REASONS IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION FOR IC REVIEW

My reasons for IC review are set out in the text below.

MY FOI REQUEST

On 29 November 2025, I submitted an FOI request to the Office of the Commonwealth Ombudsman via Right to Know: https://www.righttoknow.org.au/request/f...

The FOI request was worded:

“I refer to the submissions of Professor Peter Tregear OAM submitted to the Senate inquiry into the quality of governance at Australian higher education providers: https://www.aph.gov.au/DocumentStore.ash...

On 21 September 2020, the investigator of Professor Peter Tregear's complaint about an inadequately handled PID (Ombudsman's reference 2019-402149) noted the following:

“Our Office will consider whether it is appropriate to make any further comments or suggestions to the ANU under section 12(4) of the Ombudsman Act with a view to improving future administration of the public interest disclosure scheme.”

Under the FOI Act, I request access to any and all documents setting out “further comments or suggestions to the ANU under section 12(4) of the Ombudsman Act” arising from the investigation, under the Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), that was terminated by the Ombudsman's delegate.

Please provide the document to me by return email.”

FIRST ACCESS REFUSAL DECISION AND APPLICATION FOR INTERNAL REVIEW

On 23 December 2025, Richard Nguyen, a legal officer in the legal team of the Office of the Commonwealth Ombudsman, refused access to the document sought: https://www.righttoknow.org.au/request/1...

I sought internal review of Richard Nguyen's decision on 23 December 205: https://www.righttoknow.org.au/request/f...

DECISION THE SUBJECT OF IC REVIEW

The decision I am seeking review of is Clare Miller's access refusal decision (FOI-2025-80162-IR), dated 21 January 2026: https://www.righttoknow.org.au/request/1...

Clare Miller, a senior legal officer in the Office of the Commonwealth Ombudsman, has relied on three ground to refuse access to the document requested.

The first is based on her claim that paragraph 37(1)(a) of the FOI Act applies to the document sought.

The second is her claim that paragraph 47E(d) of the FOI Act applies to the document sought.

The third is her claim that section 47F of the FOI Act applies to the document sought.

I shall show that her reasons is support of the application of paragraph 37(1)(a), 47E(d) and section 47F are misguided, and, thus, that her reasons for refusing access to the document requested are without lawful basis.

I note that Clare Miller erroneously dated the decision “21 January 2025”.

CLARE MILLER'S CLAIM THAT PARAGRAPH 37(1)(a) OF THE FOI ACT APPLIES TO THE DOCUMENT SOUGHT

Paragraph 37(1)(a) of the FOI Act provides that:

a document is an exempt document if its disclosure under this Act would, or could reasonably be expected to prejudice the conduct of an investigation of a breach, or possible breach, of the law, or a failure, or possible failure, to comply with a law relating to taxation or prejudice the enforcement or proper administration of the law in a particular instance.

Paragraph 37(1)(a) does not apply where an investigation has concluded, because that paragraph applies to document that would, or could reasonably be expected to, prejudice the CONDUCT OF AN INVESTIGATION. Paragraph 37(1)(a) has no application to a document where the investigation has concluded: Re Hammal and Department of Veterans’ Affairs [2007] AATA 1946, [28].

The decision in Re Hammal and Department of Veterans’ Affairs [2007] AATA 1946, [28] is reflected in paragraph 5.102 of the FOI Guidelines, which, relying on Re Murtagh and Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1984] AATA 249, provides:

“Section 37(1)(a) applies to documents only where there is a current or pending investigation and release of the document would, or could reasonably be expected to, prejudice the conduct of that investigation. Because of the phrase ‘in a particular instance’ it is not sufficient that prejudice will occur to other or future investigations: it must relate to the particular investigation at hand.”

According to the evidence presented to the Senate, the Ombudsman's delegate, Ms Cassandra Hodzic ( Cassandra Hodzic has been identified as the delegate in media reports – see, for example, https://www.sydneycriminallawyers.com.au... and https://justinian.com.au/administrative-... ) , wrote to Professor Tregear on 21 September noting that she proposed to terminate an investigation of a complaint into the mishandling of a whistleblower disclosure investigation by the Australia National University: https://www.aph.gov.au/DocumentStore.ash...

