx.xxx.xx>
Cc: s47E(d)
Subject: An app 'fear' we need some lines about [SEC=OFFICIAL]
ACT 1982 (CTH)
Hi
Just looking at some of our latest consumer research and one of the key things preventing people
downloading COVIDSafe is a fear of breach or hacking resulting in personal information being
compromised (this includes but is definitely not limited to hacking via Bluetooth). It would be very
HEALTH AND AGED CARE
helpful if we could get some of the information about security framed in a way that helps us directly
counter some of these fears.
INFORMATION
R
Rachel Balmanno
First Assistant Secretary
People, Communication and Parliamentary Division
Corporate Operations Group
FREEDOM OF
Australian Government Department of Health
T: s22
| E: xxxxxx.xxxxxxxx@xxxxxx.xxx.xx
THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN RELEASED UNDER
Location: s22
THE
PO Box 9848, Canberra ACT 2601, Australia
BY THE DEPARTMENT OF
The Department of Health acknowledges the traditional owners of country throughout Australia, and their
continuing connection to land, sea and community. We pay our respects to them and their cultures, and
to elders both past and present.
Page 5 of 8
ACT 1982 (CTH)
HEALTH AND AGED CARE
INFORMATION
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THEBY THE DEPARTMENT OF
ACT 1982 (CTH)
HEALTH AND AGED CARE
INFORMATION
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FOI 4145 - Document 3
Communication Support Officer
National Incident Room
Office of Health Protec on | Australian Government Department of Health
PO Box 9848, Canberra ACT 2601, Australia
ACT 1982 (CTH)
HEALTH AND AGED CARE
INFORMATION
FREEDOM OF
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Page 8 of 8
FOI 4145 - Document 4
From:
KEYS, Daniel
Sent:
Wednesday, 27 May 2020 2:52 PM
To:
s47F
Subject:
Rapid Research Information Forum [SEC=OFFICIAL]
Hi s47F
Below are some talking points regarding Alan Finkel’s paper for your consideration
• The brief contains valuable insights that will help inform our approach to increasing take-up.
• Over 6.07m Australians have registered to use the COVIDSafe app and it is working.
• State Health Officials have been trained in the use of the system and we have already identified
close contacts that would not have otherwise remained undetected.
• We continue to see low COVID case numbers in Australia and hope this continues.
• The strongest privacy protections ever implemented are in place to ensure your data is safe and
can only be used for the sole purpose of contact tracing.
• We continue to look for opportunities to make the app available to as many Australian’s as
possible.
ACT 1982 (CTH)
Give me a ring if you want more detail.
Thanks
Daniel Keys
Chief Information Officer and Chief Security Officer
HEALTH AND AGED CARE
Information Technology Division | Corporate Operations Group
Australian Government Department of Health INFORMATION
T: (02) 6289
| M:
| E: xxxxxx.xxxx@xxxxxx.xxx.xx
s22
s22
Location:
s22
PO Box 9848, Canberra ACT 2601, Australia
Executive Assistant
| (02) 6289
|
@health.gov.au
s22
s22
s22
Executive Officer
| (02) 6289
|
x@xxxxxx.xxx.xx
s22
s22
s22
The Department of Health acknowledges the traditional owners of country throughout Australia, and their continuing connection to
land, sea and community. We pay our respects to them and their cultures, and to elders both past and present.
FREEDOM OF
THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN RELEASED UNDER
THEBY THE DEPARTMENT OF
Page 1 of 1
FOI 4145 - Document 5
From:
KEYS, Daniel
Sent:
Monday, 25 May 2020 5:22 PM
To:
News
Cc:
s22
Subject:
RE: ABC query: COVIDSafe [SEC=OFFICIAL]
Hi s22
What you’ve done is great. I’ve just made a couple of suggestions in red below. Happy for you to change
them if you think it can be worded better.
Thanks
Daniel Keys
Chief Information Officer and Chief Security Officer
Information Technology Division | Corporate Operations Group
Australian Government Department of Health
T: (02) 6289
| M:
| E: xxxxxx.xxxx@xxxxxx.xxx.xx
s22
s22
Location:
ACT 1982 (CTH)
s22
PO Box 9848, Canberra ACT 2601, Australia
Executive Assistant
(02) 6289
|
@health.gov.au
s22
s22
s22
Executive Officer
| (02) 6289
|
@health.gov.au
s22
s22
s22
HEALTH AND AGED CARE
The Department of Health acknowledges the traditional owners of country throughout Australia, and their continuing connection to
land, sea and community. We pay our respects to them and their cultures, and to elders both past and present.
INFORMATION
From: News
Sent: Monday, 25 May 2020 4:58 PM
To: KEYS, Daniel
Cc: News ; s22
Subject: FW: ABC query: COVIDSafe [SEC=OFFICIAL]
Hi Daniel,
We’ve got a longer enquiry about COVIDSafe from the ABC’s Coronacast program. Using recent
FREEDOM OF
responses I’ve prepared the following for your review please.
THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN RELEASED UNDER
Query and answers below.. There is only one which I couldn’t draw on a response.
THE
Many thanks
BY THE DEPARTMENT OF
s22
s22
Media Unit
Department of Health
T: s22
Mobile: s22
Page 1 of 4
FOI 4145 - Document 5
xxxx@xxxxxx.xxx.xx
Unless stated otherwise, this information is provided on a background basis and should not be
attributed.
The Department of Health acknowledges the Traditional Custodians of Australia and their continued
connection to land, sea and community. We pay our respects to all Elders past and present.
From: s22
@abc.net.au>
Sent: Monday, 25 May 2020 4:28 PM
To: Media <xxxxx@xxx.xxx.xx>; News <xxxx@xxxxxx.xxx.xx>
Cc: s22
@abc.net.au>
Subject: ABC query: COVIDSafe [SEC=No Protective Marking]
Good afternoon,
I have some questions about COVIDSafe for an upcoming episode of the ABC’s Coronacast – the
discussion will focus on questions the audience have about the app, so any clarity you can provide
would be much appreciated!
ACT 1982 (CTH)
• What are the most recent download numbers for the app? Is there any indication of what
percentage have it operating correctly – communicating with the server for IDs, for
example?
As at 3:30pm 25 May 2020, the COVIDSafe app has been downloaded and registered around 6.04
million times. The strict privacy legislation, which restrictions access to data from the COVIDSafe app
to health authorities in the states and territories for the sole purpose of COVID-19 contact tracing
HEALTH AND AGED CARE
means information about current users is not available to the Commonwealth Government.
• Does the government consider the app’s rollout and usage a success thus far? Can rate of
INFORMATION
uptake still be linked to the lifting of lockdown restrictions, given states are now increasingly
lifting these rules despite the nation not meeting the 40% download target?
The COVIDSafe app is a valuable tool in responding to the COVID-19 pandemic. The app has been
downloaded more than six million times in less than a month since it’s launch. The app is helping
state and territory public health officials automate and improve manual contact tracing of the
coronavirus. It has received widespread support and endorsement from across the Australian
community, including public health officials, information technology and cyber security experts, the
Australian business community, major sporting codes, and every state and territory leader.
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THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN RELEASED UNDER
The use of the app by as high a proportion of the population as possible will complement and
accelerate the existing manual processes to contact people exposed to COVID-19. State and territory
THE
health officials will continue those manual processes to find contacts of confirmed cases. There are
BY THE DEPARTMENT OF
around 16 million adults with smartphones, they're our target population.
• Has data from the app been used for contact tracing, apart from the recent case in Victoria?
As above, this information is not available to the Commonwealth Government, this enquiry is best
directed to the health authorities in the states and territories.
Page 2 of 4
FOI 4145 - Document 5
• The DTA has discussed issues around the app’s reliability on iPhone. Have these been addressed
in recent software updates? Any specificity you could provide here would be much
appreciated, as it is a common question from our audience.
Improvements have and will continue to be made to the app. Enquiries regarding specific technical
improvements are best directed to the DTA.
• Will COVIDSafe be moved onto Google and Apple’s exposure notification API? If so, how will
those companies’ rules against mandatory personal data collection be addressed, among
other restrictions?
This enquiry is best directed to the DTA.
• Are there plans to allow COVIDSafe in international app stores, and access via a non-Australian
phone number?
The app was developed to help Australians stop the spread of coronavirus. To download it, you need
an Australian app account and Australian mobile number to download and register on the app. We
are aware this impacts some Australians who have created app store accounts in other countries
and are exploring options to make sure as many Australians as possible can download and use
ACT 1982 (CTH)
COVIDSafe.
• Independent analysts have looked at the app since launch and reported security and
performance issues about the app to the DTA. However they claim they do not always get a
response, and fixes are not always clearly announced to the public. Would the DTA like to
comment?
HEALTH AND AGED CARE
This enquiry is best directed to the DTA.
My deadline is 1pm tomorrow.
INFORMATION
Many thanks,
s22
s22
Technology Reporter
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M: s47F
THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN RELEASED UNDER
We acknowledge Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples as the First Australians
THE
and Traditional Custodians of the lands where we live, learn and work.
BY THE DEPARTMENT OF
-
Please consider the environment before printing this e-mail.
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FOI 4145 - Document 5
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are not the intended recipient of this email, you are not permitted to disseminate, distribute or
copy this email or any attachments. If you have received this message in error, please notify the
sender immediately and delete this email from your system. The ABC does not represent or
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check for viruses. The ABC's liability is limited to resupplying any email and attachments.
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Page 4 of 4
FOI 4145 - Document 6
From:
KEYS, Daniel
Sent:
Monday, 25 May 2020 1:19 PM
To:
BALMANNO, Rachel; McBride, Paul; Barrett, Callie
Cc:
s47E(d)
Subject:
RE: An app 'fear' we need some lines about [SEC=OFFICIAL]
Hi Rach
s22
ACT 1982 (CTH)
The part in yellow could be taken out because they are a bit off topic but I’ll leave that for you to decide.
Tim Roy (AS) and s22
are from the ASD media team if you need to confirm anything
but I’m happy to be the conduit if you like.
HEALTH AND AGED CARE
Thanks
Daniel Keys
INFORMATION
Chief Information Officer and Chief Security Officer
Information Technology Division | Corporate Operations Group
Australian Government Department of Health
T: (02) 6289 7884 | M:
| E: xxxxxx.xxxx@xxxxxx.xxx.xx
s22
Location:
s22
PO Box 9848, Canberra ACT 2601, Australia
Executive Assistant
| (02) 6289
|
@health.gov.au
s22
s22
s22
Executive Officer
FREEDOM OF
| (02) 6289
|
@health.gov.au
s22
s22
s22
THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN RELEASED UNDER
THE
The Department of Health acknowledges the traditional owners of country throughout Australia, and their continuing connection to
land, sea and community. We pay our respects to them and their cultures, and to elders both past and present.
BY THE DEPARTMENT OF
From: BALMANNO, Rachel
Sent: Saturday, 23 May 2020 1:00 PM
To: KEYS, Daniel ; McBride, Paul ; Barrett, Callie
Cc: s47E(d)
Subject: An app 'fear' we need some lines about [SEC=OFFICIAL]
Page 1 of 2
FOI 4145 - Document 6
Hi
Just looking at some of our latest consumer research and one of the key things preventing people
downloading COVIDSafe is a fear of breach or hacking resulting in personal information being
compromised (this includes but is definitely not limited to hacking via Bluetooth). It would be very
helpful if we could get some of the information about security framed in a way that helps us directly
counter some of these fears.
R
Rachel Balmanno
First Assistant Secretary
People, Communication and Parliamentary Division
Corporate Operations Group
Australian Government Department of Health
T: 02 6289 s22 | E: xxxxxx.xxxxxxxx@xxxxxx.xxx.xx
ACT 1982 (CTH)
Location: s22
PO Box 9848, Canberra ACT 2601, Australia
The Department of Health acknowledges the traditional owners of country throughout Australia, and their
continuing connection to land, sea and community. We pay our respects to them and their cultures, and
to elders both past and present.
HEALTH AND AGED CARE
INFORMATION
FREEDOM OF
THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN RELEASED UNDER
THEBY THE DEPARTMENT OF
Page 2 of 2
FOI 4145 - Document 7
From:
KEYS, Daniel
Sent:
Thursday, 28 May 2020 8:36 AM
To:
s47E(d)
; Barrett, Callie; McBride, Paul
Cc:
s22
Subject:
RE: An app 'fear' we need some lines about [SEC=OFFICIAL]
Hi all
How about this as a response? I’m sure it can be worded better but you get the gist.
How secure is the COVIDSafe app?
The COVIDSafe app security design is underpinned by strong cyber security principles that ensure that
your information remains safe. Throughout the development of COVIDSafe, these security controls were
independently assured by cyber security experts.
The app uses Bluetooth technology on mobile phones to perform the ‘digital handshake’ which records
close contact with another user who also has the COVIDSafe app installed. The Bluetooth technology
used by the COVIDSafe app is similar to that used when pairing with other Bluetooth enabled devices
ACT 1982 (CTH)
like headphones or smartwatches.
Device-level security controls exist within the phones operating system to keep your information safe.
Smartphone users are reminded to always keep their devices software up to date to ensure the latest
security controls are installed.
All information stored by the COVIDSafe app (both on the phone and in the data store) is encrypted to
HEALTH AND AGED CARE
provide additional cyber security protection of your information.
INFORMATION
Daniel Keys
Chief Information Officer and Chief Security Officer
Information Technology Division | Corporate Operations Group
Australian Government Department of Health
T: (02) 6289
| M:
| E: xxxxxx.xxxx@xxxxxx.xxx.xx
s22
s22
Location:
s22
PO Box 9848, Canberra ACT 2601, Australia
FREEDOM OF
Executive Assistant
THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN RELEASED UNDER
| (02) 6289
|
@health.gov.au
s22
s22
s22
Executive Officer
THE | (02) 6289 |
@health.gov.au
s22
s22
s22
BY THE DEPARTMENT OF
The Department of Health acknowledges the traditional owners of country throughout Australia, and their continuing connection to
land, sea and community. We pay our respects to them and their cultures, and to elders both past and present.
From: s47E(d)
Sent: Tuesday, 26 May 2020 5:04 PM
Page 1 of 6
FOI 4145 - Document 7
To: Barrett, Callie ; KEYS, Daniel ; McBride, Paul
Cc: s47E(d)
Subject: RE: An app 'fear' we need some lines about [SEC=OFFICIAL]
Thanks all
I don’t think this really answers the question people have. Most people seem to understand how little
information is in the app itself. They’re not so worried about that being accessed. They are more
worried about whether using the app (including having Bluetooth running) makes their phone more
vulnerable to hacking generally (ie someone accessing everything else on their phone).
R
Rachel Balmanno
First Assistant Secretary
People, Communication and Parliamentary Division
Corporate Operations Group
Australian Government Department of Health
ACT 1982 (CTH)
T: 02 6289 s22 | E: xxxxxx.xxxxxxxx@xxxxxx.xxx.xx
Location: s22
PO Box 9848, Canberra ACT 2601, Australia
The Department of Health acknowledges the traditional owners of country throughout Australia, and their
continuing connection to land, sea and community. We pay our respects to them and their cultures, and
to elders both past and present.
HEALTH AND AGED CARE
From: Barrett, Callie <xxxxxx.xxxxxxx@xxxxxx.xxx.xx>
Sent: Monday, 25 May 2020 9:31 PM
INFORMATION
To: KEYS, Daniel <xxxxxx.xxxx@xxxxxx.xxx.xx>; BALMANNO, Rachel
<xxxxxx.xxxxxxxx@xxxxxx.xxx.xx>; McBride, Paul <xxxx.xxxxxxx@xxxxxx.xxx.xx>
s47E(d)
Subject: RE: An app 'fear' we need some lines about [SEC=OFFICIAL]
Hi,
Release 4 (planned for today) aimed to address some of the bluetooth hacking issue. So once we have
confirmation it went ahead, we could craft something involving this information:
FREEDOM OF
THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN RELEASED UNDER
Bluetooth privacy fixes
Device name - On an Android device, the "Bluetooth Device Name" (the usercustomisable
THE
name that is visible when you pair your device) is permanently visible.
BY THE DEPARTMENT OF
This fix will remove the ability for a malicious actor to silently use Bluetooth logging to
capture a device name for all devices in range.
Modified COVIDSafe device - An attacker could potentially use a modified device
running the COVIDSafe app to access the temporary identifier of a user through the
Bluetooth pairing exchange. This pairing will compromise a device's anonymity and
may enable further surveillance of a user’s device. This fix will remove this
Page 2 of 6
ACT 1982 (CTH)
HEALTH AND AGED CARE
INFORMATION
FREEDOM OF
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FOI 4145 - Document 7
If you’re happy with the ASD wording, let me know with or without the yellow highlights, as well as a
confirmed title, and I’ll get the content team to publish to the site.
We are doing some work on the structure of the help section as it is unwieldy, this could give us the
opportunity to highlight security and privacy within the section. We are also looking at some social
media content around top 5 FAQs, this could be included in that.
Thanks,
Callie Barrett
Innovation Lead, Digital Innovation,
www.health.gov.au Covid-19 Response
Making Flexibility Work - if you receive an email from me outside of normal business hours, I'm sending it at a
time that suits me. I'm not expecting you to read or reply until normal business hours.
People, Communication & Parliamentary Division |Corporate Operations Group
Australian Government Department of Health
ACT 1982 (CTH)
T:
E: xxxxxx.xxxxxxx@xxxxxx.xxx.xx
s22
Location: s22
PO Box 9848, Canberra ACT 2601, Australia
The Department of Health acknowledges the traditional owners of country throughout Australia, and their continuing
connection to land, sea and community. We pay our respects to them and their cultures, and to elders both past and present.
HEALTH AND AGED CARE
From: KEYS, Daniel <xxxxxx.xxxx@xxxxxx.xxx.xx>
Sent: Monday, 25 May 2020 1:19 PM
To: BALMANNO, Rachel <xxxxxx.xxxxxxxx@xxxxxx.xxx.xx>; McBride, Paul
INFORMATION
<xxxx.xxxxxxx@xxxxxx.xxx.xx>; Barrett, Callie <xxxxxx.xxxxxxx@xxxxxx.xxx.xx>
Cc: s47E(d)
Subject: RE: An app 'fear' we need some lines about [SEC=OFFICIAL]
Hi Rach
s22
FREEDOM OF
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The part in yellow could be taken out because they are a bit off topic but I’ll leave that for you to decide.
Page 4 of 6
FOI 4145 - Document 7
Tim Roy (AS) and s22
are from the ASD media team if you need to confirm anything
but I’m happy to be the conduit if you like.
Thanks
Daniel Keys
Chief Information Officer and Chief Security Officer
Information Technology Division | Corporate Operations Group
Australian Government Department of Health
T: (02) 6289
| M:
| E: xxxxxx.xxxx@xxxxxx.xxx.xx
s22
s22
Location: Sirius Building 2.N.510
PO Box 9848, Canberra ACT 2601, Australia
Executive Assistant
(02) 6289
|
@health.gov.au
s22
s22
s22
Executive Officer
| (02) 6289
|
@health.gov.au
s22
s22 s22
The Department of Health acknowledges the traditional owners of country throughout Australia, and their continuing connection to
ACT 1982 (CTH)
land, sea and community. We pay our respects to them and their cultures, and to elders both past and present.