The same evidence of Ms Hodzic noting that she proposed to terminate an investigation of a complaint into the mishandling of a whistleblower disclosure investigation by the Australia National University has also been published by:

a) the Attorney-General's Deparment on its FOI disclosure log (FOI25/593): https://www.ag.gov.au/sites/default/file... ; and

b) by the FUSION political party on its submissions log: https://assets.nationbuilder.com/futurep... – see pages 10 and 11.

According to page 10 of the decision notice issued by Richard Nguyen on 23 December 2025, the document requested, which was the “comments or suggestions to the ANU under section 12(4) of the Ombudsman Act with a view to improving future administration of the public interest disclosure scheme”, was issued from the Office of the Commonwealth Ombudsman on 15 December 2020: https://www.righttoknow.org.au/request/1...

It is clear that the investigation of Professor Tregear's complaint that he had been denied procedural fairness by consultants hired by the Australian National University to investigate his whistleblower disclosure was terminated in 2020. It is now 2026.

Since paragraph 37(1)(a) has no application to a document where the investigation has concluded, and it is obvious that the investigation of Professor Tregear's complaint concluded in 2020, Clare Miller's claim that paragraph 37(1)(a) of the FOI Act applies to refuse access to the requested document is baseless; the claim is contrary to authority.

CLARE MILLER'S CLAIM THAT PARAGRAPH 47E(d) OF THE FOI ACT APPLIES TO THE DOCUMENT SOUGHT

Paragraph 47E(d) of the FOI Act provides that:

a document is conditionally exempt if its disclosure under this Act would, or could reasonably be expected to, have a substantial adverse effect on the proper and efficient conduct of the operations of an agency.

Clare Miller has claimed, at paragraph 21 of her reasons:

“Disclosure of the Office's comments and/or suggestions provided to another agency in the context of the PID complaints process would be likely to undermine the willingness of agencies to engage openly with this Office and to provide information relevant to the handling of PIDS, if that information were disclosed publicly. Such an outcome would, in turn, underminer (sic) the Office's ability to properly and efficiently investigate PID complaints and to discharge its oversight functions under the PID framework.”

I will analyse and show how Clare Miller's conclusions are, ultimately, baseless and provide no support for Ms Miller's claim that paragraph 47E(d) of the FOI Act applies to the document requested.

Clare Miller claims that disclosure of the Office of the Commonwealth Ombudsman's comments or suggestions to the Australian National University “would be likely to reduce the willingness of agencies to engage openly with this Office and to provide information relevant to the handling of PIDS.”

A principal officer of a Department or prescribed authority must ensure the Department or prescribed authority uses its best endeavours to assist the Ombudsman in the performance of the Ombudsman’s functions: Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 32(1).

Moreover, an officer of a Department or prescribed authority must use the officer’s best endeavours to assist the Ombudsman in the performance of the Ombudsman’s functions: Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 32(2).

It is a crime for a person to refuse or fail:

(a) to attend before the Ombudsman;
(b) to be sworn or make an affirmation;
(c) to furnish or publish information;
(d) to answer a question or produce a document or record; or
(e) to give a report,

when so required in pursuance of the Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth): Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 36(1).

The crime is punishable by 3 months imprisonment or 10 penalty units: Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 36(1). Under the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s 4AA and the Crimes (Amount of Penalty Unit) Instrument 2023 (Cth), s 5, a penalty unit is, today, $330, which means that a person is liable to pay a fine of $3300 for failing to comply with their statutory duty to use their best endeavours to assist the Ombudsman in the performance of the Ombudsman’s functions when the Ombudsman has requested them to answer a question, or produce a document or record, or give a report etc. in the course of an investigation.