From: BALMANNO, Rachel <xxxxxx.xxxxxxxx@xxxxxx.xxx.xx>
Sent: Saturday, 23 May 2020 1:00 PM
To: KEYS, Daniel <xxxxxx.xxxx@xxxxxx.xxx.xx>; McBride, Paul <xxxx.xxxxxxx@xxxxxx.xxx.xx>; Barrett,
Callie <xxxxxx.xxxxxxx@xxxxxx.xxx.xx>
HEALTH AND AGED CARE
Cc: s47E(d)
Subject: An app 'fear' we need some lines about [SEC=OFFICIAL]
INFORMATION
Hi
Just looking at some of our latest consumer research and one of the key things preventing people
downloading COVIDSafe is a fear of breach or hacking resulting in personal information being
compromised (this includes but is definitely not limited to hacking via Bluetooth). It would be very
helpful if we could get some of the information about security framed in a way that helps us directly
counter some of these fears.
R
FREEDOM OF
THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN RELEASED UNDER
Rachel Balmanno
THE
BY THE DEPARTMENT OF
First Assistant Secretary
People, Communication and Parliamentary Division
Corporate Operations Group
Australian Government Department of Health
T: 02 6289 s22 | E: xxxxxx.xxxxxxxx@xxxxxx.xxx.xx
Location: s22
Page 5 of 6
FOI 4145 - Document 7
PO Box 9848, Canberra ACT 2601, Australia
The Department of Health acknowledges the traditional owners of country throughout Australia, and their
continuing connection to land, sea and community. We pay our respects to them and their cultures, and
to elders both past and present.
ACT 1982 (CTH)
HEALTH AND AGED CARE
INFORMATION
FREEDOM OF
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Page 6 of 6
FOI 4145 - Document 8
From:
KEYS, Daniel
Sent:
Thursday, 21 May 2020 11:07 AM
To:
News
Subject:
RE: COVIDSafe [SEC=OFFICIAL]
Hi s22
Although I have done a briefing for the minister of the issue, I think we should defer to the DTA to
ensure they maintain their technical authority role.
If anything we could say something like…
“The DTA are working in partnership with Apple to understand the native contact tracing
functionality under development by Apple and its applicable use in the COVIDSafe app.’
Daniel Keys
Chief Information Officer and Chief Security Officer
ACT 1982 (CTH)
Information Technology Division | Corporate Operations Group
Australian Government Department of Health
T: (02) 6289
| M:
| E: xxxxxx.xxxx@xxxxxx.xxx.xx
s22
s22
Location:
s22
PO Box 9848, Canberra ACT 2601, Australia
Executive Assistant
| (02) 6289
|
@health.gov.au
s22
s22
s22
Executive Officer
HEALTH AND AGED CARE
(02) 6289
|
@health.gov.au
s22
s22
s22
INFORMATION
The Department of Health acknowledges the traditional owners of country throughout Australia, and their continuing connection to
land, sea and community. We pay our respects to them and their cultures, and to elders both past and present.
From: News
Sent: Thursday, 21 May 2020 9:22 AM
To: KEYS, Daniel
Cc: News
Subject: FW: COVIDSafe [SEC=OFFICIAL]
FREEDOM OF
Hi Daniel, is this one for us or DTA? I think if we’re able to answer then that’s the preference.
THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN RELEASED UNDER
Thanks,
THE
s22
BY THE DEPARTMENT OF
Media Unit
Department of Health
T: s22
Mobile: s22
xxxx@xxxxxx.xxx.xx
Unless stated otherwise, this information is provided on a background basis and should not be
attributed.
Page 1 of 3
FOI 4145 - Document 8
From: s22
@abc.net.au>
Sent: Thursday, 21 May 2020 9:12 AM
To: News <xxxx@xxxxxx.xxx.xx>
Subject: COVIDSafe [SEC=No Protective Marking]
Morning
I am aware that Apple and Google have released Exposure Notifications technology.
Is this being used to update the COVIDSafe app?
If yes - what benefits/changes does this make to the app?
When will the new technology be part of COVIDSafe app?
ACT 1982 (CTH)
Do people need to update the app on their phone in order for the new technology to work?
If no - why?
HEALTH AND AGED CARE
Hoping for a response as soon as possible.
INFORMATION
Thanks
s22
Get Outlook for iOS
-
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Please consider the environment before printing this e-mail.
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THE
The information contained in this email and any attachment is confidential and may contain
legally privileged or copyright material. It is intended only for the use of the addressee(s). If you
BY THE DEPARTMENT OF
are not the intended recipient of this email, you are not permitted to disseminate, distribute or
copy this email or any attachments. If you have received this message in error, please notify the
sender immediately and delete this email from your system. The ABC does not represent or
warrant that this transmission is secure or virus free. Before opening any attachment you should
check for viruses. The ABC's liability is limited to resupplying any email and attachments.
Page 2 of 3
FOI 4145 - Document 8
ACT 1982 (CTH)
HEALTH AND AGED CARE
INFORMATION
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Page 3 of 3
FOI 4145 - Document 9
From:
KEYS, Daniel
Sent:
Monday, 25 May 2020 12:50 PM
To:
Hunter, Jessica MRS 1; Roy, Tim MR; Bolitho, Scott MR 2
Cc:
Prior, Mark MR; Kent, Nick MR; Noble, Elizabeth MISS
Subject:
RE: COVIDSafe cyber words [SEC=OFFICIAL]
Thanks Jess. Much appreciate
Happy with your suggestions and I will check the protected status with the DTA as it’s my understanding
that it is.
I’ll let you know how it evolves and come back to you with a final product.
Thanks all
Daniel Keys
Chief Information Officer and Chief Security Officer
Information Technology Division | Corporate Operations Group
ACT 1982 (CTH)
Australian Government Department of Health
T: (02) 6289
| M:
| E: xxxxxx.xxxx@xxxxxx.xxx.xx
s22
s22
Location: Sirius Building 2.N.510
PO Box 9848, Canberra ACT 2601, Australia
Executive Assistant
| (02) 6289
|
@health.gov.au
s22
s22
s22
Executive Officer
HEALTH AND AGED CARE
| (02) 6289
|
x@xxxxxx.xxx.xx
s22
s22
s22
The Department of Health acknowledges the traditional owners of country throughout Australia, and their continuing connection to
INFORMATION
land, sea and community. We pay our respects to them and their cultures, and to elders both past and present.
s22
FREEDOM OF
THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN RELEASED UNDER
THEBY THE DEPARTMENT OF
Page 1 of 4
ACT 1982 (CTH)
HEALTH AND AGED CARE
INFORMATION
FREEDOM OF
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THEBY THE DEPARTMENT OF
FOI 4145 - Document 9
From: KEYS, Daniel <xxxxxx.xxxx@xxxxxx.xxx.xx>
Sent: Monday, 25 May 2020 8:48 AM
To: Hunter, Jessica MRS 1 s22
Subject: COVIDSafe cyber words [SEC=UNCLASSIFIED]
Importance: High
Morning Jess. Hope you had a lovely weekend.
Our communications team have been conducting research on people’s sentiment towards the use of the
COVIDSafe app and the results have highlighted that one of the key things preventing people
downloading COVIDSafe is a fear of breach or hacking resulting in personal information being
compromised (this includes but is definitely not limited to hacking via Bluetooth).
I would like to put together some words for the media and health.gov.au around the controls and
assurance we have in place to address this fear and I was wondering if you’d be able to provide some
suggestions and feedback on the below attempt. Happy for you to pass it on to someone else if you
think they are better placed.
The COVIDSafe app has been designed with strong security controls that ensure that your information
ACT 1982 (CTH)
remains safe. The COVIDSafe National Data Store which holds user registration information is housed in
a data centre that has been certified to the PROTECTED level, ensuring the appropriate physical,
personnel and information controls are in place to protect the data from cyber criminals. All information
stored by the COVIDSafe app (both on the phone and in the data store) is encrypted, making it
unreadable to anyone who accessing it. The Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC) has also undertaken
an assessment of the COVIDSafe app to provide additional assurance that information gathered by the
HEALTH AND AGED CARE
app remains secure and cannot be accessed.
Any advice would be greatly appreciated. The comms people will most likely change the wording but I
INFORMATION
just wanted to get the scope and sentiment right.
Thanks
Daniel Keys
Chief Information Officer and Chief Security Officer
Information Technology Division | Corporate Operations Group
Australian Government Department of Health
FREEDOM OF
T: (02) 6289
| M:
| E: xxxxxx.xxxx@xxxxxx.xxx.xx
s22
s22
Location:
THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN RELEASED UNDER
s22
PO Box 9848, Canberra ACT 2601, Australia
THE
Executive Assistant
| (02) 6289
|
@health.gov.au
s22
s22
s22
BY THE DEPARTMENT OF
Executive Officer
| (02) 6289
|
@health.gov.au
s22
s22
s22
The Department of Health acknowledges the traditional owners of country throughout Australia, and their continuing connection to
land, sea and community. We pay our respects to them and their cultures, and to elders both past and present.
Page 3 of 4
FOI 4145 - Document 9
"Important: This transmission is intended only for the use of the addressee and may contain
confidential or legally privileged information. If you are not the intended recipient, you are
notified that any use or dissemination of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you receive
this transmission in error please notify the author immediately and delete all copies of this
transmission."
UNDER (CTH) CARE
1982 AGED
ACT
RELEASED AND
BEEN HEALTH
HAS INFORMATION
OF
OF
DOCUMENT
FREEDOM
DEPARTMENT
THIS
THE THE
BY
Page 4 of 4
FOI 4145 - Document 10
From:
KEYS, Daniel
Sent:
Wednesday, 27 May 2020 8:03 PM
To:
s22
Subject:
RE: COVIDSafe [SEC=OFFICIAL]
Hi s22
That case had 938 digital handshakes in a 48 hour period but none of them qualified for our definition of
a close contact due to missing pings and proximity. The DTA are recommending some changes to the
algorithm to improve the hit rate and we are doing that in consultation with NSW and the policy folks.
I’ll fill you in once we sort it all out
UNDER (CTH) CARE
Daniel Keys Chief Information Officer and Chief Security Officer
1982
Information Technology Division | Corporate Operations Group
AGED
Australian Government Department of Health
T: (02) 6289
| M:
| E: xxxxxx.xxxx@xxxxxx.xxx.xx
s22
s22
Location:
ACT
s22
PO Box 9848, Canberra ACT 2601, Australia
AND
Executive Assistant
RELEASED
| (02) 6289
|
@health.gov.au
s22
s22
s22
Executive Officer
| (02) 6289
|
@health.gov.au
s22
s22
s22
The Department of Health acknowledges the traditional owners of country throughout Australia, and their continuing connection to
land, sea and community. We pay our respects to them and their cultures, and to elders both past and present.
BEEN HEALTH
From: s22
@health.gov.au>
HAS
OF
Date: Tuesday, 26 May 2020, 2:05 pm
INFORMATION
To: KEYS, Daniel <xxxxxx.xxxx@xxxxxx.xxx.xx>
Subject: COVIDSafe [SEC=OFFICIAL] OF
Hi Daniel,
I was just wondering if the problem you mentioned a week and a half ago has been resolved – the one
where the couple who both tested positive for COVID-19, and who had both downloaded COVIDSafe on
Day 1, had no data to upload.
DOCUMENT
It’s for my own knowledge, not a response to anyone else.
DEPARTMENT
Thanks
FREEDOM
s22
THIS
THE THE
BY
Page 1 of 1
FOI 4145 - Document 11
From:
KEYS, Daniel
Sent:
Thursday, 28 May 2020 8:37 AM
To:
s22
; McBride, Paul; s22
Subject:
RE: data dump from NSW [SEC=OFFICIAL]
Thanks s22
I don’t think this is an escalation. More that I have been hassling the DTA on a whole range of fronts and
they have finally given in and send me something they promised to do a week ago!
Glad your across it to keep them honest.
Daniel Keys
Chief Information Officer and Chief Security Officer
UNDER (CTH) CARE
Information Technology Division | Corporate Operations Group
1982
Australian Government Department of Health
AGED
T: (02) 6289
| M:
| E: xxxxxx.xxxx@xxxxxx.xxx.xx
s22
s22
Location: Sirius Building 2.N.510
PO Box 9848, Canberra ACT 2601, Australia
ACT AND
Executive Assistant
RELEASED
(02) 6289
|
@health.gov.au
s22
s22
s22
Executive Officer
| (02) 6289
|
@health.gov.au
s22
s22
s22
BEEN
The Department of Health acknowledges the traditional owners of country throughout Australia, and their continuing connection to
HEALTH
land, sea and community. We pay our respects to them and their cultures, and to elders both past and present.
OF
From:
HAS
s22
INFORMATION
Sent: Wednesday, 27 May 2020 8:24 PM
To: KEYS, Daniel ; McBride, Paul ; s22
OF
Subject: RE: data dump from NSW [SEC=OFFICIAL]
Thanks Daniel,
In short I am aware of and support recommendation 1, however I have been pushing back on 2 at this
DOCUMENT
stage.
FREEDOM
DEPARTMENT
Recommendation 1.
THIS
I have been involved in some discussions regarding the algorithm and have been kept in the loop with
THE
regards to DTA fixing the bug in the original algorithm. This bug was one of the reasons NSW was having
THE
limited hits within the portal and further investigations in to the algorithm identified room for
BY
improvements.
With this in mind I have been very clear that the enhancements to the algorithm are fine as long as it
remains within the pre-defined business rules (15min, 1.5m) as this change ensures the COVIDSafe
system is integral and functioning as per the expectations.
Page 1 of 4
FOI 4145 - Document 11
Recommendation 2.
I have also made it very clear that the business rules are very firm as they are specific within the new
Bilateral agreements. Nothing this however, I have suggested the option to consider reviewing the
business rules if it is absolutely necessary. For this to occur, I was expecting a combined business case be
prepared between the states through the Information Management Committee (under the leadership
from Paul and Shane based off state feedback). Also I am clear for this to occur is a significant policy
change which will need coverage at the ministerial level, AHPPC and or other. Thus the need for a
significant business case and a strong coalition of the willing. Further it is too early for this too occur.
I am very surprised also that this has been escalated already. These discussions are very new.
Happy to discuss this in more detail.
(CTH) CARE
s22
UNDER
From: KEYS, Daniel <xxxxxx.xxxx@xxxxxx.xxx.xx>
Sent: Wednesday, 27 May 2020 8:08 PM
1982
To: McBride, Paul <xxxx.xxxxxxx@xxxxxx.xxx.xx>; s22
@health.gov.au>; s22
,
AGED
s22
@health.gov.au>; s22
@health.gov.au>; s22
s22
@health.gov.au>
ACT
Subject: FW: data dump from NSW [SEC=OFFICIAL]
AND
RELEASED
FYI.
Not sure if anyone has been involved in these discussion but I am worried that the DTA is engaging with
NSW on policy options without full consideration. Something for us all to be aware of.
BEEN HEALTH
I’m also quite surprised that this hasn’t been given greater priority given the impact on the effectiveness
of the app and commentary in the media.
HAS INFORMATION
OF
Daniel Keys Chief Information Officer and Chief Security Officer
OF
Information Technology Division | Corporate Operations Group
Australian Government Department of Health
T: (02) 6289
| M:
| E: xxxxxx.xxxx@xxxxxx.xxx.xx
s22
s22
DOCUMENT
Location: s22
PO Box 9848, Canberra ACT 2601, Australia
DEPARTMENT
FREEDOM
Executive Assistant
THIS | (02) 6289 |
@health.gov.au
s22
s22
s22
Executive Officer
THE THE
| (02) 6289
|
@health.gov.au
s22
s22
s22
BY
The Department of Health acknowledges the traditional owners of country throughout Australia, and their continuing connection to
land, sea and community. We pay our respects to them and their cultures, and to elders both past and present.
From: Anthony Warnock <xxxxxxx.xxxxxxx@xxx.xxx.xx>
Page 2 of 4
FOI 4145 - Document 11
Date: Wednesday, 27 May 2020, 6:47 pm
To: KEYS, Daniel <xxxxxx.xxxx@xxxxxx.xxx.xx>, s22
s22
@dta.gov.au>
Cc: s22
@dta.gov.au>, s22
<s22
@dta.gov.au>, s22
@dta.gov.au>
Subject: data dump from NSW [SEC=OFFICIAL]
OFFICIAL
Daniel,
Apologies meant to send the data dump file through earlier, but s22
has done some
analysis on it now and some commentary included below (Thanks s22
).
UNDER (CTH) CARE
My takeaway is when we get 3 phones in Bluetooth range, the new Bluetooth beaconing
seems to be setting them off and we are getting really good consecutive encounters. In
other occasions we seem to drop some in a 15 minute window which is resulting in the
1982
encounters being filtered out.
AGED
Also spoke to the UK tonight and they have offered to share some modelling they have
ACT
done with the telcos which helps characterise the handset Bluetooth perform
AND ance for a
RELEASED
range of handsets, that would be good to incorporate into the algorithm as well.
Summary and recommendations: Bluetooth handshake data is being recorded and uploaded by the app in sufficient
BEEN
quantity for analysis and tracing purposes. There were 938 handshakes in a 46 hour
HEALTH
period (avg 1 per 3 minutes, not accounting for time periods where devices may have
been off or out of range). HAS
OF
INFORMATION
Recommendation: Algorithm used to determine probability of proximity (within 1.5m)
to be refined.
OF
The data as classified by the current algorithm contained no legitimate High or Medium
results, and the defined thresholds (for High, Medium and Low) are not in the same
order of magnitude as the calculated probability scores.
Proposed change: Based on feedback from the BCG data team, a fix for this issue is
currently undergoing development and testing, for release as a bug fix this week.
DOCUMENT
DEPARTMENT
Recommendation: Implementation of the business rule defining 15 contacts in 15
FREEDOM
minutes as a close contact should be refined.
THIS There are many sets of handshakes that a human would identify as being close contact,
THE THE
but the strict definition of this rule removes them from the portal output.
For example: Between 3pm and 3:31pm, there were 21 handshakes. This could
BY
reasonably be considered “close contact” within the spirit of the business rule.
However, because handshakes do not occur exactly every minute during this time, it
would currently be excluded from the portal view for states.
Proposed change: The DTA and BCG data team are putting together a detailed
description of this problem, along with a proposed modification to the implementation
of the business rule, for discussion with the Health team later this week.
Page 3 of 4
FOI 4145 - Document 11
Engagement NSW is aware that the DTA is currently working on the proximity algorithm, and we will
be meeting to discuss any changes in the portal output once the fix has been released to
production.