In stating what she has at paragraph 21 of her reasons, Clare Miller has imputed, as a matter of likelihood (i.e. more likely than not):

a) to officials of the Commonwealth agencies the formation of the criminal intent in their minds to, in dereliction of their statutory duties, refuse or fail to answer a question, or produce a document or record at the relevant standard to be expected of that official (which is, pursuant to section 32 of the Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), by using their best endeavours to assist the Ombudsman in the performance of the Ombudsman's functions); and

b) to officials of the Commonwealth agencies, acting on the criminal intention to to, in dereliction of their statutory duties, refuse or fail to answer a question, or produce a document or record at the relevant standard to be expected of that official (which is, pursuant to section 32 of the Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), by using their best endeavours to assist the Ombudsman in the performance of the Ombudsman's functions).

Not a shred of evidence is provided to support Clare Miller's claim that disclosure of the further comments or suggestions to the ANU under section 12(4) of the Ombudsman Act would make it more likely than not that public officials would:

a) form the intent in their minds to refuse or fail to answer a question, or produce a document or record at the relevant standard to be expected of that official (which is, pursuant to section 32 of the Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), by using their best endeavours to assist the Ombudsman in the performance of the Ombudsman's functions); and

b) act on the criminal intention to to, in dereliction of their statutory duties, refuse or fail to answer a question, or produce a document or record at the relevant standard to be expected of that official (which is, pursuant to section 32 of the Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), by using their best endeavours to assist the Ombudsman in the performance of the Ombudsman's functions).

Still less, not a shred of evidence has been provided to support Clare Miller's claim that disclosure of the further comments or suggestions to the ANU under section 12(4) of the Ombudsman Act would , or could be expected to, have a substantial adverse effect on the proper and efficient conduct of the operations of the Office of the Commonwealth Ombudsman or the Australian National University.

Having not provided a shred of evidence in support of her claim that it is more likely than not that public servants would not “engage openly with this Office and to provide information relevant to the handling of PIDS” and, thus, commit the crime of failing to answer a question, or produce a document or record at the relevant standard mandated (which is, pursuant to section 32 of the Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), by using their best endeavours to assist the Ombudsman in the performance of the Ombudsman's functions), Clare Miller then proceeds to claim that it is against the public interest to grant access to the further comments or suggestions to the ANU under section 12(4) of the Ombudsman Act.

At paragraph 25 of her reasons, Clare Miller states that disclosure of the document is contrary to the public interest because disclosure would:

a) inhibit the provision of confidential information necessary to perform statutory functions. This would in turn prejudice the Office's ability to effectively conduct PID investigations by inhibiting future cooperation from potential disclosers and in particular other agencies with regards to their providing information where that information could be publicly disclosed; and

b) adversely affect the Office's relationships with the public and other agencies and undermine its reputation as an independent oversight body, by discouraging potential disclosers and agencies from engaging openly and cooperatively with the Office where communications may be publicly disclosed, and

c) impair the proper and efficient performance of statutory functions if the flow of confidential information is limited.

I will address the three grounds that supposedly make it against the public interest to grant access to the document in turn.

First, Clare Miller claims that disclosure of the further comments or suggestions to the ANU under section 12(4) of the Ombudsman Act would “inhibit the provision of confidential information necessary to perform statutory functions.”

Other than making a bald assertion that disclosure of the further comments or suggestions to the ANU under section 12(4) of the Ombudsman Act would, or could reasonably be expected to, have a substantial adverse effect on the proper and efficient conduct of the operations of the Office of the Commonwealth Ombudsman or some other agency because disclosure would make it more likely than not that public officials would:

a) form the intent in their minds to refuse or fail to answer a question, or produce a document or record at the relevant standard to be expected of that official (which is, pursuant to section 32 of the Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), by using their best endeavours to assist the Ombudsman in the performance of the Ombudsman's functions); and

b) act on the criminal intention to to, in dereliction of their statutory duties, refuse or fail to answer a question, or produce a document or record at the relevant standard to be expected of that official (which is, pursuant to section 32 of the Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), by using their best endeavours to assist the Ombudsman in the performance of the Ombudsman's functions),

Clare Miller has offered no actual evidence in support of the criminality that she imputes to public officials.