Anthony Warnock
Digital Infrastructure Service
Digital Delivery & Corporate Division
Digital Transformation Agency
Australian Government
(CTH) CARE
www.dta.gov.au
UNDER
P: s47F
| E: s22
@dta.gov.au
1982
AGED
s22
- Executive Assistant
P:
ACT
s47F
| E: s22
@dta.gov.au
AND
RELEASED
BEEN HEALTH
HAS
OF
INFORMATION
OF OFFICIAL
__________________________________________________________________
____
DOCUMENT
IMPORTANT: This message, and any attachments to it, contains information
DEPARTMENT
that is confidential and may also be the subject of legal professional or
FREEDOM
other privilege. If you are not the intended recipient of this message, you
THIS
must not review, copy, disseminate or disclose its contents to any other
THE
party or take acti
THE on in reliance of any material contained within it. If you
have received this message in error, please notify the sender immediately by
BY
return email informing them of the mistake and delete all copies of the
message from your computer system.
______________________________________________________________________
Page 4 of 4
FOI 4145 - Document 12
From:
KEYS, Daniel
Sent:
Sunday, 24 May 2020 2:52 PM
To:
News
Cc:
News
Subject:
RE: Media Inquiry - The Australian - COVIDSafe app [SEC=OFFICIAL]
How about this s22
?
Approaches have been received from the United Kingdom, Canada, the United States, the Netherlands,
Sri Lanka and New Zealand. The DTA and Health continue to engage internationally providing advice on
the approach and implementation as each country seeks to adopt the latest tools to contain the virus.
(CTH) CARE
Enjoy the rest of your Sunday :)
UNDER
Daniel Keys
1982 AGED
Chief Information Officer and Chief Security Officer
ACT
Information Technology Division | Corporate Operations Group
AND
Australian Government Department of Health
RELEASED
T: (02) 6289 s22 | M s22
| E: xxxxxx.xxxx@xxxxxx.xxx.xx
Location: s22
PO Box 9848, Canberra ACT 2601, Australia BEEN
Executive Assistant
HEALTH
s22
(02) 6289s22
Executive Officer
HAS
OF
s22
| (02) 6289 s22
INFORMATION
OF
The Department of Health acknowledges the traditional owners of country throughout Australia, and
their continuing connection to land, sea and community. We pay our respects to them and their
cultures, and to elders both past and present.
DOCUMENT
From: News <xxxx@xxxxxx.xxx.xx>
FREEDOM
DEPARTMENT
Date: Sunday, 24 May 2020, 2:14 pm
To: KEYS, Daniel <xxxxxx.xxxx@xxxxxx.xxx.xx>
THIS
Cc: News <xxxx@xxxxxx.xxx.xx>
THE THE
Subject: FW: Media Inquiry - The Australian - COVIDSafe app [SEC=OFFICIAL]
BY
Hi Daniel,
Are you able to assist with a couple of lines for the below for The Australian about countries showing
interest in the COVIDSafe app?
Let me know if there’s any issues.
Thanks,
Page 1 of 3
FOI 4145 - Document 12
s22
Media Unit
Department of Health
T: s22
Mobile: s22
xxxx@xxxxxx.xxx.xx Unless stated otherwise, this information is provided on a background basis and should not be attributed.
From: s47E(d)
Sent: Sunday, 24 May 2020 1:57 PM
To: News
Subject: Media Inquiry - The Australian - COVIDSafe app [SEC=OFFICIAL]
Hi s22 ,
Inquiry from s47F
– The Australian.
As per the highlighted in your Media Release - Is there any more details about overseas
(CTH) CARE
countries showing an interest in the COVIDSafe app?
UNDER
Could you please draft a couple of lines as to where things currently stand.
Cheers,
1982
s22
| Assistant Media Adviser
AGED
Office of the Hon. Greg Hunt MP
Minister for Health | Federal Member for Flinders
ACT
Suite s22
AND
T. s47F
|
E. s47E(d) @health.gov.au
RELEASED
From: s22
Sent: Sunday, 24 May 2020 7:14 AM
To:
BEEN
s22
@health.gov.au>
HEALTH
Cc: s22
@health.gov.au>; s22
s22
@servicesaustralia.gov.au>; s22
@servicesaustralia.gov.au>
HAS
OF
Subject: 20-05-24 Hunt Robert - Joint Media Release - World-leading COVIDSafe app working and
INFORMATION
delivering [SEC=OFFICIAL]
OF
The Hon. Greg Hunt MP
DOCUMENT
Minister for Health
DEPARTMENT
The Hon. Stuart Robert MP
FREEDOM
Minister for the National Disability Insurance Scheme
THIS
Minister for Government Services
THE
JOINT MEDIA RELEASE
THE
24 May 2020
World-leading COVIDSafe app working and delivering
BY
The Australian Government’s COVIDSafe app has reached six million downloads less than a month after
being launched by Australia’s health leaders. The app is helping state and territory public health officials
automate and improve manual contact tracing of the coronavirus.
Since its launch, the COVIDSafe app has received widespread support and endorsement from across the
Australian community, including public health officials, information technology and cyber security
experts, the Australian business community, major sporting codes, and every state and territory leader.
Page 2 of 3
FOI 4145 - Document 12
The COVIDSafe app is already proving to be a valuable tool. In Victoria, a person who had not been
identified through the normal processes, was notified as being a close contact by the app. That person is
now in quarantine, protecting the community from a further potential spread of the virus.
Minister for Health Greg Hunt said the COVIDSafe app is playing a significant role in Australia’s world-
leading health response to the coronavirus pandemic, with several countries having expressed interest in
learning from its positive impacts in Australia.
“Australia continues to be a world leader in testing, tracing, and containing the coronavirus and I would
encourage all Australians to contribute to that effort and download the COVIDSafe app today,” Minister
Hunt said.
“Remember, as state and territory health officials start to use the COVIDSafe app as part of their tracing
efforts, they will only have access to contact information for those people you may have come in close
contact with—that is, 1.5m or less for a duration of 15 minutes or more.”
Minister for Government Services Stuart Robert said the uptake of the COVIDSafe app and its use by state
(CTH) CARE
health officials, demonstrates the app is doing its job as part of Australia’s health response to the
UNDER
coronavirus pandemic.
“The COVIDSafe app was downloaded faster than any other Australian Government app and has
consistently remained the top free app in the Australian app stores. Millions of Australians are doing their
1982 AGED
bit as part of our health response,” Minister Robert said.
As restrictions ease, it’s important all Australians stay COVIDSafe. It’s critically important Australians know
ACT
how to protect themselves and others.
AND
Practical steps include:
RELEASED
• Washing your hands.
• Physical distancing
• Using the COVIDSafe app.
Do the three and stay COVID free.
BEEN
For further details about the Australian Government’s response to COVID-1
HEALTH 9 visit
https://www.australia.gov.au/
-END-
HAS INFORMATION
OF
Authorised by Greg Hunt MP, Liberal Party of Australia, Somerville, Victoria.
s22
| Assistant Media Adviser
OF
Office of the Hon. Greg Hunt MP
Minister for Health | Federal Member for Flinders
Suite s22
T. s47F
|
E. s47E(d) @health.gov.au
DOCUMENT
FREEDOM
DEPARTMENT
THIS
THE THE
BY
Page 3 of 3
FOI 4145 - Document 13
From:
KEYS, Daniel
Sent:
Wednesday, 27 May 2020 8:12 PM
To:
McBride, Paul; EDWARDS, Caroline; s22
; s22
Subject:
RE: OAIC requirement delaying the bilats [SEC=OFFICIAL]
Thanks Paul.
Once we are comfortable with the approach I suggest we share with s22
for visibility as she rang me
today to talk about the data deletion again. Clearly it is causing some angst between offices.
Daniel Keys Chief Information Officer and Chief Security Officer
(CTH) CARE
Information Technology Division | Corporate Operations Group
UNDER
Australian Government Department of Health
T: (02) 6289
| M:
| E: xxxxxx.xxxx@xxxxxx.xxx.xx
s22
s22
Location: s22
1982
PO Box 9848, Canberra ACT 2601, Australia
AGED
Executive Assistant
| (02) 6289
|
@health.gov.au
s22
s22
s22
Executive Officer
ACT
| (02) 6289
@health.gov.au
s22
s22
s22
AND
The Department of Health acknowledges the traditional owners of country throughout Australia, and their continuing connection to
RELEASED
land, sea and community. We pay our respects to them and their cultures, and to elders both past and present.
From: McBride, Paul <xxxx.xxxxxxx@xxxxxx.xxx.xx>
BEEN
Date: Wednesday, 27 May 2020, 6:48 pm
HEALTH
To: s22
@health.gov.au>, s22
@health.gov.au>,
s22
@health.gov.au>, KEYS, Daniel <xxxxxx.xxxx@xxxxxx.xxx.xx>
HAS
OF
Subject: OAIC requirement delaying the bilats [SEC=OFFICIAL]
INFORMATION
Hi
OF
As you know, we’ve had discussions with the states and territories on revising the Bilateral Agreements
to take account of the amendments to the Privacy Act, and to facilitate downloading of COVID App data.
Their feedback has been relatively benign and we are close to having a final.
However recent feedback from the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner is likely to delay
finalisation DOCUMENT
They have expressed three main concerns
DEPARTMENT
(i)
FREEDOM
That the way we seek to measure 1.5m by using Bluetooth strength is inconsistent with the
PIA and the training materials. We spoke to OAIC again today, and we think they are ok
THIS on this issue
THE THE
(ii) Postcodes and the fact that a state may end up with contact information about a person in
another state. As discussed previously, we will try and capture the processes that states
BY use to share relevant data and the protections they have in place. However postcodes
was always going to be a proxy (given that postcodes cross state boarders) so we may
have to wear a level of dissatisfaction from the OAIC on this
(iii) Downloading. The OAIC is seeking more specific requirements with respect to downloading
of data onto state systems, including:
Page 1 of 2
FOI 4145 - Document 13
• That a risk assessment has been undertaken with respect to handling of
downloaded data to ensure that privacy risks are mitigated (e.g. they have
proposed that states and territories conduct privacy impact assessments),
and
• That downloaded data will be deleted within a specified time period (14 days),
rather than being deleted when no longer relevant as required under the
privacy principles. This is a higher standard than is placed on app data held
in the data store, that sits there until the end of the pandemic, unless
people make specific requests to delete
We’ve had discussions with Victoria who have been advocating for the export functionality and they
already have a PIA underway. We will go back to the other jurisdictions to test the proposal for a PIA
and other OAIC recommendations with them. I guessing some states will be prepared to go down the
PIA path, some will consider the burden associated with downloading outweighs the benefit and will
(CTH) CARE
choose not to download, and some states will get angry and ask for a lesser standard than the OAIC
UNDER
prefers. We will test the states positions on this from tomorrow.
As a result of the above, the App data export functionality is being modified so that the DTA only
provides the download function to those states willing to meet a minimum data privacy
1982 / security
AGED
standard We expect this to be in place by 12 June.
While we could try and push the states to sign the agreement by this Friday, I think it is better to try and
ACT
get the download function and its necessary protections in place, even if that means delaying it a week
AND
i.e we now aim to sign by 12 June when download functionality is ready
RELEASED
I’m also inclined to try and address the OAIC concerns, as I think this will also assist in addressing
concerns from the Minister’s Office. I understand that the Attorney’s Office have also been seeking
further information with respect to downloading of data.
Please let me know if you have any comments or concerns.
BEEN
Your loyal servant
HEALTH
Paul
HAS INFORMATION
OF
OF
DOCUMENT
FREEDOM
DEPARTMENT
THIS
THE THE
BY
Page 2 of 2
FOI 4145 - Document 14
From:
KEYS, Daniel
Sent:
Monday, 25 May 2020 5:20 PM
To:
s22
Subject:
RE: Update on COVIDSafe R4 [SEC=OFFICIAL]
Issues as discussed…
1) CGM Bluetooth issues – Diabetes Australia continues to raise concerns regarding interference
with CGM products and I think we need to consider applying and testing the Data61
recommendations to determine a way forward so that we can close the loop.
2) Multi-language support – We currently translate the COVIDSafe help content to 63 languages in
addition to translating the privacy policy however we also need to consider multi-language
support within the app itself.
(CTH) CARE
3) Older operating systems support – keen to understand what additional work is being
UNDER
undertaken in addition to the support for Android version 5.1. Do we still plan on trying to
support Android Go or not?
4) Smart watch version – ability to run the app on smart watches.
1982 AGED
5) Support for Huawei and Oppo phones
ACT
Thanks
RELEASED AND
Daniel Keys
Chief Information Officer and Chief Security Officer
BEEN
Information Technology Division | Corporate Operations Group
HEALTH
Australian Government Department of Health
T: (02) 6289
| M:
| E: xxxxxx.xxxx@xxxxxx.xxx.xx
s22
s22
Location: s22
HAS
OF
PO Box 9848, Canberra ACT 2601, Australia INFORMATION
Executive Assistant
| (02) 6289
|
@health.gov.au
s22
s22
s22
OF
Executive Officer
| (02) 6289
|
@health.gov.au
s22
s22
s22
The Department of Health acknowledges the traditional owners of country throughout Australia, and their continuing connection to
land, sea and community. We pay our respects to them and their cultures, and to elders both past and present.
DOCUMENT
From:
DEPARTMENT
s22
FREEDOM
Sent: Monday, 25 May 2020 2:19 PM
THIS
To: KEYS, Daniel THE
Subject: FW: Update on COVIDSafe R4 [SEC=OFFICIAL]
THE
BY
From: s22
@servicesaustralia.gov.au>
Sent: Monday, 25 May 2020 11:54 AM
To: s22
@pm.gov.au>; s22
@health.gov.au>; s22
s22
@pm.gov.au) <s22
@pm.gov.au>
Page 1 of 2
FOI 4145 - Document 14
Cc: s22
@servicesaustralia.gov.au>; s22
s22
@servicesaustralia.gov.au>; s22
@servicesaustralia.gov.au>
Subject: Update on COVIDSafe R4 [SEC=OFFICIAL]
Team,
For your visibility, please see attached the details of the upcoming releases on May 26 (tomorrow) and
June 3 (next week) for both the backend portal as well as the app.
Any questions, please let me know.
Regards,
s22
UNDER (CTH) CARE
**********************************************************************
IMPORTANT: This e-mail is for the use of the intended recipient only and may contain
1982
information that is confidential, commercially valuable and/or subject to legal or parliamentary
AGED
privilege. If you are not the intended recipient you are notified that any review, re-transmission,
disclosure, dissemination or other use of, or taking of any action in reliance upon, this
ACT
information is prohibited and may result in severe penalties. If you have received this e-mail in
AND
error please notify the sender immediately and delete all electronic and hard copies of this
RELEASED
transmission together with any attachments. Please consider the environment before printing this
e-mail **********************************************************************
BEEN HEALTH
HAS INFORMATION
OF
OF
DOCUMENT
FREEDOM
DEPARTMENT
THIS
THE THE
BY
Page 2 of 2
FOI 4145 - Document 15
From:
Daniel Keys s47F
Sent:
Wednesday, 27 May 2020 10:37 AM
To:
KEYS, Daniel
Subject:
RRIF Q011 Using the COVIDSafe app 17 May 2020.pdf.pdf [SEC=No
Protective Marking]
Attachments:
RRIF Q011 Using the COVIDSafe app 17 May 2020.pdf.pdf; ATT00001.htm
UNDER (CTH) CARE
1982 AGED
ACT
RELEASED AND
BEEN HEALTH
HAS INFORMATION
OF
OF
DOCUMENT
FREEDOM
DEPARTMENT
THIS
THE THE
BY
Page 1 of 17
UNDER (CTH) CARE
1982 AGED
ACT
RELEASED AND
BEEN HEALTH
HAS INFORMATION
OF
OF
DOCUMENT
FREEDOM
DEPARTMENT
THIS
THE THE
BY
FOI 4145 - Document 15
17 May 2020
This rapid research brief responds to the question: what motivates people to download and continue to use
the COVIDSafe app?
• Since launching on 26 April 2020, 5.7 million Australians have downloaded COVIDSafe, the fastest
uptake of any app in Australian history (as at 15 May).
• As a digital aid to manual contact tracing, COVIDSafe offers a potentially valuable supplement to
protecting public health in an ongoing epidemic. Similar apps are in use globally.
• Collective and societal wellbeing are strong motivators for uptake of COVIDSafe, as is the ability to
exercise individual choice and control, including to permanently delete the app and its data.
• Potential barriers to the uptake of COVIDSafe include access, language, trust in government, p
(CTH) rivacy
UNDER CARE
concerns, and reliability of the technology.
• The motivation to continue use of COVIDSafe will rely on addressing the above poten
1982 tial barriers as
AGED
well as demonstrating a positive impact on contact tracing, confidence in government management of
further outbreaks, transparency, and effective messaging from communit
ACT y leaders.
AND
• The success of COVIDSafe will ultimately be measured by the number o
RELEASED f positive cases identified and
quarantined because of the app and its contribution to containing community spread as lockdown
restrictions are relaxed.
BEEN HEALTH
OF
The COVID-19 pandemic is an urgent, populati
HAS on-wide health challenge. The Australian Government’s public
INFORMATION
health response necessitated rapid and extensive viral testing, physical distancing, isolation protocols and
OF
contact tracing. The COVIDSafe app for android and iPhone smartphones is a form of digital contact tracing
that offers a potentially useful supplement to manual tracing. COVIDSafe is one of several contact tracing
apps being rapidly developed around the world. Uptake is voluntary and relies on wide deployment
(download and instal ation) and susta
DOCUMENT ined use. Since launching on 26 April 2020, COVIDSafe has been
downloaded by 5.7 million Australians, the fastest uptak
DEPARTMENT e of any app in Australian history. This represents
FREEDOM
more than a third of the estimated 16.4 million adult smartphone users in Australia.1
THIS THE
While user sentim
THE ent and consumer surveys are beginning to emerge, there is as yet little data on what
motivates Australian
BY s to download COVIDSafe.2–4 To understand the drivers of adoption, this paper looks at
past successful public health campaigns as well the use of non-commercial apps (i.e., volunteer fire and
emergency services apps).5 The paper also looks more broadly at behavioural research that addresses public
motivation at the national and global levels, risk calculations, attitudes to data collection, privacy, and trust in
government.
Page 3 of 17
FOI 4145 - Document 15
The evolving COVID-19 pandemic will continue to shape societal and personal behaviours and attitudes. So
far, the key determinants of whether the public will install and continue to use COVIDSafe include:
• beliefs about COVIDSafe data privacy, security and control
• trust in government and public health experts
• perceptions of individual and collective safety, including perceived risk of contracting the virus and
likely severity of health impacts
• consistent messages across levels of governments, business and local role models
• col ective purpose and community-minded messaging
• technological facility with app use, including ease of use, and appropriate user support
• updates on COVIDSafe’s effectiveness in reducing infection spread and saving lives if this emerges.