As paragraph 6.249 of the FOI Guidelines provides:

“Public servants are expected to operate within a framework that encourages open access to information and recognises Government information as a national resource to be managed for public purposes (ss 3(3) and (4)). In particular, the FOI Act recognises that Australia’s democracy is strengthened when the public is empowered to participate in Government processes and scrutinise Government activities (s 3(2)). In this setting, transparency of the work of public servants should be the accepted operating environment and fears about a lessening of frank and candid advice correspondingly diminished.”

It follows, a fortiori, that where it is a crime to refuse or fail to answer a question, or produce a document or record at the relevant standard to be expected of that official (which is, pursuant to section 32 of the Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), by using their best endeavours to assist the Ombudsman in the performance of the Ombudsman's functions), public servants are expected to frankly and candidly engage with the Commonwealth Ombudsman or his officials.

As I have already explained, it is a crime for any official, or head of department or agency, to refuse or fail to answer a question or produce a document or record, or furnish information in accordance with the standard mandated (which is, pursuant to section 32 of the Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), by using their best endeavours to assist the Ombudsman in the performance of the Ombudsman's functions).

Therefore, a fortiori, it follows that public servants are expected to frankly and candidly engage with the Commonwealth Ombudsman or his officials. It is absurd to claim, in the context of assessing whether it is in the public interest to grant access to a document, that transparency of the work of public servants should be the accepted operating environment and fears about a lessening of frank and candid advice correspondingly diminished, but to then claim that, where it is a crime to refuse or fail to answer a question, or produce a document or record at the relevant standard to be expected of that official (which is, pursuant to section 32 of the Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), by using their best endeavours to assist the Ombudsman in the performance of the Ombudsman's functions), fears about a lessening of frank and candid are not diminished but, correspondingly, increased.

As an aside, I note that disclosure of the further comments or suggestions to the ANU under section 12(4) of the Ombudsman Act has nothing to do with “prejudic[ing] the Office's ability to effectively conduct PID investigations by inhibiting future cooperation from potential disclosers and in particular other agencies with regards to their providing information” because the documents requested are not about “conducting PID investigations”. The documents requested relate to the Commonwealth Ombudsman's investigation and subsequent comments, UNDER THE OMBUDSMAN ACT 1976 (CTH), into the inadequacies of the AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY'S conduct of a PID investigation.

As the Commonwealth Ombudsman noted in submissions to the AGD in October 2025 ( https://consultations.ag.gov.au/integrit... ), the “PID Scheme currently operates in a decentralised way with principal officers of each agency responsible for ensuring: a) disclosures about their agency are encouraged; b) disclosures are properly handled – including being investigated and responded to as appropriate; c) disclosers belonging to their agency are supported and protected from reprisal.”

That is why, at page 28 of the Commonwealth Ombudsman's 2024-25 annual report on the Public Interest Disclosure Scheme ( https://comomb-search.funnelback.squiz.c... ), the Commonwealth Ombudsman noted the following:

“Consistent with the principles for allocation in s 43(5) of the PID Act, the Office considers that in most instances the agency to which the disclosure relates is best placed to investigate … We allocated 25 disclosures about other agencies for investigation under the PID Act, with 22 allocated to agencies and 3 allocated to our Office. We also accepted allocation of a disclosure from another agency.”

In other words, the Commonwealth Ombudsman rarely investigates public interest disclosures. How disclosure of further comments or suggestions to the ANU under section 12(4) of the Ombudsman Act about the AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY'S failures to conduct an adequate public interest disclosure could “prejudice [the Commonwealth Ombudsman's] ability to effectively conduct PID investigations by inhibiting future cooperation from potential disclosers and in particular other agencies with regards to their providing information” is, aside from being beside the point, unexplained.

Clare Miller's statement that disclosure of further comments or suggestions to the ANU under section 12(4) of the Ombudsman Act could “prejudice [the Commonwealth Ombudsman's] ability to effectively conduct PID investigations by inhibiting future cooperation from potential disclosers and in particular other agencies with regards to their providing information” is beside the point and, thus, of no relevance to determining whether it is or is not in the public interest to provide access to the further comments or suggestions to the ANU under section 12(4) of the Ombudsman Act.