UNDER (CTH) CARE
Digital contact tracing aims to complement manual tracing
1982
Contact tracing is a valuable epidemiological strategy for managing highly infectious diseases, in con
AGED cert with
active testing, physical distancing and quarantine protocols.6,7 Manual contact tracing is labour intensive,
ACT
involving structured interviews of infected people by trained health workers and follow
AND -up with al points of
RELEASED
known contact. Further contacts are likely to be interviewed as well as required to undergo mandatory
testing, self-quarantines, and medical observation.
BEEN
COVIDSafe is intended to expedite manual contact tracing by automating and accelerating data collection.8-10
HEALTH
It uses Bluetooth-enabled smartphone technology to identify when a person is in proximity to another user of
HAS
OF
the app and for how long. According to existing arrangements, when a person tests positive for COVID-19, the
INFORMATION
doctor or hospital will notify public health officials who initiate manual contact tracing. If the infected person
OF
has installed the app, they may be asked by public health officials to upload data from their device to a central
database. The system is intended to help public health officials identify all the contacts of an infected person,
including those unknown to them, during the period they were considered contagious. Public health officials
DOCUMENT
remain responsible for notifying people of a positive test result, verifying the data and making risk and
DEPARTMENT
exposure determinations for contacts.
FREEDOM One potential drawback is the amount of additional work digital
contact tracing c
THIS ould generate.11
THE THE
The use of contact tracing apps is new
BY
As of 7 May 2020, 23 countries have COVID-19 tracing apps, nine are in development and 14 have been
launched.12 They vary according to location technologies, data storage and retention practices as well as
oversight and review.11,13 The majority of global apps use centralised data storage and absolute location
technology, including global positioning systems (GPS) and cel -tower triangulation. The choice of how and
Page 4 of 17
FOI 4145 - Document 15
where to store user data may impact adoption and usage rates.14 Australia’s approach involves col ection and
storage of user data on a local device. In the event of a positive test, depending on user consent, data will be
stored central y using Amazon Web Services. Australia’s choice to use Bluetooth (i.e., proximity data rather
than absolute location) for COVIDSafe is in line with best-practice protocols for privacy-preserving contact
tracing, as it forgoes the collection of a broader set of data.15
The uptake of contact tracing apps global y has been uneven. It is not yet clear what the optimum adoption
rate is and how this might change over the course of the pandemic.16 Governments and public health officials
are modifying the apps in real time. The uptake rate at the time of launch may correlate with the perceived
success of a government’s management of the pandemic and sustained use may depend on continued
successful overall management. Iceland, for example, has a very high adoption rate of a voluntary contact-
(CTH) CARE
tracing app (almost 40% of the population by 22 April, about three weeks after launching).17,18
UNDER At launch,
Iceland had already embarked on a mass testing program combined with aggressive quarantine measures to
1982
contain community spread.
AGED
Technical issues have also impacted uptake. Singapore’s TraceTogether has experienced technical problems,
ACT AND
such as iPhone incompatibility, and general problems with functionality (not able to take calls with the app
RELEASED
running in the background). Less than 20% of its population has downloaded the app to date.19
Motivations for downloading COVIDSafe BEEN HEALTH
The role of COVIDSafe differs from the Australian Government’s previous public health and educational
HAS
OF
campaigns where apps have been used predominately as a communication platform.20 Social drivers for the
INFORMATION
uptake of an app that collects personal information include self-interest, tradeoffs between perceived
OF
benefits, a clear sense that the app will play a central role in the desired outcome, and trust in government.21
While the motives for adoption between commercial and non-commercial apps are likely to differ, the rapid
uptake of the volunteer fire and emergency services apps during the 2019–20 bushfire season offers evidence
for widespread civic engagement and
DOCUMENT trust of a governmental app to provide immediate personal safety and
DEPARTMENT
broader community safety.22
FREEDOM
THIS
Public campaigns that have aimed to ‘get the community on board’ have led to lasting behaviour change
THE THE
without having to resort to coercive measures.23 Previous Australian public health campaigns, such as ‘Slip
BY
Slop Slap’ and ‘SunSmart’ achieved social and individual change, based on research, evaluation, and
consistency and continuity of messaging.24 Queensland Water’s ‘Water Wise’ campaign saw a reduction in per
capita water consumption and was highly effective not only in providing information, but also in appealing to
a shared identity and purpose, and a sense that people have, on altruistic grounds, a duty to take on small
costs when doing so can prevent severe harms from occurring to others.25–28
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Impact of the digital divide on COVIDSafe
Uptake and use of COVIDSafe may be negatively impacted by Australia’s ‘digital divide’. There are challenges
of access, affordability and ability for Australians with lower levels of income, education and employment, and
for people over 65, Indigenous Australians, people with disability and those living in regional and remote
Australia.29–31 According to one widely-used measure of digital inclusion, these gaps are substantial and have
proved to be persistent. Australians in the lower income ‘quintiles’, for example, consistently score
substantially lower than the Australian average. The digital inclusion gap between Australians in the highest
income and those in the lowest remains unchanged since 2014.29 Addressing the needs of these diverse
groups is important as many are in high-risk categories for COVID-19.
A review of Australia’s public health response to the H1N1 pandemic found a need for “consistent app
(CTH) roaches
UNDER CARE
to engaging with high-risk communities” including Indigenous people and those from non-English-speaking
backgrounds, where “unsupported mass media has not been shown to be effective”.32
1982 AGED
While Indigenous Australians in both remote and non-remote areas score lower on digital inclusion and
ACT
access, they score above the national average in terms of positive attitudes to digital technologies, and are
AND
already strong users of social media and other platforms to maintain communit
RELEASED y connections.33–35 There are
opportunities to leverage existing Indigenous platforms such as the #thismymob app to support the uptake of
COVIDSafe, in collaboration with trusted community health organisations.
BEEN HEALTH
Research from Taiwan suggests the need for public communications to better cater to multilingual
populations during the COVID-19 pandemic.36 While culturally
OF and linguistically diverse Australians scored
HAS INFORMATION
above the national average in a survey of digital inclusion, there is significant internal diversity within this
community, depending on factors such as age
OF , income, and educational levels.29,37,38 There is benefit in
providing multilingual communication to encourage the use of COVIDSafe by diverse communities; this may
include multilingual versions of the app, as well as culturally appropriate messaging.39
DOCUMENT
Challenges to continued rates of adoption will include privacy, and trust in government
FREEDOM
DEPARTMENT
Major barriers for user uptake of COVIDSafe include concerns about privacy, the security of data-storage
THIS
services and future unsanctio
THE ned use of the data collected by contact tracing apps. This is evident in research
THE
literature and the media.40,41 The complex relationship between attitudes to privacy and individual behaviour
BY
is well documented, including differential disclosure practices involving government and commercial entities –
the blend of governmental and commercial entities in COVIDSafe development and delivery is an additional
complexity.42,43 That people routinely use commercial apps that are far more intrusive on privacy points to the
‘privacy paradox’, a stated commitment to privacy belied by willingness to trade privacy for relatively small
benefits.44 Researchers have also shown that there is a significant ‘endowment effect’ when it comes to
Page 6 of 17
FOI 4145 - Document 15
privacy: if we think it is already lost we won’t pay much to get it back; but if we have it we’re unlikely to let go
of it.45
Attitudes to privacy can depend on the type of data.46,47 The sharing of personal health and medical
information in Australia has been an ongoing issue for many consumers, illustrated by concerns expressed
during the rollout of MyHealth Record.48 However, research on health data prior to the pandemic suggests a
majority of Australians are willing to share personal medical information for the purposes of disease tracking
(60% of respondents, according to one poll), improving patient care (74%) and advancing medical research
(79%).49
A 2018 report found high levels of “support for government to use and share data” but much less confidence
that the Australian Government has the right safeguards in place or can be trusted with people’s data.50 This
UNDER (CTH) CARE
may suggest a concern over the potential for ‘function creep’, the possibility that data col ected for one
purpose is used for other purposes. Recently conducted research on another form of biometric data collection
1982 AGED
– facial recognition technology – found that, despite expressed privacy concerns, 61% of interviewed people
supported the use of facial recognition when the goal was framed in terms of safety and security.51,52
ACT AND
Research also shows that people are more likely to accept the presence of intrusive technologies when they
RELEASED
are not coerced into acceptance, but instead motivated by a col ective benefit, supported by a sense of
solidarity and shared identity.14,53,54
BEEN
On the other hand, research on Australian attitudes toward the collection and
HEALTH use of personal information
suggests that privacy concerns are often expressed in terms of a perceived lack of control over personal
HAS
OF
data.55 For instance, there has been increasing public awareness that ex
INFORMATION isting practices of ‘deidentification’ of
user data are not as secure as once thought.56,57 Uptake and ongoing use of COVIDSafe may then be
OF
influenced by an emphasis on the sense of control provided by multiple decision points for app users:
whether to instal , the ability to delete, the decision to keep one’s phone on (or carry it with oneself), the
ability to disable Bluetooth, and the choice to share contact information upon diagnosis. Confidence that
DOCUMENT
robust privacy safeguards are in place may positively influence uptake.58 Motivations for continued use will
FREEDOM
DEPARTMENT
vary. THIS
The effectiveness of COVIDSafe will ultimately be measured by the number of positive cases identified and
THE THE
quarantined because of the app, as this will most directly reflect the public health agenda to prevent
BY
transmission of the virus.9 Illustrating that COVIDSafe works as intended may assist decision-making for those
yet to download the app.59,60
Page 7 of 17
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COVIDSafe will not only need to stay installed on people’s phones, it wil need to remain active. It is not
known whether the motivation to continue use differs from that for the initial download and installation;
there are very few sources of reliable insight or knowledge upon which to draw and no longitudinal data.