Second, Clare Miller claims that it is against the public interest to grant access to the further comments or suggestions to the ANU under section 12(4) of the Ombudsman Act because doing so would “discourage potential disclosers and agencies from engaging openly and cooperatively with the Office where communications may be publicly disclosed.”

In the context of “discouraging … agencies from engaging openly and cooperatively with the Office”, other than making a bald assertion that disclosure of the further comments or suggestions to the ANU under section 12(4) of the Ombudsman Act would, or could reasonably be expected to, have a substantial adverse effect on the proper and efficient conduct of the operations of the Office of the Commonwealth Ombudsman or some other agency because disclosure would make it more likely than not that public officials would:

a) form the intent in their minds to refuse or fail to answer a question, or produce a document or record at the relevant standard to be expected of that official (which is, pursuant to section 32 of the Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), by using their best endeavours to assist the Ombudsman in the performance of the Ombudsman's functions); and

b) act on the criminal intention to to, in dereliction of their statutory duties, refuse or fail to answer a question, or produce a document or record at the relevant standard to be expected of that official (which is, pursuant to section 32 of the Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), by using their best endeavours to assist the Ombudsman in the performance of the Ombudsman's functions),

Clare Miller has offered no actual evidence in support of the criminality that she imputes to public officials.

Public servants are expected to operate within a framework that encourages open access to information and recognises Government information as a national resource to be managed for public purposes (ss 3(3) and (4)). In particular, the FOI Act recognises that Australia’s democracy is strengthened when the public is empowered to participate in Government processes and scrutinise Government activities (s 3(2)). In this setting, transparency of the work of public servants should be the accepted operating environment and fears about a lessening of frank and candid advice correspondingly diminished: FOI Guidelines, 6.249.

It follows, a fortiori, that where it is a crime to refuse or fail to answer a question, or produce a document or record at the relevant standard to be expected of that official (which is, pursuant to section 32 of the Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), by using their best endeavours to assist the Ombudsman in the performance of the Ombudsman's functions), public servants are expected to frankly and candidly engage with the Commonwealth Ombudsman or his officials.

It is a crime for any official, or head of department or agency, to refuse or fail to answer a question or produce a document or record, or furnish information in accordance with the standard mandated (which is, pursuant to section 32 of the Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), by using their best endeavours to assist the Ombudsman in the performance of the Ombudsman's functions).

Therefore it follows, a fortiori, that public servants are expected to frankly and candidly engage with the Commonwealth Ombudsman or his officials. It is absurd to claim, in the context of assessing whether it is in the public interest to grant access to a document, that transparency of the work of public servants should be the accepted operating environment and fears about a lessening of frank and candid advice correspondingly diminished but to then claim that, where it is a crime to refuse or fail to answer a question, or produce a document or record at the relevant standard to be expected of that official (which is, pursuant to section 32 of the Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), by using their best endeavours to assist the Ombudsman in the performance of the Ombudsman's functions), fears about a lessening of frank and candid are not diminished, but correspondingly increased.

In the context of “discouraging potential disclosers … from engaging openly and cooperatively with the Office”, all Clare Miller has done is advance a bald assertion. No evidence has been presented to support her assertion that it would be contrary to the public interest to disclose the further comments or suggestions to the ANU under section 12(4) of the Ombudsman Act about the ANU's mishandling of the PID investigation conducted into Professor Tregear's whistleblower disclosure because such disclosure would “discourage potential disclosers … from engaging openly and cooperatively with the Office.”

I will show that the evidence actually establishes the contrary.

On 19 March 2025, the Office of the Commonwealth Ombudsman published, on its FOI disclosure log (log reference: FOI-2025-80009), comments and suggestions to the Australian Public Service Commission under section 12(4) of the Ombudsman Act about the APSC's mishandling of a whistleblower disclosure investigation: https://www.ombudsman.gov.au/__data/asse...

According to the at page 26 of the Commonwealth Ombudsman's 2024-25 annual report on the Public Interest Disclosure Scheme ( https://comomb-search.funnelback.squiz.c... ):

“The Ombudsman received 40 complaints about agencies’ handling of PIDs, an increase on the 35 complaints received in the previous year and comparable to the 39 complaints received in 2022–23. The Office received 22 complaints in the first 6 months of the financial year and 18 in the second.”

If it were true that disclosing comments or suggestions made to an agency under section 12(4) of the Ombudsman Act would “discourage potential disclosers … from engaging openly and cooperatively with the Office” then in the 2024-2025 financial year, following publication of the Office of the Commonwealth Ombudsman's comments and suggestions to the Australian Public Service Commission under section 12(4) of the Ombudsman Act about the APSC's mishandling of a whistleblower disclosure investigation in March 2025, there would have been a decline in potential disclosers engaging openly and cooperatively with the Office of the Commonwealth Ombudsman. But the evidence contradicts the bald assertion made by Clare Miller that disclosing comments or suggestions made to an agency under section 12(4) of the Ombudsman Act would “discourage potential disclosers … from engaging openly and cooperatively with the Office.”

On the contrary, there was a more than 10% increase in the number of complaints received by the Office of the Commonwealth Ombudsman in the 2024-25 financial year compared to the 2023-24 financial year.

The inference to be drawn from the evidence is that the release (let alone publication on the FOI disclosure log of the Office of the Commonwealth Ombudsman) of comments or suggestions made to an agency under section 12(4) of the Ombudsman Act by an authorised officer, for the purposes of the FOI Act, has not had the effect of “discouraging potential disclosers … from engaging openly and cooperatively with the Office”, as Clare Miller claims (without a shred of evidence).

Therefore, the claim that it is contrary to the public interest to grant access to comments or suggestions made to an agency under section 12(4) of the Ombudsman Act because doing so would have the effect of “discouraging potential disclosers … from engaging openly and cooperatively with the Office” is baseless and, more than that, controverted by the available evidence.

Third, Clare Miller has claimed that it would be against the public interest to release comments or suggestions made to the ANU under section 12(4) of the Ombudsman Act following the ANU's mishandling of an investigation of Professor Peter Tregear's whistleblower disclosure because release of the document would “impair the proper and efficient performance of statutory functions if the flow of confidential information is limited.”

Again, I note that in the context of “impair the proper and efficient performance of statutory functions if the flow of confidential information is limited” from agencies, other than making a bald assertion that disclosure of the further comments or suggestions to the ANU under section 12(4) of the Ombudsman Act would, or could reasonably be expected to, have a substantial adverse effect on the proper and efficient conduct of the operations of the Office of the Commonwealth Ombudsman or some other agency because disclosure would make it more likely than not that public officials would:

a) form the intent in their minds to refuse or fail to answer a question, or produce a document or record at the relevant standard to be expected of that official (which is, pursuant to section 32 of the Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), by using their best endeavours to assist the Ombudsman in the performance of the Ombudsman's functions); and

b) act on the criminal intention to to, in dereliction of their statutory duties, refuse or fail to answer a question, or produce a document or record at the relevant standard to be expected of that official (which is, pursuant to section 32 of the Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), by using their best endeavours to assist the Ombudsman in the performance of the Ombudsman's functions),

Clare Miller has offered no actual evidence in support of the criminality that she imputes to public officials.

Public servants are expected to operate within a framework that encourages open access to information and recognises Government information as a national resource to be managed for public purposes (ss 3(3) and (4)). In particular, the FOI Act recognises that Australia’s democracy is strengthened when the public is empowered to participate in Government processes and scrutinise Government activities (s 3(2)). In this setting, transparency of the work of public servants should be the accepted operating environment and fears about a lessening of frank and candid advice correspondingly diminished: FOI Guidelines, 6.249.

It follows, a fortiori, that where it is a crime to refuse or fail to answer a question, or produce a document or record at the relevant standard to be expected of that official (which is, pursuant to section 32 of the Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), by using their best endeavours to assist the Ombudsman in the performance of the Ombudsman's functions), public servants are expected to frankly and candidly engage with the Commonwealth Ombudsman or his officials.