Research into previous public health campaigns and app use suggests that confidence and trust in the
technology is likely to be critical.40 An ongoing program of published independent third-party testing may also
increase confidence in the technology and allay privacy concerns, as may the release of the source code. MIT’s
COVID Tracing Tracker rates apps according to five measures, one of which is transparency.11,15
Potential technical challenges risk undermining confidence and continued use.11 These include:
• the current functionality of the app on both operating systems
(CTH) CARE
• inter-operability with other functionality of the handset and operating system (i.e., current iPhone
UNDER
issues, battery life)
1982
• timing of updates to operating systems or changes in the app
AGED
• upgrades of phone handsets.
ACT
From a usability and functionality perspective, the following factors might help overcom
AND e perceived technical
RELEASED
chal enges and help improve uptake (based on analogous mental health apps used at population level): level
of personalisation; amount of feedback; ease of use; good design; visualisation; support; and
autonomy.11,30,61–63
BEEN HEALTH
Another factor in continued use wil be the extent to which the app no longer feels voluntary or helpful. This
HAS
OF
could include ‘alert fatigue’ if a person is repeatedly contacted by health officials based on their COVIDSafe
INFORMATION
data (i.e., someone working in a high exposure location), or if there are false positive or requirements for
OF
excessive testing, or people feel pressure by their employers or other groups to use the app.
Continued use will also rely on public awareness that the other elements of the public health campaign are in
place and working together effectively; the app cannot be perceived as a direct means of preventing infection.
DOCUMENT
Over-promising the benefits of the app, or overloading manual contact tracers, risks COVIDSafe being
FREEDOM
DEPARTMENT
perceived as failing to live up to expectations, thereby potential y reducing support for its continued uptake.
THIS
There is confidence in the government’s handling of the pandemic. However, previous research shows more
THE THE
than 60% of the population is concerned or very concerned about their data being used by the Australian
BY
Government to make “unfair decisions”.50 The continued use of COVIDSafe will be driven both by trust in the
government and its success with the current pandemic.
The decision by individuals to download and continue to use COVIDSafe will involve reasoned calculations and
it will also involve emotional appeals and sentiment. The role of media, and of social influencers, should not
Page 8 of 17
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be underestimated.64 Empirical evidence from the Ebola crisis shows that leadership by communities and
community support centres had an important role to play; they were seen as credible and trusted sources of
information.65,66 The stories we will tell about Australian responses to, and uses of, COVIDSafe will matter too.
The voices of trusted figures, community leaders, healthcare workers and citizens will likewise inform the
adoption, and continued use of, COVIDSafe.
An important note on available COVID-19 research
Although current COVID-19 research is available through pre-print servers, many of these articles have not yet
been peer reviewed (an imperative pillar of the scientific method) and the relatively short time length of the
(CTH) CARE
current outbreak has resulted in variable testing and reporting practices in different countries
UNDER . Conclusions
drawn need to be interpreted with caution. Pre-prints are marked with a § in the reference list.
1982
This brief is accurate at the time of writing and may become out of date at a later time of reading.
AGED
Consultation with the Australian Academy of the Humanities is possible if the reader has questions.
ACT
RELEASED AND
BEEN HEALTH
HAS INFORMATION
OF
OF
DOCUMENT
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DEPARTMENT
THIS
THE THE
BY
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APPENDIX
Contributing authors and peer reviewers of this rapid research report
Lead author
Distinguished Professor Genevieve Bell AO FTSE, Florence Violet McKenzie Chair, Director of the Autonomy,
Agency & Assurance (3A) Institute, Australian National University
Contributing authors
Professor Mark Andrejevic, School of Media, Film, and Journalism, Monash University
Professor Christian Barry FAHA, School of Philosophy, Australian National University
(CTH) CARE
Professor Helen Christensen AO FASSA FAHMS, Director of the Black Dog Institute
UNDER
Distinguished Professor Larissa Hjorth, Director of the Design and Creative Practice ECP Platform, RMIT
1982 AGED
Professor Matthew Hornsey FASSA, School of Business, University of Queensland
ACT
Professor Jolanda Jetten FASSA, Australian Research Council Laureate Fellow, School of Psychology, University
RELEASED AND
of Queensland
Associate Professor Christopher Lawrence, Director of the Centre for Indigenous Technology Research and
Development, Faculty of Engineering & Information Techn
BEEN ology, University of Technology Sydney
HEALTH
Professor Seth Lazar, School of Philosophy, Australian National University
HAS
OF
Associate Professor Mark Taylor, Deputy Director of HeLEX@Melbourne
INFORMATION , Melbourne Law School, University of
Melbourne
OF
Peer reviewers
Professor Susan Dodds, Deputy Vice-Chancellor (Research and Industry Engagement) and Professor of
Philosophy, La Trobe University
DOCUMENT
DEPARTMENT
Professor Gerard Goggin FAHA, Wee Ki
FREEDOM m Wee Chair in Communication Studies, Nanyang Technological
THIS
University, Singapore
THE THE
Dr Melissa Gregg, Senior Principal Engineer and Chief Technologist, User Experience & Sustainability, Intel
BY
Professor Katherine Reynolds, College of Health and Medicine, Australian National University
Acknowledgements
The production of this rapid research report was supported by Dr Christina Parolin and Dr Kylie Brass of the
Australian Academy of the Humanities. Edited by Dr Elizabeth Finkel AM and Ms Robyn Diamond.
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References
1.
At June 2019, approximately 16.4 million Australians aged 18 years and over had a smartphone. ACMA.
Communications report 2018–19. https://www.acma.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-
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Australian Government has the ability to prevent data being hacked or leaked (30%); can be trusted to
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use data responsibly (29%); or is open and honest about how data are col ected, used and shared
(27%). Biddle, N., Edwards, B., Gray, M. & Mceachern, S.
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ACT
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BEEN HEALTH
HAS INFORMATION
OF
OF
DOCUMENT
FREEDOM
DEPARTMENT
THIS
THE THE
BY
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RAPID RESEARCH
INFORMATION FORUM
Motivators for use of
the COVIDSafe app
UNDER (CTH) CARE
1982 AGED
The Rapid Research Information Forum (RRIF) is a forum for rapid inf
ACT ormation
sharing and collaboration within the Australian research and innovation sect
AND or.
RELEASED
It is convened by Australia’s Chief Scientist, Dr Alan Finkel AO FTSE FAA
FAHMS, and its operations are led by the Australian Academy of Science.
RRIF provides a mechanism to rapidly bring together relevant multidisciplinary
BEEN
research expertise to address pressing questions about Australia’s response to
HEALTH
COVID-19, as they emerge.
HAS
OF
RRIF enables timely responses to be provided to governments based on the
INFORMATION
best available evidence. RRIF also informs the Chief Scientist’s interactions
and collaboration with other national chief scientific advisers. It demonstrates
OF
the critical value of research and innovation in driving societal as well as
economic progress now and into the future.
Forum member organisations
• Australia’s Chief Scientist (Chair)
DOCUMENT
• Australian Academy of Science (AAS)
FREEDOM
DEPARTMENT
• Australian Academy of Health and Medical Sciences (AAHMS)
• Australian A
THIS cademy of Technology and Engineering (ATSE)
THE
• Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia (ASSA)
THE
• Australian Academy of the Humanities (AAH)
BY
• Royal Society Te Apārangi (New Zealand)
• Australian Council of Learned Academies (ACOLA)
• State and Territory Chief Scientists and representatives
• Chief Science Advisor to the Government of New Zealand
• Scientific expert members of the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC)
• CSIRO
• Universities Australia (UA)
• Science & Technology Australia (STA)
Page 17 of 17
FOI 4145 - Document 16
From:
KEYS, Daniel
Sent:
Friday, 22 May 2020 8:28 AM
To:
s47E(d)
Cc:
Wann, Charles; s22
; s22
Subject:
Weekly update [SEC=OFFICIAL]
Good morning all
s22
UNDER (CTH) CARE
1982 AGED
ACT AND
I spent a large proportion of the week responding to media requests regarding the COVIDSafe app and
RELEASED
working with the DTA, Google and Apple on their newly announced Exposure Notification Framework.
We have a small team from across the division helping me out coordinate the backlog of changes,
responding to ministerial correspondence and providing input to the comms team for various public
statements and help content. Thanks to all involved for all you support. Minister Hunt said yesterday
BEEN
how happy he was with the way the app was being received and asked me to thank all those involved.
HEALTH
s22
HAS INFORMATION
OF
OF
DOCUMENT
FREEDOM
DEPARTMENT
THIS
THE THE
Hope everyone has a wonderful weekend ☺
BY
Daniel Keys
Chief Information Officer and Chief Security Officer
Information Technology Division | Corporate Operations Group
Australian Government Department of Health
T: (02) 6289
| M:
| E: xxxxxx.xxxx@xxxxxx.xxx.xx
s22
s22
Page 1 of 2
FOI 4145 - Document 16
s22
PO Box 9848, Canberra ACT 2601, Australia
Executive Assistant
| (02) 6289
|
@health.gov.au
s22
s22
s22
Executive Officer
| (02) 6289
|
@health.gov.au
s22
s22
s22
The Department of Health acknowledges the traditional owners of country throughout Australia, and their continuing connection to
land, sea and community. We pay our respects to them and their cultures, and to elders both past and present.
UNDER (CTH) CARE
1982 AGED
ACT
RELEASED AND
BEEN HEALTH
HAS INFORMATION
OF
OF
DOCUMENT
FREEDOM
DEPARTMENT
THIS
THE THE
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