It is a crime for any official, or head of department or agency, to refuse or fail to answer a question or produce a document or record, or furnish information in accordance with the standard mandated (which is, pursuant to section 32 of the Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), by using their best endeavours to assist the Ombudsman in the performance of the Ombudsman's functions).

Therefore, a fortiori, it follows that public servants are expected to frankly and candidly engage with the Commonwealth Ombudsman or his officials. It is absurd to claim, in the context of assessing whether it is in the public interest to grant access to a document, that transparency of the work of public servants should be the accepted operating environment and fears about a lessening of frank and candid advice correspondingly diminished but to then claim that, where it is a crime to refuse or fail to answer a question, or produce a document or record at the relevant standard to be expected of that official (which is, pursuant to section 32 of the Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), by using their best endeavours to assist the Ombudsman in the performance of the Ombudsman's functions), fears about a lessening of frank and candid are not diminished, but correspondingly increased.

Again, I note that in the context of “impair the proper and efficient performance of statutory functions if the flow of confidential information is limited” from whistleblower complainants, all Clare Miller has done is advance a bald assertion. No evidence has been presented to support her assertion that it would be contrary to the public interest to disclose the further comments or suggestions to the ANU under section 12(4) of the Ombudsman Act about the ANU's mishandling of the PID investigation conducted into Professor Tregear's whistleblower disclosure because such disclosure would “impair the proper and efficient performance of statutory functions if the flow of confidential information is limited” from whistleblower complainants.

I have, above, shown that the evidence actually establishes the contrary. Therefore, the claim that it is contrary to the public interest to grant access to comments or suggestions made to the Australian National University under section 12(4) of the Ombudsman following the ANU's mishandling of an investigation into Professor Peter Tregear's whistleblower disclosure because doing so would“impair the proper and efficient performance of statutory functions if the flow of confidential information is limited” from whistleblower complainants is baseless and, more than that, controverted by the available evidence.

CLARE MILLER'S CLAIM THAT PARAGRAPH 47F OF THE FOI ACT APPLIES TO THE DOCUMENT SOUGHT

Subsection 47F(1) of the FOI Act provides that a document is conditionally exempt if its disclosure under the FOI Act would involve the unreasonable disclosure of personal information about any person.

Subsection 47F(2) of the FOI Act provides that in determining whether the disclosure of the document would involve the unreasonable disclosure of personal information, an agency or Minister must have regard to the following matters:

(a) the extent to which the information is well known;

(b) whether the person to whom the information relates is known to be (or to have been) associated with the matters dealt with in the document;

(c) the availability of the information from publicly accessible sources.

The whistleblower in question is Professor Peter Tregear OAM, the one time head of the ANU's music school. This fact can be gleaned from multiple media articles and submissions to the Parliament. Some open access documents, which I found on Google by typing in “Peter Tregear”, are set out below to prove the availability of the whistleblower's identity:

https://www.aph.gov.au/DocumentStore.ash...

https://www.ag.gov.au/sites/default/file...

https://assets.nationbuilder.com/futurep...

https://www.smh.com.au/national/act/watc...

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-05-24/c...

https://justinian.com.au/administrative-...

https://www.sydneycriminallawyers.com.au...

https://region.com.au/oversight-bodies-f...

https://citynews.com.au/2025/why-the-pro...

https://www.smh.com.au/national/act/inte...

https://www.watoday.com.au/national/act/...

https://www.smh.com.au/national/act/anu-...

https://www.smh.com.au/national/act/anu-...

https://independentaustralia.net/politic...

etc.

The Commonwealth Ombudsman's delegate's identity (Cassandra Hodzic) is also well known, because she is identified in documents readily available on the internet (following a Google search by typing in “Peter Tregear”):

https://www.sydneycriminallawyers.com.au...

https://justinian.com.au/administrative-...

https://assets.nationbuilder.com/futurep... – see pages 10 and 11.

The name of the the third party investigator engaged by the ANU to investigate Professor Tregear's PID is also known because the contract entered into with Deloitte has been published on the ANU's FOI disclosure log: https://d1zkbwgd2iyy9p.cloudfront.net/fi... . The investigator was Matt O'Donnell.

The name of the ANU's Vice Chancellor, and principal officer for the PID Act, at the time that the ANU ignored Cassandra Hodzic's requests for more information (in 2020) is well known; it is the Nobel Prize winner, Professor Brian Schmidt. The names of the vice-chancellors of the ANU can be found by typing “ANU vice chancellor” into Google, with many results returning: e.g. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Au...

It is well known that the whistleblower complainant, Professor Peter Tregear, wrote to the chancellor of the ANU, Ms Julie Bishop, on 12 November 2020 (see pages 8 – 11 of published submissions to the Senate - https://www.aph.gov.au/DocumentStore.ash... ), and that Julie Bishop wrote to Professor Tregear on 23 December 2020, noting that “the Australian National University takes seriously all responsibilities we have have under the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013 (PID Act) and to the Commonwealth Ombudsman”, which is obviously false (see page 6 of 11 of published submissions to the Senate - https://www.aph.gov.au/DocumentStore.ash... ).

Clearly, it is well known that:

a) Professor Peter Tregear;

b) Cassandra Hodzic;

c) Matt O'Donnell (a partner at Deloitte);

d) Brian Schmidt; and

e) Julie Bishop,

are involved with the complaint to the Commonwealth Ombudsman about the inadequate investigation of Professor Peter Tregear's whistleblower disclosure.

Clearly, the information is well known, not the least because it has been addressed in many media articles over the years.

Clearly, the information is readily available on the internet, with a simple Google search of the name “Peter Tregear” returning scores of returns on the matter.

Clearly, neither the Parliament nor the Attorney-General's Department has found it in the public interest to withhold disclosure of the glaring failures of the Ombudsman's office or the shamelessness of the ANU's officials from publication.

It is obviously the case that section 47F of the FOI Act has no application to the requested document in respect of the names of the persons identified, let alone it being the case, as Clare Miller has claimed in paragraph 36 of her reasons, that it is not in the public interest to disclose the names of those associated with the comments or suggestions made to the Australian National University under section 12(4) of the Ombudsman following the ANU's mishandling of an investigation into Professor Peter Tregear's whistleblower disclosure.

After all, were it not in the public interest, why would so many media organisations have addressed the issue?

Why would the Parliament have published submissions on the gross failures of the Office of the Commonwealth Ombudsman to investigate complaints about inadequately investigated whistleblower disclosures?

Why would the Parliament have published submissions on the gross failures of the ANU's officials to investigate whistleblower disclosures according to law (i.e. by providing a whistleblower with procedural fairness when making denigratory comments about the whistleblower)?

Why would the AGD have published submissions on the gross failures of the Office of the Commonwealth Ombudsman to investigate complaints about inadequately investigated whistleblower disclosures?

Why would the AGD have published submissions on the gross failures of the ANU's officials to investigate whistleblower disclosures according to law (i.e. by providing a whistleblower with procedural fairness when making denigratory comments about the whistleblower)?

Of course, Clare Miller's reasons on it being against the public interest disclose the names of those associated with the comments or suggestions made to the Australian National University under section 12(4) of the Ombudsman following the ANU's mishandling of an investigation into Professor Peter Tregear's whistleblower disclosure, which were, according to paragraph 35 of her reasons:

a) disclosure could reasonably be expected to prejudice the protection of a person’s right to privacy;

b) such personal information is not on the public record or otherwise available from publicly accessible sources; and

c) disclosure would be an unreasonable intrusion into the individuals' privacy and wellbeing,

are, in the light of the evidence set out of the ready availability of the information, and the requirements set out in paragraphs 47F(2)(a) – (c), baseless.

Clare Miller's claim that the “personal information is not [mine]” (see paragraph 35 of her reasons) is of no relevance in the circumstances.